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Executive Summary
Changes in climate create diverse challenges across the U.S.
energy system. Some energy infrastructure assets have
already suffered damage or disruption in services from a
variety of climate-related impacts, such as higher
temperatures, rising sea levels, and more severe weather
events. In the absence of concerted action to improve
resilience, energy system vulnerabilities pose a threat to
America’s national security, energy security, economic wellbeing, and quality of life.
Building climate change resilience into our energy
infrastructure planning is a challenging and complex
undertaking. Planning horizons can span several decades
(the typical service life of most energy assets), associated
investments can extend into the billions of dollars, and
relevant technologies can change rapidly. Some climate
change impacts may trigger cascading effects on natural

resources, energy demand, and supply chains. Challenges
are compounded when addressing climate risks at the
regional or local level, where climate change projections are
subject to less certainty than at the national scale.
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has proactively
launched numerous initiatives to support and facilitate
energy sector climate preparedness and resilience at
national, regional, and local levels. In addition to enhancing
resilience to climate change, these actions may also have
co-benefits that accommodate non-climate resilience needs
(e.g., aging infrastructure, cybersecurity, physical attacks,
geomagnetic storms). To assist infrastructure owners and
utility planners, DOE has compiled this report on regionspecific energy vulnerabilities to climate change (see Figure
ES-1) and current resilience solutions.

Figure ES-1. Potential climate change impacts on the U.S. energy infrastructure vary by region. Energy subsectors considered most
1
vulnerable to projected climate impacts are listed first for each region.
1

“Thermoelectric” generally refers to power plants that use a steam turbine to generate electricity. Examples of thermoelectric power plant fuel sources
include coal, natural gas, oil, nuclear, biomass, geothermal, and concentrated solar power. “Oil & Gas E&P” refers to upstream oil and gas operations, primarily
exploration and production (E&P). “Fuel Transport” refers to movements of energy resources by rail, truck, marine vessel, and pipeline, and it includes
associated facilities such as ports, pumping stations, terminals, and storage facilities. Hurricane impacts in Hawaii refer to a projected increase in the frequency
of all hurricanes striking the islands, not just intense hurricanes; see Chapter 10 for specific projections. The order of subsector vulnerabilities shown in the
figure is based on judgments by the report authors as well as experts from government agencies, national laboratories, and private sector energy companies.
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Key Climate Impacts and Regional
Vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities to climate change vary across regions
depending upon the nature of the climate impacts (see text
box), the types and age of energy systems present, and the
projected combined impacts on operations, energy
demand, and energy supply chains. Major energy systems
affected by regional climate impacts include the following:
 Oil and gas upstream operations are most vulnerable in
the Southeast, Southern Great Plains, and Alaska.
 Fuel transport in every region is vulnerable to a variety
of climate impacts, including increasing heavy
precipitation, heat waves, drought, hurricanes, and sea
level rise-enhanced storm surge.
 Thermoelectric power generation is vulnerable to
increasing temperatures and reduced water availability
in most regions, particularly in the Midwest, Great
Plains, and southern regions.
 Hydropower is vulnerable to reduced snowpack, earlier
melting, and changes to precipitation patterns, mainly
in western regions.
 Bioenergy crops in the Midwest and Northern Great
Plains may be harmed by higher temperatures and
more frequent droughts and floods.
 Electric grid operations and infrastructure in every
region is vulnerable to a variety of climate impacts,
including increasing temperatures, heavy rainfall
events, wildfire, hurricanes, and storm surge.
 Electricity demand is affected by increasing
temperatures and is a key vulnerability in nearly every
region.
Critical regional vulnerabilities are summarized below.
Northwest: Hydropower
provides more than 70% of
the Northwest's electricity
and is an important export
to California and Canada
(EIA 2014a, EIA 2014b).
Warmer temperatures and
less mountain snowpack will shift peak streamflow in the
region from summer toward spring (BPA 2011, CIG 2009,
DOE 2012, Doppelt 2009, USGCRP 2014). Meanwhile,
warmer temperatures will likely increase electricity demand
for cooling in the summer, when available hydropower
generation is reduced (BPA 2011, DOE 2012, DOE 2013,
USGCRP 2014). Warmer and drier summers may also
increase the threat of wildfires, which have the potential to
disrupt electricity transmission (DOE 2013, USGCRP 2014).

Key climate impacts projected by region
Climate impact

Increasing temperatures
and heat waves
Increasing heavy
downpours
Decreasing water
availability
Increasing wildfire
Increasing sea level rise
and storm surge
Increasing frequency of
intense hurricanes
Permafrost thaw

Regions with energy
systems that are most
affected
All regions
Northern regions
Western and southern
regions
Western regions
Nearly all coastal regions
Gulf and Atlantic
regions, including
Puerto Rico
Alaska

Southwest:
Many energy
systems in the
Southwest are
already designed
for hot and arid
conditions, but
system reliability
is increasingly threatened by higher temperatures, declining
water availability, and greater risk of wildfire (DOE 2013,
NOAA 2013, USGCRP 2014). More frequent and severe heat
waves are likely to amplify demand for cooling energy
(NOAA 2013, Sathaye et al. 2012, USGCRP 2014). Higher
temperatures and reduced water availability may limit the
ability of natural gas-fired, coal-fired, and other
thermoelectric power plants in the region to meet demand
(DOE 2013, Sathaye et al. 2012). Hydropower resources will
be affected by reductions in streamflow and shifts in
streamflow timing (AEG and Cubed 2005, Cayan et al. 2013,
NOAA 2013, USGCRP 2014). Electricity transmission lines
essential to connecting remote generation assets to
demand centers are vulnerable to projected increases in
wildfire as forests and shrub lands become drier (DOE 2013,
Sathaye et al. 2012, USGCRP 2014).
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Northern Great
Plains: The Northern
Great Plains produces
coal, crude oil, and
biofuel for use across
the nation (EIA 2012,
EIA 2014c). Delivery is
mainly by railroad and
pipeline, which are vulnerable to damage or disruption
from increasing heavy precipitation events and associated
flooding and erosion (USGCRP 2014). Summer heat waves
could also damage railroad tracks and are likely to reduce
thermoelectric power plant and transmission line capacity
(DOE 2013, USGCRP 2014). Higher temperatures could
lower the yields of crops used for biofuels while expanding
northward the range in which certain biofuel crops (e.g.,
corn) can be cultivated (NOAA 2013, Roberts and Schlenker
2011, USGCRP 2014).
Southern Great Plains: The
Southern Great Plains is home
to substantial oil and gas
production, refining, and
transportation assets, with an
especially high concentration
near the Gulf Coast. Projected
increases in the intensity of
Atlantic hurricanes and
associated rainfall, combined
with rising global sea levels
and subsiding coastlines, escalate the risk of coastal
flooding and wind damage to many of these assets (DOE
2013, USGCRP 2014, DOE 2015). Heat waves and higher
temperatures are also projected for the region, increasing
electricity demand for cooling while reducing the
generation capacity of thermoelectric power plants and the
transmission capacity of power lines (DOE 2013, NOAA
2013, USGCRP 2014). Drought and increased competition
for water could limit the water available for power plant
cooling and oil and gas operations (Cook et al. 2013, DOE
2013, USGCRP 2014).
Midwest: More than 90%
of the region’s electricity
is generated by coal-fired
and other thermoelectric
power plants, which are
vulnerable to increasing
temperatures (DOE 2013,
EIA 2013). Warmer
temperatures reduce the

generation capacity of power plants and the transmission
capacity of power lines, while simultaneously increasing
electricity demand for cooling (DOE 2013, USGCRP 2014).
Energy-related infrastructure, including roads, railroads,
and electric grid equipment, may also be at increased risk of
damage due to flooding, as heavy precipitation events are
projected to occur more frequently (DOE 2013, NOAA 2013,
USGCRP 2014). Increased risk of floods and droughts may
disrupt fuel transport on inlands waterways. Changing
water availability and increasing temperatures may also
affect biofuel production and refining capacity in the
Midwest (NOAA 2013, USGCRP 2014).
Northeast: The Northeast
region is comparatively
cool, so as temperatures
rise, increased electricity
demand for cooling is
likely to be driven in part
by increasing market
penetration of air
conditioners
(Auffhammer 2011, DOE
2013, NOAA 2013,
USGCRP 2014). Warmer temperatures and more intense
heat waves also reduce the capacity of thermoelectric
power plants and electric grid transmission during periods
of peak electricity demand (DOE 2013, USGCRP 2014). Sea
level rise and storm surge increasingly threaten coastal
energy infrastructure, including ports, electric grid
equipment, and power plants (DOE 2013, USGCRP 2014).
Farther inland, low-lying infrastructure, such as roads,
railroads, refineries, and power lines, is vulnerable to more
frequent flooding from heavy precipitation events (DOE
2013, NOAA 2013,
USGCRP 2014).
Southeast: The
Southeast, especially
the northern Gulf
Coast, hosts a large
amount of energy
infrastructure in lowlying coastal plains
that are vulnerable to
increases in flooding
(DOE 2013, USGCRP
2014). High winds, coastal erosion, flooding, and large
waves from hurricanes and sea level rise-enhanced storm
surge threaten oil and gas production, ports, pipelines,
refineries, and storage facilities, as well as electricity
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generation and transmission assets (DOE 2013, USGCRP
2014, DOE 2015). Higher temperatures and more frequent,
severe, and longer-lasting heat waves are also projected for
the Southeast, potentially increasing peak electricity
demand for cooling while reducing the capacity of the
thermoelectric generation and transmission systems
needed to meet the increased demand (DOE 2013, NOAA
2013, USGCRP 2014).
Alaska: Northern
latitudes,
including all of
Alaska, are
warming faster
than temperate
regions, and the
permafrost
underlying much
of Alaska's
interior and
northern coastlines is at risk of thawing (USGCRP 2014).
Thawing permafrost causes underlying land to shift and
soften. These structural changes can potentially damage the
foundations of pipelines as well as roads and airstrips used
for fuel shipments to Alaska's remote rural communities
(USGCRP 2014). Thawing permafrost and declining sea ice
have already accelerated the erosion of coastlines in rural
communities, resulting in damaged or destroyed
infrastructure for fuel transfer and storage (Alaska AAG
2010, DOE 2013, USGCRP 2014). Warmer temperatures are
likely to shorten the season during which ice roads can be
used to reach oil and gas operations in the North Slope
(DOE 2013). Alaska's extensive energy assets may also be
vulnerable to projected increases in wildfire (USGCRP
2014).
Islands: Hawaii and
Puerto Rico share
many similarities in
their energy systems,
including reliance on
imported petroleum and other fuels. In both of the island
regions, projected sea level rise and hurricane-driven storm
surge threaten ports and other essential coastal energy
infrastructure with flooding, wave damage, and erosion,
while hurricane winds pose a danger to structures and
power lines (DOE 2013, Murakami et al. 2013, PRCCC 2013,
USGCRP 2014). Higher temperatures reduce the efficiency
of oil-fired and other thermoelectric power plants,
significantly restricting electricity supply if such losses are
not offset by reduced demand or supplies added elsewhere

in the system (DOE 2013). Other U.S. islands in the Pacific
and in the Caribbean are not separately examined in this
report but are likely to have climate impacts and resilience
solutions similar to those in Hawaii and Puerto Rico.

Challenges and Opportunities to
Accelerate and Expand Resilience
st

Building a reliable and resilient 21 century U.S. energy
sector will require a concerted effort to overcome an array
of challenges, including those that are technological and
financial, informational and behavioral, institutional, and
policy-related. Informational shortcomings, for example,
may prevent energy sector owners from making an
attractive business case for resilience actions. The public
and private sectors are working together to overcome these
challenges and better understand the implications of
projected climate impacts and the suitability of various
resilience solutions.
The private sector, which owns and operates the majority
of energy assets, holds central responsibility for identifying
and implementing appropriate measures to ensure the
climate resilience of those assets. However, DOE fills an
important role by facilitating basic scientific discovery;
enhancing research, development, demonstration, and
deployment; providing technical information and
assistance; designing, analyzing, recommending, and
fostering enabling policies; and convening and partnering
with stakeholders. As a result, a range of organizations are
sharing their experiences, conducting research to identify
vulnerabilities and evaluate resilience strategies, and
incorporating projected climate impacts into risk
management decision making.
While government, academia, and technical institutions
continue to provide supporting research, data, and tools,
energy system planners, owners, and operators are already
identifying vulnerabilities, monitoring resources, investing
in resilient technology, and planning for rapid recovery.
Continued and expanded efforts by states, localities, and
tribes will build regional energy resilience capabilities. This
proactive approach will improve access to critical
information for decision making and assist in building the
body of knowledge required to cope effectively. Smart
decisions today will help to provide a robust and resilient
energy system for tomorrow. Working together, the private
and public sectors can make sure that the United States
continues to deliver the reliable, affordable, and
increasingly clean power and fuels required to maintain a
healthy economy and comfortable standard of living.
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Preface
Changes in the global climate system will profoundly affect
the U.S. energy sector, which powers the nation’s economy.
The energy sector provides the electricity and fuels that
underpin every facet of the economy, including commerce,
manufacturing, transportation, communications, health
care, water supply and treatment, and other critical
infrastructure and systems. The clear potential for
disruptions to the energy sector raises concern for normal
economic operations and American’s quality of life.
In addition to efforts to reduce the greenhouse gas
emissions that cause climate change, the Administration
recognizes the importance of adapting to and preparing for
climate impacts that can no longer be avoided (see
sidebar). This report is part of a broad U.S. Department of
Energy (DOE) effort to inform preparedness, resilience
planning, and response initiatives (see sidebar on following
page).
While this report focuses on resilience to climate change
impacts, DOE is also pursuing resilience initiatives that
address other energy sector risks not related to climate
change (e.g., aging infrastructure, cybersecurity, physical
attacks, geomagnetic storms, etc.) that will increase
resilience, reliability, safety, and asset security of U.S.
energy infrastructure. For example, the Administration
recently released the first installment of the Quadrennial
Energy Review (QER) that addresses this broader set of
challenges and recommends policies and investments to
modernize energy transmission, storage, and distribution
infrastructure that will promote economic competitiveness,
1
energy security, and environmental responsibility.
Previously, DOE’s 2013 report U.S. Energy Sector
Vulnerabilities to Climate Change and Extreme Weather
provided a national perspective on U.S. energy system
vulnerabilities to potential climate impacts, including
increasing temperatures, decreasing water availability, and
increasing storms, flooding, and sea level rise (as
2
summarized in Table P-1). That report identified
vulnerabilities in the system and highlighted opportunities
to enhance preparedness and resilience at a national level.
1

Quadrennial Energy Review: Energy Transmission, Storage, and
Distribution Infrastructure. U.S. Department of Energy.
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/04/f22/QERALL%20FINAL_0.pdf.
2

U.S. Energy Sector Vulnerabilities to Climate Change and
Extreme Weather. U.S. Department of Energy.
http://www.energy.gov/downloads/us-energy-sectorvulnerabilities-climate-change-and-extreme-weather.

Federal leadership on climate change resilience
initiatives
In June of 2013, President Obama announced the
Climate Action Plan, which identifies activities to
prepare for a changing climate—impacts of which are
already evident across the country. Executive Order
(EO) 13653: Preparing the United States for the Impacts
of Climate Change (November 2013) directs federal
agencies to take steps to help American communities
strengthen their resilience to extreme weather and
prepare for other impacts of climate change. EO 13653
also instructs agencies to provide the information, data,
and tools that local, state, and private sector leaders
need to take timely and informed actions to improve
preparedness and resilience in critical systems,
including energy systems.
EO 13653 created the Council on Climate Preparedness
and Resilience, which led to the development of
national principles for adaptation and is leading to
crosscutting and government-wide adaptation policies.
The Council is also facilitating development of
information, data, and tools for climate change
preparedness and resilience to support federal,
regional, state, local, tribal, private sector, and
nonprofit sector efforts to prepare for the impacts of
climate change. For example, see
http://www.data.gov/climate/energy-infrastructure/.
EO 13653 also established a short-term task force of
state, local, and tribal officials to advise on key actions
the federal government can take to better support local
preparedness and resilience-building efforts. In the fall
of 2014, this task force recommended removing barriers
to resilient investments, modernizing grant and loan
programs, and developing information and tools to
better serve communities.
This new report builds upon the 2013 report, the QER, and
other DOE preparedness and resilience initiatives by
examining energy sector vulnerabilities to climate impacts
at the regional level. To improve understanding of the
vulnerabilities in each region, this document reviews the
composition, operation, and management of regional
energy systems—including regional energy resources,
private and public infrastructure, imports and exports, and
energy consumption patterns. It also examines regional
energy planning efforts, state and local regulations, and
measures taken by energy sector owners and operators to
enhance climate resilience.
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Energy infrastructure has always been vulnerable to many
natural phenomena, such as earthquakes, extreme heat,
thunderstorms, high winds, ice storms, landslides, erosion,
and floods. This report focuses on potential energy
infrastructure impacts of weather-related hazards that are
likely to worsen because of climate change. These hazards
include changes in average and extreme temperatures;
changes in average, seasonal, and extreme precipitation
and hydrology; more intense hurricanes; increasing sea
level rise and storm surge; and changes to ecosystems,
which could increase the risk of wildfire. Some of these
phenomena have already become more frequent or severe
because of climate change—and these trends are expected
to continue. The introduction of this report describes these
trends, and their national and regional implications in more
detail.
Analyses of the changing climate and impacts on energy
systems at the regional level are valuable for several
reasons:
• Energy systems are designed for and often depend upon
regional features, such as the historical climate and
presence of natural resources.

• Projected near- and long-term climate change threats
and vulnerabilities to energy systems vary considerably
by region.
• Interdependencies between regions and energy
subsectors may exacerbate or, conversely, reduce
energy sector vulnerabilities.
• Appropriate resilience strategies for energy systems
depend on regional and local circumstances, such as
available resources, population trends, energy demand,
and the mix of projected climate impacts.
This report is intended as a resource for private entities,
institutions, governments, and other decision makers in
need of regional and localized information and insights to
assist in assessing risks and developing effective resilience
strategies for energy systems vulnerable to climate impacts.
The aim is to provide decision makers with a base of
regional information that they can use to (1) further explore
what the projected changes in climate might mean for their
specific energy assets and (2) evaluate a range of strategies
for effectively increasing local, regional, and national energy
system resilience to climate change.

Examples of DOE initiatives that address preparedness, resilience planning, and response
• Climate Action Champions: DOE conducted a national competition to identify local and tribal community organizations pursuing
preparedness and resilience activities that can serve as models for other communities. The agency initially selected 16 organizations
working on a range of ambitious activities at the frontier of climate action—from creating climate-smart building codes to installing
green infrastructure. Federal agencies facilitate peer-to-peer learning and mentorship, provide targeted support, and foster
coordination and communication across agencies and organizations. See http://www.energy.gov/epsa/climate-action-champions.
• Preparedness Pilots: In cooperation with the State of Colorado, DOE and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory are leading a
pilot program that connects local communities with key federal agencies (e.g., NASA, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Departments of
Defense, Interior, and Agriculture) to assess and plan for region-specific interdependencies and climate change vulnerabilities. This
effort promotes preparedness planning and helps create models for other communities.
• State Energy Assurance Plan Assistance and Risk Assessment Initiative: DOE works with state and local governments on energy
resilience, developing information and tools and conducting forums, training, and tabletop exercises with energy officials,
emergency managers, policy makers, and industry asset owners and operators. DOE initiatives include support to State Energy
Emergency Assurance Coordinators (EEACs) on information sharing and coordination protocols, as well as grants to help state and
local governments develop or refine their energy assurance plans and develop in-house expertise on infrastructure
interdependencies and related vulnerabilities. DOE is also leading a State Energy Risk Assessment Initiative, in collaboration with
the National Association of State Energy Officials, National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, National Conference of
State Legislatures, and National Governors Association, to increase state officials' awareness of risk considerations and be prepared
to make informed decisions related to energy systems and infrastructure investments, energy assurance planning, resilience
strategies, and asset management. See http://www.energy.gov/indianenergy/downloads/tribal-energy-system-vulnerabilitiesclimate-change-and-extreme-weather.
• Strengthening Tribal Energy Systems: In September 2015, DOE released a report on Tribal Energy System Vulnerabilities to Climate
Change and Extreme Weather (DOE 2015b). The report describes climate-related events that threaten the economic and energy
security of Indian Tribes, who are among the nation’s most impoverished communities. The report is part of a broad DOE effort to
support tribal climate preparedness that includes technical assistance to help tribes identify, assess, and respond to specific
vulnerabilities and resilience options.
• Partnership for Energy Sector Climate Resilience: On April 21, 2015, the White House and DOE announced the establishment of the
Partnership for Energy Sector Climate Resilience with initially 17 companies representing a range of utilities, including investorowned as well as federal, state, municipal, and cooperative organizations. Through the Partnership, DOE works with the private
sector to develop and deploy effective strategies for enhancing resilience to extreme weather and climate change. The Partnership
will assist in the dissemination of user-friendly climate data and decision tools; assessment of costs and benefits of climate
resilience actions; and identification of gaps, opportunities and metrics for developing and deploying climate-resilient energy
technologies, practices, and policies. See http://www.energy.gov/epsa/partnership-energy-sector-climate-resilience.
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Table P-1. Potential effects of climate change on the energy sector
Energy sector

Climate projection

Potential implication

Oil and gas
 Thawing permafrost in Arctic Alaska
exploration and  Longer sea ice-free season in Arctic Alaska
production

Fuel transport

Thermoelectric
power
generation
(Coal, natural
gas, nuclear,
geothermal,
and solar CSP)

Hydropower

Bioenergy and
biofuel
production

 Damaged infrastructure and changes to existing operations
 Limited use of ice-based infrastructure; longer drilling season; new
shipping routes

 Decreasing water availability

 Impacts on drilling, production, and refining

 Increasing frequency of intense hurricanes,
and increasing sea level rise and storm surge

 Increased risk of physical damage and disruption to offshore and
coastal facilities

 Increasing intensity and frequency of flooding

 Increased risk of physical damage and disruption to inland facilities

 Reduction in river levels

 Disruption of barge transport of crude oil, petroleum products, and
coal

 Increasing intensity and frequency of flooding

 Disruption of rail and barge transport of crude oil, petroleum
products, and coal

 Increasing air temperatures

 Reduction in plant efficiencies and available generation capacity

 Increasing water temperatures

 Reduction in plant efficiencies and available generation capacity;
increased risk of exceeding thermal discharge limits

 Decreasing water availability

 Reduction in available generation capacity; impacts on coal, natural
gas, and nuclear fuel supply chains

 Increasing frequency of intense hurricanes,
and increasing sea level rise and storm surge

 Increased risk of physical damage and disruption to coastal facilities

 Increasing intensity and frequency of flooding

 Increased risk of physical damage and disruption to inland facilities

 Increasing temperatures and evaporative
losses

 Reduction in available generation capacity and changes in operations

 Changes in precipitation and decreasing
snowpack

 Reduction in available generation capacity and changes in operations

 Increasing intensity and frequency of flooding

 Increased risk of physical damage and changes in operations

 Increasing air temperatures

 Increased irrigation demand and risk of crop damage from extreme
heat events

 Extended growing season

 Increased production

 Decreasing water availability

 Decreased production

 Sea level rise and increasing intensity and
frequency of flooding

 Increased risk of crop damage

Wind energy

 Potential variation in wind patterns

 Uncertain impact on resource potential

Solar energy

 Increasing air temperatures

 Reduction in potential generation capacity

 Decreasing water availability

 Reduction in concentrated solar power (CSP) potential generation
capacity

 Increasing air temperatures

 Reduction in transmission efficiency and available transmission
capacity

 More frequent and severe wildfires

 Increased risk of physical damage and decreased transmission
capacity

 Increasing frequency of intense hurricanes,
and increasing sea level rise and storm surge

 Increased risk of physical damage

Electric grid

Energy demand  Increasing air temperatures
 Increasing magnitude and frequency
of extreme heat events

 Increased electricity demand for cooling; decreased fuel oil and
3
natural gas demand for heating
 Increased peak electricity demand

Source: Adapted from DOE 2013

3

Energy demand is often reported as a function of heating degree days (HDDs) and cooling degree days (CDDs). Degree days measure the
difference between mean air temperature and a standard baseline temperature at which buildings would begin using air conditioning on warm
days and heating on cool days; this standard baseline temperature is typically 65°F. On an annual basis, HDDs and CDDs measure the timeintegrated difference over a year between the mean daily temperature and the baseline temperature (DOE 2013).
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1. Introduction
Across the country, energy systems are increasingly
vulnerable to the effects of a changing climate. This section
describes the key climate change trends, including rising
temperatures and sea levels, changing precipitation
patterns, and more frequent and severe episodes of
extreme weather, that are already forcing energy systems
to operate outside of the conditions for which they were
designed and are threatening to damage or disrupt critical
energy infrastructure.
Climate change and extreme weather can damage
equipment and facilities, disrupt supply chains and
operations, and cause shifts in energy supply and demand.
Disruptions in energy services can have serious
consequences at the local and regional level and can hurt
the national economy. U.S. competitiveness and economic
health depend upon an energy system that is prepared to
meet the demands and threats of the 21st century. The
climate and weather impacts that are evident today are
expected to become more frequent and more intense in the
decades ahead. Planning and investment will be required to
ensure that the nation’s energy systems can continue to
deliver high performance while anticipating and reducing
vulnerabilities to climate change and extreme weather.

Influence of climate on energy systems
Energy production, transport, and delivery infrastructure
and operations are typically tailored either to take
advantage of or to address regional differences in climate
conditions, available resources, and demand for energy (see
Figure 1-1). A region’s resources, including water availability
and energy resources (fossil and renewable resources), are
primary considerations in the design of energy systems. For
example, the Northwest has high volumes of water flowing
through mountainous terrain, making the region well-suited
for hydroelectric power generation. Similarly, the
Southeast, Midwest, and Northeast are served by navigable
waterways, so marine vessels are used extensively in these
regions to transport energy products such as petroleum and
coal. Regional differences in water availability are also
reflected in technologies used in power plant cooling water
systems. In the Southeast, many large generating stations
incorporate once-through cooling technologies that rely on
an abundant supply of fresh surface water. In the
Southwest, where fresh surface water is scarce, most power
plants rely on alternative sources of water (e.g., municipal
waste water), or they use water-efficient cooling systems
(e.g., recirculating systems or dry cooling). In fact, less than
1% of Southwest generating capacity uses once-through
surface water for cooling (UCS 2012).

Figure 1-1. Energy systems are designed for regional climate
conditions, resources, and energy demand

Beyond the available resources, which tend to influence the
type of energy systems used, energy demand typically
drives the amount of energy system infrastructure needed
in an area. High demand centers require numerous highvoltage transmission lines. Across the country, natural gas
and crude oil pipelines have been built to serve energy
supply centers such as power plants and refineries, which,
in turn, are located in proximity to large demand centers for
electricity and fuel.
The climate (historical norms) influences multiple factors,
including many of the resources that are available for
generating energy (e.g., water, solar, wind, and biomass) as
well as the level of energy demand (e.g., requirements for
heating and cooling). For example, precipitation patterns
and temperatures affect the amount of water and biomass
resources available for bioenergy. Additionally, ambient
temperatures and humidity are among the biggest factors
in determining energy demand; more than 40% of U.S.
household energy is used for heating and cooling (EIA
2013).
In addition to influencing natural resources and energy
demand, climate also directly influences the technology,
design, and operations of regional energy systems. For
example, thermoelectric power plants design and operate
their cooling water intakes and effluent systems based, in
part, on an expected range of air and water temperatures.
In addition, utilities typically equip their transformers with
cooling systems that are adequate to prevent overheating
in regions that historically experience extremely hot
weather. Similarly, pipelines constructed on permafrost in
Arctic Alaska are designed for an expected range of historic
temperatures.
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The energy used for space heating and cooling is also
affected by climate and varies by region. In the northern
states, more energy is used for winter heating (often in the
form of natural gas or oil) than for cooling; in the southern
states, the opposite typically holds true. In parts of the
Northeast, many homes use electric window air
conditioners to address the limited need for cooling but rely
on natural gas for heat. In the Southeast, by contrast, many
homes are equipped with electric heat pumps for efficient
summer cooling and rely on electricity for winter heat (EIA
2013).
Weather and climate patterns—including the prevalence of
storms, wildfires, floods, and drought—have long shaped
energy system design and operations. Hurricanes can have
devastating impacts on local or regional energy systems.
Companies operating oil and gas infrastructure along the
Gulf Coast in the Southern Great Plains and Southeast, for
example, typically incorporate the historical likelihood of
severe hurricanes into risk management planning.
Transmission line operators in wildfire areas incorporate
vegetation management and other techniques to mitigate
fire risk. Utilities in tornado-prone regions are commonly
prepared with emergency response and recovery plans. The
QER examines these and other hazards that impact energy
transmission, storage, and distribution systems. Figure 1-2
from the QER shows the regional distribution of certain
natural hazards.

The annual frequency of billion-dollar weather events and
associated costs from these events has increased during the
last 30 years (Figure 1-3). These storm-related damages
affect the energy sector and many other sectors.

Figure 1-3. Billion-dollar disaster events and aggregate costs by
4
year
Data source: NOAA 2015

As climate change progresses, energy infrastructure that
has been designed to perform across the known range of
historical conditions in a region may not be designed to
withstand the projected changes to temperatures,
precipitation, hurricanes, wildfire, and sea level rise. A
regional climate’s departure from the historical averages
could significantly impede energy system performance and
expose the system to much greater risks, particularly with
aging energy infrastructure. Geographic variations in
climate change and energy infrastructure underscore the
value of a regional approach to analyzing infrastructure

Figure 1-2. Regional distribution of hazards, of which fires, hurricane intensity, and storm surge are projected to intensify because of
climate change
Source: DOE 2015a

4

Number of events exceeding $1 billion using 2014 consumer
price index (CPI) adjustment
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vulnerabilities and developing and implementing effective
climate resilience solutions.

Regional variations in projected climate
impacts
Projected changes to local and regional climates differ from
national or global average projections. In general, the
United States is expected to become warmer, and periods
of extreme heat are likely to become more severe, more
frequent, and more extended. However, the degree of
projected warming varies; Alaska and the northern and
interior areas of the nation are expected to experience
more rapid warming, while the Pacific, South Atlantic, and
Gulf coastal areas are likely to see their warming trends
moderated by the oceans (Figure 1-4) (NOAA 2013, USGCRP
2014).

changes in precipitation patterns, such as increased
frequency or severity of heavy precipitation events and
changes in the length of dry spells, are also projected to
vary across regions. The largest increases in heavy
precipitation events are projected for the northern regions,
including the Northern Great Plains and the Northeast, as
well as interior areas of the West (Figure 1-5), while the
largest increases in consecutive dry days are anticipated in
the Southern Great Plains and Southwest (Figure 1-6)
(NOAA 2013).

Figure 1-5. Change in annual heavy precipitation events by mid6
century
Source: NOAA 2013

5

Figure 1-4. Increase in annual mean temperature by mid-century
Source: NOAA 2013

Annual average precipitation is generally expected to
increase across the northern United States but decline in
the southern states (NOAA 2013, USGCRP 2014). Other
Certainty of regional climate projections
Climate models have improved dramatically over
the last several decades, particularly at a national or
global scale. However, the complexity of climate
systems and scientific uncertainty about some
aspects of climate mean that small variations in
inputs and assumptions can produce a range of
outcomes. Small differences at the global scale can
create large changes to projected climate impacts
for a region. Figure 1-4, Figure 1-5, and Figure 1-6
show averages from multiple models. Hatched lines
indicate areas with the greatest agreement among
models.
5

Simulated difference in annual mean temperature (°F) for 2041–
2070 compared to 1971–2000 under a high (A2) emissions
scenario. Climate projections for Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico
are based on different sources and can be found in Chapters 9 and
10.

Figure 1-6. Change in consecutive days with minimal
7
precipitation by mid-century
Source: NOAA 2013

6

Simulated percentage difference in the mean annual number of
days with precipitation of greater than one inch for 2041–2070
compared to 1980–2000 under a high (A2) emissions scenario.
Climate projections for Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico are based
on different sources and can be found in Chapters 9 and 10.
7

Simulated difference in the mean annual maximum number of
consecutive days with precipitation of less than 0.1 inches for
2041-2070 compared to 1980-2000 under a high (A2) emissions
scenario. Climate projections for Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico
are based on different sources and can be found in Chapters 9 and
10.
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The severity of climate change impacts on a region or locality
will depend on baseline climate conditions as well as the scale
of the projected change. In colder parts of the country, for
example, higher winter temperatures may reduce net energy
consumption, as reductions in energy demand for winter
heating may more than offset increases in energy demand for
summer cooling, at least in the near term. In western forests,
higher temperatures and reduced precipitation are projected
to increase the risk of wildfire, while forests in the East are less
likely to see an immediate increase in fires than those in the
West—despite also experiencing increases in temperatures
8
and summer drying (USGCRP 2014). Increases in sea level rise
and hurricane intensity are most likely to affect regions with
low-lying coastal energy infrastructure, high rates of land
subsidence, and gently sloping continental shelves, such as
parts of the Gulf and Mid-Atlantic Coasts (USGCRP 2014).
Figure 1-7 illustrates the projected exposure of a portion of the
Gulf Coast to sea-level rise and storm surge from a Category 1
hurricane.

under the auspices of the Global Change Research Act of
1990, assesses the effects of global climate change on
human and natural systems, analyzes current trends in
global change, and projects major trends for the next 25 to
100 years. The NCA provides the United States' most
comprehensive scientific assessment of how climate change
affects each region of the country.
This report also draws upon valuable studies and resources
from several federal agencies, including the U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE), U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT), U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (USACE), and NOAA, among others.
Supplemental resources used in this report include state,
regional, and local publications and planning documents;
regulatory filings; and peer-reviewed studies and datasets
published in major scientific journals. News articles and
press releases are used to illustrate climate change impacts
and resilience solutions.

Using this report

Figure 1-7. Storm surge inundation zones from a Category 1
hurricane under different sea level rise scenarios; exposure to
9
electrical substations shown
Source: DOE 2015a

Each of the next nine chapters of this report focuses on a
single region of the United States. These nine regions
broadly correspond with the geographic breakdown used in
10
the Third National Climate Assessment (Figure 1-8). By
aligning the regional boundaries of this report with the
NCA, this report is able to better leverage the scientific
findings of the authoritative NCA and its series of
supportive analyses. Each of the chapters in this report is
structured as a stand-alone regional profile and includes a
brief overview of the regional energy infrastructure and key
vulnerabilities, a more detailed description of the critical
energy subsectors that are most vulnerable to the impacts
of climate change, a one-page description of regional
climate change trends and projections, and its own
references section. The final chapter provides crosscutting
observations relevant to multiple regions.

Key sources
Projected climate impacts in this report are primarily based
on assessments by the U.S. Global Change Research
Program (USGCRP) and the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The projections
represent an average of multiple climate models, as
presented in in the 2014 Third National Climate Assessment
(NCA) and its supporting analyses. The NCA, conducted
8

Although both western and eastern forests may experience
increasing disturbances caused by climate change, western forests
are already more vulnerable to large-scale die-offs resulting from
drought, disease, and pests than eastern forests, so climate
impacts on western forests are expected to be more severe.
9

Baseline vulnerability corresponds with sea level in 1992. Future
vulnerabilities correspond with a high-end sea level rise scenario
of 10 inches in 2030, 23 inches in 2050, and 32 inches in 2060.

Figure 1-8. Regions of the United States addressed in this report
10

Report chapters correspond to the regions in the Third National
Climate Assessment with two main exceptions: the Great Plains
region, which is separated into two regions in this report, and the
Islands region, which discusses Hawaii and Puerto Rico.
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Chapter 2: Northwest

Climate Change and the Energy Sector

2. Northwest

Overview
The Northwest has a diverse topography with rocky shorelines,
lush forests, mountains, farmlands, and arid regions. Major
climate change impacts projected to increasingly threaten the
region’s energy infrastructure include the following:
 Higher temperatures may increase the amount of
precipitation falling as rain rather than as snow and cause
mountain snowpack to melt earlier in the spring.
Combined with projected declines in summer
precipitation, these changes may lead to reduced summer
a
streamflow. The Northwest is highly dependent on
hydroelectric power to supply its electricity. Together, these
changes may contribute to higher streamflows in the winter
and spring and decreased streamflows and hydropower
b
generation in the summer.
 Average temperatures are projected to increase by 3°F–
10°F over the course of the century, and annual cooling
degree days (CDDs) for some areas could increase by 400
by mid-century. The region is also projected to experience
longer and more severe heat waves and higher overnight
c
low temperatures. Greater seasonal demand for electricity
for cooling could occur simultaneously with reduced
d
availability of hydropower in the summer.
 Wildfire activity is projected to increase, with median burn
e
area projected to quadruple by the 2080s. Wildfires in the
region’s forests threaten to disrupt or damage critical
transmission infrastructure. Fires can burn poles, and smoke
and fire retardants can foul lines, increasing the chance of
f
arcing to ground.
 Sea levels are projected to rise more slowly in the
Northwest than in other regions because of tectonic uplift,
g
which has elevated much of the Northwestern coast. The
uplift is not consistent, however, and infrastructure in the
Puget Sound may be more vulnerable than in other areas.

QUICK FACTS
Northwest States:

Washington, Oregon, Idaho

Population (2013)
Area (square miles)
Energy Expenditures
ENERGY SUPPLY
& DEMAND
Electric power
Petroleum
Coal
Natural gas
ELECTRIC
POWER

Annual
Production
TWh
million barrels
million tons
Bcf
Annual
Production
(TWh)

Natural gas
19
Coal
6
Nuclear
9
Hydroelectric
140
Wind
15
Biomass
3
Solar
<1
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
Petroleum
Wells (>1 boe/d):
0
Refineries:
5
Liquids pipelines:
5
Ports (>200 tons/yr):
6
Natural Gas
Wells:
27
Interstate pipelines:
3
Market hubs:
3

193
0
0
1
% of Total
Production

13,000,000 (4% of U.S.)
245,000 (7% of U.S.)
$49 billion
% for
Annual
electric
Consumption
power
163
n/a
232
<1%
5
89%
569
24%
Power
Capacity
plants
(GW)
>1 MW*

10%
3%
5%
72%
8%
2%
<1%

9
2
1
32
7
1
<1

Electric Power
Power plants (> 1 MW):
Interstate transmission lines:
Coal
Mines:
Waterways
Coal and petroleum routes:
Railroads
Miles of freight track:

39
4
1
209
87
48
6

394
10
0
10
7,200

Note: Table presents 2012 data except number of oil wells, which is 2009 data.
*Some plants use multiple fuels, and individual generating units may be <1 MW.
Sources: AAR 2014, EIA 2011, EIA 2013b, EIA 2013d, EIA 2013f, EIA 2014a, EIA 2014e,
EIA 2014f, EIA 2014g, EIA 2014h, EIA 2014i, EIA 2014j, USACE 2014, U.S. Census
Bureau 2014

Table 2-1. Examples of important energy sector vulnerabilities and climate resilience solutions in the Northwest

Subsector

Vulnerability

Magnitude

Illustrative Resilience Solutions

Hydroelectric
Power

Reduced availability of summer
power generation due to
h
declining summer streamflow
Increased summer demand
due to warmer air
k
temperatures
Increased risk of damage from
more frequent and severe
n
wildfires

Summer hydropower generation
may decrease by 18%–21% by the
i
2080s
Peak load may increase by almost
3,200 MW (about 8%) by 2030 due
l
to temperature alone
Recent wildfires have burned
through transmission and
o
distribution lines and threatened
p
the critical Pacific Intertie
Four power plants are at or below
s
four feet above sea level

Water conservation, integrated water
management, water availability
j
forecasting, energy storage
Capacity expansion, energy efficiency,
m
demand management, energy storage

Electricity Demand

Electric Grid

Coastal
Infrastructure

Threats from rising sea levels
to power plants, terminals, and
r
other low-lying assets

Vegetation management, improved
design standards for transmission
q
equipment, redundant systems
Hardening and elevating structures,
incorporating sea-level rise projections
into infrastructure project planning
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Regional Energy Sector Vulnerabilities
and Resilience Solutions
Key energy subsectors and illustrative examples of
resilience solutions in the Northwest are discussed below.
System components that are most vulnerable to climate
change are described first.
Hydroelectric Power
Subsector Vulnerabilities
Hydroelectric power dominates the Northwest’s
electricity generation mix, providing 72% of the region’s
power (Table 2-2). Washington is the leading producer of
hydroelectric power in the United States, followed by
Oregon. The region supplies both Canada and U.S.
1
markets with significant electricity (EIA 2014l). Oregon
and Washington both produce more electricity than they
consume, while Idaho is a net power importer and
dependent on interstate transmission lines (EIA 2014a).
Table 2-2. 2012 net electricity generation (percentage of total
electricity generated)
Generation Type

OR

WA

ID

Natural Gas
Coal
Nuclear
Hydroelectric
Other Renewables

19%
4%
65%
12%

5%
3%
8%
77%
7%

12%
71%
16%

Figure 2-1. Federal and non-federal dams in the Columbia River Basin
Source: EIA 2014k

Total
Region
10%
3%
5%
72%
9%

 Increase in winter/early spring hydropower production
and spills at dams (BPA 2011a, USGCRP 2014).
 Decrease in water available for hydropower production
as competition for water increases (USGCRP 2014).

Source: EIA 2013f

Federal agencies—including the U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the
Bonneville Power Administration (BPA)—and private
owners operate 203 hydroelectric facilities in the region,
which produced almost 140 TWh in 2012. Hydroelectric
power is generated from multiple dams in the Columbia
River Basin, which provides more than 40% of the nation’s
total hydropower (Figure 2-1) (EIA 2014k). The Grand
Coulee Dam in Washington is the largest electric power
plant in the United States and sixth largest in the world,
with a capacity of over 6,800 MW (EIA 2014k). The nation’s
largest privately owned hydroelectric facility is located in
Idaho, at the Hells Canyon complex on the Snake River (EIA
2013a, EIA 2014a).
Climate change is expected to affect hydropower in the
Northwest in a number of ways, including:
 Decrease in summer hydropower production from a
combination of earlier spring snowmelt, reduced
snowpack, and declining summer precipitation (BPA
2011a, CIG 2009, DOE 2012a, Doppelt 2009, USGCRP
2014).

Climate change is affecting the supply of water for
hydropower. Projected changes in the timing of snowmelt
and streamflow in the summer would reduce hydropower
generating capacity due to reduced available water (see
Figure 2-2 for one scenario’s projection of changes in
streamflow). One recent study simulated streamflows in the
Columbia River watershed for historical and future climates
2
under two scenarios, and found that annual hydropower
production could decrease by 3.0%–3.5% by the 2080s
th
compared to 20 century levels. This is the net effect of a
projected increase of 7%–10% in the winter and a projected
decrease of 18%–21% in the summer (CIG 2009).
At the same time, increasing temperatures are causing
larger percentages of precipitation to fall as rain instead of
snow, reducing snow water equivalent in mountain
snowpacks (CIG 2009, Doppelt 2009, USGCRP 2014). For the
winter through early spring (January through April),
increased winter rainfall would provide more power
generation due to increased streamflows, but also increase
occurrences of dam spilling due to exceeding available
generation, most notably in April and May (BPA 2011a, BPA
2011c). Streamflows in some watersheds are expected to
increasingly be driven by rainfall rather than snowmelt (CIG
2009), and with summer precipitation expected to decline

1

Three Northwest states are discussed here; however, it is
recognized that the vulnerabilities could substantially affect the
electricity supply in Canada and California.

2

B1 (low emissions) scenario and A1B (medium emissions)
scenario
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by as much as 30% by the end of the century (USGCRP
2014), the availability of hydropower at periods of higher
demand could be further diminished.
Reduced availability of hydropower generation in the
summer coincides with anticipated greater demand for
cooling energy due, in part, to temperature increases
during the same period (see Electricity Demand section).
Abundant and low-cost hydropower has helped maintain
what have been historically low regional wholesale power
prices. If hydropower becomes less dominant, prices in the
region may be increasingly determined by the cost of
natural gas generation (EIA 2014c).
Changes to the supply of water in the Northwest due to
climate change not only affect hydropower but other
competing consumers of water reservoir supplies, including
irrigation, municipal, and industrial uses; flood control;
water quality; navigation; recreation; and aquatic species
habitat preservation. In the summer (especially during drier
years), not all competing water needs can be met all of the
time. By the 2080s, it is projected that hydropower
production could be reduced by as much as 20% in order to
preserve Columbia River Basin in-stream flow for fish
(USGCRP 2014).
Hydroelectric Power
Resilience Solutions
A comprehensive resilience approach to climate change will
need to include strategies for optimized hydropower
production as part of an integrated water management
plan. The approach should also consider options for

electricity supply diversification and demand management
to reduce reliance on hydropower.
Actions to enhance resilience will need to take into account
formal agreements, such as those regarding hydropower in
the Northwest, including the Columbia River Treaty and the
agreement between Canada and the United States that
addresses Columbia River Basin flooding and water
resources regulation. While the agreement is due to expire
in 2024 and would have to be renegotiated, the U.S. Bureau
of Reclamation, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and BPA
are integrating climate change data in their review of the
treaty (BPA 2011a). A significant amount of the Columbia
River Basin storage capacity is located in Canada (USACE and
BPA 2013a). As a part of the treaty, Canada is entitled to 50%
of power generated downstream in the Columbia River; this
power is delivered to British Columbia and either used in
Canada or re-sold to the western United States (USACE and
BPA 2014). Renegotiation of the Columbia River Treaty that
affects the dispensation of water rights in the region could
also affect future levels of available hydropower production
(Dalton et al. 2013).
For the Columbia River Basin, recommendations from the
United States for modernizing the Columbia River Treaty
post-2024 will consider competing interests for water in
Canada and the Northwestern United States and the
possibility of reduced hydropower generation capability and
other effects due to climate change and other factors.

Figure 2-2. (Left) Projected increased winter flows and decreased summer flows by the 2020s, 2040s, and 2080s in the Yakima River Basin
under the A1B emissions scenario (compared to 1916–2006). (Right) Projected changes in local runoff (shading) and streamflow (colored
circles) for the 2040s summer (compared to 1915–2006) under the A1B Scenario.
Source: USGCRP 2014
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Additional hydropower capacity, either through new
facilities or through increased turbine efficiency and/or
capacity at existing dams, could help address some issues
related to reduced water availability. However, recent
assessments of capacity expansion at existing federally
owned dams found minimal opportunity for economic
expansion in the Northwest (DOI et al. 2007, USBR 2011).
Engineering solutions to control water supply for
hydroelectric power production must be balanced with
potentially competing requirements for flood control and
wildlife conservation (USGCRP 2014). Water conservation
measures in other sectors may help to reduce conflicting
demands on water resources, and improved planning can
help to better manage competing demands (DOE 2013,
Doppelt 2009). Increased deployment of technologies such
as pumped storage can improve short-term response to
changes in power demand; however, alternative sources of
power generation may be more economically efficient (DOE
2013, MWH 2009, NPCC 2010).
Examples of recent hydropower shortages
2015: Above average temperatures and below average
precipitation in the winter led the Northwest River
Forecast Center to project lower-than-average runoff in
the Columbia River Basin for the summer of 2015.
Runoff projections are below historical averages for
almost every measurement site, including major dams
such as The Dalles (projected to see only 67% of
average runoff), John Day (69%), and Grand Coulee
(74%) (Hernandez 2015, NWRFC 2015).
2010: BPA experienced basin-wide precipitation and
streamflows well below normal during the first half of
2010. By year’s end, runoff at The Dalles Dam was 16%
below normal (BPA 2011b).
2001: The second-lowest flow of river runoff ever
recorded led BPA to declare a power emergency and
stop spills along the Columbia and Snake rivers. Power
shortages led to industrial plant shutdowns and rate
increases (Harrison 2008).
2000: A summer water shortage in the Northwest helped
spur a power crisis and soaring market prices on the
West Coast. In response, BPA deployed a power trading
strategy to keep reservoirs full by restricting
hydropower production during the day while importing
power from the Southwest and sending power to
California utilities at night (Harrison 2008).

The provision of accurate information about future
resource availability and demand is critical for avoiding
shortfalls. Forecasting snowmelt timing based on snowpack
and temperature trends gives system operators critical
information in predicting seasonal availability of
hydropower generation, which can be used to prepare and

execute contingency plans if shortfalls are projected.
Forecasts of snowmelt timing are provided by the
Northwest River Forecast Center, operated by the U.S.
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration
(EIA 2014c). Utilities, such as Seattle City Light, have
projects underway to assess climate change impacts on
hydropower generation and characterize present and
future glacier contribution to summer streamflow, update
streamflow projections with multiple climate scenarios and
glacier runoff, and develop regional climate model
projections of changes in windstorm and convective storm
frequency and timing (Seattle City Light 2012, Raymond
2014a, Raymond 2014b).
Greater supply diversification may also be an effective
strategy to increase system resilience to climate change.
Since the western power crisis in 2000, the region has relied
on natural gas and wind power to supply additional capacity
needs. Those two sources accounted for 96% of new
capacity added between 2000 and 2012 (EIA 2013d). If
shortages in hydropower lead to increased dispatch from
these new sources, electricity prices in the region (currently
at a historic low) may also increase. In addition, the recent
significant expansion of wind generation capacity will
require grid system operators to explore options to
appropriately balance supply from variable wind energy
production with other energy sources, such as hydropower,
to optimize supply and demand and enhance resilience.
Frequent cycling of hydropower to compensate for wind’s
intermittent supply is a sub-optimal generation practice and
causes significant wear on hydroelectric turbine gates (BPA
2011c).
Storage systems could allow intermittent renewable
generation sources such as wind power to store energy and
then deliver it when needed. This ability could prove
especially useful in the Northwest, as wind power
generators have faced curtailments in the past due to the
availability of lower-cost hydropower (McKenna 2011). A
recent study of pumped hydropower storage in the
Northwest found that wide-scale deployment could allow
economic integration of intermittent generation. Over
13,000 MW of pumped storage projects have received
preliminary permits in the region (MWH 2009).
Electricity Demand
Subsector Vulnerabilities
The changing demand profile for electric power is critically
important to the region’s energy sector. Historically, the
Northwest’s electricity prices have been the lowest in the
nation, and a substantial amount of built infrastructure,
such as building heating, has come to rely upon low-cost
electricity (CIG 2009, EIA 2014a). Climate change is only one
of several factors (including population growth and
changing technologies, such as electric vehicles) that may
drive changes in electricity demand (DOE 2012a). While
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these factors are likely to increase the region’s demand for
electricity, existing constraints on water usage and
ecological considerations mean that relatively little
potential hydropower capacity remains untapped to offset
demand increases (CIG 2009, DOE 2012b).
Climate change is projected to have the following impact on
electricity demand in the Northwest:
 Higher maximum temperatures, longer and more severe
heat waves, and higher overnight lows are expected to
increase electricity demand for cooling in the summer
(BPA 2011a, DOE 2012a, DOE 2013, USGCRP 2014).
Climate change is projected to increase the annual number
of CDDs in the region by up to 400 degree days, depending
on the emissions scenario (NOAA 2013).
Several studies indicate that the region’s peak load and
total electricity demand may increase significantly as a
result of rising temperatures. The Northwest Power and
Conservation Council (NPCC) estimated that, by 2030,
increases in peak load due to temperature alone would
exceed 2,800 MW in July and approach 3,200 MW in August
under a scenario of a 2°F increase in annual average
temperature. The study also found declines in December
and January of over 1,000 MW (NPCC 2010). Another
study—the 2009 Washington Climate Change Impacts
Assessment—found that, by 2080, Washington’s demand
for cooling energy alone may be 11 to 20 times higher than
demand in the 1980s, depending on the emissions scenario,
population growth, and air conditioning market penetration
rates (CIG 2009). The assessment also found that, while
heating energy demand would likely fall significantly under
a warming climate, population growth could more than
offset this effect, leading to increased energy demand for
both heating and cooling (CIG 2009).
Excluding population growth, warmer winter temperatures
are expected to decrease demand for heating energy due to
less frequent extremely cold nights and a decrease in the
number of heating degree days (HDDs) (DOE 2012a, DOE
2013, USGCRP 2014).
Increasing summer demand for power can also affect other
regions that rely on power exports from the Northwest.
California depends on power imports to supplement its
generation during periods of peak demand, much of which
comes from hydropower in the Northwest (DOE 2012a, EIA
2014d). In addition, California—where summer electricity
demand is greater than in the Northwest—could face CDD
increases that are more than double those in the
Northwest, as well as declines in water availability that
could affect California’s in-state generation (EIA 2014d,
NOAA 2013, USGCRP 2014).

Electricity Demand
Resilience Solutions
Measures to address increasing electricity demand include
adding new electric generating capacity and implementing
technologies, policies, or measures to reduce overall
demand or reduce consumption at peak hours. New
generating capacity can be designed to operate year-round
(baseload) or only during periods of greatest demand
(peaking). Likewise, overall demand can be reduced by
improving the energy efficiency of buildings, appliances,
and other significant loads, and peak demand can be
reduced by incentivizing large industrial and commercial
consumers or groups of residential consumers to turn off
equipment or reduce their cooling energy consumption
(e.g., by turning up their thermostats) during peak hours.
Because the Northwest exports electricity outside the
region, demand management measures being implemented
in other states, particularly California, may help mitigate
potential supply shortages during summer season peaks
(FERC 2013).
Decisions to invest in new capacity are typically made in the
context of integrated resource planning, a process that may
consider a number of factors affecting future demand,
including population change, technology change, policy risk,
and climate change, as well as existing and future
resources. The NPCC considered a number of scenarios in
its Sixth Power Plan (in 2010) and proposed a near-term
strategy to 2030. The plan involves an additional 4.5 GW of
new wind capacity (assumed to produce an average of 1.45
GW), 1.0 GW of combined-cycle natural gas capacity, and
expanded energy efficiency measures. The primary factor
driving wind development in the strategy is the mandate for
new renewables in state renewable portfolio standard (RPS)
policies. In scenarios considered by the NPCC that did not
consider RPS policies, new wind development is
considerably lower (NPCC 2010). NPCC’s analysis finds that
in scenarios that involve greater retirements of existing
capacity, natural gas capacity would be deployed to fill the
gap.
Although hydropower provides the large majority of
generating capacity in the region, capacity expansion at
federally owned dams in the Columbia River basin is not a
strategy currently under consideration (BPA 2012).
Moreover, the most recent assessment of all federally
owned dams in the region found only two dams with
potential for economic expansion of capacity. Together,
these projects could add 17 MW of capacity (DOI et al.
2007).
Renewable energy development is a means of expanding
clean energy capacity and diversifying generating resources
to enhance resilience, which are goals supported by the
federal government. For example, DOE issued a $1.3 billion
partial loan guarantee to finance one of the largest wind
farms in the world. The Caithness Shepherds Flat wind
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project is an 845 MW wind-powered electrical generating
facility located in eastern Oregon. To leverage the region’s
low-temperature geothermal resources, DOE issued a $97
million partial loan guarantee to USG Oregon LLC for the
construction of the Neal Hot Springs geothermal power
plant (Figure 2-3). This technology more efficiently extracts
heat from lower-temperature geothermal wells, allowing
energy generation from previously untapped locations (DOE
2011, DOE 2014).

Figure 2-3. Neal Hot Springs 20 MW geothermal power plant in
Malheur County, Oregon
Source: DOE 2015

Energy efficiency, load management, and other programs
administered by regional power producers have already
helped reduce total and peak electricity demand in the
Northwest. For example, to delay the construction of new
peaking facilities, Idaho Power has implemented a number
of energy efficiency and load management programs. The
program strategy includes incentives for residential
customers who implement home upgrades and install
energy efficient appliances and remote-controlled
thermostats, and incentives for commercial customers
participating in the FlexPeak load-shaving program that
allows businesses to customize which load reductions they
will make at what times. Together, Idaho Power’s demand
reduction programs cut summer peak load by 101 MW,
with a total demand reduction capacity of 438 MW in 2012
(EIA 2013e, Idaho Power 2013).
In the Northwest, a total of 37,000 residential customers,
3,100 industrial customers, and 170 commercial customers
are participating in price-responsive, incentive-based
demand-side management programs, while more than
46,000 residential customers, 600 industrial customers, and
680 commercial customers are in time-based rate demandside management programs (EIA 2013e). By 2012, a total of
almost 800 MW in peak load reductions had been achieved
from existing demand management programs across
residential, commercial, and industrial customers, with
approximately 700 MW achieved through energy efficiency

programs and 100 MW achieved through load management
(EIA 2013e).
The NPCC identified almost 7,000 MW of technically
achievable conservation potential by 2029 (NPCC 2010).
Although not all technically achievable efficiency measures
were identified as cost-effective, almost 6,000 MW were
estimated to be achievable at a levelized cost of less than
$200/MWh (with more than half of that estimated to be
achievable at a price of $30–$40/MWh), including 2,600 MW
from residential buildings and appliances, 1,400 MW from
commercial buildings (especially from lighting), 800 MW
from consumer electronics, and 800 MW from industry.
Additionally, while the plan assumed 1,500 MW and 1,700
MW of available demand response by 2030 in the winter
and summer respectively, the NPCC found that the region
lacks sufficient experience with demand response to
provide a detailed estimate of potential resources. Looking
forward, the NPCC anticipates that the levelized cost of
efficiency developed in its resource strategy is $36/MWh
(NPCC 2010).
Grid-scale energy storage systems can also contribute to
meeting the region’s changing demand profile (see the
Hydroelectric Power section for a discussion of the use of
pumped hydropower storage). Other potentially feasible
grid-scale energy storage technologies include compressed
air, flow batteries, and sodium-sulfur batteries (NPCC 2010).
Electric Grid
Subsector Vulnerabilities
The Northwest is part of the Western Interconnection, the
wide-area AC power transmission grid that stretches from
Western Canada southward to Baja California and eastward
to the Great Plains (EIA 2014a). The region is also the
northern terminus of the Pacific Intertie, a high-voltage DC
(HVDC) power line that connects Columbia River
hydropower resources to demand in the Los Angeles-area
(EIA 2014a). About three fourths of the region's
transmission infrastructure is owned and operated by BPA
(BPA 2013a).
Climate change is expected to have the following impacts
on energy transmission, storage, and distribution in the
Northwest:

Increased risk of physical damage from wildfires—
including associated heat, soot, and fire retardants—
causing damage to transmission infrastructure and
disruption of power supply (DOE 2013, USGCRP 2014).

Increased transmission and distribution equipment
losses, damage to transformers, and reduced capacity
due to higher temperatures (Bérubé 2007, DOE 2013).
Energy transmission, storage, and distribution
infrastructure are vulnerable to physical damage from
increasing wildfires. Fires can damage wooden transmission
line poles, and the associated heat, smoke, and soot can
affect transmission line capacity (Figure 2-4) (DOE 2013,
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SDG&E 2008). For example, following the Soda Fire in 2015,
Idaho Power Company had to replace 129 poles and 2.5
miles of power lines (Kahn 2015). Soot can also reduce the
electrical resistance of the air, increasing the risk of
transmission lines arcing to other lines or to nearby
vegetation (DOE 2013). Other lasting effects from wildfires
that can impact the energy system can include increased
soil erosion and risk of landslides and changes in water
quality (through increased amounts of sediment) (Dalton et
al. 2013, FS 2014, USGS 2015).

Figure 2-4. Transmission lines following wildfire in Washington
Source: BPA 2014

transformer loading or risk causing additional damage
(Hashmi et al. 2013, USBR 2000).
Electric Grid
Resilience Solutions
Strategies to improve the resilience of new and existing
transmission infrastructure will rely upon improved
technology, designs, and planning, as well as improved
vegetation management practices to reduce the build-up of
hazardous fuels near key power lines (DOE 2013).
Increasing redundancy in the transmission grid can also
improve system resilience to climate change impacts (DOE
2013).
Strengthening power lines and towers to resist physical
damage—e.g., replacing wood towers with steel towers for
the most vulnerable lines—can improve individual lines’
resilience to wildfires, limiting damage and expediting
restoration (Figure 2-5) (SDG&E 2008). Approximately one
third of BPA’s transmission line circuit miles are supported
by wood poles, many with aging and outdated equipment
(BPA 2013a). Other technological measures may include
development of new compounds safe for use around active
power lines that may improve firefighting crews’ ability to
protect key lines without causing disruptions.

Since the 1970s, wildfires have increased in number and
extent in the Northwest, with the trend expected to
continue (USGCRP 2014). Under one scenario, the median
area burned each year by wildfires in the Northwest would
quadruple (to 2 million acres, with a range of 0.2 million
acres to 9.8 million acres for the entire region) by the
th
2080s, compared to the average for the 20 century
3
(USGCRP 2014).
Higher temperatures can reduce the efficiency and capacity
of power lines and other power grid components, such as
transformers, and can increase the risk of disruption to
transmission lines (DOE 2013). Increased temperatures can
also cause conductors to expand, leading to sagging power
lines that are more likely to strike trees and automatically
close, shutting off the power line (DOE 2013). Tree strikes
can cause power outages if sufficient redundancy is not
available and can ignite brush fires, which may cause even
more damage. Temperature-related risks are exacerbated
by the relationship between temperatures and summer
peak energy demand; the greatest demand for electricity
typically occurs during periods of highest temperature and
thus is when temperature effects on grid capacity are
greatest. Increased temperatures also shorten the lifetime
of transformers. At higher temperatures, transformers age
at accelerated rates, typically up to 100 times faster than
normal during emergency overloading conditions (Bérubé
2007). On very hot days, grid operators must reduce

3

th

Under the A1B scenario; 20 century baseline includes the
period covering 1916–2007

Figure 2-5. Structural failure of wooden power poles
Source: BPA 2013b

Proactive vegetation management is also an important
practice for increasing resilience against transmission and
distribution line damage resulting from increased wildfires,
as well as for reducing the risk of wildfires caused by
transmission line tree strikes. Management practices
include tree trimming, forest thinning, and prescribed
burning to reduce fuel buildup, as well as reducing potential
ignition points (SDG&E 2008, USGCRP 2014). In 2008, an
overgrown tree struck one of BPA’s 230 kV feeder lines,
resulting in $20 million in damages (BPA 2013a). In
response, BPA has redeveloped its vegetation management
practices, including establishing metrics for the program
and reaching agreements with stakeholders, and has since
achieved zero “grow-in” outages (outages caused by
vegetation growing into the path of a line) (BPA 2013a).
Expansion of regional transmission capacity can address
capacity reductions resulting from higher temperatures and
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increasing summer demand for cooling energy. To facilitate
coordinated grid planning, the region’s utilities have formed
two regional planning groups: ColumbiaGrid, oriented
around BPA and Washington utilities, and Northern Tier
Transmission Group, which extends from the Northwest
into Montana, Wyoming, and Utah. Recently, ColumbiaGrid
implemented a significant number of projects based on
BPA’s innovative queuing process for analyzing, costing, and
financing transmission expansions (NPCC 2010). Load
management measures that reduce peak demand on hot
days can also improve grid resilience (see Electricity
Demand section).
Examples of recent wildfire events
2014: The Carlton Complex Fire, the largest fire in
Washington State history, led to several weeks of
power outages (Burns 2014, La Ganga and Muskal
2014).
2009: An Oregon wildfire damaged a transmission line
and left 25,000 customers without power (Crombie
2009).
2006: Wildfires threatened the Pacific Intertie, which
transmits power from the Pacific Northwest to Los
Angeles, California (AP 2006).
Operational practices can also help prevent physical
damage to overheating power transformers. By monitoring
temperatures and managing loading of transformers on
hotter days, operators can prevent excessive damage and
premature aging. Physical measures to prevent damage to
transformers include upgraded insulators capable of
handling higher operating temperatures and installation of
cooling fans to reduce thermal loading on hot days (Bérubé
et al. 2007, USBR 2000).
Thermoelectric Power Generation
Subsector Vulnerabilities
Electricity from thermoelectric power plants represents
approximately 18% of the generation mix in the region
(Table 2-2). Washington has 21 natural gas-fired power
plants, eight biomass-fired power plant, one nuclear power
station, and one large coal-fired power plant. The coal-fired
plant is scheduled to shut down in 2025, while the nuclear
plant is licensed through 2043 (EIA 2014a, NRC 2012). In
Oregon, a coal generating station in Boardman is the state’s
only coal power plant, and it is scheduled to close in 2020
(EIA 2014a). In Idaho, coal is used for two industrial cogeneration facilities but not for any commercial power
production (EIA 2014a). There are 39 natural gas power
plants across the region, many of which are simple-cycle gas
turbines (EIA 2014a).
The region also has several geothermal generating stations,
including the 20 MW Neal Hot Springs plant, Oregon’s only
commercial unit (Oregon Dept. of Geology and Mineral

Industries 2013). Washington has fewer high-temperature
resources, which are located in the volcanic Cascade Range.
Idaho has 13 MW of commercial geothermal generation at
the Raft River facility in the southeastern portion of the
state (EIA 2014a).
Climate change could have the following impacts on
thermoelectric power generation in the Northwest:
 Higher average temperatures and extreme
temperatures that lower thermoelectric plant
efficiency, reducing generating capacity (DOE 2013,
Sathaye et al. 2012, USGCRP 2014).
 Increased height of storm surge and tidal action due to
sea level rise, resulting in a higher rate of coastal
erosion and higher risk of flooding for coastal
infrastructure (including the Puget Sound) (USGCRP
2014).
Higher average temperatures are expected to reduce the
efficiency of thermoelectric power generation, reducing the
total amount of power a plant can produce (DOE 2013). As
thermoelectric power plants are increasingly relied upon to
provide peaking power during periods of maximum demand
on the hottest days, reduced peak capacity may increase
the risk of generation shortfalls. One study of natural gas
power plants found that most plants are designed to
operate optimally at 15°C (59°F) and that a 1°C increase in
ambient temperature above the design point could reduce
capacity 0.7% for a combined-cycle gas plant and 1% for a
simple-cycle plant (Sathaye et al. 2012).
Coastal power plants in the Northwest are also vulnerable
to the impacts of rising sea levels. However, along much of
the region’s coastline, sea levels are expected to rise more
slowly than in other regions, as much of the Pacific
Northwest coastline is undergoing tectonic uplift, which
reduces the rate of relative sea level rise compared to the
global average (USGCRP 2014). The rate of local tectonic
uplift varies significantly, and some areas (including the
Puget Sound) are more vulnerable to sea level rise than
others (Verdonck 2006). For example, over the last century,
tide gauges in Seattle show sea level rise at a rate of 2.1
mm per year (over the period 1900–2005), while in Astoria,
Oregon (on the mouth of the Columbia River), sea levels
have been falling at a rate of 0.3 mm per year (1925–2005)
(Verdonck 2006).
Although most of the region’s thermoelectric power plants
are well above sea level, four plants in Washington’s Puget
Sound are situated on properties in which at least part of
the land is at or below four feet above sea level—the upper
end of expected increases in global average sea levels by
the end of the century (Climate Central 2014, USGCRP
2014). In addition, three more plants, as well as one of the
region’s oil refineries, are at or below seven feet above sea
level (Climate Central 2014). Coastal flooding is typically the
product of storm surge and wave action on top of average
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sea levels, and increasing sea levels in the Puget Sound can
make flooding during storms more likely (USGCRP 2014).
The record highest tide in Seattle occurred on December
17, 2012, when a storm combined with an especially high
tide to produce tide levels of 14.5 feet (Broom 2012).
Thermoelectric Power Generation
Resilience Solutions
Reduced available generation capacity due to higher
average or extreme air temperatures can be addressed
primarily by building new dispatchable capacity or by
ensuring adequate transmission infrastructure exists to
import additional power during peak hours. Capacity
reductions can also be ameliorated by demand-side
efficiency and load-shedding programs (discussed in the
Electricity Demand section), and storage systems are
another option to accommodate the Northwest’s changing
demand profile (discussed in the Hydroelectric Power and
Electricity Demand sections).
Engineered barriers such as levees can effectively protect
vulnerable thermoelectric power plants from flooding.
Utilities may also elevate critical equipment to protect
against flooding. Planners can protect new capacity by
locating new generators at higher elevations that are not at
risk of flooding due to sea level rise.
Fuel Transport
Subsector Vulnerabilities
Washington serves as the principal refining center for
regional markets and is ranked fifth in the nation for crude
oil-refining capacity. The largest refinery is the Cherry Point
Refinery operated by British
Petroleum, followed by Shell’s
Anacortes Refinery, Tesoro’s
Anacortes Refinery, Phillips’ Ferndale
Refinery, and U.S. Oil’s Tacoma
Refinery. Refineries receive crude oil
primarily from Alaska but are
increasingly receiving imports from
Canada (EIA 2014a, EIA 2014b). The
regional network of petroleum
refining and distribution systems is
illustrated in Figure 2-6.
Oregon and Idaho do not have any
refineries; most petroleum is
imported into these states by
pipeline and barge. The three main
pipelines in the region are the
Olympic, Yellowstone, and Chevron
Pipelines. The Olympic pipeline is
operated by Enbridge and provides
Oregon with refined petroleum from
refineries in northwest Washington.
The Yellowstone pipeline, operated
by Phillips 66, runs from Montana

into Washington through northern Idaho. The Chevron
pipeline transfers petroleum products from Utah to
southern Idaho, northeast Oregon, and southeast
Washington (EIA 2014a, EIA 2014b, WDOC 2013).
Idaho, Oregon, and Washington rely primarily on natural
gas supplied from Canada and receive natural gas by three
pipelines (the Mist gas field in Oregon is the only producing
natural gas field in the region, but production has declined
during the past 30 years) (EIA 2014a). The Northwest
pipeline runs from Canada southward into western
Washington and Oregon and turns eastward from Oregon
into southern Idaho. The Gas Transmission–Northwest
pipeline runs southward from Canada through northern
Idaho and into eastern Washington and Oregon. The Ruby
pipeline runs along the southern border of Oregon (EIA
2014a). Two proposed LNG export terminals in Oregon are
seeking federal permits (EIA 2014a).
In recent years, a number of shipping terminals for coal
export have been proposed in the region. Current proposals
include two ports in Washington (Cherry Point and
Longview) and one in Oregon (Boardman) (ODOEQ 2014,
WDOE 2013). All of the proposed terminals would export
coal transported from the Powder River Basin in Wyoming
via new or existing rail lines and barge routes. There are no
active coal mines in the Northwest (EIA 2014a), nor are
there any estimated coal resources (USGS 2014b). Coal is
shipped into the region from Montana, Utah, and Wyoming
(EIA 2014a).

Figure 2-6. Movement of gasoline in the Northwest, 2010
Source: WDOC 2013
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Climate change may have the following impacts on
petroleum refining and fuel transportation in the
Northwest:
 Increased height of storm surge and tidal action due to
sea level rise, resulting in more damage, a higher rate of
coastal erosion, and higher risk of flooding for coastal
infrastructure, including refineries, terminals, pipelines,
and railroads (CIG 2013, USGCRP 2014).
 Increasing precipitation increases the risk of inland
flooding for riparian infrastructure in rain-fed and
mixed-source basins, including railroads and pipelines at
river crossings or that follow river courses (CCSP 2008,
CIG 2013, USGCRP 2014).
Coastal infrastructure, including petroleum ports and
refineries, coal terminals, and pipelines may be threatened
by the effects of rising sea levels, including heightened
wave action and storm surge during storms. Along much of
the region’s coastline, sea levels are expected to rise more
slowly than in other regions, as the underlying land is rising
(USGCRP 2014). However, as noted above in the
Thermoelectric Power Generation section, local rates of
relative sea level rise vary significantly, and the Puget Sound
is expected to experience greater sea level rise than other
coastal areas in the region (Verdonck 2006). For example,
low-lying rail yards in the Port of Seattle are vulnerable to
permanent inundation if sea levels rise more than three
feet (CIG 2013).
Most of the region’s refinery facilities are well above
sea level, with the single exception of U.S. Oil’s
Tacoma Refinery, which is located in the Port of Tacoma
(Figure 2-7). Coastal equipment, petroleum ports, and
pipelines located at sea level may be exposed to heightened
sea levels and coastal flooding as well as greater rates of
erosion (DOE 2013, USGCRP 2014).

Figure 2-7. Aerial image of U.S. Oil's Tacoma Refinery
Source: WDOE 2015

Inland flooding of river valleys and flood plains can affect
pipelines, railroads, and other infrastructure at river
crossings, or that follows river courses (DOE 2013). Flooding
can wash-out rail track beds and cause disruptions, and
increased streamflow can erode riverbanks, undercutting
railroads and scouring bridge piers (CCSP 2008, DOE 2013).
Buried pipelines are less vulnerable to flooding impacts, but
may be subject to damage from flood-borne debris if high
streamflow erodes the soil and exposes pipelines buried in
riverbanks or under a riverbed (CCSP 2008, GAO 2014).
Projected increases in precipitation are more likely to
increase the risk of flooding in river basins that are primarily
rain-fed and mixed rather than those that are primarily
snow-fed (USGCRP 2014). However, as winter precipitation
shifts from snow to rain, more watersheds in the region are
expected to become primarily rain-fed (CIG 2013).
Fuel Transport
Resilience Solutions
As the threats of coastal flooding, heightened storm surge,
and increasing erosion mount, coastal hardening measures,
including the construction of sea walls or natural barriers
such as wetlands to reduce the impacts of storm surge, may
be necessary for existing infrastructure, (CCSP 2008, DOE
2013). Planning future infrastructure—including LNG or coal
export terminals—for higher sea levels is also critical to
build resilience (DOE 2013). For example, the Army Corps of
Engineers directs analysts to consider what effect changing
relative sea level rates could have on designs, and agency
reports are required to contain scenarios that include
accelerating future sea level rise (USACE 2011).
Railroads can be protected from wash-out from flooding
with engineering solutions and track upgrades such as
elevating rails and bridges; however these can be costly
(CCSP 2008, DOT 2009). Additional resilience solutions
include upgrading drainage systems and ensuring culverts
can handle increased runoff from heavy precipitation
events (DOT 2009). Policy measures that restrict new rail
line development in floodplains or revised standards for
drainage capacity or elevating tracks can also improve
resilience. The risk of erosion can be reduced through the
use of manmade or natural barriers along vulnerable
riverbanks. At crossings, bridge piers can be protected with
riprap, and vulnerable buried pipelines can be protected by
using horizontal drilling techniques to bury the pipe
significantly deeper than traditional trenching methods
(Brown 2013, DOT 2009, Miller and Bryski 2012). Pipelines
at risk from erosion can also be replaced with materials that
are less likely to leak or rupture from impacts (e.g., coated
steel rather than cast iron or bare steel).
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Wind Energy
Subsector Vulnerabilities
Oregon has more than 3,000 MW in operational wind
farms, and Washington has an installed capacity of more
than 2,500 MW. Idaho has substantial wind energy
potential, and wind-generated electricity in the state was
almost six times greater in 2013 than in 2010 (EIA 2014a).
There is not yet substantial agreement among sources as to
how a changing climate will ultimately affect wind
resources in the United States in general, and in the
Northwest in particular (DOE 2013). One study of the
Northwest region found significant seasonal declines in
wind speed in parts of the Northwest, but this result has
not been confirmed by additional studies (DOE 2013). It is
uncertain how wind power production may be disrupted by
climate change-driven changes to wind patterns, or if wind
power will see an increase in available capacity.
Despite the uncertainty of potential climate impacts on
wind speeds, additional wind capacity has created the need
for new transmission lines, often in remote locations
(Durbin 2010). Compared to other sources of power, wind
generators may be especially vulnerable to wildfires
threatening power transmission infrastructure.
Wind Energy
Resilience Solutions
When siting wind farms in the Northwest, the threat of
wildfire on power lines connecting the wind farms to the
grid should be considered in the risk management of the
projects and in long-term asset planning.
Ensuring adequate transmission capacity to optimize the
use of available energy sources, including renewable
energy, is also important for resilience. For example, states
such as Montana may have relatively large wind energy
resources that exceed energy demand in the state, and
could serve a role as a major exporter of wind energy,
helping other western states to meet their energy demand
(NREL 2014). However, transmission infrastructure is
needed to tap this resource and transfer the electricity out
of Montana, while states like California and Nevada have
the demand, but may not have the wind capacity.
As noted in the Hydroelectric Power and Electricity Demand
sections, energy storage systems could allow wind power,
an intermittent renewable generation source, to store
energy and then deliver it when needed.
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Regional Climate Change Observations
and Projections in Detail
Higher Temperatures
Historical observations
 Average temperatures have increased 1.3°F from 1895
to 2011 (USGCRP 2014).
Future projections
 Average temperatures are projected to increase at a
4
faster rate: Increases of 3.3°F–9.7°F are projected by
2070–2099, compared to 1970–1999 levels (USGCRP
2014).
 Extremely hot days are projected to become slightly
more common: Under a higher emissions scenario (A2),
across most of the region, 0–6 more days with a daily
maximum >95°F are projected by mid-century (2041–
2070) compared to 1980–2000; southern Idaho may see
up to 15 more hot days per year (NOAA 2013).
 Extremely cold nights are projected to become much
less common: Under a higher emissions scenario (A2),
across most of the region, 10–30 fewer days with daily
minimums <10°F are projected by mid-century (2041–
2070), with inland regions seeing the largest decrease;
the coasts may see 0–5 fewer cold nights per year
(NOAA 2013).
 CDDs are expected to increase, but less so than in other
regions: Under a higher emissions scenario (A2), an
increase of 0–400 CDDs is projected across the region by
mid-century (2041–2070) compared to 1980–2000,
although this increase is large when compared to
relatively low historical averages (NOAA 2013).
 Heating degree days (HDDs) are projected to fall more
severely: Under a higher emissions scenario (A2),
declines of 700–1,100 HDDs along the coasts, and up to
1,600 HDDs in the mountains, are projected by midcentury (2041–2070) compared to 1980–2000 (NOAA
2013).
Drier Summer Seasons and Changing Water Patterns
Historical observations
 Average annual precipitation has increased, but the
trend is small from 1895 to 2011 (USGCRP 2014).
 Spring snowpack has decreased: Area-averaged
snowpack in the Cascades, as measured on April 1, has
fallen 20% since 1950 (USGCRP 2014).
 Spring snowmelt has been occurring earlier: Since 1950,
spring snowmelt has occurred 0–30 days earlier
depending on location, late winter/early spring
streamflows have been a 0%–20%+ greater share of
annual flow, and summer flows have decreased 0%–15%
(USGCRP 2014).

Future projections
 Future changes to total annual precipitation are
uncertain: Changes of -11% to +12% are projected by
2030–2059 and -10% to +18% by 2070–2099, compared
to 1970–1999 (USGCRP 2014).
 Seasonal changes are expected to be much larger:
Decreases in summer precipitation as great as 30%
below 1970–1999 levels are projected by the end of the
century under a higher (A2) emissions scenario, while
average projected decreases are 10% (USGCRP 2014).
 Snowmelt is projected to occur much earlier,
decreasing summer flow: By 2050, snowmelt may occur
th
three to four weeks earlier than the 20 century
average, even under a lower-emissions scenario
(USGCRP 2014).
Extreme Precipitation, Wildfires, and Sea Level Rise
Historical observations
 Dry spells are projected to increase: The maximum
number of consecutive dry days with <3 mm of
precipitation are projected increase up to 9% by midcentury (2041–2070) compared to 1980–2000, with
increases of 9%–15% along the coast (NOAA 2013).
Future projections
 Increasing fire activity is projected to continue in the
future: By the 2080s, the median annual area burned in
the region is projected to be four times greater than the
th
20 century median (1916–2007), increasing to 2 million
acres under the A1B scenario (USGCRP 2014).

Figure 2-8. Increases in area burned that would result from
regional temperature and precipitation changes associated with
1°C warming, relative to 1950–2003
Source: USGCRP 2014


Increases in extreme precipitation are projected in
some areas: The number of days with precipitation >1
inch is projected to increase by an average of 13% by
mid-century (2041–2070) across the region compared to
5
1971–2000 (USGCRP 2014).
 Relative sea level rise is not as severe in the region as
elsewhere in the United States: Tectonic uplift across
most of the Northwestern coastline is countering the

4

Range largely dependent on total global heat-trapping gas
emissions

5

For the high emissions (A2) scenario
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effects of sea level rise, meaning local sea levels are
rising more slowly than elsewhere in the country,
although uplift is varied. However, a major earthquake
(as is expected in the region in the next several hundred
years) may lead to rapid sea level rise of 40 inches or
more (USGCRP 2014, Verdonck 2006).
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Chapter 3: Southwest

Climate Change and the Energy Sector

3. Southwest

Overview
The large and geographically diverse Southwest region includes
mild coastal climates, an arid interior, and mountain ranges that
store critical water supplies as snow. The region is home to a
large and growing population. Key energy infrastructure includes
oil and gas refineries and large amounts of power plant capacity.
Major climate change impacts projected to increasingly threaten
the region’s energy infrastructure include the following:
 Average temperatures and cooling degree days (CDDs) are
projected to increase across the region, with hotter, more
a
frequent, and longer-lasting heat waves. Increases in
CDDs, extreme temperatures, and heat waves result in
expanded air conditioner use. These projections are also
expected to increase both average and peak demand for
cooling while reducing the efficiency and available capacity
b
of power plants and transmission lines.
 Average and summer seasonal precipitation is projected to
decrease, droughts are projected to intensify, and
c
streamflow in major river basins is projected to decline.
Power plants that rely on surface water for cooling may face
shortages and ecological or safety-related curtailments that
reduce available generation capacity. Oil producers may also
d
face water shortages.
 Spring thaws are projected to occur earlier, and a greater
fraction of precipitation is projected to fall as rain rather
e
than as snow, reducing mountain snowpack. Alongside
reduced overall precipitation, less snowpack could reduce
total potential hydropower production at high-elevation
dams. Changing streamflow timing, decreased precipitation,
and increased evaporation may impair hydropower
f
production during peak summer electricity demand.
 The risk of wildfire and the annual average area burned is
g
expected to increase across the region. Wildfires threaten
physical damage to power lines, including fouling of lines
h
and increased risk of arcing.

QUICK FACTS
Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico,
Utah
Population (2013)
58,000,000 (18% of U.S.)
Area (square miles)
686,000 (19% of U.S.)
Energy expenditures
$208 billion
% for
ENERGY SUPPLY
Annual
Annual
electric
& DEMAND
Production Consumption
power
Electric power
TWh
474
476
n/a
Petroleum
MMbbls
362
948
<1%
Coal
million tons
76
75
96%
Natural gas
Bcf
3,662
3,920
38%
Annual
Power
ELECTRIC
% of Total
Capacity
Production
plants
POWER
Production
(GW)
(TWh)
>1 MW*
Natural gas
202
44%
84
398
Coal
136
30%
24
42
Nuclear
50
11%
9
3
Hydroelectric
38
8%
19
347
Wind
19
4%
9
147
Geothermal
15
3%
3
57
Biomass
7
1%
2
119
Solar
3
<1%
2
214
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
Petroleum
Electric Power
Wells (>1 boe/d):
64,400 Power plants (> 1 MW):
1,346
Refineries:
29 Interstate transmission lines:
32
Liquids pipelines:
21 Coal
Ports (>200 tons/yr):
6 Mines:
26
Natural Gas
Waterways
Wells:
68,500 Coal and petroleum routes:
5
Interstate pipelines:
30 Railroads
Market hubs:
5 Miles of freight track:
14,000
Southwest States:

Note: Table presents 2012 data except number of oil wells, which is 2009 data.
*Some plants use multiple fuels, and individual generating units may be <1 MW.
Sources: AAR 2014, EIA 2011a, EIA 2013a, EIA 2013b, EIA 2013d, EIA 2014a, EIA
2014b, EIA 2014c, EIA 2014e, EIA 2014h, EIA 2014i, EIA 2014k, US Census Bureau
2014, USACE 2014

Table 3-1. Examples of important energy sector vulnerabilities and climate resilience solutions in the Southwest
Subsector

Vulnerability

Magnitude

Illustrative Resilience Solutions

Electricity Demand

Increased demand for cooling energy
from increasing CDDs and average and
i
peak temperatures

Increases of up to 1,000 CDDs by
mid-century, with peak demand
increasing 12%–24% owing to higher
j
extreme temperatures

Capacity expansion, increased
power imports, efficiency, and
demand-side management

Thermoelectric
Power Generation

Reduced power plant capacity due to
higher temperatures and reduced
water availability, and coastal plants
k
vulnerable to sea level rise

Capacity expansion and
diversification, water-efficient
technologies, coastal hardening

Hydropower
Generation

Reduced capacity in some seasons
from earlier peak streamflow, and
m
declining snowpack and precipitation

Capacity reductions of up to 4.5%, up
to 12 coal-fired power plants
vulnerable to water shortages, and
25 coastal plants vulnerable to sea
l
level rise
Snowpack reductions of up to 43% in
n
California by the end of the century

Electric Grid

Reduced capacity from higher
temperatures, and threat of
o
disruptions from increased wildfires

Transmission line capacity losses of
1.5%–2.5%, substation losses of 1%–
p
3% from rising temperatures

Transmission capacity expansion
and redundancy, improved
vegetation management

Integrated water planning to
optimize water use, upgraded
equipment to increase efficiency

Regional Vulnerabilities and Resilience Solutions | Southwest

3-1

Regional Energy Sector Vulnerabilities
and Resilience Solutions
The following sections discuss key energy subsectors and
illustrative examples of resilience solutions in the
Southwest. System components that are most vulnerable to
climate change are described first.
Electricity Demand
Subsector Vulnerabilities
Electric power demand in the Southwest is dominated by
end-use in California, accounting for more than half of the
1
region’s electricity consumption (EIA 2013c). Interregional
electricity flows are oriented towards serving California’s
load. In the Western Interconnection (shown Figure 3-1),
hydropower resources in the Northwest and mixed
generation in the interior Southwest supply almost 25% of
California’s electricity (EIA 2011b). Power imports from the
Northwest peak during spring and early summer (DOE 2012,
EIA 2011b, EIA 2014d). Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah are
net power exporters, producing 48%, 58%, and 33% more
power than they consume, respectively (EIA 2013c).

Climate change is expected to affect the region’s electricity
demand in the following ways:
 Higher average temperatures will increase the number
of CDDs, increasing demand for cooling energy (NOAA
2013, USGCRP 2014).
 Hotter summer temperatures and an increase in the
length, intensity, and frequency of heat waves are
expected to increase peak electricity demand,
potentially exceeding current generation and
transmission capacities in some areas (NOAA 2013,
Sathaye et al. 2012, USGCRP 2014).
Changes to temperature and to the total annual number of
CDDs are expected to be largest where temperatures are
already highest. For example, southeastern California and
southwestern Arizona could see an increase of up to 1,000
CDDs per year (Figure 3-2). Important changes in electricity
demand may also occur where populations are
concentrated and the percentage of homes currently with
air conditioners is low, such as coastal California. In these
areas, large scale adoption of air conditioners may result in
significant increases in electricity demand (EIA 2013g, NOAA
2013).

Figure 3-2. Increase in annual CDDs by mid-century under an A2
emissions scenario
Source: NOAA 2013

Figure 3-1. Annualized net electricity flows within the Western
Interconnection in 2010 (Million MWh)
Source: EIA 2011b

1

On a per capita basis, California's electricity consumption is
about 40% lower than other states in the region (EIA 2013c). This
is partly due to the relatively low number of CDDs experienced in
California’s coastal cities, as well as the lower rate of air
conditioning use in California households. In California, 56% of
households are air conditioned, while the average rate is 71% for
other states in the region and 91% in Arizona, the region's second
most populous state (EIA 2013c, EIA 2013g).

Under a higher emissions scenario, higher temperatures
alone could increase average per capita peak energy
demand in California by 12%–24% by the end of the century
(compared to 2003–2009), according to an analysis
conducted by the California Energy Commission (CEC)
(Sathaye et al. 2012). This study supports the findings of an
earlier CEC study that estimated end-of-century increases in
peak demand due to temperature increases alone could be
4%–19% (compared to 1961–1990), depending on
emissions scenario (Miller et al. 2007). When population
and economic growth are considered, increases in peak
electricity demand could be even larger, as regional
population is projected to increase 68% by 2050 (DOE
2015a). Almost half of California households do not
currently have air conditioning; cooling energy demand may
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grow at a faster rate than increases in CDDs if efficiency
improvements do not offset additional air conditioning
penetration (Auffhammer 2011, EIA 2013c). In states with
already-high air conditioning use, such as Arizona and
Nevada, increases in demand for cooling energy may
increase faster than the rise in average temperatures
(Aroonruengsawat and Auffhammer 2009).
The effects of extreme temperatures on electricity demand
will be exacerbated by the influence of urban heat islands
since air conditioning use is focused in urbanized areas. The
three most extreme urban heat islands in the previous
decade, as measured by the temperature difference
between urban centers and surrounding areas, are located
in the region: Albuquerque, Denver, and Las Vegas (Figure
3-3) (Climate Central 2014b).

Figure 3-3. Satellite images showing population growth in Las
Vegas, Nevada, from 1982 (left) to 2013 (right), which
contributes to increasing electricity and water demand
Source: USGS 2015

The seasonal timing of peak energy demand and the
potential for reduced availability of power imports from the
Northwest may compound the effects of increased energy
demand from temperature alone. California relies heavily
on power imports from the Northwest during the summer
(EIA 2011b). The Northwest, which generates more than
70% of its power from hydroelectric plants, is projected to
experience shifts in the timing of snowmelt and peak
streamflows away from the summer and towards the early
spring, potentially making less power available to export to
the Southwest region in the summer (USGCRP 2014).
In the winter, the region is expected to experience a
decrease in the number of heating degree days, reducing
the demand for heating energy (USGCRP 2014). Heating
energy is provided by electricity and other fuels, such as
natural gas. Southwest states with cold winters, including
Colorado, use primarily natural gas as a space heating fuel;
while states with mild winters, including Arizona, use mainly
electricity for space heating (EIA 2013g). On average,
electric utilities in the region have a summer demand peak
about 25% higher than their winter peak, and warmer
temperatures in the Southwest are likely to increase the
summer electricity peak more than they will decrease the
winter electricity peak (ANL 2008, EIA 2013h).

Electricity Demand
Resilience Solutions
Strategies to address increasing electricity demand include
capacity expansion, energy efficiency, and implementation
of measures that reduce demand at peak hours. New
generating capacity can be designed to operate year-round
(baseload) or only during periods of greatest demand
(peaking). Demand can be reduced through improved enduse energy efficiency and demand management strategies.
Because of economic and population growth trends, new
technologies such as electric vehicles, as well as climate
change-driven reductions in existing generation capacity,
new capacity may be a necessary part of a comprehensive
response strategy to increases in peak demand. Evolving
emissions regulations and existing water constraints
suggest that new baseload thermoelectric plants in the
region may employ water-efficient combined-cycle natural
gas turbines similar to the Public Service Company of New
Mexico’s (PNM’s) Afton plant, which uses hybrid cooling
technology (PNM 2011). A study of demand growth and
capacity changes found that gas-fired peaking generators
may be required to meet peak electricity demand (Sathaye
et al. 2012). New solar power can also contribute to
meeting growing peak demand.
Efficiency standards reduce total energy demand, and most
states in the region have integrated energy efficiency into
statewide electric sector planning and regulations (ACEEE
2014a). In the past decade, Arizona, California, Colorado,
and New Mexico state legislatures have all passed new
energy efficiency resource standards (EERS) with
quantitative targets for investor-owned utilities requiring
that they achieve consumption reduction goals. In addition,
both California and New Mexico have policies in place that
decouple utility profits from the amount of electricity sold
to customers (ACEEE 2014a). In 2008, California adopted a
strategic plan for energy efficiency that ensures that energy
efficiency is the highest priority resource for meeting
current and future energy demand (CPUC 2008). CEC also
approved new building codes that exceed International
Energy Conservation Code (IECC) standards by 25% for
residential buildings and 30% for nonresidential
construction (CEC 2014a). Many regional utilities offer
rebates for energy efficiency measures. For example,
Colorado Springs Utilities offers rebates to residential
customers of up to $250 each for upgraded windows,
appliances, and other improvements (CSU 2014). In
response to energy savings goals set by the Public Utilities
Commission of the State of Colorado in 2008, the state's
largest investor-owned utility, Xcel Energy, has spent almost
$320 million on energy efficiency incentives through 2013
(SWEEP 2014). Similarly, Pacific Gas and Electric Company
(PG&E) has an energy efficiency program that covers a
diverse array of programs and services, some of which
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helped customers save more than $155 million in 2013
(PG&E 2014a).
Salt Lake City actions for greater climate resilience
Salt Lake City, Utah, which has been recognized as a
Climate Action Champion by the White House, is
working to improve resilience in part by reducing its
energy consumption (White House 2015). As outlined
in Sustainable Salt Lake–Plan 2015, goals for 2015
include reducing city-wide building energy use by 5%,
increasing the number of LEED and EnergyStar
buildings, and converting all city facilities to “net-zero”
energy use (SLC 2014).
Demand response is another method for reducing peak
demand. California’s demand response resource represents
slightly more than 5% of California’s 2012 peak load (FERC
2013). In addition, the California Public Utilities
Commission, CEC, and the state’s independent system
operator (CAISO) have been working to allow residential
ratepayers to participate in demand response, potentially
expanding the resource (FERC 2013). Arizona Public Service
(APS) offers a cooling energy load management program
with financial incentives that allows APS to control
customer thermostats to reduce air conditioning load
during summer peak demand periods (DOE 2014b).
Similarly, Las Vegas utility NV Energy offers commercial
customers rate incentives for use of remotely controllable
thermostats that reduce cooling during peak demand
periods. Tucson Electric Power offers its commercial,
institutional, and industrial customers a year-round
program that compensates participants for reducing
electricity usage during peak demand events (DOE 2014b).
Thermoelectric Power Generation
Subsector Vulnerabilities
Power in the Southwest is generated from diverse sources;
natural gas, coal, nuclear, biomass, and geothermal power
plants produced 87% of the region’s net electric generation
in 2012 (EIA 2013c). The efficiency of thermoelectric power
plants is sensitive to ambient air and water temperatures,
and the plants need large amounts of water to generate
steam and to cool process components. The Southwest is
predominantly arid, and much of the region has
traditionally experienced water constraints. For this reason,
few thermoelectric plants in the region use freshwaterintensive once-through cooling systems and instead employ
recirculating cooling and, increasingly, advanced
technologies such as wet–dry hybrid and dry cooling (UCS
2012). Climate change is projected to further reduce water
availability in some seasons and parts of the region, and
increasing temperatures may exacerbate the impacts of
water scarcity by reducing the efficiency of power
production and increasing the volume of water required for
cooling. Additionally, many thermoelectric plants along the

coast that use seawater for cooling are vulnerable to the
threats posed by accelerating sea level rise.
Climate change is projected to have the following impacts
on thermoelectric power generation in the Southwest:
 Increasing average temperatures and more frequent
and severe extreme temperatures are expected to
reduce the efficiency and available generating capacity
of thermoelectric power plants (DOE 2013, Sathaye
et al. 2012, USGCRP 2014).
 Reduced availability of surface water resources and
changing seasonal flow patterns of some sources of
cooling water may increase the risk of thermoelectric
power plant de-ratings (Cayan et al. 2013, DOE 2013,
USGCRP 2014).
 Accelerating sea level rise increases the vulnerability of
coastal energy infrastructure to inundation (Climate
Central 2014a, NRC 2012, USGCRP 2014).
As temperatures increase, efficiency of thermoelectric
power plants will decrease and, in turn, reduce available
capacity. Plant equipment is typically designed for optimal
operation at a set ambient temperature; deviation from
those conditions can affect both efficiency and available
capacity. The standard design conditions for air-breathing
combustion turbines are 59° F (15°C) at pressure at sea
level , and a 1°C increase in ambient temperature above the
design point could reduce capacity by 0.7% for a combinedcycle gas plant and 1% for a simple cycle plant (Sathaye et
al. 2012). Based on these rates, climate change-driven
temperature increases could lead to reductions of 1.7%–
4.5% of peak capacity across California's natural gas power
plants by the end of the century (2070–2099), depending
on emissions scenario (Sathaye et al. 2012).
Electric impedance in assets also increases with higher
temperature, which leads to higher electric losses, and
hotter processes require more cooling water to operate,
meaning more power is required to pump greater volumes
of water (DOE 2013). Higher air temperature also leads to
warmer water temperature, which exacerbates the need
for pumping. In some cases, hotter sources of cooling water
can lead to mandatory plant shutdowns for environmental
reasons (DOE 2013).
Only about half of the installed generating capacity in
the region uses water-intensive once-through cooling, and
of the plants that do, very few use freshwater sources
(Figure 3-4) (UCS 2012). Most thermoelectric plants use
recirculating cooling or use ocean water for cooling, and
many of those that use freshwater for once-through cooling
are set to retire or are inactive. Groundwater is a significant
water source, although 74% of groundwater withdrawals
for thermoelectric cooling are saline and do not currently
compete with fresh groundwater users (UCS 2012, USGS
2005).
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2050 (Macknick et al. 2012). These declines are primarily
due to the retirement of older thermoelectric units and
introduction of natural gas-fired combined-cycle plants,
which require significantly less cooling water than existing
coal and nuclear plants (DOE 2013, Macknick et al. 2012).
Consumption of freshwater for thermoelectric power
generation is projected to decrease in the Lower Colorado
Basin, though total region-wide water consumption for
power generation is not projected to change significantly
(Macknick et al. 2012).
Figure 3-4. Types of cooling systems for U.S. plants (note limited
once-through cooling systems that use freshwater sources in the
Southwest)

The changing face of Southwest coal
During the last decade, a number of large coal power
plants in the region shut down, reduced their output,
or secured new sources of water to cope with
developing regulations and changes to water supplies
(PNM 2011).

Source: EIA 2012

Coal power plants in the interior may be particularly
vulnerable to declining water supplies. One 2010 study
found that, without taking future climate change into
account, the water sources for 12 coal-fired power plants in
the Southwest’s Great Basin and Colorado River watersheds
are already vulnerable to decreasing supply or increasing
demand (Figure 3-5). Several of these plants have since
reduced generation or closed (NETL 2010, PNM 2011).

2013: PNM announced the decommissioning of two of
four coal-fired units at the San Juan Generating Station,
replacing the capacity with new natural gas plants and
uprated nuclear capacity (EIA 2013d). Also, in response
to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s)
Regional Haze Program, three of the five coal-fired
units at the APS Four Corners Power Plant closed
(Randazzo 2013).
2005: The 1,580 MW Mohave Generating Station
closed after Southern California Edison was unable to
secure necessary water and coal contracts to fulfill its
obligations under a consent decree with the EPA
(Edwards 2009).
2002: In response to drought conditions, PNM sought
additional water sources for its San Juan Generating
Station and entered into shortage sharing agreements
with local tribes and other water users in the region
(PNM 2011).

Figure 3-5. Coal power plants identified as vulnerable to water
supply and demand concerns
Sources: EIA 2014c, NETL 2010

Coal-fired power plants are facing increasing economic
pressure and may be retired before their lifetimes expire
because of higher coal prices, lower wholesale electricity
prices, increasing deployment of natural gas and renewable
capacity, and environmental regulations that require
investment in emissions reduction (EIA 2014l) (see side bar:
The changing face of Southwest coal). For example,
following passage of Colorado’s Clean Air, Clean Jobs Act,
which requires that utilities reduce emissions by 30% by
2020, Xcel Energy announced that 702 MW of coal-fired
generation would be retired and replaced with new natural
gas-fired generation (Xcel Energy 2015). Retirements of
coal-fired generation may reduce the burden on the water
supply. One study that considered aggregate thermoelectric
water demand in the region found that in the reference
case, freshwater withdrawals are estimated to fall 30% by

Sea level rise poses a threat to low-lying coastal power
plants in California. Rising sea levels accelerate erosion and
can increase the risk of inundation during high tides and
storm surges. Approximately 25 coastal power plants have
been classified as at risk of inundation from a 100-year
flood with a 1.4-meter sea level rise, although site-specific
analyses are required in order to establish actual risk
(Sathaye et al. 2012).

2

Estimate does not account for increased demand due to climate
change but does include economic and population growth as well
as the retirement and replacement of older plants.
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Thermoelectric Power Generation
Resilience Solutions
Strategies to increase power plant resilience include the
addition of new capacity (including low-water renewables
such as wind or solar photovoltaics [PV]), deployment of
water-efficient technologies and non-traditional water
sources for cooling, and coastal hardening for plants
vulnerable to sea level rise.
Reduced available generation capacity is primarily
addressed by building new capacity or by importing
additional power. Capacity reductions can also be
ameliorated by demand-side efficiency and demand
response programs (discussed in the Electricity Demand
section).
Declining water availability can be addressed through
deployment of technologies that increase water efficiency,
use non-traditional water sources, or provide alternative
generation sources that inherently require less or no water.
Many thermoelectric power plants in the region already use
recirculating cooling technology, and almost all plants in the
region that use once-through cooling are supplied by ocean
water (Table 3-2) (UCS 2012). In 2010, California opted to
phase out once-through systems in coastal power plants,
which will reduce withdrawals and the impact of discharge
on California estuaries (CEC 2014c). Under a previous CEC
policy, new power plants in California are essentially
prohibited from using freshwater for cooling (CEC 2003).

natural gas-fired power plants rely on dry cooling systems
that minimize water use and discharge. The Humboldt Bay
Generating Station uses minimal amounts of water by
implementing a closed-loop liquid coolant cooling system
with air radiators (PG&E 2014a). Compared to a plant with a
traditional once-through cooling system, PG&E’s Gateway
Generating Station’s air-cooled condenser requires about
97% less water and discharges about 98% less wastewater,
and PG&E’s Colusa Generating Station has a zero liquid
discharge system that recycles wastewater (PG&E 2014a).
However, plants with dry cooling systems are more
susceptible to decreasing efficiency due to high
temperatures than those with wet cooling systems (GAO
2014, Garfin et al. 2013). Plants with dry cooling systems
can lose 0.5% of capacity for every 1°F increase in peak
temperature, about twice the capacity lost in plants with
wet cooling systems under the same conditions (Garfin
et al. 2013, Gordon and Ojima 2015).
Switching to non-traditional water sources, such as saline
groundwater, municipal and industrial wastewater, and
recycled brown water from landscaping, also present viable
options for resilient water supplies (PNM 2011). For
example, the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station in
Arizona has been converted to use municipal wastewater
(Figure 3-6) (PNM 2011).

Table 3-2. Southwest thermoelectric capacity by type of cooling
technology, 2005

Once-through cooling
Ocean water
Surface
Municipal

51.4%
50.3%
0.9%
0.2%

Recirculating/cooling pond

42.9%

Groundwater
Surface
Wastewater
Municipal
Unknown
Dry cooling
Unknown/other

14.5%
13.7%
8.3%
6.2%
0.2%
4.4%
1.3%

Figure 3-6. The Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, which
uses municipal wastewater for cooling
Source: USNRC 2015

Source: UCS 2012

Some new plants in the region are being built to use
extremely water-efficient hybrid wet–dry cooling
technology, which allows the plant to use cooling water
when it is available but, in case of a shortage, to operate on
dry cooling or with advanced dry cooling technologies that
use minimal water. PNM’s Afton Generating Station is a
natural gas combined-cycle (NGCC) plant that uses hybrid
cooling to reduce water intensity by 60% compared to
PNM’s other NGCC plant (PNM 2011). Three of PG&E’s

Expanded deployment of renewable technologies such as
wind and solar PV could significantly reduce water demand
for energy. In low-carbon scenarios with wider deployment
of solar PV and wind technologies, 2050 water withdrawals
and consumption could decline up to 90% and 72%,
respectively, depending on technology assumptions
(Macknick et al. 2012). To support clean renewables in the
region, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has granted a
number of loan guarantees for solar PV and wind projects.
For example, DOE issued a loan guarantee to support the
550 MW Desert Sunlight solar PV project in California, the
nation’s largest solar project on public lands. Deployment of
solar PV projects near thermoelectric power plants can
provide additional benefits by shading water supply for
these plants, potentially reducing evaporation from the
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water supply and decreasing the temperature of the intake
water.
DOE has also supported expanded deployment of solar
thermal technologies that employ low-water strategies in
the Southwest. One such project is the 392 MW Ivanpah
Solar Generating Station in California (Figure 3-7). The plant
employs advanced dry cooling technology for its steam
condensers to reduce its burden on freshwater resources,
and it uses groundwater to supplement evaporative losses
as well as to wash its mirror array, while it also recycles onsite wastewater to further reduce water needs (CEC 2014b).

Figure 3-8. Hydroelectric facilities (blue) in the Sierra Nevada
Source: DOE 2015b

Figure 3-7. Ivanpah Solar Electric Generating System
Photo Credit: BrightSource Energy

Beyond technology changes, operations and planning can
also improve resilience to water shortages. For example,
the Public Utilities Commission of the State of Colorado
requires that generators bidding to serve new power to
investor-owned utilities must disclose information about
the source and cost of their water supplies (WWA 2011).
For coastal impacts from sea level rise and erosion,
resilience solutions include hardening shorelines and subsea infrastructure (such as water intakes) to resist erosion
and scouring, installing engineered barriers such as levees,
raising vulnerable equipment, ensuring critical equipment is
submersible, upgrading plants with watertight doors, and
building coastal defenses like wetland habitats, where
relevant.
Hydroelectric Power
Subsector Vulnerabilities
Hydropower is a significant resource in the Southwest, with
approximately 19 GW of installed capacity providing 8% of
electricity generation (EIA 2013c, EIA 2013d). More than
70% of the region’s capacity is located in California, where
most dams are powered by highly seasonal melting
snowpack from the Sierra Nevada mountains (Figure 3-8). In
addition to its own hydropower generation, California also
relies on hydropower imports from the Northwest to meet
3
its peak summer power demands. The Colorado River
watershed hosts a smaller number of large dams, including
the Glen Canyon and Hoover dams (Figure 3-9).

Figure 3-9. The 1,312 MW Glen Canyon Dam on the Colorado
River watershed in Arizona
Source: USBR 2009

Hydropower production in the region is vulnerable to the
following climate impacts:
 Declining April 1 snowpack and earlier spring snowmelt
is expected to shift peak streamflow timing in
snowmelt-fed rivers, potentially reducing summer
water availability and hydropower generation (AEG and
Cubed 2005, Cayan et al. 2013, NOAA 2013, USGCRP
2014).
 Winter precipitation is expected to increase, with a
greater fraction expected to fall as rain rather than as
snow. Overall, annual average precipitation is expected
to decline (Barnett et al. 2008, NOAA 2013, USGCRP
2014).

3

Northwest hydropower production and climate vulnerabilities
are discussed in the Northwest regional profile.
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Climate impacts affecting hydropower generation are
expected to result from changes to both the total amount
of water available in the region and to the timing of
seasonal snowmelt and water flows. These changes could
diminish the availability and capacity of hydropower
resources.
From 2012 through 2014, California experienced historic
drought conditions and a reduction of approximately
34,000 GWh of hydroelectricity compared to average water
years. The cost of reduced hydroelectricity production and
the use of additional natural gas to meet energy demand
was estimated at $1.4 billion dollars (Pacific Institute 2015).
The drought has continued in 2015, and is projected to
contribute to a 10.4% decrease in annual hydropower in the
United States in 2015 compared to 2014 (EIA 2015b).
Changes in regional precipitation and increasing
evapotranspiration are generally expected to reduce water
availability across the region. During the last decade,
precipitation declines compared to the historical average in
both the Sacramento–San Joaquin and Colorado River
basins have been correlated to significant declines in
4
streamflow (Garfin et al. 2013). In the Colorado River
watershed, reduced precipitation may exacerbate water
management issues already being faced by the basin’s
major dams. One study estimates that without taking
climate changes into account, there is already a 50% chance
that the lakes could hold insufficient quantities of water to
produce power by 2021 (Barnett and Pierce 2008).
Of California’s fleet of dams, high-elevation dams are the
5
most important for hydropower generation, but they
typically have much smaller reservoirs than low-lying dams
and are more reliant on snowpack to supply water in the
spring and early summer (AEG and Cubed 2005). For
California’s hydropower resources, changes to total annual
precipitation may be less important than a number of
factors affecting the accumulation and timing of winter
snowpack, including increases in winter precipitation, shifts
from snow to rain, and earlier spring snowpack melting.
Winter precipitation is projected to increase by mid-century
(NOAA 2013). But as winters become warmer, more winter
precipitation is expected to fall as rain rather than snow,
decreasing snowpack (Barnett et al. 2008, USGCRP 2014).
The trend toward increased winter rainfall is strongest in
4

During the last decade (2001–2010), streamflow in the
Sacramento–San Joaquin basin was 37% lower and precipitation
7% lower than average amounts for the period 1931–2000. On the
Colorado River, streamflow was 16% lower and precipitation 4%
lower than the average levels for 1901–2000.
5
The primary purpose of many low-elevation dams in California is
flood control and water supply, not power production (AEG and
Cubed 2005).

California’s Sierra Nevada range, where most of California’s
high-elevation hydropower is located (EIA 2014c, Knowles
et al. 2007). Furthermore, the annual pattern of spring
snowpack melting is expected to occur earlier across the
region as winter and spring temperatures increase (USGCRP
2014). Earlier peak melting presents problems for power
planning since greater hydropower production is desirable
during the summer when electricity demand is the highest.
The total amount of snowpack available on April 1 has fallen
at measurement sites across much of the region since
6
1955. In 2015, April 1 snowpack was 6% of the long-term
average, the lowest water content on record, owing to high
temperatures and dry conditions that a recent study
suggests are more likely to co-occur in the future (CDWR
2015, Diffenbaugh et al. 2015). Climate change is expected
to lead to significant continued reductions in snowpack
(EPA 2014, USGCRP 2014). Under a higher emissions
scenario (A2), California snowpack could fall to 43% of
recent levels by the end of this century (2070–2099)
compared to 1971–2000 (USGCRP 2014).
It is uncertain how these changes will interact to affect the
total accumulation of high-elevation snowpack, and thus
the region's ability to produce hydropower, but the effects
could be substantial. One study estimates annual
streamflow changes could drive changes in generation in
California's American River Watershed ranging from a 13%
decrease to a 14% increase by 2070–2099, depending on
emissions scenario and other modeling uncertainties
7
(Vicuna et al. 2007).
Hydroelectric Power
Resilience Solutions
Operational measures to increase hydropower resilience
will require consideration of a larger integrated water
management approach, as seasonal and extended water
scarcity continues to have an impact on the region. In the
face of competing demands, and depending on available
alternatives, hydropower may not be seen as the highestpriority user. Reducing spill and better utilizing or storing
early-spring runoff can improve hydropower resilience but
may conflict with other water management goals, such as
flood control. Expanding and diversifying non-hydro
capacity would help ensure reliable electricity delivery
during dry periods.

6

In the southern Sierra Nevadas, the recent historical trend has
not followed the regional pattern of earlier melting, as wetterthan-average conditions have acted to increase April 1 snowpack
(EPA 2014, Pierce et al. 2008). Long-run warming is expected to
reverse this trend and lead to declines in snowpack in the
southern range (Cayan et al. 2013, USGCRP 2014).
7
The study examined the 11 reservoirs and 8 hydroelectric
facilities that compose the Sacramento Municipal Utility District's
Upper American River Project and modeled system impacts under
the A2 and B1 climate change scenarios.
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PG&E has actively engaged with state and local
stakeholders and developed strategies to adapt to
reductions in snowpack in the Sierra Nevada Mountains.
These strategies include maintaining higher winter
carryover reservoir storage levels, reducing discretionary
reservoir releases, and developing new modeling tools for
forecasting runoff (GAO 2014, PG&E 2014a).
For dams facing declining water availability, technological
options to increase resilience include overhauling and
upgrading plant equipment to minimize water leaks and
increase turbine efficiency. In 2001, in response to falling
water levels in Lake Mead, ongoing work by the Bureau of
Reclamation to overhaul the Hoover Dam’s 17 turbinegenerator pairs shifted focus to increasing efficiency and
regaining lost capacity. By reducing water leaks and
overhauling the turbines, efficiency is now 3%–4% higher at
each overhauled unit, and more water is being conserved
for power generation (HydroWorld 2009). On a much
smaller scale, the City of Boulder replaced the nearly 50year-old turbine and generator at its Boulder Canyon
Generating Station with a significantly more efficient 5 MW
unit, increasing capacity by 30% (City of Boulder 2014).
To reduce the impact of decreasing hydropower production
in dry years on customers, Sacramento Municipal Utility
District (SMUD) has implemented a rate-stabilization fund,
which uses savings from high-production years to buy
power during drought years (Kasler 2014).
Electric Grid
Subsector Vulnerabilities
The operational structure of the electric grid varies within
the Southwest region. In California, the grid is operated by
CAISO, while interior states mainly have vertically
integrated utilities that plan and operate generation and
transmission capacity internally (DOE 2014a). In some parts
of the Southwest, including parts of Arizona and New
Mexico, there is less redundancy built into the grid system
compared to other parts of the country (BLM 2013).

small amount of power flows internationally between
Mexico and California (EIA 2013i). The Comisión Federal de
Electricidad (CFE) Baja California Control Area is connected
by two 230 kV transmission lines to the Western
Interconnection (Figure 3-10) (CEC 2008). The CFE Baja
Control Area transmits power generated at two plants in
Mexico with a combined capacity of 1,120 MW to supply
demand in the San Diego area (CEC 2008). The tie in Baja
California is the only synchronous cross-border tie between
Mexico and the United States (EIA 2013i).
Interstate power flows in the region are generally oriented
toward California (discussed in the Electricity Demand
section). Several major power corridors, including the
Pacific DC Intertie, the California–Oregon Intertie (Path 66),
and the Intermountain Power Project DC line, supply
significant peaking capacity to California from neighboring
states (CAISO 2012). Across the region, construction of new
transmission lines has accelerated in recent years, as
electricity flows need to keep up with changing demand and
distribution of existing generation, including upcoming
retirements and new generating capacity (DOE 2014a).
Climate change could have the following impacts on the
electric grid:
 Increasing frequency and size of wildfires and
associated heat, soot, and application of fire retardants
may damage and disrupt power transmission
infrastructure (DOE 2013, Sathaye et al. 2012, USGCRP
2014).
 Increasing average and extreme temperatures reduce
the capacity of power lines and substations and
increase the risk of damage to power transformers
(Bérubé et al. 2007, DOE 2013, Sathaye et al. 2012,
USGCRP 2014).
 Rising sea levels increase the exposure of low-lying
coastal substations to inundation during storm surges
(Sathaye et al. 2012, USGCRP 2014).
Projected increases in the frequency and extent of wildfires
heighten the risk of grid outages and safety shutdowns.
Both tree mortality and wildfires have increased
dramatically in the past several decades, with the area
burned in western mid-elevation conifer forests increasing
th
almost sevenfold during the late 20 century (USGCRP
8
2014). Wildfires can burn and destroy wooden power poles
that typically hold smaller transmission lines, and the
associated smoke, soot, fire retardants, and heat from fires
can damage and disrupt larger grid assets by fouling lines
and insulators, increasing risk of arcing and reducing
transmission capacity (DOE 2013, Sathaye et al. 2012,
SDG&E 2008). For example, in early September 2015, the
Valley, Butte, and Rough Fires damaged grid infrastructure

Figure 3-10. Power flows between the Southwest and Mexico,
including a synchronous tie between California and Mexico
Source: EIA 2013i

8

The measurement period is 1970–2003.
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Wildfire disrupts electricity in San Diego
In 2007, wildfire knocked out the Southwest Power
Link, a transmission line connecting San Diego to
distant generation, requiring 500 MW of load shedding
in San Diego by San Diego Gas & Electric and Southern
California Edison. Over the next week, fires took out
two dozen additional transmission lines, destroying 35
miles of wire and 1,500 poles. Nearly 80,000
customers in San Diego lost power, some for more
than two weeks (PPIC 2008, SDG&E 2007).

lack of alternate or redundant routes to the Northwest
power market and the projection that Path 66—the artery
that connects northern California loads to low-cost
Northwest hydropower and the Diablo Canyon nuclear
plant—will become significantly more vulnerable to wildfire
(Sathaye et al. 2012). Southern California relies on even
greater amounts of power imports to meet peak demand in
the summer, although with a larger number of transmission
corridors; about one-third of peak capacity is provided via
transmission lines connecting to interior states (Sathaye
et al. 2012).
Higher temperatures may result in decreases in the
available current-carrying capacity of power lines and
substations and exacerbate vulnerabilities of the broader
energy system in the region, particularly during peak
demand periods (Figure 3-12) (DOE 2013). High
temperatures cause thermal expansion of power line
materials, and greater sag in transmission lines increases
the risk of widespread power outages when lines arc to
trees, the ground, or other power lines (DOE 2013).
Furthermore, when transmission lines arc, they may ignite
overgrown vegetation. To prevent damage to lines,
operators may reduce the capacity on transmission lines. By
the end of the century the combined effects of higher
demand and temperature could increase total loss factors
for the transmission and distribution grids by 1.5%–2.5%,
Impacts of higher electricity demand are compounded
by efficiency reductions in power sector

Figure 3-11. The Witch Creek/Guejito wildland urban
interface fire of October 2007
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce 2013

and knocked out power to more than 15,000 PG&E
customers in Northern and Central California (DOE 2015d).
Wildfire models have estimated the impact that climate
change, in concert with other changes such as future
development, may have on the extent of wildfires in the
Southwest. In the southern Rockies, the average area
burned each year may double by mid-century (Litschert
9
et al. 2012, USGCRP 2014). In California, projections
indicate that under a higher emissions scenario, wildfires
could increase in all forested areas by the end of the
century (Sathaye et al. 2012). In the Sierra Nevada, fires are
projected to increase by almost 75% by the end of the
century (compared to 1960–1990) (USGCRP 2014).
Models estimating the probability of wildfire impacts on
transmission lines in California have shown that lines in two
regions—the state’s northern border and the region north
of Los Angeles—are particularly vulnerable to wildfire under
higher emissions scenarios (Sathaye et al. 2012).
Compounding the vulnerability of northern California is the
9

Increases are for the period 2041–2070, compared to 1970–
2006.

A CEC study found that increasing energy demand and
capacity losses across power sector infrastructure
could, under a higher emissions scenario, require a
38.5% increase in the nameplate capacity of gas-fired
peaking generators by the end of the century (Sathaye
et al. 2012). Figure 3-12 shows how efficiency penalties
along generation, transmission, and substations serve
to compound the impacts of increasing energy demand
on system resource requirements.

Figure 3-12. Required increase in capacity in California due
to higher temperatures, in order to provide 1961–1990
levels of per-capita peak power by the end of this century.
th
Assumes A2 scenario, and a 90 -percentile temperature.
Source: Based on Sathaye et al. 2012
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while reducing capacity by 7%–8% (for a 9°F increase in air
temperature) (Sathaye et al. 2012). Higher temperatures
may also reduce substation capacity 1%–3% compared to
current capacity (Sathaye et al. 2012).
Increased temperatures also shorten the lifetimes of power
transformers. At higher temperatures, the insulation in
transformers breaks down at an accelerated rate (Bérubé
2007). At extreme temperatures, such as those
encountered during grid emergencies when some
transformers may be overloaded, significant overheating
can rapidly shorten transformer lifetime. On very hot days,
grid operators must reduce transformer loading or risk
causing additional damage (Hashmi et al. 2013, USBR 2000).
Increasing nighttime temperatures will prevent equipment
from cooling off, which may exacerbate the effects of high
temperatures on power lines and transformers (DOE 2013).
As climate change leads to higher relative sea levels, coastal
flooding may pose a risk to some low-lying electric
substations, especially when combined with storm surge. In
a scenario with a 4.6-foot rise in sea level, one study
determined that 3% of California’s electric substations
would be vulnerable to a 100-year coastal flood (Sathaye
10
et al. 2012). Increases in winter precipitation may also
affect inland flooding via rain-on-snow events, which
produce large amounts of runoff in mountain drainages.
However, recent trends in the Western United States have
shown these events occurring less frequently (McCabe et al.
2007, USGCRP 2014).
Electric Grid
Resilience Solutions
Measures to improve the resilience of new and existing
electric transmission infrastructure include engineering
structures to better withstand sea-level rise and hotter
conditions, increased fire management practices to reduce
short-term threats such as overloaded equipment, longterm planning to increase network redundancy where
wildfires are likely to occur, and transmission capacity
expansion when necessary (DOE 2013).
To reduce wildfire risk, utilities engage in vegetation
management, including tree trimming, as well as thinning
and prescribed burning to reduce fuel buildup (USGCRP
2014). Adequate vegetation management can also reduce
the risk of wildfires caused by tree strikes, and California
regulators have cleared the way for utilities to take more
proactive measures by requiring management on lowervoltage power lines and by allowing utilities to cut off
service to properties that will not allow tree trimming (EEI
2014). Three California utilities—San Diego Gas & Electric
(SDG&E), PG&E, and Southern California Edison—are also
jointly funding the development of a statewide fire-threat
10

map that will indicate physical and environmental
conditions that are associated with higher risk of power line
fires (EEI 2014). PG&E has also partnered with local fire safe
councils to help fund fuel reduction and emergency
response access projects, such as installing remote fire
detection cameras on lookout towers in critical fire risk
areas (PG&E 2014b). To help ensure that power outages are
identified and restored quickly, advanced communications
and control technologies, such as state-of-the-art
automated switch technologies, can “self-heal” the grid
(PG&E 2015).
Technologies to improve transformer resilience include
installing or upgrading cooling fans or replacing transformers
with more expensive, higher-temperature-rated units
(Bérubé et al. 2007, USBR 2000). Management practices for
protecting grid equipment, such as reducing loading on
transformers during heat waves, can help prevent shortterm damage (Hashmi et al. 2013). In 2014, Colorado
Springs Utilities partnered with Landis+Gyr to install an
advanced load management program to protect distribution
system assets during peak power consumption by
dynamically reducing loads. The utility is planning to deploy
1,900 smart thermostats and software applications to
enable load shedding on specific feeder circuits to protect
transformers and other distribution equipment, while
maintaining reliable electric service (Landis+Gyr 2014).
Illustrative electric grid resilience solutions
Following the damaging wildfires of 2007, SDG&E
implemented greater minimum clearances for
vegetation and has explored using LiDAR to identify
clearance issues (Fotland 2012). The utility has also
hardened critical portions of its lines, including
replacing wood poles with steel, replacing power
conductors with stronger steel-core lines, increasing
transmission line spacing, and installing advanced line
closers to protect lines in case of emergency. In June
2012, SDG&E activated the Sunrise Powerlink
transmission line connecting San Diego to the Imperial
Valley to improve reliability during summer heat waves
(SDG&E 2012). SDG&E also partnered with the U.S.
Forest Service and University of California, Los Angeles,
to develop the Santa Ana Wildfire Threat Index, a webbased tool available to the public that assesses the risk
of wildfires during Santa Ana wind events (Rolinski
et al. 2014).

Out of 2,690 substations, 86 are at risk (Sathaye et al. 2012).
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Oil and Gas Exploration and Production
Subsector Vulnerabilities
The Southwest’s oil and gas infrastructure includes oil and
gas wells, oil refineries, and natural gas processing facilities.
About 13% of domestic oil production is in the region,
mostly in California, but also in New Mexico, Colorado, and
Utah (EIA 2014a). The region's refinery capacity is also
concentrated in California, mostly along the coast, and
locally produced oil is primarily refined and consumed in
the region (EIA 2014f, EIA 2014g). About 14% of the nation's
natural gas is produced in the region, with Colorado and
New Mexico as the largest producers (EIA 2013f).
Climate change may have the following impacts on oil and
gas exploration and production:
• Rising sea levels, when combined with land subsidence
and storm surge, could accelerate erosion and inundate
low-lying and coastal oil and gas infrastructure (DOE
2013, USGCRP 2014).
• Declining water availability, including increased risk of
drought, may affect production and refining operations
that require freshwater resources (DOE 2013,
Tiedeman et al. 2014, USGCRP 2014).
Flooding and inundation risks associated with rising sea
levels may affect facilities along the entire California
coastline, although land subsidence and concentrations of
energy assets localize the impact to a few areas. Over the
last century, sea levels in California have increased 6.7–7.9
inches. South of Cape Mendocino, where tectonic shifts are
causing land subsidence, sea levels are expected to increase
another 1.4–5.5 feet by 2100, depending on emissions
scenario and other uncertainties (NRC 2012).
The vulnerability of specific energy assets is sensitive to
their elevation and proximity to coastlines. An analysis of
flooding impacts on utilities in Los Angeles (including
electric power, water, and fuel systems) found that
assuming 1.4 meter (4.6 feet) of sea level rise, combined
with a once-in-100-year flood, caused moderate damage to
three of the city's oil refineries but affected none of the
city's power plants or natural gas facilities (Grifman et al.
2013).
Energy production can also be affected by prolonged
drought. California's oil production is mostly composed of
older wells undergoing water-intensive secondary and
tertiary enhanced recovery processes. For the period 1999–
2012, the water intensity of the median California oil well
increased more than 20%, and many wells are located in
areas that may experience moderate to severe water stress
by 2025 (Tiedeman et al. 2014). In the midst of a recent
drought, California has passed new legislation mandating
that oil drillers report the amount and source of water used
in oil recovery (California Department of Conservation
2015, Carroll 2014). Throughout the region, hydraulically
fractured wells, which require about 3–6 million gallons of

water per well for drilling and fracturing (Mantell 2011), are
located in areas with water stress challenges that could be
exacerbated by declining precipitation. One study found
that over 95% of hydraulic fractured wells in Colorado and
California are in locations considered “high” or “extremely
high” water stress (Ceres 2014).
Like thermoelectric power plants, oil refineries require a
substantial amount of cooling water and may face
escalating costs as droughts and critical water shortages
become more frequent (DOE 2013).
Oil and Gas Exploration and Production
Resilience Solutions
Resilience strategies to protect the Southwest’s coastal oil
and gas infrastructure from inundation include both
hardening and management solutions.
Oil and gas companies facing periodic water constraints on
drilling and refining operations can use degraded water or
wastewater to reduce demand for municipal or freshwater.
For example, a BP oil refinery in Los Angeles recently
switched to recycled municipal wastewater to meet some
of its process water needs (Troeh 2012). Oil production
operations using water-intensive enhanced oil recovery
could expand use of brackish groundwater or reuse
produced water (DOE 2013). Alternative fracturing
techniques that are typically used to promote enhanced
product recovery in select shale formations may also reduce
water use; these includeLiquid Petroleum Gas (LPG)
fracturing, which uses propane and chemical additives in
lieu of water; foam-based fracturing, which uses water, a
foaming agent, and nitrogen or carbon dioxide; and channel
fracturing, which uses proppant-laden fluid and gelled fluid
to create channels (GAO 2015). In addition, enhanced oil
recovery using carbon dioxide injection from carbon
capture, storage, and use activities could contribute to
reduced greenhouse gas emissions (climate mitigation) as
well as enhanced resilience to climate change. Because
water management is already a high-priority issue for most
Southwestern states, solutions to problems of increased
energy infrastructure vulnerability will continue to require
comprehensive resilience strategies that address
stakeholders in multiple sectors.
Fuel Transport
Subsector Vulnerabilities
Much of the Southwest region is dependent on the
extensive fuel transport infrastructure located along the
California coast (Figure 3-13) (EIA 2014c). In particular,
refineries in California rely on coastal infrastructure, such as
ports in Los Angeles, Long Beach, and the Bay area, for
imports of crude oil (EIA 2014c, CEC 2015). Once refined,
gasoline and other petroleum products are transported
primarily by pipelines to customers in California, Nevada,
and Arizona (CDPC 2010). In addition, the region has
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become increasingly dependent on domestic shipments of
crude oil by rail.

Figure 3-13. Natural gas and other fuel pipelines in the
Southwest
Source: Adapted from EIA 2014c

New Mexico and Colorado are major producers of natural
gas, which is consumed in-state and transported via
pipeline to other western states. Markets in California are
served by natural gas from Arizona, Nevada, and the
Northwest (EIA 2014c). California exports and imports a
limited amount of natural gas by pipeline to and from
Mexico (EIA 2014m, EIA 2015a).
Climate change may have the following impacts on fuel
transport:
 Rising sea levels could result in a higher rate of coastal
erosion and a greater likelihood of flooding coastal
infrastructure, including ports, terminals, pipelines, and
railroads (CEC 2012, Sathaye et al. 2012, USGCRP 2014).

groundwater. As sea levels rise, pipelines may also be
increasingly at risk from flooding that can expose buried
pipe, making it susceptible to impact from flood-borne
debris (DOE 2013). Pumping stations, terminals, low-lying
railroad equipment and other fuel transport infrastructure
near the coast are also at increased risk of damage from
flooding and erosion as sea level rise accelerates.
Fuel Transport
Resilience Solutions
Fuel transport assets, including port facilities, can be
hardened to mitigate the risks from sea level rise, reducing
the likelihood of damaging coastal erosion and flooding
events. For instance, sea walls and natural barriers such as
wetlands can dampen the impacts of sea level rise and
prevent coastal erosion in some instances. Pipelines may be
upgraded to more robust materials such as coated steel or
plastics to prevent corrosion and damage from flood-borne
debris. Another resilience measure is elevating or relocating
critical equipment such as pumping stations, port assets,
and railroad structures out of coastal floodplains. For
example, the McDonald Island natural gas storage facility is
designed so that the compressor and wellhead controls can
still operate under a 20 foot head of water (Sathaye et al.
2012). Some equipment can also be sealed in waterproof
enclosures to prevent damage during flood events (DOE
2010). Planning for future sea level rise when siting and
designing coastal transport infrastructure will improve long
term resilience.

Coastal ports and facilities are vulnerable to increased flood
regimes along the coast due to higher sea levels, and may
be at greater risk of being forced to stop or delay
operations during floods. According to one study, 80% of
the Port of San Francisco, 60% of the Port of Oakland, and
approximately 50% of the Port of Richmond in the Bay Area
could be inundated during a 100-year flood event with 1.4
meters (4.6 feet) of sea level rise (CEC 2012). A 100-year
flood event combined with sea level rise could also flood
almost 1,700 miles of roadway in the Bay area, including
almost 170 miles of major highways, stalling port
operations by hindering the transport of personnel and
goods (CEC 2012). Much of northern California’s
Sacramento–San Joaquin River Delta region has subsided
below sea level and is already highly vulnerable to flooding.
The delta contains significant natural gas infrastructure,
including the McDonald Island natural gas storage facility
and multiple pipelines, that supplies the Bay Area and
Sacramento/Stockton (Sathaye et al. 2012).
Pipelines along the coast and in low-lying areas may be
vulnerable to corrosion as coastal flooding associated with
rising sea levels may increase saltwater intrusion of
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Regional Climate Change Observations
and Projections in Detail
Higher Temperatures
Historical observations
 Since 1895, temperatures have increased an average
of 0.17°F per decade, or almost 2°F (NOAA 2013).
 Heat waves are occurring more often and cold waves
less often: For 1895–2011, there is a statistically
significant increase in the number of heat waves across
the region (NOAA 2013).
Future projections
 Average temperatures are expected to increase at a
faster rate, with summer and autumn increases most
severe: Under a higher emissions scenario (A2),
temperatures are projected to increase 5.5°F–8.5°F by
the end of the century (2070–2099, compared to the
climate of 1971–1999), with the lowest increases along
the coast. Under a lower emissions scenario (B1),
increases may be 3.5°F–5.5°F (NOAA 2013).
 Extremely hot days are projected to become more
common, and consecutive number of days of extreme
heat are expected to grow longer: In the southern part
of the region, especially in deserts, arid regions, and
high plains, 25–40 more days with a daily maximum
temperature >95°F are expected by mid-century
(2041–2070, compared to 1980–2000), and the
maximum number of consecutive hot days is projected
to increase by 16–32; through most of the rest of the
region, 10–25 more extremely hot days per year are
projected, with annual maximum consecutive hot days
growing by 4–16 (NOAA 2013).
 Cooling degree days (CDDs) are expected to increase:
In much of the region, an increase of 400–1,000 CDDs is
expected by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to
1980–2000); increases of 200–400 CDDs are expected
in northern parts, and fewer in the Rockies (NOAA 2013).
 Heating degree days (HDDs) are expected to decrease,
cold nights to occur less frequently, and freeze-free
season to grow: The northern and mountainous parts
of the region are expected to experience a decline in
HDDs of 1,100–1,700 by mid-century (2041–2070,
compared to 1980–2000); in the south and along the
coast, declines of 500–1,100 HDDs are projected. The
freeze-free season is expected to be 20–45 days longer
by mid-century, and days with daily minimums less
than 10°F are no longer expected to occur, except in
high-elevation areas (NOAA 2013).
Changing Water Patterns and Wildfires
Historical observations
 More winter precipitation has been falling as rain
rather than as snow: Across western mountain regions,
October-to-March snow water equivalent (SWE),
normalized by total precipitation, has fallen over the
period 1950–1999, with a strong indication that up to

60% of the changes are due to climate change (Barnett
et al. 2008).
Future projections
 Annual mean precipitation is expected to decrease:
Under a higher emissions scenario (A2), end-of-century
(2070–2099) precipitation is projected to be 3%–12%
lower in the southern portion of the region than the
period 1971–1999. Under a lower emissions scenario
(B1), models are less certain (NOAA 2013).
 Spring and summer are projected to be drier and
winter wetter: Spring and summer average
precipitation may decline by more than 15% in parts of
the region by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to
1971–2000); summer coastal precipitation is projected
to increase more than 15%; winter precipitation is
generally expected to increase, with regions seeing
greater than 15% increases (NOAA 2013).
 Periods with little or no precipitation are likely to
become longer: Across most of the region, the annual
maximum number of consecutive days with less than
three millimeters of precipitation is projected to
increase 5–25 days per year by mid-century (2041–
2070, compared to 1980–2000). Projected increases
are smallest in eastern Colorado (NOAA 2013).
 Snowpack may decline across the region: By midcentury (2041–2070), April 1 SWE is projected to fall by
more than 40% compared to 1971–2000 (Cayan et al.
2013).
 Streamflow in many major basins is expected to
decline: By the 2070s, annual streamflow in the
Klamath, Sacramento–San Joaquin, Colorado, and Rio
Grande rivers is projected to decline relative to the
1990s (USGCRP 2014). For all but the Colorado River,
declines are projected to be greatest between April and
July (USGCRP 2014).
 Droughts are expected to intensify across the region:
Future droughts in the region, and especially in the
Colorado River watershed, are projected to become
more frequent, intense, and longer-lasting than in the
historical record (USGCRP 2014).
 Risk of wildfire is expected to increase: The area of
land burned in wildfires is projected to increase,
including a doubling of area in the southern Rockies by
mid-century (2041–2070, compared to 1970–2006) and
an almost 75% increase in northern California by endof-century (compared to 1960–1990) (USGCRP 2014).
Sea Level Rise
Future projections
 Sea level rise is expected to accelerate: Along most of
the California coastline (south of Mendocino), relative
sea levels are projected to increase by 17–66 inches by
2100 compared to 2000, depending on emissions
scenario and other uncertainties (NRC 2012).
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Chapter 3 Endnotes
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Source: NOAA 2013
Sources: DOE 2013, NOAA 2013, USGCRP 2014
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Sources: Cayan et al. 2013, NOAA 2013, USGCRP 2014
f
Sources: AEG and Cubed 2005, Garfin et al. 2013, Vicuna et al. 2007, USGCRP 2014
g
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Changes in CDDs are regional (see Figure 2), compared to 1980–2000 (NOAA 2013). Increases in per capita average peak demand by end of the
century compared to 2003–2009 under A2 scenario (Sathaye et al. 2012).
k
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Capacity reductions represent effects of increased ambient temperature on California's natural gas-fired generators and include projections of
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Chapter 4: Northern Great Plains
Climate Change and the Energy Sector

4. Northern Great Plains

Overview
The Northern Great Plains is home to less than 2% of the U.S.
QUICK FACTS
population but is a major supplier of critical energy resources
Northern Great
Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota,
used throughout the nation. These resources include coal from
Plains States:
Wyoming
the Powder River Basin, electricity exported via interstate
Population (2013)
5,036,423 (1.6% of U.S.)
transmission lines, and rapidly growing oil production from the
Area (square miles)
464,000 (13% of U.S.)
Energy expenditures
$33 billion
Bakken formation. Extensive rail and pipeline networks
% for
transport energy resources across the region. Major climate
ENERGY SUPPLY
Annual
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electric
& DEMAND
Production Consumption
change impacts projected to increasingly threaten the region’s
power
energy infrastructure include the following:
Electric power
TWh
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88
n/a
Petroleum
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333
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1%
 Climate change is projected to increase both the frequency
Coal
million
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466
85
88%
and severity of heavy precipitation events in northern
Natural gas
Bcf
2,280
528
3%
a
states, increasing heavy runoff and the risk of flooding.
Annual
Power
ELECTRIC
% of Total
Capacity
Floods threaten low-lying assets such as power plants, oil and
Production
plants
POWER
Production
(GW)
gas facilities, and rail lines located in flood plains, and they
(TWh)
>1 MW*
b
can disrupt delivery of fuels and damage infrastructure.
Natural gas
2
1%
4
55
Coal
114
71%
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42
 Average temperatures are projected to increase, and
Nuclear
6
4%
1
2
extremely hot days are projected to occur more
Hydroelectric
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14%
5
55
frequently. Heat waves are likely to become more
Wind
15
9%
5
72
c
Biomass
<1
<1%
<1
4
frequent, more severe, and longer-lasting. Extreme heat
Solar
0
0%
0
0
can delay or disrupt rail service, affecting fuel shipments. As
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
air and water temperatures rise, thermoelectric power
Petroleum
Electric Power
plants operate less efficiently, and electricity demand for
Wells (>1 boe/d):
15,900 Power plants (> 1 MW):
277
cooling increases. Higher temperatures also cause sag and
Refineries:
11 Interstate transmission lines:
18
Liquids pipelines:
29 Coal
increase resistance in transmission lines. Together, these
Ports (>200 tons/yr):
0 Mines:
28
effects may reduce available power supply during the
Natural Gas
Waterways
d
hottest months when demand is highest.
Wells:
29,000 Coal and petroleum routes:
1
 Decreasing water availability is projected in the summer
Interstate pipelines:
26 Railroads
for parts of the region as a result of seasonal changes in
Market hubs:
1 Miles of freight track:
13,500
Note: Table presents 2012 data except number of oil wells, which is 2009 data.
precipitation patterns from climate change and competing
*Some plants use multiple fuels, and individual generating units may be <1 MW.
e
uses for water. Limited water availability may reduce the
Sources: AAR 2014, EIA 2011, EIA 2013a, EIA 2013c, EIA 2014b, EIA 2014e, EIA 2014m,
EIA 2014n, EIA 2014o, EIA 2014p, EIA 2014q, USACE 2014, US Census Bureau 2014
availability of thermoelectric power generation and affect
biofuel production and oil and gas operations. Power plants,
biorefineries, and agriculture are all major water users and require more water as temperatures increase. Competing uses for
f
water, such as crop irrigation, may also contribute to limited availability.
Table 4-1. Examples of important energy sector vulnerabilities and climate resilience solutions in the Northern Great Plains

Subsector
Fuel Transport

Thermoelectric
Power
Generation
Electricity
Demand

Vulnerability

Magnitude

Illustrative Resilience Solutions

Increased disruption from roadbed
washouts and erosion from heavy
g
precipitation and flooding

From the Bakken fields, rail accounts for
more than 70% of total oil shipments and
i
100% of deliveries to the West Coast

Preventive maintenance, track
inspection, and reliability
k
standards

Increased disruption of coal and
oil by rail from extreme heat and
h
rail buckling

Almost 50% of the coal produced in the
United States travels along a small number
j
of central rail lines in the region

Improved detection of track
defects including buckling and
l
weak points

Reduced efficiency from
increasing air and water
temperatures and decreasing
water availability
Increased electricity demand in
the summer from higher
n
temperatures

The region exported over 70 TWh of
electricity in 2012, so reductions in
available generation may also affect
m
neighboring regions
An additional 200–800 CDDs per year is
projected by mid-century for most of the
o
region

Alternative water sources,
recirculating, dry, or wet-dry
hybrid cooling systems
Capacity expansion, energy
efficiency, and demand-side
management programs
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Regional Energy Infrastructure
Vulnerabilities and Resilience Solutions
Key energy subsectors and illustrative examples of
resilience solutions in the Northern Great Plains are
discussed below. System components that are most
vulnerable to climate change are described first.
Fuel Transport
Subsector Vulnerabilities
The Northern Great Plains is a major supplier of both coal
and crude oil to U.S. energy markets (see sidebar). The
Powder River Basin in Wyoming alone produces almost half
of the nation’s coal (EIA 2012a), and the rapid development
of the Bakken shale in North Dakota has made it one of the
top-producing oil fields (EIA 2014a). Railways are an integral
part of the transportation infrastructure for both of these
resources. Rail is also the primary mode of transport for
ethanol.
The Northern Great Plains is also traversed by a substantial
network of high-capacity natural gas and oil pipelines. The
region is the proposed location of several major new crude
oil pipeline routes, with 12 crude oil pipeline projects
(ranging from 10,000 barrels per day to 800,000 barrels per
day) proposed in the region as of 2012 (KLJ 2012). Gas
pipelines are also undergoing expansion, largely as a result
of the development of coal bed methane and tight sands
natural gas in the Powder River Basin and shale gas
production in the Bakken formation (EIA 2014g, EIA 2014i).
Since 2005, over $17 billion has been invested in natural gas
pipelines connecting to states in the Northern Great Plains
(EIA 2014h).
Climate change is expected to have the following impacts
on fuel transport in the Northern Great Plains:
 Projected increases in the frequency of heavy
precipitation, as well as total annual precipitation, may
increase the frequency of damage and disruption to
railways and pipelines from flooding (CCSP 2008,
USGCRP 2014).
 Rising temperatures, including increases in the
frequency, severity, and duration of heat waves, may
increase the risk of delays and disruptions to rail
shipments, as well as cause damage to—and higher
maintenance costs for—rail infrastructure (USGCRP
2014).

Powder River Basin coal
The nine largest U.S. coal mines are located in the
Powder River Basin (EIA 2014o). Coal from Wyoming
supplies power plants in more than 30 states (EIA 2014b).
In the western United States, a small number of routes
handle very large amounts of coal. Much of this coal is
transported in trains of 120 coal cars going from a single
mine to a single power plant over distances that can
exceed 1,000 miles (EIA 2012b, EIA 2014c).
The Joint Line, a 100-mile rail line, links Powder River
Basin coal to the nation's rail network. The Joint Line is
the busiest freight railroad in the world as measured by
gross ton-miles. Approximately 130 trains, weighing as
much as 19,000 tons, move on the Joint Line on a normal
day (DOE 2007).
Powder River Basin

Figure 4-1. Coal deliveries by rail from the Powder River Basin
Source: EIA 2012b

Bakken oil
Crude oil production in the Bakken shale formation of North
Dakota has increased more than 750% since 2007 (EIA
2014d). North Dakota currently produces over one million
barrels per day, representing over 10% of domestic oil
production (EIA 2014e). As the region's crude oil resources
become more important to the national energy economy
and pipeline capacity remains limited (EIA 2014f), railroads
are playing a more important role in transporting crude oil
(CRS 2014, EIA 2012c, EIA 2012d).

Annual precipitation (Figure 4-3) and the frequency and
severity of heavy precipitation events are projected to
increase in the northern and eastern portions of the area
(NOAA 2013a), increasing the risk of flooding impacts on
fuel transport.
Figure 4-2. Crude-by-rail loading (blue) and unloading (red)
terminals
Source: EIA 2014f
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limits, which can cause track buckling under heat stress
(also known as “sun kinks,” pictured in Figure 4-4) (CCSP
2008, NRC 2008). Tracks buckle when excessive
compressive stress along the track leads to deformation or
misalignment (Volpe 2003). Compressive stress can come
from both increased track temperature (as the rail material
expands) and loading from train traffic (FRA 2011). Since
2003, there have been 49 derailments in the Northern
Great Plains directly attributable to buckled or sun-kinked
track, and the average temperature at the time of
derailment was about 89°F (FRA 2014).
Figure 4-3. Mean change in annual precipitation by mid-century

1

Source: NOAA 2013c

Both heavy precipitation events and extended periods of
rainfall can lead to regional flooding events (NOAA 2013a).
Heavy precipitation events can cause high runoff and
flooding that can disrupt train traffic and damage
submerged track and roadbed (Union Pacific 2011). High
streamflows can cause erosion of track beds, especially
where railroads run in low-lying areas adjacent to rivers and
streambeds (DOE 2013a, USGCRP 2014). In the Red River
Valley of North Dakota, one of the most flood-prone rivers
in the country, peak streamflows have been steadily
increasing from rapid spring snowmelt combined with
rainfall (Hirsch and Ryberg 2012, NOAA 2013a).
Intense precipitation events and flooding can also affect
buried pipelines by eroding soil cover and exposing the
pipeline to damage from flowing water and collisions with
flood debris or even vehicles or boats (DOE 2013a, DOT
2014, NRC 2008). Pipelines that are near creeks, rivers, or
where water is funneled away are more vulnerable to
erosion (DOT 2014). Intense precipitation can also cause
ground subsidence, where the soil underneath the pipeline
sinks, causing stress on the pipeline structure (NRC 2008). A
flooding event in Montana was a key contributing factor in
the rupture of the ExxonMobil Silvertip Pipeline that
resulted in damages of more than $100 million (DOE
2013a). Historically, however, pipeline damage from natural
events is responsible for only a small fraction of damages to
pipelines; corrosion and equipment failure are the biggest
causes of accidental crude oil pipeline releases (DOT 2012).
Any damage or disruption to major interstate and
international pipelines crossing the Northern Great Plains
could have a significant impact on energy markets outside
the region. Several of the largest interstate natural gas
pipelines that operate in the region deliver to customers
outside of the region (EIA 2014i).
Temperature increases due to climate change and increased
rail traffic may cause the rails to exceed temperature design
1

Projected changes for mid-century (2041–2070) relative to the
end of the last century (1971–2000) under an A2 emissions
scenario

Figure 4-4. Examples of track buckling
Source: Volpe 2003

Railroad operators respond to high ambient temperatures
by slowing traffic along rail lines (called slow orders) and
reducing loads to prevent buckling and related derailments
(CCSP 2008, FRA 2011). Slow orders are costly, as they
consume rail capacity, lead to higher operating costs and
delays in deliveries, and increase equipment cycle time,
requiring railroads to maintain larger fleets (CCSP 2008).
Fuel Transport
Resilience Solutions
Risks to railroads from increased flooding can be mitigated
through system and track upgrades, but they can be costly.
Resilience solutions include upgrading drainage systems,
ensuring culverts can handle increased runoff from heavy
precipitation events, and increasing pumping capacity in
tunnels (DOT 2009). Policy measures that restrict new rail
line development in floodplains, revise standards for
drainage capacity or elevating tracks, or require more
frequent track inspection can also improve resilience. Track
integrity inspections are shifting from visual methods to
sophisticated sensing techniques operated from vehicles
such as hi-railers (trucks that ride on rails).
Resilience of natural gas and liquid fuels transmission
pipelines could be improved by upgrading to pipes made
from more robust materials such as coated steel or modern
plastics. Pipeline operators may also install barriers (such as
berms) or plant grass above pipelines to reduce the risk of
erosion and subsequent exposure of buried pipelines, and
horizontal directional drilling can be used to bury pipelines
deeper to reduce the risk of pipeline exposure (Brown 2013,
DOT 2014, Miller & Bryski 2012). After the Silvertip pipeline
ruptured in Montana, ExxonMobil was ordered to replace
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the existing Yellowstone River, Clarks Fork, and Rock Creek
river crossings with horizontal directionally drilled pipelines
(Katchmar 2012).
Examples of rail damage and disruption
2011: Exceptional spring rains, combined with rapid
snowmelt, produced flooding in the Missouri River
basin, threatening Union Pacific's Central Corridor
line near North Platte, Nebraska. When the Platte
River began to carve a new channel near the rail
line, the Nebraska National Guard and Nebraska
Highway Department contributed to an effort to
build an emergency levee. During the same floods,
levee breaks on additional Union Pacific lines near
Omaha, Nebraska, led to closures for portions of
June and July. To reopen the line, rail workers raised
the track bed before the floodwaters had receded
(Union Pacific 2011).
2007: Severe flooding in March and April resulting
from a blizzard significantly disrupted service on the
Powder River Basin's Joint Line. Rail facilities were
shut in, and 170 rail loadings were cancelled (DOE
2007).
2005: Greater-than-normal rainfall and accumulating
coal dust caused a series of three major derailments
and significant damage to Powder River Basin’s Joint
Line. The derailments caused significant delays in coal
deliveries and led to a restriction on new customers
that lasted almost two years. Many power plant
customers were forced to draw down stockpiles
because of delayed or cancelled deliveries, and some
had limited coal supplies for the summer when high
temperatures led to greater-than-normal energy
demand. Following the derailments, production at
Powder River Basin mines was curtailed for several
months, and problems with deliveries to generators
persisted through the spring of 2006 (DOE 2007).

Temperature impacts affecting railroads can be reduced by
incorporating climate projections into design considerations
when replacing tracks. Rails are designed to withstand
temperature gradients based on expected ambient
temperatures and heat generated from railcar traffic (FRA
2011, Volpe 2003). Railroad companies that are
incorporating higher baseline temperatures into their
planning would most likely upgrade tracks when they are
replaced for other reasons, including normal wear and tear,
upgrades for traffic reasons, or damage from other extreme
events, including flooding (CCSP 2008).
Management practices, such as ensuring rails are regularly
inspected for signs of damage, can also increase resilience
to climate impacts. Manual inspection remains the
preferred method to detect erosion damage, buckles, and
sun kinks, although rail breakage can be inspected via the
application of an electrical current to detect faults remotely
(CCSP 2008, Volpe 2003).

Thermoelectric Power Generation
Subsector Vulnerabilities
Electricity from coal-fired thermoelectric power plants
dominates the generation mix in Northern Great Plains
states (Table 4-2).
Table 4-2. Electricity generation by type for states in the
Northern Great Plains

Generator
Type

MT

ND

NE

SD

WY

Total

Coal
Hydroelectric
Wind
Nuclear
Natural Gas
Other

50%
41%
5%
0%
2%
3%

78%
7%
15%
0%
0%
0%

73%
4%
4%
17%
2%
0%

24%
50%
24%
0%
2%
0%

88%
2%
9%
0%
1%
1%

71%
14%
9%
4%
1%
1%

Source: EIA 2013c

Climate change is projected to have the following impacts
on thermoelectric power generation in the Northern Great
Plains:
 Higher average and extreme temperatures are expected
to reduce electricity generation and transmission
capacity (DOE 2013a, USGCRP 2014).
 Reduced precipitation in the southern and western
portions of the region, as well as higher evaporative loss
from reservoirs, may affect water availability for
thermoelectric power generation (DOE 2013a, NOAA
2013a, USGCRP 2014).
 Increased average and extreme precipitation may
heighten the risk of damage or disruption caused by
flooding (NOAA 2013a).
Projected changes in precipitation and temperature—both
independently and in combination—may restrict the
available capacity of thermoelectric power generation in
the region. The efficiency of thermoelectric power
generation decreases with increasing air and water
temperatures (DOE 2013a). Because of projected increases
in average and extreme temperatures in the Northern Great
Plains, climate change may reduce regional power
generation capacity during times of high demand for
cooling (USCGRP 2014). Furthermore, high air temperatures
reduce transmission capacity (DOE 2013a), which can
compound problems of reduced power supply. As shown in
Table 4-3, all states in the region except South Dakota
export electricity to other states, and capacity restrictions
may affect neighboring regions.
Table 4-3. Net interstate trade of electricity for states in the
Northern Great Plains, Terawatt-hours (2012)

MT

ND

NE

SD

WY

12.8

21.5

0.8

-0.5

30.1

Source: EIA 2014u
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As shown in Figure 4-5, precipitation is projected to
increase throughout the region during the winter, but
precipitation is projected to decrease in the southern and
western portions of the region during warmer seasons,
when demand for power is highest. Affected regions include
Montana, Nebraska, and Wyoming (NOAA 2013a).

Thermoelectric power plants are also vulnerable to
flooding. They are typically located near rivers or other
sources of water and are susceptible to physical damage
and disruption from flooding. The eastern portion of the
Northern Great Plains has experienced an increasing
frequency and magnitude of flooding events (Hirsch and
Ryberg 2012) and is projected to see higher levels of total
precipitation and heavy precipitation events as a result of
climate change (NOAA 2013a).
Examples of impacts to power plants from
flooding and limited water availability
2011: Missouri River floodwaters surrounded Fort
Calhoun Nuclear Power plant in Nebraska. The
nuclear reactor remained closed during the
summer because of persistent flood waters (DOE
2013a).

Figure 4-5. Change in seasonal precipitation by mid-century

2

Source: NOAA 2013c

Decreased availability of water could pose an operational
risk to thermoelectric facilities using freshwater for cooling
(DOE 2013a). For example, the Platte River, which flows
through Wyoming and Nebraska, is a heavily managed and
over-appropriated river system (NOAA 2013a). The coalfired power plants using the Platte River and its tributaries
for cooling water are vulnerable to water stress (DOE
2013a). When water shortages occur, power plants in the
region are likely to draw from groundwater and compete
with irrigated agriculture for scarce water resources (NETL
2009, UCS 2011).
Projected increases in extreme heat could accelerate the
loss of surface water reservoirs through evaporation and
may compound local water scarcity issues. Across most of
the region, 5–20 more days with a daily maximum
temperature >95°F are projected by mid-century (NOAA
2013a). Nebraska is likely to be the most affected, including
increases of as many as 25 more extremely hot days per
year projected (NOAA 2013a). Moreover, because high
temperatures decrease thermal efficiency of power
generation (DOE 2013a), more extreme high-temperature
days could compound the risks to these facilities,
particularly during periods of low water availability.

2

Projected changes for mid-century (2041–2070) relative to the
end of the last century (1971–2000) under an A2 emissions
scenario

2008: Owners of the 1,710 MW Laramie River
Station in Wyoming installed a 90,000-foot-long
pipeline to deliver groundwater to supplement
water from the Grayrocks Reservoir, but a drought
lowered the reservoir to 10% of its capacity and
forced the utility to purchase water from the
Wheatland Irrigation District (NETL 2009, UCS
2011).
2004: The Nebraska Public Power District spent
$12 million and installed 40 wells at its 1,300 MW coalfired Gerald Gentleman Station to ensure there would be
enough water in the event that its reservoir goes dry
(NETL 2009).

Thermoelectric Power Generation
Resilience Solutions
New generation capacity can help address falling capacity
due to decreased plant efficiency during periods of higher
air and water temperatures. New generation capacity with
sources and supply chains less affected by increasing
temperatures and decreased water availability (e.g., wind
and solar photovoltaics [PV]) may help make the region’s
power sector more resilient to climate change. Programs
that reduce total and peak electricity demand can also
reduce the water needs of thermoelectric generators.
Water scarcity has already threatened major power plants
in the region, and several generation facilities have
undertaken major infrastructure projects to ensure access
to alternative sources of water (NETL 2009). Many facilities
have installed recirculating water cooling systems, which
withdraw significantly less water than once-through plants
(DOE 2013a). Power plant owners in the Northern Great
Plains have turned to groundwater to supply cooling water
needs when surface water reservoirs have reached critically
low levels. Future competition for limited surface and
groundwater resources may lead power plants to consider
adoption of more water-efficient cooling technologies (e.g.,
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dry cooling, wet–dry hybrid cooling, etc.), use of
nontraditional water (e.g., saline and brackish groundwater,
municipal waste water, etc.), and additional water
conservation measures.
Diversification of power generation sources to fuels
requiring little or no water input, such as wind power and
solar photovoltaic systems, may help to make the region’s
power sector more resilient to water scarcity events. For
example, in response to Minnesota's Renewable Portfolio
Standard (RPS) and North and South Dakota renewable
energy objectives, the Otter Tail Power Company has
expanded its wind generation resources, which require no
cooling water. Through the TailWinds program, customers
can choose to purchase 100% of their electricity from wind
generation (Otter Tail Power Company 2014).
Programs that reduce total and peak electricity demand can
also reduce the water needs of thermoelectric generators,
as discussed in the Electricity Demand section.
Engineered barriers such as levees can be effective in
protecting vulnerable thermoelectric power plants from
flooding during heavy precipitation events. Utilities may
also elevate critical equipment to protect against flooding
or upgrade low-lying components with submersible
equipment or watertight doors. Planners can protect new
capacity by locating new equipment at higher elevations or
outside of flood plains.
Electricity Demand
Subsector Vulnerabilities
The Northern Great Plains exports more than 50% of the
electricity generated in the region and on the whole has
sufficient generating capacity to meet increased demand
within the region (EIA 2014b). However, neighboring states
that receive electricity exports from the Northern Great
Plains states, including states in the Midwest, Southwest, and
Southern Great Plains, may be affected if local demand grows
or generating capacity falls.
The region is situated far from the moderating effects of the
oceans and has a distinctly continental climate, with
average low temperatures in January about 0–15°F and
average high temperatures in July about 80–88°F (NOAA
2015). Like other regions with cold winters, the Northern
Great Plains uses primarily natural gas for space heating,
with electricity a distant second (EIA 2014l, EIA 2014r). The
region’s power consumption is typically summer-peaking,
with utilities in the region experiencing peak demand about
16% higher in summer than in winter (EIA 2013b). Much of
the electricity demand is driven by non-residential uses,
including irrigation, food processing, fertilizer and pesticide
production, and manufacture of farm and construction
equipment (EIA 2014b).

Climate change is projected to have the following impacts
on electricity demand in the Northern Great Plains:
 Higher maximum temperatures, longer and more severe
heat waves, and higher overnight lows are expected to
increase electricity demand for cooling in the summer
(DOE 2013a, NOAA 2013a).
Hotter summers will increase electricity demand for air
conditioning and refrigeration, while warmer winters may
lead to reduced heating demand, with the summer increase
in electricity demand outweighing the winter decrease
(USCGRP 2014). As shown in Figure 4-6, an increase of 200–
800 cooling degree days (CDDs) per year is projected by
mid-century for most of the region, with the exception of
the higher elevations of Montana and Wyoming (USGCRP
2014). Although the annual CDDs in the region are lower
than most other regions, an increase in CDDs may lead to
an increased proportion of households and businesses
installing air conditioning units (USGCRP 2014). For
example, Williston, North Dakota, is projected to
experience 200–400 additional CDDs, which is an increase
of 43%–86% compared to its historical average (NOAA
2013b). In addition, buildings already with air conditioning
are expected to increase electricity demand for cooling
(USGCRP 2014).

Figure 4-6. Change in annual CDDs by mid-century

3

Source: NOAA 2013c

Climate change is only one of several factors projected to
drive changes in demand for electricity. Population shifts
from rural to urban areas and electricity use associated with
growing oil production in the Bakken region are also
altering the demand profile, as well as other unrelated
changes to demand resulting from new devices and
technologies. One study projects electricity demand
(electrical load) in the Bakken region will increase more
than 200% in 20 years, from 1,209 MW in 2012 to 3,721
MW in 2032, excluding demand shifts expected due to
climate change (KLJ 2012).

3

Projected changes for mid-century (2041–2070) relative to the
reference period (1980–2000) under an A2 emissions scenario
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With the region being a net exporter of electricity, there is
likely adequate electricity supply to meet additional
demand. However, shifting demand loads within the region
may also require additional investments in transmission
capacity to reach the expanding areas (Basin 2014), which is
further discussed in the Electric Grid section.
Electricity Demand
Resilience Solutions
Capacity expansion, energy efficiency, load management,
and other programs administered by regional power
producers can help reduce total electric power demand and
peak loads. Power producers in the Northern Great Plains
states have already implemented a number of demand-side
management practices to reduce the load and improve
energy efficiency. These efforts have so far reduced the
region’s peak load by 2,100 MW, and over 4,000 industrial
customers are enrolled in price-responsive programs to
reduce consumption during peak demand (EIA 2013b).
Because the Northern Great Plains exports electricity
outside of the region, measures being implemented in
other states can also help mitigate critical summer season
peaks.
Demand response resources program
Montana–Dakota Utilities Co. has contracted with
Constellation Energy to offer a demand response
resources program for commercial and industrial
customers. Participants in Montana, North Dakota, and
South Dakota agree to curtail non-critical load during
demand response events initiated by the utility and
will receive financial compensation (both capacity and
energy payments) in return (Constellation Energy
2011).
Many agricultural-heavy electric utilities use demand
response programs to manage a large number of small
users connected to the grid. For example, Nebraska's
Dawson Public Power partners with agricultural customers
who allow the utility to control the electric usage of these
systems when demand for electricity is high (EIA 2014j).
Energy storage systems provide one potential solution to
addressing the region's changing demand profile. The
region has seen expanding wind power assets, with net
generation from wind power increasing by over 300% from
2002 to 2012, and storage systems could allow these
intermittent sources to store generated energy and then
deliver it when needed (EIA 2013c).
Capacity expansions may also help alleviate growing
demand for electricity, especially in remote areas where the
cost of installing new transmission capacity is high. Owing
to the region's extensive wind resources, new generation is
likely to include expanded wind capacity (NREL 2014). For

example, Montana–Dakota Utilities Co. announced in 2013
that, to meet growing customer demand, the company was
purchasing a 107 MW wind farm (Capital Journal 2014).
Electric Grid
Subsector Vulnerabilities
As Northern Great Plains states are net exporters of
electricity, neighboring regions are dependent on a reliable
flow of power from those states. The region straddles the
divide between the western and eastern electricity grids,
with Montana and Wyoming largely part of the Western
Interconnection, and most of Nebraska, North Dakota, and
South Dakota connected to the Eastern Interconnection.
The Northern Great Plains is home to four of the six DC ties
between the western and eastern grids (WAPA 2015).
Climate change is expected to have following impacts on
the electric grid in the Great Plains North region:
 Higher average and extreme air temperatures are
expected to reduce the efficiency and capacity of
transmission lines and substations, and may damage
power transformers (Bérubé 2007, DOE 2013a).
 Increased wildfire activity in the western, forested part
of the region is expected to increase the risk of physical
damage to transmission lines and distribution systems
(DOE 2013a, USGCRP 2014).
Higher temperatures decrease the current-carrying capacity
of transmission lines and reduce the efficiency of substation
equipment (DOE 2013a). High temperatures also cause
thermal expansion of transmission line materials, and
sagging lines increase the risk of power outages when they
make contact with other lines, trees, or the ground (DOE
2013a). When energized transmission lines come into
contact with vegetation, they can also spark wildfires,
potentially leading to much greater damage. Additionally,
elevated ambient air temperatures may also put
transformers at a greater risk of damage and force
operators to reduce the loading of transformers on the
hottest days (Hashmi et al. 2013, USBR 2000). Incremental
changes in transformer operating temperature lead to
exponentially larger rates of irreversible transformer
insulation breakdown, so even small increases in ambient
air temperatures can lead to extensive damage if protective
measures are not taken (Bérubé 2007, Hashmi et al. 2013).
Electricity transmission and distribution infrastructure is
also vulnerable to physical damage from increasing
wildfires, which can destroy wood poles and steel towers,
damage extensive miles of conductor, and foul lines with
soot and fire retardant (DOE 2013a). Wildfires can also
cause operators to shut down or derate lines to protect
them from wildfire-associated heat and smoke (CPUC and
DOI 2008, DOE 2013a). Soot and smoke can reduce the
electrical resistance of air, increasing the likelihood of tree
strikes or arcing between lines. In addition, wildfires
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remove vegetation and can increase exposure of electricity
poles to erosion resulting from subsequent heavy
precipitation events.
The risk of wildfires is projected to increase in the
mountainous forest and shrubland areas of Montana and
Wyoming, as warmer temperatures, increased
evapotranspiration, and a longer growing season can dry
soils and contribute to a buildup of combustible biomass
(USDA 2013). Some ecosystems may experience a four-fold
increase or more in the average area burned per year for
each 1°C global temperature rise (NRC 2011). Increased
wildfire risk areas coincide with the location of several large
transmission lines (>345 kV) in the region (Figure 4-7). In
2005, the Tarkio fire burned under two of the Bonneville
Power Administration’s (BPA's) 500 kV transmission lines in
western Montana, causing BPA to preemptively shut the
lines down (Montana Standard 2005). In another recent
example, the 2012 Ash Creek Complex Fire in southeast
Montana caused significant damage to the area's grid as it
burned through a major transmission line (KTVQ 2012).

Figure 4-7. Electric transmissions lines (>345 kV), shown by
dashed lines on the map, and projected percentage increase in
4
burned areas for a 1°C increase in global average temperature
Sources: NRC 2011, EIA 2014k

Electric Grid
Resilience Solutions
Both operational and hardening measures can be taken to
improve the resilience of new and existing transmission
infrastructure. The detrimental effects of increased
temperatures on grid capacity may require expanding
capacity or reducing demand, while assets can be protected
from increased fire activity with both system upgrades and
improved management practices.

4

Wildfire projections are based on temperature and precipitation
patterns associated with a 1°C increase in global average
temperature and are relative to the median area burned during
1950–2003.

Adding grid capacity and redundancy can increase resilience
to falling capacity on extremely hot days, especially as the
hottest days will likely see the highest demand for
electricity (DOE 2013a). Utility measures to reduce demand,
including energy efficiency and load management
programs, can also reduce the need for new transmission
capacity (DOE 2013a). As the region is a significant
electricity exporter, local demand management programs
may have limited efficacy when addressing falling
transmission capacity on long-distance interstate
transmission lines. However, such measures may be
effective for reducing burdens on transmission lines
connecting small communities to the grid. Such programs
are discussed in the Electricity Demand section.
To prevent damage to transformers, operators can reduce
transformer loads when air temperatures are high (Hashmi
et al. 2013). Operators can also install or upgrade cooling
systems for large transformers and invest in newer
thermally upgraded transformers (USBR 2000, Bérubé
2007).
Proactive vegetation management is an important practice
for increasing resilience to both increasing temperatures
and wildfire. Managers can reduce the risk of tree strikes
resulting from sagging lines by trimming trees along
transmission rights-of-way. Vegetation management is a
key practice for reducing transmission line vulnerabilities to
wildfire. Active forest management includes measures to
reduce build-up of hazardous fuels near key power lines—
such as forest thinning and prescribed burning—and reduce
the likelihood of human-caused ignition (e.g., campfires,
short circuits from faulty equipment on power lines) (CPUC
and DOI 2008, DOE 2013a, USGCRP 2014). PacifiCorp, a
power company that operates Rocky Mountain Power in
the Northern Great Plains and Southwest region, has
developed an app to monitor wildfires that could damage
lines and disrupt service to customers. The app allows the
utility to monitor and protect transmission lines and
prevent power outages even when lines are damaged (ESRI
2014).
Strengthening of power lines and towers to resist physical
damage, including the installation of steel towers for the
most vulnerable lines, can improve the resilience of
individual lines to wildfires, limiting damage and expediting
restoration (DOE 2013a). Resilience could also be improved
through increased redundancy in the transmission networks
(DOE 2013a).
Hydroelectric Power
Subsector Vulnerabilities
Hydroelectric generation produces 14% of the region's
electric power (see Table 4-2 on page 4-4) (EIA 2013c).
Hydroelectric facilities in Montana and South Dakota make
up the majority of the region’s total output of hydropower,
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generating about 11 million MWh per year and 6 million
MWh per year, respectively (Figure 4-8) (EIA 2013c).

Figure 4-8. Canyon Ferry Dam and Reservoir near Helena,
Montana
Source: USBR 2013

Climate change in the Northern Great Plains may affect
hydropower in the following ways:
 In the Columbia River Basin, decreasing summer
streamflows may reduce downstream hydropower
production, and increasing winter and early spring
streamflows may increase production (BPA 2011, DOE
2013a, USGCRP 2014).
 In the Missouri River basin, projected seasonal declines
in precipitation in the southern and western portion of
the region may reduce the water available to generate
hydropower (USGCRP 2014).
The Northern Great Plains largely lies to the east of the
Continental Divide; however, four dams in Montana are
located in the Columbia River Basin on the Flathead,
Kootenai, and Clark Fork Rivers (EIA 2014t). Spring
snowpack and summer precipitation in far western
Montana are expected to decline in a warming climate,
contributing to decreased summer streamflows for power
plants in the Columbia River Basin (BPA 2011, DOE 2012).
The Missouri River basin stretches across most of the
region, and its drainage provides water to many of the
hydroelectric generators in both Montana and South
Dakota. For example, the Platte River basin in Wyoming and
Nebraska, which is part of the Missouri River system, is the
source of numerous hydropower facilities (EIA 2014b). The
Missouri River basin draws from a large area where climate
models project both increasing and decreasing
precipitation, depending on the season, location, and
emissions scenario. The gradient towards reduced
precipitation in the southwestern portion of the region
suggests that facilities drawing on water flows from those
areas could face reductions in available generating capacity,
although there is uncertainty about these projections.

Hydroelectric Power
Resilience Solutions
Most of the Northern Great Plains is projected to see higher
precipitation during the winter (Figure 4-5). If excess river
flow remains within the reservoir capacities of dams, then
hydropower facilities may be able to store the water for
generation (DOE 2013a). Otherwise, potentially reduced
summer flows may have an impact on generation.
In the western, mountainous parts of the region,
forecasting snowmelt timing based on snowpack and
temperature trends will facilitate the prediction of seasonal
availability of hydropower generation. Leveraging these
data resources can improve the resilience of regional power
production—not only by supporting the preparation and
execution of contingency plans for hydropower production
but also by improving the effectiveness of overall regional
water management strategies that affect thermoelectric
generation and other water users.
Bioenergy
Subsector Vulnerabilities
As a major producer of biofuels, the Northern Great Plains
is vulnerable to climate impacts that affect the cultivation,
transportation, and conversion of crops to fuel. Bioenergy
production and consumption in the region is dominated by
ethanol production from corn and also includes a small
amount of biodiesel from canola oil and electricity
generation from captured landfill and wastewater gases.
The region is home to almost a quarter of the nation's
ethanol refining capacity, with operational facilities
capable of producing 3.2 billion gallons of ethanol per year
(Figure 4-9) (NEO 2014). Of the 48 ethanol biorefineries in
the region, all but one use corn as a feedstock (RFA 2014).
The region harvested 22% of the nation's corn acres in 2013
(USDA 2014).

Figure 4-9. Industrial biorefinery in York County, Nebraska
Source: ORNL 2006
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Climate change in the Northern Great Plains may affect
bioenergy production in the following ways:
 Increasing temperatures may benefit certain crops, but
extreme temperatures may harm them; warmer
temperatures may also benefit weeds, disease, and
pests (USGCRP 2014).
 Lower numbers of freezing days and a lengthening of
the frost-free growing season may extend the range
where biofuel crops can be grown (Bjerga 2012, NOAA
2013a, Roberts and Schlenker 2011).
 Changes to precipitation and evapotranspiration,
including an increasing risk of periodic drought or floods,
may either benefit or harm agricultural production
(NOAA 2013a, USGCRP 2014).
Climate change impacts on corn growth are complex, with a
mix of outcomes depending on the region, and are evolving
over time. Changes in the length of the frost-free season in
the plains are projected to be favorable, with increases of
15–24 days per year by mid-century, depending on the
location (NOAA 2013a). A longer growing season will
improve northern farmers' ability to grow a more diverse
set of crops, expanding from wheat in the northern parts of
the region to include both corn and soy (Bjerga 2012,
Roberts and Schlenker 2011). Plant growth is generally
aided by increased average temperatures and CO2 levels;
however, beneficial effects to crops may be outpaced by
adverse impacts such as increased growth of weeds and
survival of diseases and pests farther north as winters warm
(USGCRP 2014). Projected increases in winter and spring
precipitation may also benefit agricultural productivity as
soil moisture reserves are recharged, although increased
heavy precipitation events can erode soils, flood fields, and
damage or destroy crops (USGCRP 2014).
Higher temperatures increase evapotranspiration, and
declining summer precipitation may increase instances of
drought (USGCRP 2014). In 2012, drought coincided with a
16% decline in Nebraska corn production compared to 2011
levels, and surface water irrigation withdrawals were halted
in some areas to maintain sufficient streamflow (Plume
2012, USDA 2012a, USDA 2014). The corn shortage resulted
in Nebraska’s ethanol plants operating at 70% of capacity,
and eight ethanol plants in Nebraska and Minnesota
stopped production (Nebraska Ethanol Board 2012, Salter
2013).
Biorefineries are also vulnerable to decreasing water
availability during drier summers and periods of drought
(DOE 2013a, USGCRP 2014). Biorefineries use about
2.7 gallons of water per gallon of ethanol produced (Wu
et al. 2011). A typical 100 million gallon-per-year ethanol
plant requires approximately one million gallons of water
per day (DOE 2013a).

Bioenergy
Resilience Solutions
Resilience strategies for agriculture include diversification
of crops, increased and efficient application of pesticides,
and additional practices associated with sustainable
agriculture, such as no-till farming to better retain soil
moisture and reduce erosion (USGCRP 2014).
Although water efficiency in biorefineries has significantly
improved over the past decade, there are additional
opportunities for process improvements (Wu et al. 2011).
Freshwater demand could be substantially reduced by
recycling water or using alternative water resources (DOE
2013a). For example, Tharaldson Ethanol LLC in Casselton,
North Dakota, uses wastewater from Fargo, North Dakota,
as its main source of water (Schuh 2010).
Water use efficiency in cellulosic ethanol plants
The Dakota Spirit AgEnergy cellulosic ethanol plant is
expected to function as a prototype for a high level
of water-use efficiency when it is constructed. The
plant in Jamestown, North Dakota, will use steam
from the Spiritwood Energy Station, an electricity
generating station that uses wastewater from the
City of Jamestown as its main water source (Schuch
2010).
Oil and Gas Exploration and Production
Subsector Vulnerabilities
The region’s oil and gas industry is driven by increasing
crude oil production from the Williston Basin's Bakken and
Three Forks formations in North Dakota and eastern
Montana. Advances in drilling methods and technology,
high oil prices for the past decade, and a better
understanding of the geology of the Bakken have
contributed to the growth of the region’s oil industry (EIA
2014s).
Climate change is projected to affect oil and gas exploration
and production in the Northern Great Plains as follows:
• Declining water availability in the summer may increase
costs for oil production operations, which require
freshwater resources (DOE 2013a, USGCRP 2014).
• More frequent and intense heavy precipitation events
increase the likelihood of associated flooding, which
could damage facilities and disrupt operations (DOE
2013a, USGCRP 2014).
Under a high emissions scenario, some models project
summer precipitation to decline in the Missouri River basin
(USGCRP 2014). Decreasing precipitation in the summer
and warmer temperatures accelerating evaporation of
surface water could limit local water available in the Bakken
region for oil and gas operations, which mainly uses surface
water sources such as Lake Sakakawea in North Dakota
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(Figure 4-10). Other surface water systems in the Bakken
region do not provide a reliable source of water because of
seasonal flow variations (NDIC 2010). Lake Sakakawea is a
main water supply source for competing uses, such as the
large agriculture sector, and decreasing water availability
can increase costs and amplify current challenges for the oil
industry in obtaining water. Water used in North Dakota’s
Bakken for hydraulic fracturing can be as high as 60,000
barrels (bbl) (3 million gallons) per shale well, depending on
the number of stages in the fracture. Companies must truck
water to many well site locations in 7,500–8,000 gallon
tanker trucks, and resulting transport costs can lead to
purchased water costs ranging from $0.88/bbl to $6.05/bbl
(NDIC 2010).

Oil and Gas Exploration and Production
Resilience Solutions
As competition for limited water resources increases, oil
and gas companies can take measures to reduce their
vulnerability to freshwater scarcity. Resilience solutions
include water reuse/recycling and switching to lowerquality water, such as produced water, degraded water,
wastewater, or brackish groundwater sources, which do not
compete with irrigation and municipal water needs.
Companies may also be able to utilize alternative fracturing
techniques such as foam-based fracturing, Liquid Petroleum
Gas (LPG) fracturing, or channel fracturing. These methods
use alternate fluids for fracturing and may reduce water
requirements while promoting enhanced recovery, but only
work in formations with specific characteristics (GAO 2015).
Planners can protect oil and gas operations from flooding
by locating new equipment at higher elevations or outside
of flood plains, where practical. Levees or other engineered
barriers can also be an effective option to prevent damage
to valuable equipment from floods.

Figure 4-10. Proximity of Lake Sakakawea to Bakken oil and gas
operations
Source: EIA 2014k

While seasonal water availability could decline, annual
average precipitation and heavy rainfall events are
expected to increase (NOAA 2013a). Extreme precipitation
events cause large volumes of runoff to flow quickly over
farmland and rangeland into streams and rivers, increasing
the chance of overland and river flooding. Oil and gas
equipment and operations in low-lying areas are
susceptible to physical damage and disruption from floods.
In June 2015, North Dakota oil regulators ordered an oil
producer to shut-in 15 oil wells near the confluence of the
Missouri River and Yellowstone River after more than 1.5
inches of rainfall sparked flooding concerns (DOE 2015).
In the winter, warmer temperatures could benefit oil
production. Cold and icy weather can strand wells, cause
producers to scale back on drilling and completions, and
reduce output (DOE 2014b). Cold waves are projected to be
less intense in the future (USGCRP 2014).

Wind Energy
Subsector Vulnerabilities
The Northern Great Plains region has over 5,100 MW of
operational wind generating capacity, or almost 15% of
total electricity generation capacity in the region, and some
of the best onshore wind resources in the country (EIA
2013a, NREL 2014). In the region, there are 38 utilities
operating 72 wind generation stations (EIA 2013a).
There is not yet substantial agreement among sources as to
how a changing climate will ultimately affect wind
resources in the United States in general and in the
Northern Great Plains in particular (DOE 2013a). It is
uncertain whether wind power production will be disrupted
by climate-driven changes to wind patterns or whether it
will see an increase in available capacity.
Wind Energy
Resilience Solutions
Sophisticated wind forecasting systems allow operators to
better predict available wind generation and determine
when wind power needs to be supplemented with other
generation sources to meet customer demand. Xcel Energy,
a utility operating throughout the midwestern and western
United States, has deployed the WindWX system, which
uses real-time, turbine-level operating data to forecast wind
generation (Edison Foundation 2013).
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Wyoming’s Foote Creek Rim project has 183 wind turbines
with a generating capacity of 135 MW. These turbines are
designed to withstand 125-mph gusts and are also
adapted to operate reliably in extremely cold conditions (
Figure 4-11). The project also has electronic control systems
that point each turbine into the wind and adjust the pitch of
the blades to make the best use of wind in variable
operating conditions (BLM 2011).

Figure 4-11. Foote Creek Rim wind project in southeastern
Wyoming, which is equipped with technology to maximize
generating output under a range of conditions
Source: BLM 2011
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Regional Climate Change Observations
and Projections in Detail
Higher Temperatures
Historical observations
 Since 1895, average temperatures have increased 0.2°F
per decade, or almost 2.2°F (NOAA 2013a).
 Winters have warmed faster than other seasons: Since
1895, average temperatures have increased 0.33°F per
decade in the winter, compared to 0.20°F per decade in
the spring, 0.14°F per decade in the summer, and 0.13°F
per decade in the fall (NOAA 2013a).
 Freeze-free season has been growing: Across all of the
Great Plains, the length of the freeze-free season has
grown since 1895. The average freeze-free season was
about six days longer during 1991–2010 than during
1961–1990 (NOAA 2013a).
Future projections
 Average temperatures are projected to increase at a
faster rate: Increases of 3.5°F–9.5°F are projected by
2070–2099 compared to 1971–1999 levels, depending
on the region and greenhouse gas emissions (NOAA
2013c).
 Extremely hot days are projected to become more
common: Across most of the region, 5–20 more days
with a daily maximum >95°F are projected by midcentury (2041–2070, compared to 1980–2000);
Nebraska is likely to be most affected, including
increases of as many as 25 more extremely hot days per
year projected (NOAA 2013c).
 Consecutive number of days of extreme heat are
expected to become longer: The annual maximum
number of consecutive days with a daily high >95°F is
projected to increase by 0–12 days by mid-century
(2041–2070, compared to 1980–2000) across most of
the region, with larger increases in the southern part
(NOAA 2013c).
 Extremely cold nights are projected to become much
less common: Across the region, 10–30 fewer days with
daily minimums <10°F are projected by mid-century
(2041–2070, compared to 1980–2000), with
mountainous regions seeing the largest decrease and
Nebraska and South Dakota seeing the smallest change
(NOAA 2013c).
 Freeze-free season is projected to lengthen: Across
most of the region, the freeze-free season is projected
to be 18–24 days longer by mid-century (2041–2070,
compared to 1980–2000), with larger increases in the
mountains (NOAA 2013c).
 Cooling degree days (CDDs) are projected to increase:
In Nebraska and South Dakota, an increase of 400–800
CDDs is projected by mid-century (2041–2070,
compared to 1980–2000), while increases are projected

to be lower elsewhere in the region, especially in the
mountains (NOAA 2013c).
 Heating degree days (HDDs) are projected to decrease:
Across the region, declines of 850–1,650 HDDs are
projected by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to
1980–2000), with the lowest declines in Nebraska and
the highest declines in the western and northern
portions of the region (NOAA 2013c).
Changing Precipitation Patterns and Wildfire
Historical observations
 Historical trends in precipitation are not statistically
significant, neither annually nor seasonally (NOAA
2013a).
 Across the Great Plains, extreme precipitation events
have occurred more frequently: An index of one-day
precipitation events projected to occur once every five
years shows a statistically significant upward trend since
1895 (NOAA 2013c).
 April snowpack in Montana and Wyoming has declined:
From 1955 through 2013, annual total snowpack in April
has declined at most observation sites in the region's
mountains (EPA 2014).
 Snowmelt in Wyoming has occurred earlier over the
last half-century: From 1961–2002, snowmelt in
Wyoming has occurred earlier (USGCRP 2014).
Future projections
 Across most of the region, annual precipitation is
projected to increase: By the end of the century (2070–
2099, compared to 1971–1999), precipitation is
projected to increase 0%–9% across the entire region
excluding Nebraska and depending on both latitude and
emissions scenario. Generally, the projected increase
increases with latitude (NOAA 2013c).
 Winter and spring precipitation is projected to
increase: In general, northern state winters and springs
are projected to see increased precipitation relative to
the 1970–1999 period average under a higher emissions
(A2) scenario, while changes to summer and fall
precipitation are small (USGCRP 2014).
 Drier summers are projected: In the central Great
Plains, a trend toward drier summers is projected
(USGCRP 2014).
 Extreme precipitation is projected to occur more
frequently in the northern states: Very heavy
precipitation events are projected to increase in
northern states, leading to increased runoff and flooding
(USGCRP 2014).
 Risk of wildfire is projected to increase: For every 1°C
rise in global temperature, the area burned by wildfire in
the western Northern Great Plains region is projected to
increase by 73% to over 600% (compared to the median
annual burned from 1950–2003), depending on the
ecosystem (NRC 2011).
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Chapter 5: Southern Great Plains
Climate Change and the Energy Sector

5. Southern Great Plains

Overview
The Southern Great Plains region, comprising Kansas,
QUICK FACTS
Oklahoma, and Texas, contains oil and gas infrastructure critical
to the nation’s energy supply, including numerous offshore
Southern Great Plains States:
Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas
platforms, onshore oil and gas wells, oil refineries, natural gas
Population (2013)
33,000,000 (11% of U.S.)
Area (square miles)
412,000 (12% of U.S.)
processing plants, pipelines, and shipping terminals. Many of
Energy
expenditures
$190 billion
these assets are located near the Texas Gulf Coast. Key climate
% for
ENERGY SUPPLY
Annual
Annual
change impacts projected for the region include the following:
electric
& DEMAND
Production Consumption
 The intensity of Atlantic hurricanes is projected to
power
Electric power
TWh
552
465
n/a
increase, and the most intense hurricanes (Category 4 and
Petroleum
MMbbls
861
1,460
<1%
5) are projected to occur more frequently. Associated
Coal
million tons
45
135
99%
storm surge impacts may be enhanced by higher sea levels.
Natural gas
Bcf
9,800
4,800
39%
Sea level rise is expected to be greater in some areas
Annual
Power
ELECTRIC
% of Total
Capacity
a
Production
plants
because of local land subsidence. Critical oil and gas
POWER
Production
(GW)
(TWh)
>1 MW*
infrastructure, power plants, and transport infrastructure
Natural gas
256
46%
95
257
such as bridges and pipelines located along the Texas Gulf
Coal
195
35%
36
35
Coast may be at risk of damage from more powerful
Nuclear
47
8%
6
3
hurricanes and storm surges amplified by sea level rise. High
Hydroelectric
2
<1%
2
36
Wind
46
8%
18
146
winds from more intense hurricanes may increase risk of
b
Biomass
2
<1%
<1
30
damage to power lines.
Solar
<1
<1%
<1
6
 Average temperatures are projected to increase, and
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
extremely hot days are likely to occur more often. Heat
Petroleum
Electric Power
Wells (>1 boe/d):
133,000 Power plants (> 1 MW):
555
waves are projected to become more severe and last
Refineries:
36 Interstate transmission lines:
24
longer. By mid-century, the average number of cooling
Liquids pipelines:
32 Coal
c
degree days (CDDs) may increase by 600–1,000 per year.
Ports (>200 tons/yr):
13 Mines:
20
Increasing air and water temperatures in the Southern
Natural Gas
Waterways
Great Plains will reduce the efficiency and available capacity
Wells:
161,000 Coal and petroleum routes:
11
Interstate pipelines:
41 Railroads
of power plants and transmission lines while also increasing
Market hubs:
8 Miles of freight track:
18,600
average and peak electricity demand for electricity for
d
Note: Table presents 2012 data except number of oil wells, which is 2009 data.
cooling in the summer.
*Some plants use multiple fuels, and individual generating units may be <1 MW.
Sources: AAR 2014, EIA 2011a, EIA 2013b, EIA 2013d, EIA 2013e, EIA 2014a, EIA
 Precipitation is projected to decrease across most of the
2014d, EIA 2014f, EIA 2014g, EIA 2014h, EIA 2014i, EIA 2014j, U.S. Census Bureau
region, with the largest declines occurring in the summer.
2014a
Dry spells may become longer. These changes may lead to
e
more frequent droughts. Combined with increasing demand and competition for water from other sectors, climate change
may further limit the availability of water for energy. This includes withdrawals for critical operations such as power
f
generation, oil refining, and the region’s growing unconventional oil and gas production.
Table 5-1. Examples of important energy sector vulnerabilities and climate resilience solutions in the Southern Great Plains
Subsector

Vulnerability

Magnitude

Illustrative Resilience Solutions

Oil and Gas
Exploration and
Production

Heightened exposure to damage
and disruption from an increasing
intensity and frequency of the most
g
intense hurricanes

Increasing numbers of Category 4 and 5
h
hurricanes by the end of the century

Infrastructure hardening and
elevation, improved operations
protocols, restoration of coastal
habitats

Electricity
Demand

Increased demand for cooling
energy in the summer, coinciding
with reduced available capacity of
i
power generation and transmission
Reduced available generation
capacity from higher temperatures
and decreased water availability,
and reduced capacity of electric
k
lines from higher temperatures

Increasing CDDs by as much as 1,000
degree days by mid-century compared
j
to historical averages

Energy efficiency, demand-side
management programs and
policies, new peak load capacity

Increasing air temperatures by 3.5°F–
8.5°F and decreasing summer rainfall by
l
10%–30% by the end of the century

Alternative water sources and
water-efficient power generation
technologies, new generation and
m
transmission capacity

Thermoelectric
Power
Generation;
Electric Grid
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Regional Energy Sector Vulnerabilities
and Resilience Solutions

Examples of Gulf Coast infrastructure damage from
hurricanes*

Key energy subsectors and illustrative examples of
resilience solutions in the Southern Great Plains are
discussed below. System components that are most
vulnerable to climate change are described first.

Hurricanes Gustav and Ike (2008)
 At peak of disruptions, more than 20% of U.S.
refinery capacity was offline (API 2014a).
 Significant destruction to electric power
infrastructure delayed the restart of pipeline and
refinery operations (API 2014a).
 60 offshore platforms (approximately 1% of total
offshore oil production) were destroyed (API
2014a).
 Three of the four Strategic Petroleum Reserve
sites sustained extensive damage (DOE 2010a).

Oil and Gas Exploration and Production
Subsector Vulnerabilities
The Southern Great Plains is a principal element of the U.S.
oil and gas supply network. The region includes extensive
upstream exploration and production infrastructure, as well
as downstream refining and product delivery systems. The
region accounts for 40% of total domestic crude oil
production, with Texas the leading crude oil-producing
state in the nation (EIA 2014a). Oil refineries in the region
account for one third of the nation’s capacity (Table 5-2).

Hurricanes Rita and Katrina (2005)
 The storms destroyed 115 platforms and
damaged 52 others, and 19 drilling rigs were set
adrift (API 2014a).
 Hundreds of platforms were shut down, and over
400 offshore pipelines were damaged (DOE
2009).
 An estimated 29% of U.S. refinery capacity was
taken offline (API 2014a).

Table 5-2. Southern Great Plains crude oil production and
refinery capacity, 2013
KS

OK

TX

Total

Crude Oil Production (million bbl)

47

114

924

1,084

Share of U.S. Total

2%

4%

34%

40%

Refinery Capacity (million bbl/d)

0.3

0.5

5.1

6.0

Share of U.S. Total

2%

3%

29%

34%

Hurricane Ivan (2004)
 Seven platforms were destroyed and 24 damaged
(API 2014a).
 At the time, Hurricane Ivan was considered the
costliest hurricane season ever to the oil and gas
industry (Cruz and Krausmann 2008).

Sources: EIA 2014a, EIA 2014b

Climate change is projected to have the following impacts
on the subsector:
 Increasing frequency of intense hurricanes increases
the risk of damage or disruption to coastal and offshore
oil and gas facilities (DOE 2013, USGCRP 2014).
 Rising sea levels, combined with projected increases in
hurricane intensity and associated heavy rainfall, leads
to intensified flood regimes along coasts (USGCRP
2014).
 Decreasing water availability and drought could affect
unconventional oil and gas production and oil refining
operations (DOE 2013).
More intense hurricanes and rising sea levels will expose

the region’s extensive oil and gas exploration, production,
and refining infrastructure to increased risk of damage and
disruption (DOE 2013). The intensity, frequency, and
duration of North Atlantic hurricanes, as well as the
frequency of the strongest storms (Category 4 and 5), have
all increased since the early 1980s. As the climate continues
to warm, hurricane-associated storm intensity and rainfall
rates are projected to increase (USGCRP 2014).

* Includes all Gulf Coast states

Offshore oil and gas platforms are vulnerable to high winds
and damaging surf caused by hurricanes. One study found
that approximately 3%–6% of offshore platforms exposed
1
to hurricane force winds typically experience damage that
can take less than a month to over six months to repair, and
2%–4% are typically destroyed (Kaiser and Yu 2009). As the
frequency of Category 4 and 5 hurricanes increases,
damage from these intense storms will increase as well.
Offshore platforms typically follow the design specifications
of the American Petroleum Institute (API), which sets
performance standards for withstanding stresses such as
wind speeds and wave heights for a 100-year storm.
However, some of these threshold limits have been
significantly surpassed in recent years (Cruz and Krausmann
2008). Furthermore, as oil exploration and production
operations move farther offshore into deeper waters, the
potential for damage increases (DOE 2013).

1

Hurricane force winds typically extend 25–50 miles from the eye
of the storm (Kaiser and Yu 2009).
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Dependence of refineries on electricity
Many refineries rely on offsite power generation and
transmission systems to operate at full capacity. This
interdependence with the electric grid means that
interrupted electricity supply, transmission, and
distribution may result in broad disruptions to petroleum
production and distribution systems.
Hurricane force winds can also cause severe damage to
refineries, including refining cooling towers. For example,
during Hurricane Rita, 50% of the cooling towers at facilities
in Port Arthur, Texas, were damaged (NIST 2006).
Hurricanes also destroy wetlands and other features that
help protect coastal infrastructure, increasing the
vulnerability of coastal and inland infrastructure to future
storms. Moreover, the exposure of coastal energy facilities
to damage and disruption from hurricanes is magnified by
sea level rise, which amplifies the height of storm surges
(Figure 5-1) (DOE 2013). In Texas, 17 major energy facilities
are located less than four feet above sea level (Climate
2
Central 2014).

by the end of the century for most of the region (USGCRP
2014). A recent study found that under a high emissions
scenario, droughts are likely to be longer, with 80%
likelihood that the region will experience a decadal or multidecadal drought between 2050 and 2099 (Cook et al. 2015).
Effects from climate change, including decreasing rainfall,
higher temperatures, and increasing evaporation rates, in
combination with increasing competing demands for water
from increasing population and other factors, are expected
to increase water stress on both surface water and
groundwater resources.
One of the sectors that may face increasing water stress is
the region’s rapidly growing unconventional oil and gas
industry (Figure 5-2). Ninety percent of hydraulic fracturing
operations in Texas currently use groundwater reservoirs
(Arnett et al. 2014). In the Eagle Ford shale formation,
where hydraulic fracturing is the third-largest consumer of
groundwater (after irrigation and municipal districts),
aquifers are being depleted 2.5 times faster than the rate of
recharge (Arnett et al. 2014).

Figure 5-2. Growth of crude oil production (in millions of barrels
per day) at two major shale formations in the Southern Great
Plains
Source: EIA 2014c

Figure 5-1. Flooded Texas refinery in 2008 following Hurricane
Ike
Source: PBS 2008

Depending on location, relative mean sea level in Texas has
already increased by approximately one to three inches per
decade because of a combination of global sea level rise
and land subsidence in the region (NOAA 2009). Future sea
level rise is projected to climb between one and five inches
st
per decade in the first half of the 21 century and to
accelerate over time (USGCRP 2014).
Decreasing water availability may negatively affect the oil
and gas sector. Under a high emissions scenario, spring and
summer precipitation is projected to decrease by 10%–30%

Oil refineries may also be affected by decreasing water
availability. Conventional oil refining typically consumes
between 0.5 and 2.5 gallons of water per gallon of gasoline
equivalent, and securing access to diminishing water
supplies may increase costs (DOE 2013).
Example impact from water shortages
2011: During the worst drought ever recorded in Texas,
the river that provided water for the ConocoPhillips
refinery near the town of Sweeny, Texas, ran dry,
forcing the company to construct an emergency
pipeline to tap into groundwater (Galbraith 2012).

2

Climate Central data uses the FEMA HAZUS dataset to define
major energy facilities. These include electricity generating
stations and substations, natural gas control stations and
compressor stations, oil refineries, control stations, and tank
farms, among others (Climate Central 2014, FEMA 2014).
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Oil and Gas Exploration and Production
Resilience Solutions
The oil and gas industry is experienced with managing
hurricane risk and actively pursues measures to mitigate
these risks. For example, the API has developed guidance
and recommendations for improving the resilience of
offshore platforms to hurricane-related damage and
operations disruption. In response to heavy damage
inflicted by recent storms, new engineering and operations
guidance has been developed that provides:
 Modified design specifications for new platforms
 Operations protocols for hurricane season, such as
positioning platform decks higher above the sea
surface, methods for securing platform equipment to
rigs, and locating “jack-up” rigs on more stable areas of
the sea floor
 Improved data for wind, wave, current, and surge
conditions at higher spatial resolution
 Protocols for post-hurricane structural assessment
(API 2014a)
Better coordination between government and industry will
also improve the preparation for and response to future
hurricanes. The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management,
Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE), formerly the
Minerals Management Service, has adopted measures to
improve pre-season planning and communications among
federal agencies and help industry develop new standards
and guidelines (Cruz and Krausmann 2008).

short term, many producers are resorting to hauling water
over long distances by truck (Dittrick 2012). Another option
is to switch to brackish groundwater sources, which do not
compete with irrigation and municipal water needs but
which require additional treatment steps and costs (Nicot
and Scanlon 2012). Additional options for some operations
include recycling and reuse of produced fracking water or
dry fracking. Dry fracking uses highly pressurized gas
instead of water to crack rock formations, and at least two
companies in Texas are using dry fracking technology
(Processing Magazine 2013). Along with technological
solutions, market-based approaches to water conservation
may be an effective strategy to improve the sector’s
resilience to climate change (Arnett et al. 2014).
Fuel Transport and Storage
Subsector Vulnerabilities
The Southern Great Plains is a critical node in the
nationwide natural gas and liquid fuels transport and
distribution network (Figure 5-3). The Cushing oil hub in
Oklahoma is the world’s largest crude oil storage hub,
which transfers approximately 1.7 million barrels per day
(Zawadski 2013). The port of Houston is the second largest
petrochemical complex in the world and is the location of
ExxonMobil’s Baytown Refinery, the nation’s second largest
petrochemical refinery behind Valero’s Port Arthur facility
(EIA 2014d, Port of Houston 2014).

Refineries can reduce wind damage to cooling towers
through multiple actions, including special braces to stop
fan blades from dislodging, and installation of wind girders
to deflect wind and reinforce the structural integrity of the
tanks to prevent collapse (DOE 2010b).
Engineered barriers such as levees can be effective in
protecting vulnerable coastal areas. In addition, wetland
restoration and development of other natural barriers
(“green infrastructure”) may be a cost-effective resilience
technique (TNC-DOW 2012). These types of structures—
natural and manmade—help protect coastal infrastructure
from storm surges and wave impacts (DOE 2013).
Historically, the economic value of natural landscape
features has not been incorporated into the risk
management decisions involved in the planning and
construction of coastal infrastructure. Recently, however,
projects undertaken between private industry and natural
resource conservation stakeholders have shown that
collaboration and data sharing can be a successful strategy
for integrating the value of environmental features into
coastal facilities planning (TNC-DOW 2012).

Figure 5-3. Extensive petroleum transport infrastructure in Texas
and Oklahoma
Source: DOE 2015b

As competition for declining water resources increases, oil
and gas producers using hydraulic fracturing can take
measures to reduce vulnerability to water scarcity. In the
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The Gulf Intracoastal Waterway is a key asset in the
distribution of petroleum products (Figure 5-4) (CCSP 2008).
In 2010, the Texas portion of the Gulf Intracoastal
Waterway transported 67 million short tons of petroleum
and chemical products—comprising 91% of the waterway’s
traffic by weight—and the total value of all shipments was
over $25 billion (TxDOT 2013).

Figure 5-4. Gulf Intracoastal Waterway
Source: TxDOT 2013

Offshore, a network of more than 25,000 miles of seafloor
pipeline carries the daily production of oil and gas platforms
in the Gulf to facilities along the Texas coast and other Gulf
states (NOAA 2014). The Texas coast is also the location of
two of the nation’s four storage sites of the Strategic
Petroleum Reserve (SPR) (EIA 2014d). The SPR provides a
government-owned emergency stockpile of crude oil,
should disruption in commercial oil supplies threaten the
U.S. economy.
Climate change is projected to have the following impacts
on fuel transport and storage:
 Increasing hurricane intensity, and increasing
frequency of the most intense hurricanes (Category 4
and 5) along with associated storm surges and rising
sea levels, increases the risk of damage or disruption
to coastal and offshore oil and gas transportation and
storage facilities from wind, coastal flooding, and storm
surge (DOE 2013, USGCRP 2014).
Coastal ports and facilities are vulnerable to high wind
speeds and storm surge associated with intense hurricanes.
Storm surge has the capacity to knock down terminal
buildings, dislodge cargo containers, damage terminal
equipment, and damage wharf and pier structures (CCSP
2008). Hurricane- and sea level rise-related impacts may
also increase the risk of damage to waterway assets and
disruption of operations (CCSP 2008). Storm debris can
block navigation channels, and markers and barrier islands
can be affected (CCSP 2008). Rail terminals, docks, and
ships located along the coast are also vulnerable.
Aboveground storage facilities can be damaged by high
winds associated with intense hurricanes, and storage tanks
can be lifted by floodwaters, which may cause spills of
hazardous materials (API 2014a, DOE 2010b, DOE 2015a,
Santella et al. 2010). SPR facilities may also be exposed to

hurricane damage, including inundation caused by storm
surge (DOE 2015a).
Large surface waves and strong near-bottom currents from
hurricanes can scour the seafloor and create underwater
mudslides that damage subsea pipes and other equipment
that rests on the bottom (Burkett 2011). In fact, during the
2005 hurricane season, pipelines were identified by
industry experts as the weakest link and were a major cause
of delays in bringing production back online (Cruz and
Kraussman 2008). The majority of damage to offshore
pipelines during previous hurricanes has occurred at or near
platform interfaces (DOE 2015a).
Onshore pipelines are vulnerable to damage from coastal
and inland flooding events, which can alter the water table
or soil stability and damage buried pipes (DOT 2014, GAO
2014). Buried onshore pipes may be further damaged by
storm surge and flooding by corrosion due to saltwater
intrusion of groundwater (DOT 2014). During hurricanes,
debris from high winds and flooding can damage
aboveground pipeline infrastructure such as compressor
and pumping stations and metering stations, and
aboveground infrastructure is vulnerable to flood damage
and subsequent scour (DOT 2014).
Dependence of pipelines on electricity
The vulnerability of oil and gas pipelines is closely
connected to the operability of the electric grid.
Pipeline operations rely on electricity to deliver
products to consumers. Electricity is needed for
operations of pumps and valves that control the flow
of fuel through pipelines. Power disruptions can shut
down oil and gas operations, even when there is no
direct structural damage (DOE 2013).
The projected increase in intense hurricanes may lead to
increased natural gas and oil supply disruptions due to
damage and disruption of pipeline and refinery
infrastructure, which could in turn affect short-term fuel
prices. Supply disruptions during hurricanes may cause
natural gas and petroleum product prices to spike while
crude oil prices fall (API 2014b).
Fuel Transport and Storage
Resilience Solutions
Options for improving resilience of onshore pipelines
include installing manmade or natural barriers to reduce
risk of erosion, which could expose buried pipes. Another
risk reduction measure is upgrading pipes with more robust
materials that are less likely to leak or rupture from
seawater-induced corrosion—such as coated steel pipes
instead of cast iron or bare steel.
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Similar to other low-lying and coastal infrastructure, some
fuel storage and transport assets can be hardened to better
withstand more intense hurricanes and storm surges.
Example measures include installing water-tight doors,
elevating critical equipment (substations, control rooms,
pump stations), relocating vulnerable facilities, and building
or strengthening berms, levees, and floodwalls. Shorelines
of critical waterways can be hardened to prevent and offset
erosion, and dredging can be employed to maintain
shipping access (CCSP 2008, DOE 2010b).
Resilience efforts for wind protection may include installing
wind girders on storage tanks (DOE 2010b).
Thermoelectric Power Production
Subsector Vulnerabilities
Fossil fuel-fired power plants dominate the electricity
source mix in the region, with natural gas and coal
representing over 80% of the total generation (Table 5-3).
Thermoelectric power from nuclear plants provides another
8% of generation. Projected changes in temperature and
water availability—both independently and in
combination—may restrict the available capacity of
thermoelectric power generation in the region.
Table 5-3. Net electric power generation by fuel type, 2012

Natural Gas
Coal
Nuclear
Wind
Other

Kansas

Oklahoma

Texas

6%
63%
19%
12%
0%

50%
38%
0%
10%
2%

50%
32%
9%
7%
2%

Total
Region
46%
35%
8%
8%
2%

Source: EIA 2013b

Climate change is projected to have the following impacts
on thermoelectric power generation in the region:
 Reduced surface water availability for cooling in most
locations and seasons and higher evaporative loss from
surface water sources could reduce generation
capacity.
 Higher air and water temperatures reduce plant
efficiencies and increase the risk of exceeding thermal
water discharge limits (DOE 2013).
 Increased intensity of hurricanes and sea level riseenhanced storm surge increase risk of damage and
disruption to coastal power plants (DOE 2013, USGCRP
2014).
The vast majority of thermoelectric power water
withdrawals in the region are from fresh surface water
3
sources (UCS 2012, USGS 2005), making the region’s
3

Two different sources provide different estimates: the U.S.
Geological Survey provides an estimate that 84% of thermoelectric
withdrawals are from fresh surface water, while the Union of
Concerned Scientists' EW3 model calculated 94% in 2008.

thermoelectric power production infrastructure vulnerable
to increasing droughts, including a possible multi-decadal
drought by the end of the century projected as a result of
climate change (Cook et al. 2015, USGCRP 2014).
A number of power plants have been stressed by limited
water availability in recent years. For example, water
shortages forced one power plant to curtail operations and
threatened more than 3,000 MW of generating capacity in
Texas during a historic drought in 2011, and the grid
operator put an emergency action alert system in effect to
deal with coincident increases in electricity demand (CRS
2013, ERCOT 2011, USGCRP 2014). The impact of drought
on electricity supply was exacerbated in Texas by the fact
that the state is nearly isolated from the rest of national
electricity grid; marginal electricity prices reached the
market ceiling of $3,000 per MWh, and daily day-ahead
prices reached over $600 per MWh (CRS 2013, EIA 2011b,
USGCRP 2014).
Thermoelectric power infrastructure may also face
increased stress from higher temperatures. Average annual
temperatures in the region are projected to increase by
3.5°F–8.5°F by the end of the century, depending on the
emissions scenario, with extremely hot days (>95°F)
occurring more frequently and for longer stretches of time
(NOAA 2013). Increasing air and water temperatures reduce
the efficiency and available generation capacity of
thermoelectric power plants (DOE 2013). Higher surface
water temperatures will also heighten the likelihood that
power plants will exceed thermal water discharge limits
mandated to protect aquatic ecosystems, which could
further reduce available power capacity. One study found
that under a high emissions scenario, curtailments of power
plants in Texas could remove up to 5,500 MW of peak load
capacity from the ERCOT grid in 2030 (Cook 2013).
Similar to the risk posed to coastal oil and gas
infrastructure, increased frequency of intense (Category 4
and 5) hurricanes and sea level rise-enhanced storm surge
threatens power plants located near the Texas Gulf coast.
Plants farther inland, which are often located along rivers
and in low-lying areas, may also be at increased risk from
flooding caused by heavy precipitation associated with
intense hurricanes. Specific vulnerabilities to hurricanes and
sea level rise vary significantly from site to site and are
largely dependent on facility elevation, distance from coast,
and mitigating measures the facility may have taken to
improve its resilience.
Thermoelectric Power Production
Resilience Solutions
Installing water-saving technologies at power plants could
significantly reduce water withdrawals. Cooling towers with
condensing technology, recirculating cooling, or dry cooling
systems are examples. Other solutions include retrofitting
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or replacing plant equipment to accommodate use of
nontraditional water (e.g., brackish groundwater or
municipal wastewater). For example, the 1,080 MW coalfired Harrington Station in Amarillo, Texas, uses treated
wastewater rather than freshwater to meet cooling needs
(UCS 2011). One analysis suggests that most plants
vulnerable to drought could be retrofitted for less than
$4/MWh, or for less than a 10% increase in the levelized
cost of electricity (Tidwell et al. 2013).
Water availability issues could be partly addressed through
policy measures employed at the state and local levels and
informed by technical assistance at the federal level. Some
areas have established market-driven solutions to address
the vulnerability of critical shortages in supply. For example,
nineteen water districts using the Edwards Aquifer in San
Antonio, Texas, have formed an alliance that creates a
streamlined market for trading water rights for sustainable
water development through 2060 (USGCRP 2014).
Examples of state policy measures addressing storm
damage
In Texas, utilities are required to submit annual reports
that describe their efforts to identify areas within their
service territories that are particularly susceptible to
severe weather damage and harden facilities in those
areas (EEI 2014).
New generation capacity with sources and supply chains
less affected by increasing temperatures and decreased
water availability, such as wind power and solar PV, will also
help make the region’s power sector more resilient to
climate change. Fuel sources that are less dependent on
water availability can help supply peak power generation
during critical summer days. Indeed, new wind turbines
represent about 38% of the new capacity additions in the
region since 2000 (Figure 5-5), and in most cases, ERCOT
anticipates that new generation resources will primarily be
renewables that do not require cooling water (ERCOT
2012).

Shifting from coal-fired power plants to natural gas
combined cycle plants (NGCCs) can also reduce annual
freshwater consumption. Estimates of the potential effects
of coal-to-natural-gas fuel switching in Texas’ power sector
projected savings of 53 billion gallons of freshwater per
year, or 60% of Texas coal power’s water footprint, largely
due to the higher efficiency of NGCCs (Grubert et al. 2012)
Retrofitting facilities to harden them against more intense
hurricanes and storm surges can also reduce vulnerabilities.
Improved engineered barriers such as levees can be
effective in protecting vulnerable thermoelectric power
plants from flooding. Utilities may also elevate critical
equipment to protect against flooding or upgrade plants
with submersible equipment or watertight doors. Planners
can protect new capacity by locating new generators at
higher elevations that are not at risk of flooding due to
hurricanes or storm surges.
Electricity Demand
Subsector Vulnerabilities
Compared to other areas of the United States, the warmer
weather in Texas and its neighboring states means that air
conditioning accounts for a greater portion of home energy
use (18% compared to 6% nationally), while space heating
accounts for a much smaller portion (22% compared to 41%
nationally) (EIA 2014d). Almost all residents in the region
use air conditioning equipment, with over 80% using central
air conditioners. Along with the Southeast region, the
Southern Great Plains has among the highest per capita
electricity use in the nation (EIA 2014d).
Hotter temperatures and more frequent extreme high
temperatures are projected for the Southern Great Plains;
these increases are expected to contribute to higher energy
demand from increased use of air conditioning (USGCRP
2014).
Climate change is expected to affect electricity demand in
the Southern Great Plains as follows:
 Higher maximum temperatures, longer and more severe
heat waves, and higher overnight lows are expected to
increase electricity demand for cooling in the summer
(NOAA 2013, USGCRP 2014).

Figure 5-5. Recent additions in Southern Great Plains electric
generation nameplate capacity (MW) by fuel type, 2000–2012
Source: EIA 2013d
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Example impact from heat waves
2011: During a summer of intense heat, the electricity
demand in Texas surpassed a previous record for three
consecutive days (Tweed 2012).

Bureau 2014b). These trends will have significant implications
for the power sector in the region, as predicted increases in
air conditioning demand will require a system that can
handle more extreme peak loads. Current forecasts from the
Electricity Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) anticipate that
summer peak reserve margins could fall to 7.3% by 2024
without capacity expansion (ERCOT 2014). ERCOT’s forecast
did not take future warming into account and instead relied
on recent weather averages.
In the winter, warmer temperatures and fewer days below
freezing are expected to reduce demand for heating energy
(DOE 2013, USGCRP 2014). Almost all homes in the region
are heated, and about half of residents use electricity for
heating, a greater proportion than the U.S. average (EIA
2013g). However, peak electricity demand in the winter is
5
about 25% less than in the summer, and this difference
may increase with warmer temperatures (EIA 2013a,
USGCRP 2014).

Figure 5-6. Days above 100°F in summer 2011
Source: NOAA 2013

Compounding power sector vulnerabilities from higher
temperatures and reduced water availability

NOAA climate models project that, by mid-century, there will
be more than 15 additional days with temperatures reaching
100°F and upwards of 30 more warm nights (>80°F) per year.
These warmer temperatures will increase cooling energy
demand. Over the same period, the region is expected to
have 600 to 1,000 more CDDs per year compared to the end
of last century (Figure 5-7) (NOAA 2013).

High temperatures stress multiple components of the
electric power system. At the same time that higher
temperatures increase demand for air conditioning, they
also decrease the efficiency of thermoelectric power
plants and transmission lines. Meanwhile, power plants
require more water for cooling in hot temperatures,
when water availability and thermal discharge restrictions
are already more likely to be risk factors (DOE 2013).
Electricity Demand
Resilience Solutions
Alongside measures to reduce demand, such as energy
efficiency measures and demand-side management
programs, capacity expansion can help mitigate falling
summer reserve margins.

Figure 5-7. Increase in annual CDDs by mid-century

4

Source: NOAA 2013

Other factors, such as population growth and changing
technologies such as electric vehicles, are also important to
consider in long-range electricity demand projections,
especially in Texas, which contains three of the five fastestgrowing cities in the nation and which has faced declining
reserve margins in recent years (EIA 2012, U.S. Census
4

Projected changes for mid-century (2041–2070) relative to the
end of the last century (1980–2000) under an A2 emissions
scenario

Capacity expansion in the region is likely to be a necessary
component of any adaptive response. In Texas, ERCOT has
identified a need to replace 13 GW of retiring natural gas
generation, in addition to addressing growing summer peak
demand (ERCOT 2012). In its latest Integrated Resource
Plan, ERCOT found that demand for new capacity will be
met over a 20-year planning horizon by new natural gas
combined-cycle units, by wind and solar generation, or by a
combination of the three. For example, in one scenario
(BAU [business as usual] with Updated Wind Shapes),
capacity requirements are met by 17 GW of new wind, 3.6
GW of natural gas combined-cycle units, and 10 GW of solar
PV (ERCOT 2012). Wind power currently generates 8% of
5

On average across all utilities located in the region, peak winter
electricity generation is about 25% less than peak summer
generation.
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the region’s electricity, with 18 GW of wind turbines
installed (EIA 2013d). The market penetration of solar PV is
also increasing in the region. Since wind and solar PV do not
require cooling water, they are inherently more resilient to
water stress than many other power generation
technologies. Wind and natural gas plants represent most
of the new capacity planned to come online in the region
(Figure 5-8).

Texas’ grid are also part of the grid operated by the
Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO). ERCOT
is unique in that, unlike SPP and MISO, it operates as an
independent interconnection—i.e., it is not synchronously
connected to the Eastern and Western Interconnections
that cover the other lower 48 states (FERC 2014). ERCOT is
also connected to the Mexican states of Tamaulipas and
Chihuahua, although trade between ERCOT and Mexico
represents a small portion of electricity supply and typically
occurs during periods of constrained supply (EIA 2013h). Six
of the seven connections between Mexico and ERCOT are
for emergency use only (Center for Energy Economics
2006).
Climate change is projected to have the following impacts
on the region’s electric grid:
 Increases in average and extreme temperatures reduce
the efficiency and available capacity of transmission
lines and substations and could damage power
transformers (DOE 2013, USGCRP 2014).
 Hurricane intensity and the frequency of the most
intense hurricanes (Category 4 and 5) are projected to
increase, and sea level is expected to rise at an
accelerating rate, increasing the risk of physical damage
to grid infrastructure from wind and coastal flooding
(DOE 2013, USGCRP 2014).

Figure 5-8. Utility-scale generating plants planned to come online
from December 2014 to November 2015
Source: EIA 2015

Approximately 3,000 MW of peak load have been avoided
through demand-side management programs in the Southern
Great Plains (EIA 2013a). Approximately 180,000 residential,
commercial, and industrial customers are enrolled in priceresponsive programs. The city of San Antonio by itself
accounts for almost half of these customers. Time-sensitive
programs such as demand response are also established in
the region, with almost 120,000 customers enrolled (EIA
2013a). However, on the whole, demand response is mostly
an untapped mechanism in the region. As of 2012, demand
response potential within ERCOT represented only 2.6% of
the total system peak load (FERC 2013).
Grid-scale energy storage systems and other developing
technologies can also contribute to meeting the region's
changing demand profile. Storage systems could allow
intermittent renewable generation sources, such as the
region’s burgeoning wind power capacity, to store
generated energy and then deliver it when needed.
Electric Grid
Subsector Vulnerabilities
The Southern Great Plains encompasses two regional
electricity grids: ERCOT, which covers most of Texas, and
the Southwest Power Pool (SPP) market in Kansas,
Oklahoma, and the Texas panhandle, which is part of the
Eastern Interconnection power grid. Small portions of

Higher temperatures can force transmission operators to
decrease the current-carrying capacity of transmission lines,
which can exacerbate supply constraint issues during
extreme heat events when demand for power is the
highest. For example, one California study estimated that a
9°F increase in air temperature could decrease transmission
line capacity by 7%–8% (Sathaye et al. 2013). Higher
temperatures cause thermal expansion of transmission line
materials, and sagging lines increase the risk of power
outages when the lines make contact with other lines,
trees, or the ground (DOE 2013). More than 825,000
customers in Texas have been affected by electric
transmission outages caused by heat waves between 1992
and 2009 (DOE 2015b).
The risk of damage to transformers from higher ambient
temperatures can also impel operators to constrain
transmission capacity (USBR 2000). As transformers are
forced to operate above their rated ambient temperature,
their insulation begins to break down at an exponentially
increasing rate, eventually destroying the transformer
(Bérubé et al. 2007, Hashmi et al. 2013). Transformers are
critical to system operations and may be overloaded during
system emergencies (such as when transmission capacity is
insufficient), pushing temperatures to critical limits.
The infrastructure associated with electric power
transmission is also likely to be increasingly threatened by
more frequent intense hurricanes. The damage to the
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electric grid during the 2008 hurricane season, for example,
left 2.5 million Texas customers without power (API 2014a).
The combined effects of rising sea levels, increasing storm
surges, and increases in hurricane rainfall may expose lowlying substations near the Gulf Coast to flooding and
inundation, threatening lengthy shutdowns during and after
hurricanes (DOE 2013, USGCRP 2014). Furthermore, higher
wind speeds associated with higher-intensity hurricanes will
increase the threat of damage and disruption to power lines
(Figure 5-9). Finally, because of the relative isolation of
ERCOT, it is more difficult to import power from other
regions when the grid is stressed by capacity limitations,
and the risk of cost increases or supply disruptions to power
customers in Texas may be higher than in surrounding
states and regions.

procured a large-scale energy storage system to provide
islanding for the entire town. Presidio is particularly
vulnerable to extended outages because the town is
supplied by a single transmission line that is difficult to
access (NEMA 2013).
Wind Energy
Subsector Vulnerabilities
The Southern Great Plains contains some of the best
onshore wind resources in the country (Figure 5-10) and
represents almost a third of total installed wind power in
the United States. Texas, with over 12,000 MW installed, is
the national leader, while Kansas and Oklahoma together
contribute about 6,000 MW (EIA 2013d).

Figure 5-9. Linemen repairing downed distribution poles
following Hurricane Ike near Galveston, Texas

Figure 5-10. Annual average wind speed at 80 meters

Source: FEMA 2008

Source: NREL 2014

Electric Grid
Resilience Solutions
Resilience could be improved through increased
transmission redundancy and capacity (DOE 2013). For
infrastructure located near the Gulf Coast, hardening
measures include activities such as replacing wood power
poles with steel, concrete, or composite structures, along
with installing guys and other structure supports; burying
power lines in areas of high wind exposure; elevating critical
equipment and relocating substations to areas less
susceptible to flooding; and investing in spare/backup
equipment (CCSP 2008, DOE 2010b, EOP 2013).

Wind turbines in close proximity to the Gulf Coast may be
vulnerable to wind damage from more intense hurricanes.
Most wind turbines are designed to withstand sustained
wind speeds of 112 mph (Rose et al. 2012), and many
hurricanes have winds that significantly exceed this speed.
Some climate models have suggested that climate change
may lead to changes in average wind speeds, although
there is not yet substantial agreement among sources as to
how a changing climate will ultimately affect wind
resources (DOE 2013).

Utilities also use mobile transformers and substations to
temporarily replace damaged energy infrastructure. These
temporary units can include a trailer, switchgear, breakers,
emergency power supply, and transformers with enhanced
cooling capability that allows restoration of grid service
while circumventing damaged substation equipment,
allowing time to repair grid components (DOE 2010b).

Wind Energy
Resilience Solutions
There is limited research examining hurricane force wind
speeds as pertains to resilience of wind turbine design and
construction (Pryor and Barthelmie 2010). While the
industry standard design criteria call for turbines to
withstand sustained 112 mph wind speeds, more research
may be necessary regarding updates to these standard
practices and other potential strategies for improving wind
turbine resilience.

In some instances, energy storage systems can be a viable
option for improving resilience to vulnerable areas. For
example, AEP, the serving utility in Presidio, Texas, has
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Regional Climate Change Observations
and Projections in Detail
Higher Temperatures
Historical observations
 Since 1895, average temperatures have increased
0.09°F per decade, or almost 0.99°F (NOAA 2013).
 Frost-free season has been lengthening: The average
duration of the frost-free season across the entire
Great Plains region increased by about ten days (1991–
2012, compared to 1901–1960) (USGCRP 2014).
Future projections
 Average temperatures are expected to increase at a
faster rate: Depending on the region and greenhouse
gas emissions, increases of 3.5°F–8.5°F are expected by
2070–2099 compared to 1971–1999 levels (NOAA 2013).
 Extremely hot days are projected to become more
common: Across most of the region, 15–30 more days
with a daily maximum temperature >95°F are expected
by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to 1980–2000);
Texas is likely to be the most affected and may see over
30 more extremely hot days per year (NOAA 2013).
 Consecutive number of days of extreme heat are
expected to become longer: The annual maximum
number of consecutive days with a daily high >95°F is
projected to increase by 8–20 days by mid-century
(2041–2070, compared to 1980–2000) across most of
the region; West Texas is likely to be the most affected
and may see the number of consecutive days with a
daily high >95°F increase by up to 24 days (NOAA
2013).
 Extremely cold nights are expected to become less
common: Across the region, 0–10 fewer days with daily
minimums <10°F are expected by mid-century (2041–
2070, compared to 1980–2000) (NOAA 2013).
 Freeze-free season is expected to lengthen: Across the
region, the freeze-free season is expected to be 21–30
days longer by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to
1980–2000) (NOAA 2013).
 Cooling degree days (CDDs) are expected to increase:
Across the region, an increase of 600–1,000 CDDs is
expected by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to
1980–2000), with Texas and Oklahoma seeing the
largest change (NOAA 2013).
 Heating degree days (HDDs) are expected to decrease:
Across most of the region, declines of 450–850 HDDs
are expected by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to
1980–2000); Kansas is likely to be the most affected,
with declines of up to 1,050 HDDs possible by midcentury (NOAA 2013).
Changing Precipitation Patterns
Historical observations

Historical trends in precipitation are not statistically
significant, neither annually nor seasonally (NOAA
2013).



Across the Great Plains, extreme precipitation events
have occurred more frequently: An index of one-day
precipitation events expected to occur once every five
years shows a statistically significant upward trend
since 1895. In 2011, a linear trend of the series showed
a 30% increase over the period (NOAA 2013).
Future projections
 Across most of the region, annual precipitation is
expected to decrease: By the end of the century
(2070–2099), precipitation across the region is
expected to decrease 0%–12% compared to the period
1971–1999, depending on both latitude and emissions
scenario. The decrease in precipitation is expected to
be greatest in Texas and southwestern Oklahoma
(NOAA 2013).
 Spring precipitation is projected to decrease in Texas:
Texas is expected to see a 10%–30% decrease in
precipitation by the end of the century (2071–2099,
compared to 1971–1999) under a higher-emissions
scenario (USGCRP 2014).
 Drier summers are expected across most of the
region: Summer precipitation is expected to decrease
by 10%–30% by the end of the century (2071–2099,
compared to 1971–1999) under a higher emissions
scenario across the entire region, excluding
southwestern Texas (USGCRP 2014).
 Consecutive number of days with little or no
precipitation are likely to become longer: The annual
maximum number of consecutive days with less than
3 mm of precipitation is projected to increase 3–15
days by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to 1980–
2000) across most of the region, excluding Kansas
(NOAA 2013).
Hurricanes and Sea Level Rise
Historical observations
 Relative mean sea level in Texas has risen because of
a combination of global sea level rise and land
subsidence in the region: Relative mean sea level on
the Texas coast rose 0.08–0.27 inches/year, depending
th
on the location, between the middle of the 20 century
and 2006 (NOAA 2009).
Future projections
 Sea level rise is expected to accelerate: Between 1992
and 2050, sea level on the Texas coast is projected to
rise at an average rate of 0.14–0.35 inches/year (no ice
sheet melt) or 0.27–0.48 inches /year (ice sheet melt),
depending on the location (USGCRP 2014).
 Frequency of intense hurricanes (Category 4 and 5) is
projected to increase (USGCRP 2014).
 Hurricane-associated storm intensity and rainfall are
projected to increase: Rainfall rates within 100 km of
tropical storm centers are projected to increase by 20%
by 2100 (USGCRP 2014).
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Chapter 6: Midwest

Climate Change and the Energy Sector

6. Midwest

Overview

QUICK FACTS
The Midwest is home to expansive agricultural lands, forests in
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Midwest States:
the north, the Great Lakes, substantial industrial activity, and
Ohio, Wisconsin
Population (2013)
61,000,000 (19% of U.S.)
major urban centers. The region has an energy-intensive
Area (square miles)
447,000 (13% of U.S.)
economy, and its electricity mix is heavily dependent on
Energy expenditures
$260 billion
thermoelectric plants, with coal- and natural gas-fired power
% for
ENERGY
SUPPLY
Annual
Annual
plants accounting for about 70% of annual generation and
electric
& DEMAND
Production Consumption
power
nuclear power representing more than 20%. More than one
Electric power
TWh
815
771
n/a
quarter of national installed wind energy capacity, one third of
Petroleum
MMbbls
24
1,150
<1%
biodiesel capacity, and more than two thirds of ethanol
Coal
million tons
112
285
90%
production are located in the Midwest. Major climate change
Natural gas
Bcf
225
4,600
17%
Annual
Power
impacts projected to increasingly threaten the region’s energy
ELECTRIC
% of Total
Capacity
Production
plants
infrastructure include the following:
POWER
Production
(GW)
(TWh)
>1 MW*
 Average temperatures are projected to increase, extremely
Natural gas
97
12%
69
347
hot days are projected to occur more frequently, and heat
Coal
476
58%
105
208
waves are projected to become longer and more severe.
Nuclear
183
22%
25
17
Hydroelectric
6
1%
2
174
The average number of cooling degree days (CDDs) is
a
Wind
38
5%
15
261
projected to increase by 150–900 by mid-century. Higher
Biomass
8
1%
2
140
air and water temperatures cause power plants to operate
Solar
<1
<1%
<1
10
less efficiently and in some cases may force plants to curtail
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
Petroleum
Electric Power
production or temporarily shut down. Transmission line
Wells (>1 boe/d):
5,230 Power plants (>1 MW):
1,421
capacity also declines with higher temperatures, reducing
Refineries:
14 Interstate transmission lines:
48
the available power supply in the Midwest and in other
Liquids pipelines:
27 Coal
regions that depend on its electricity exports. At the same
Ports (>200 tons/yr):
6 Mines:
94
Natural Gas
Waterways
time, higher temperatures increase demand for cooling
b
Wells:
47,000 Coal and petroleum routes:
17
energy, increasing the potential for shortfalls.
Interstate pipelines:
33 Railroads
 Heavy precipitation events are projected to occur more
Market hubs:
2 Miles of freight track:
35,600
frequently, and average winter and spring precipitation
Note: Table presents 2012 data except for the number of oil wells, which is 2009 data.
*Some plants use multiple fuels, and individual generating units may be <1 MW.
levels are projected to increase, increasing the risk of high
Sources: AAR 2014, EIA 2013a, EIA 2013b, EIA 2013c, EIA 2013d, EIA 2014a, EIA
c
streamflows and flooding. Floods can disrupt energy
2014b, EIA 2014c, EIA 2014d, EIA 2014e, EIA 2014g, EIA 2014m, NEO 2014, US Census
Bureau 2014, USACE 2014
service and damage assets located in flood plains, such as
power plants and rail lines. Varying water levels on important shipping routes, including the upper Mississippi River, Illinois
d
River, Missouri River, and Ohio River, as well as the Great Lakes, could disrupt fuel transport along these waterways.
Table 6-1. Examples of important energy sector vulnerabilities and climate resilience solutions in the Midwest
Subsector

Vulnerability

Magnitude

Illustrative Resilience Solutions

Thermoelectric
Power
Generation;
Electric Grid

Reduced power plant generation
capacity and reduced electric grid
e
capacity due to higher temperatures

Improved operations protocols,
expanded capacity, alternative
water sources, recirculating, dry,
or wet-dry hybrid cooling systems

Fuel Transport

Increased risk of disruption to rail and
barge transport of coal and petroleum
due to flooding, drought, and
g
changing waterway levels

More than 90% of power generation
is from thermoelectric plants. The
region exports significant quantities
of electricity, so reductions in
generation also affect neighboring
f
regions
The Midwest produces 11% of U.S.
coal, and 58% of the region’s power
plant capacity is coal-fired.
Disruptions in rail and barge
h
transport also affect other regions

Electricity
Demand

Increased demand for electricity for
cooling in the summer due to higher
temperatures, severe heat waves, and
j
higher humidity

The region is projected to experience
150–900 CDDs per year by midcentury, as well as increased
k
humidity

Energy efficiency, load
management, capacity additions

Elevating infrastructure, upgrading
drainage systems, ensuring
culverts can handle increased
runoff, waterway dredging and
i
maintenance
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Regional Energy Sector Vulnerabilities
and Resilience Solutions
Key energy subsectors and illustrative examples of
resilience solutions in the Midwest are discussed below.
System components that are most vulnerable to climate
change are described first.

down, or sought special exemptions from state regulators
to continue to operate.
Examples of high temperatures affecting
thermoelectric power generation in the Midwest

Thermoelectric Power Generation
Subsector Vulnerabilities
Electricity generation in Midwestern states is dominated by
thermoelectric power plants, accounting for about 92% of
total electricity production, with over half generated from
coal-fired plants (EIA 2013d). Projected changes in
precipitation and temperature—both independently and in
combination—may restrict the available capacity of
thermoelectric power generation in the region.
Climate change is projected to have the following impacts
on thermoelectric power generation in the Midwest:
 Increasing air and water temperatures are expected to
reduce the generation capacity and efficiency of
thermoelectric units (DOE 2013).
 Expected increases in heavy precipitation events will
increase the likelihood of associated flooding, which
could damage facilities and disrupt operations (USGCRP
2014).
 Decreasing summer precipitation and longer periods
between rainfall events may limit water availability,
affecting power plant operations (DOE 2013, USGCRP
2014).
Projected climate change-induced increases in average and
extreme temperatures in the Midwest may reduce regional
power generation capacity. Increases in ambient air and
water temperatures reduce the thermal efficiencies of
thermoelectric power plants, which can result in reduced
power output and additional fuel consumption.
Approximately 95% of electrical generating infrastructure in
the region is susceptible to decreased efficiency due to
higher temperatures (USGCRP 2014). In addition, the
Midwest is a net exporter of electricity; decreases in power
output or increases in fuel consumption could hinder
system flexibility or increase costs across the eastern United
States (USGCRP 2014).
Increasing water temperatures put power plants at risk of
exceeding thermal discharge limits established to protect
aquatic ecosystems, and nuclear power plants face safety
limits on the intake temperature of water used for cooling
(DOE 2013). Plants facing elevated water temperatures may
be forced to temporarily shut down or curtail generation.
The sidebar presents examples of nuclear and coal plants
that, over the last few years, have had to take action
because of incoming or outgoing water being inadequate or
too warm. These plants have reduced generation, shut

2012: Four coal-fired power plants and four nuclear
power plants in Illinois requested permission to
exceed the permitted water temperature discharge
levels, established to prevent adverse ecological
impacts. The Illinois Environmental Protection
Agency granted special exceptions to the eight power
plants, allowing them to discharge water that was
hotter than allowed by federal Clean Water Act
permits (Eilperin 2012).
2012: The Braidwood nuclear plant in Illinois had to get
special permission from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission to continue operating after the
temperature of the water in its cooling pond rose to
102°F (Eilperin 2012).
2012: The Powerton coal plant in central Illinois had to
temporarily shut down a generator during peak
summer heat when water in the cooling pond
became too warm for effective cooling (Bruch 2012).
2006: One unit at American Electric Power’s D.C. Cook
Nuclear Plant was shut down because the high
summer temperatures raised the air temperature
inside the containment building above 120°F, and the
temperature of the cooling water from Lake
Michigan was too high for cooling intake. The plant
could not be returned to full power until the heat
wave passed five days later (Krier 2012).
2006: Two units at Exelon’s Quad Cities Generating
Station had to reduce electricity production to less
than 60% electricity capacity because the
temperature of the Mississippi River was too high to
discharge heated cooling water from the reactors
(USNRC 2006).
Thermoelectric power plants are also vulnerable to
flooding. Winter and spring precipitation for much of the
Midwest could increase by 20% or more by the end of the
century, although summer rainfall is projected to decline
(NOAA 2013b, USGCRP 2014). In addition, more intense
rainfall events are expected, increasing the chance of
flooding from rapid runoff channeled from farm fields and
urban areas. Power plants are typically located near rivers
or other sources of water and may be susceptible to
physical damage and disruption from flooding. Many areas
in the Midwest have experienced increasing frequency and
magnitude of flooding events (Hirsch and Ryberg 2012), and
this trend is projected to continue (Figure 6-1) (USGCRP
2014).
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Thermoelectric Power Generation
Resilience Solutions
New generation capacity can help address falling capacity
due to decreased plant efficiency. Capacity expansion with
low water requirements (e.g., thermoelectric power plants
with dry cooling or wet–dry hybrid cooling technology) or
no water requirements (e.g., wind and solar photovoltaics)
would help make the region’s power sector more resilient
to climate change. Programs that reduce total and peak
electricity demand can also reduce the water needs of
thermoelectric generators.

Figure 6-1. Rainfall increase during the wettest five-day period
1
over a year by mid-century
Source: USGCRP 2014

While annual average precipitation and heavy rainfall
events are expected to increase, summer rainfall is
projected to decline, and the number of consecutive days
with no precipitation is projected to rise (Figure 6-2)
(USGCRP 2014).Models indicate more precipitation when it
rains but increased duration between rainfall events, which
increases the chance of seasonal drought. Over 90% of
electricity generation in the Midwest requires freshwater
for cooling (UCS 2012), and low flow conditions in rivers and
lakes pose an operational risk to thermoelectric facilities
that require cooling water. Summer droughts can also
contribute to warmer surface water temperatures,
exacerbating power plant vulnerabilities associated with
higher temperatures.

Technologies such as wind energy that are more resilient to
climate change impacts can play an important role in future
capacity additions. The region has abundant wind
resources, and new generation is likely to include expanded
wind capacity (NREL 2014a). For example, Illinois, Iowa, and
Minnesota are among the top five states in the nation in
existing and planned wind capacity additions in 2014 and
2015 (Figure 6-3). Policy measures play an important role in
encouraging wind energy development. Michigan’s wind
capacity is among the fastest growing in the nation and is
boosted by Michigan's Clean, Renewable, and Efficient
Energy Act, which requires that all electricity providers
obtain at least 10% of their power from renewable
resources (EIA 2013e). Illinois' renewable portfolio standard
requires that investor-owned electric utilities with more
than 100,000 Illinois customers obtain 25% of retail sales
from renewable resources by May 2026, with at least 75%
of the requirement from wind (EIA 2015).

Figure 6-3. Existing wind capacity (green) and planned wind plant
installations in 2014 (dark blue) and 2015 (light blue)
Source: Adapted from EIA 2014j

Figure 6-2. Increase in the number of consecutive dry days over a
1
year by mid-century
Source: USGCRP 2014

1

Projected changes for mid-century (2041–2070) relative to the end
of the last century (1971–2000) under an A2 emissions scenario

Engineered barriers such as levees can be effective in
protecting vulnerable thermoelectric power plants from
flooding during heavy precipitation events. Utilities may
also elevate critical equipment to protect against flooding
or upgrade plants with submersible equipment or
watertight doors. Planners can protect new capacity by
locating new generators at higher elevations or outside of
flood plains.
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To better understand the implications of changing water
availability for cooling thermoelectric generation, advances
are being made in modeling and projecting future impacts.
For example, Exelon is developing tools to predict near- and
long-term (decades) changes in water availability, including
impacts linked to climatic changes, increased population
density, and upstream use (Exelon 2013). In 2013, Exelon
completed a pilot hydrological/climate modeling study of
the Kankakee River in northern Illinois, which supplies
water to the Braidwood nuclear plant. The facility had to
suspend its withdrawals for several days during the summer
of 2012 because flows in the river dipped below the
threshold specified in the facility’s public water withdrawal
permit from the Illinois Department of Natural Resources.
The Braidwood study was conducted as an analytical pilot
to determine the extent to which watershed flows could be
predicted and the extent to which climate change could
potentially alter future water availability. In addition, Exelon
and the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) are examining approaches to
“downscale” NOAA climate models, which would be
required before such models could be applied to
operational decision making on a facility level.
Fuel Transport
Subsector Vulnerabilities
The Midwest is reliant on rail, barge, pipeline, and truck
transport of energy products, notably coal. The region
produces about 11% of the coal produced in the United
States and imports significant quantities from the Northern
Great Plains and Northeast regions (EIA 2013a). The
Midwest depends heavily on coal for electricity, with coalfired generation making up 58% of all electricity generated
in the region (EIA 2013d). Rail is the primary means of
transporting coal, but another key fuel transportation
method is shipping of coal (and other energy products) by
barge, utilizing the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers, as well as
the Great Lakes. Energy commodities make up the largest
proportion of total inland U.S. waterborne cargo traffic, and
waterborne commerce is essential to the energy sector
(USACE 2012). New domestic energy production is spurring
rapid growth in the waterborne transport of energy
commodities and related products, increasing the demands
on waterborne traffic.
Midwest refineries and consumers rely on supplies of crude
oil and refined petroleum products imported from other
regions by barge and pipeline. In 2013, almost 580 million
barrels of crude oil and refined petroleum products were
moved via pipeline from PADD 3 (a region including the Gulf
Coast states) to PADD 2 (which includes the Midwest, as
well as some Great Plains and Southeast states) (EIA 2014k).
As supplies of crude oil from the Northern Great Plains and
Canada continue to grow, the Midwest is becoming less
dependent upon pipeline shipments of crude oil from the
Gulf Coast. Movements by barge or tanker are smaller but

still important. In 2013, 80 million barrels of crude oil and
petroleum products were shipped from PADD 2 to PADD 3
by barge and tanker, and 18 million barrels of petroleum
products were moved in the opposite direction (EIA 2014f).
In 2012, crude oil, refined petroleum products, and coal
accounted for 55% of all U.S. waterborne cargo traffic by
weight (DOE 2015c).
Climate change is projected to have the following impacts
on energy transport in the Midwest:
 Expected increases in extreme precipitation events will
increase the frequency of associated floods, which
could damage and disrupt transport infrastructure
(DOE 2013, NOAA 2013b, USGCRP 2014).
 More frequent and intense heat waves could damage
rail infrastructure, increasing the likelihood of rail
congestion and disruption to energy commodities
transport (DOE 2013, NOAA 2013b, USGCRP 2014).
 Barge transport of energy products on rivers and lakes
faces increased risk of disruption from changes in water
levels due to flooding, droughts, and evaporation (DOE
2013, USGCRP 2014).
Both heavy precipitation events and extended periods of
rainfall that saturate the soil can lead to regional flooding
events (NOAA 2013b, USGCRP 2014). High water levels
increase flow velocities and make river navigation by barge
difficult or dangerous (Posey 2014, USGCRP 2009). Heavy
precipitation events can also cause high runoff and flooding
that can disrupt train traffic and submerge track and
roadbed, causing extensive damage (Figure 6-4) (Union
Pacific 2011). High streamflows during heavy precipitation
events erode track beds, especially where railroads run in
low-lying areas adjacent to rivers and streambeds (DOE
2013, USGCRP 2014). Higher current velocities can also
affect river crossings, including rail and pipeline bridges, by
scouring bridge piers (Posey 2014). Buried pipelines are less
vulnerable to flooding impacts but may be subject to
damage from flood-borne debris, as high streamflow could
erode the soil and expose pipelines buried in riverbanks or

Figure 6-4. A railroad bridge is partially swept away by Cedar
River floodwaters in Waterloo, Iowa, in 2008
Source: NOAA 2015
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under the riverbed (GAO 2014). For example, in 2011,
flooding along the Missouri River in Iowa submerged and
damaged a pipeline, causing the pipeline to spill over 800
barrels of natural gas liquids into the river (EPA 2012,
Gebrekidan 2011).

pulled or pushed as a group) on the upper Mississippi,
Illinois, and Ohio Rivers typically has 15 barges, each
capable of carrying more than 1000 tons. A one-inch drop in
river level reduces tow capacity by 255 tons, resulting in
transport delays and higher costs (NOAA 2012).

As the frequency, length, and intensity of heat waves
increase, railroads and roadbeds are more susceptible to
material stress and damage (Posey 2012). Heat waves also
increase the likelihood of rail buckling, and railroads may
reduce the loading of rail cars and issue “slow orders" to
prevent derailments due to rail buckling (CCSP 2008, FRA
2011, USGCRP 2014). These measures can be costly, as they
lead to delays, consume rail capacity, increase operating
costs, and require railroads to maintain larger fleets of
rolling stock (CCSP 2008). Heat waves can also cause
bridges to expand, stressing thermal expansion joints and
causing a need for more frequent maintenance (Posey
2012).

There is still considerable uncertainty in projections for
Great Lakes water levels (USGCRP 2014). Increasing
temperatures may lead to drops in lake levels due to
increased evaporation, but increases in precipitation may
offset this effect (Posey 2012). While lower water levels
could reduce the amount of cargo ships could transport, if
lake ice levels decline, the St. Lawrence Seaway may remain
open longer and increase the shipping season (USGCRP
2014, Posey 2012).

Fuel transport during the 2008 Midwest floods
Parts of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, and Wisconsin received
more than a foot of rain over 15 days in 2008, causing
widespread flooding along the Mississippi River and
regional rivers. The floods caused extensive damage to
the region and disrupted barge, truck, and rail transport
of energy products (NOAA 2008). The U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers was forced to close locks on a 250-mile
stretch of the upper Mississippi River, disrupting
transport of petroleum products, coal, and ethanol
(Iowa DOT 2008). Major rail infrastructure in the region
was destroyed by floodwaters as railroad bridges were
swept away, disrupting rail service in Iowa and other
portions of the Midwest (DOE 2008). Damage to the
railroad system in Iowa was estimated to be between
$68 and $83 million and repairs lasted up to 12 months.
In addition, 125 miles of primary highway were washed
out, and 1,500 miles of road needed replacement
(NOAA 2009).
Increasing episodes of flooding (see text box) and drought
affect waterway levels and may have an impact on barge
transport of energy commodities in the region, particularly
along the Mississippi River. For example, during the 2012
drought, Mississippi River levels were near historic lows,
and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers allowed barges to
move in only one direction for eight hours a day and closed
the river to barge traffic for the remaining 16 hours for
dredging operations (Fears 2013). In December 2012, total
barge cargo in the portion of the Mississippi River running
from St. Louis to Cairo, Illinois, was down more than 1,100
kilotons compared to December 2011. By February 2013,
barges that typically run 12 feet deep were only allowed to
run 8–9 feet deep (Rizzo 2013). A tow (chain of barges

Fuel Transport
Resilience Solutions
Measures to harden fuel transportation infrastructure to
better withstand flooding include building or improving the
design of dams and levees, some of which failed to hold
during the 2008 floods in the Midwest. The dams and
levees along the upper Mississippi River were not
constructed according to a comprehensive plan, and the
level of protection provided by these structures varies,
ranging from protection from flood events occurring once in
5 years or less up to once in 500 years (CRS 2009). To
improve resilience to drought conditions, increased
maintenance dredging can increase river depths, reducing
the likelihood of barge transport restrictions.
Risks to railroads from flooding can be mitigated through
system and track upgrades, but these can be costly.
Resilience solutions include upgrading drainage systems,
ensuring culverts can handle increased runoff from heavy
precipitation events, and increasing pumping capacity in
tunnels (DOT 2009). Policy measures that restrict new rail
line development in floodplains, revise standards for
drainage capacity or elevating tracks, or require more
frequent track inspection can also improve resilience. Track
integrity inspection is shifting from visual methods to
sophisticated sensing techniques operated from vehicles
such as hi-railers (trucks that ride on rails).
Riverbank transport assets, including railroads and buried
pipelines, can be protected through the use of manmade or
natural barriers to reduce the risk of erosion. Pipelines
under river crossings can be protected by using horizontal
drilling techniques to bury the pipe significantly deeper
than traditional trenching methods (Brown 2013, Miller and
Bryski 2012). Pipelines at risk from erosion can also be
replaced with materials that are less likely to leak or
rupture from impacts (e.g., coated steel rather than cast
iron or bare steel).

Regional Vulnerabilities and Resilience Solutions | Midwest

6-5

Rails are designed to withstand temperature gradients
based on expected ambient temperatures and heat
generated from railcar traffic (FRA 2011, Volpe 2003). New
or replacement tracks can be installed to function at higher
temperatures, reducing the likelihood of derailment.
Railroad companies that are incorporating considerations of
higher temperatures from climate change into their
planning would most likely upgrade tracks when they are
replaced for other reasons, including normal wear and tear,
upgrades for traffic reasons, or damage from other extreme
events, including flooding (CCSP 2008).
To increase resilience to disruptions in fuel supply, utilities
may also consider increasing fuel stockpiles. For example,
Ameren is implementing new fuel inventory policies and
developing alternative delivery options at facilities to
mitigate the risk of fuel supply disruption (Ameren 2013).
Electricity Demand
Subsector Vulnerabilities
The Midwest on the whole is an electricity exporter,
providing power to adjacent states in the Northeast
(USGCRP 2014). However, several states in the region,
including Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and
Wisconsin, are net importers of power from neighboring
states and Canada (EIA 2014a, EIA 2012b). Some localities in
the Midwest, as well as adjacent states in the Northeast,
may be affected if electricity demand in the region grows.
Winters in the region are cold, and in most cities, total
energy demand for winter heating is five to seven times
greater than energy demand for cooling (USGCRP 2014).
But since heating is traditionally provided by fossil fuels,
including natural gas and heating oil, utilities in the region
are typically summer peaking, with summer peak demand
an average of 14% higher than winter peak demand (EIA
2013c). The region is highly energy-intensive and more
industrial than the rest of the country, with 34% of total
electricity consumption in the industrial sector (EIA 2013c,
USGCRP 2014).

Figure 6-5. Increase in annual total CDDs by mid-century

2

Source: NOAA 2013b

Additional CDDs will likely impel consumers to use more air
conditioning as daytime and nighttime temperatures rise. In
addition, it is likely that warmer temperatures will increase
the number of homes and businesses with air conditioners
in the region, which would amplify the electricity demand
effects of increasing CDDs. One study projects that
temperatures in much of the Midwest will be similar to
current temperatures in the South by the end of the
century, including more days over 95°F each year in Chicago
than the average Texas resident experiences today (RBP
2015). Market penetration of air conditioners in the South
is currently 98%, compared to 91% in the Midwest (EIA
2011b). As temperatures increase, the market penetration
of air conditioners in the Midwest may approach that of the
South. These changes could contribute to rapid increases in
total and peak energy demand.
Demand for cooling energy depends on not only
temperature but also humidity (Beecher and Kalmbach
2012). Projected changes for the region include increasing
heat waves coinciding with increased humidity,
compounding factors driving growth in peak energy
demand (USGCRP 2014).

Climate change is projected to have the following impact on
electricity demand in the Midwest:
 Higher maximum temperatures, longer and more severe
heat waves, higher humidity, and higher overnight lows
are likely to increase electricity demand for cooling in
the summer (NOAA 2013b, USGCRP 2014).

Increasing use of air conditioning is likely to heighten power
sector vulnerability to service disruptions unless it is offset
by demand management programs, improvements in air
conditioner energy efficiency, or new generation and
transmission capacity (refer to Thermoelectric Power
Generation and Electric Grid sections).

As shown in Figure 6-5, an increase of 300–900 CDDs is
projected by mid-century for most of the region, with the
exception of the northern portions of Minnesota and
Wisconsin and the upper peninsula of Michigan (NOAA
2013b). Relative to historical climate, and depending on the
region, these increases represent up to a doubling of CDDs
by mid-century (NOAA 2013b).

In the winter, increasing temperatures are expected to
reduce demand for heating. One study found that heating
degree days may decrease by 15% across the Midwest by
mid-century (CMAP 2013). Having fewer heating degree

2

Projected changes for mid-century (2041–2070) relative to the
end of the last century (1980–2000) under an A2 emissions
scenario
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days is likely to reduce demand for heating fuel, primarily
natural gas (EIA 2013f).
Electricity Demand
Resilience Solutions
Energy efficiency, load management, and capacity
expansion (including more climate-resilient technologies) all
play roles in reducing the exposure of the Midwest’s power
sector to increasing electricity demand. One study found
that increased demand in the Midwest associated with
climate change could exceed 10 GW, which would require
more than $6 billion in infrastructure investments (Gotham
et al. 2012).
As changes to electricity demand depend on not only
climate but also population change, economic growth, and
the deployment of new technologies, investments in
capacity expansion will likely be made as part of an
integrated planning process. Growth in power consumption
in the region has been slower than the national average
over the last two decades and has fallen in several states
(Beecher and Kalmbach 2012). This decrease is partly due to
slow population growth, which has been slower than any
other region over the same period (U.S. Census Bureau
2014).
Energy efficiency, load management, and other programs
administered by regional power producers can help reduce
total electric power demand and peak loads (Beecher and
Kalmbach 2012). Midwest utilities have already
implemented a number of demand-side management
(DSM) practices to reduce loads and improve energy
efficiency. For example, Hoosier Energy is expanding DSM
efforts targeting water heaters, air conditioners, and heat
pumps, contributing to lower costs and better reliability in
times of high energy demand. The utility also offers
incentives to encourage installation of higher efficiency
heating and cooling systems, helps customers meet
enhanced energy efficient design and construction
standards to lower energy costs, and supports appliance
recycling programs to remove inefficient refrigerators and
freezers (Hoosier Energy 2014).
Increasing resilience through flexible demand
Columbia Water & Light (CWL) in Missouri offers a load
shedding program to commercial and industrial
customers. Customers who reduce their electric
demand during peak demand periods can receive a
credit of $36 per year per kilowatt based on the
average reduction in demand during requested
periods. Customers can receive credits for up to 50%
of the customer’s normal base load demand prior to
load shedding (CWL 2014b).

DSM programs have so far achieved peak load reductions of
over 3,700 MW and enrolled over 5,000 industrial
customers, 32,000 commercial customers, and 1.2 million
households in price responsive programs (EIA 2013c). A
survey of 37 Midwest Independent System Operator (MISO)
utilities indicated a peak load reduction potential of over
4,700 MW from retail demand response programs (LBNL
2008).
Capacity expansion can also help alleviate the stresses that
increasing peak electricity demand will place on the region’s
electricity supply. In addition, new capacity investments
2003 Blackout: A lesson in regional interdependencies
On August 14, 2003, a major blackout struck the
northeastern United States and parts of Canada,
including areas in Connecticut, Maryland, Michigan,
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Vermont, and the
Canadian provinces of Ontario and Quebec. Some 50
million people were affected. The blackout occurred on
a hot summer day, with temperatures exceeding 87°F
and elevated power demand throughout the region
(DOE 2004).

Figure 6-6: New York City skyline during the 2003 blackout
that was initiated in the Midwest
Source: DHS 2013

The blackout was initiated by outages on transmission
lines operated by First Energy (FE) in Ohio. High
ambient temperatures and high demand caused a
345 kV transmission line to sag low enough to arc to a
tree, causing the line to trip (DOE 2004). This outage
caused increased loads on other lines, causing those
lines to trip, and soon a surge of power propagated
throughout the northeastern grid. While management
practices allowed the outage to spread across the
region, the sensitivity of FE’s transmission lines to
elevated temperatures were also to blame (DOE 2004).
Subsequent investigations found that FE made
optimistic assumptions about transmission line cooling
when setting summer emergency ratings, and that FE
had failed to trim trees in its rights-of-way, precipitating
the line strike (DOE 2004).

Regional Vulnerabilities and Resilience Solutions | Midwest

6-7

may be needed to replace a substantial number of baseload
coal plants that may be retiring (see Thermoelectric Power
Generation section) (EIA 2014l).
Electric Grid
Subsector Vulnerabilities
The Midwest region includes portions of MISO and PJM
Interconnection, as well as a small part of the Southwestern
Power Pool (SPP). The region’s grid is dense, with total
regional power production and consumption second only to
the Southeast and significant mileage of 345 kV lines (EIA
2013b, EIA 2013c, EIA 2014a).
Climate change is expected to have the following impacts
on the electric grid in the Midwest:
 Higher average and extreme air temperatures and
higher nighttime temperatures reduce the capacity of
transmission lines and substations, increasing the
likelihood of disruption (DOE 2013, USGCRP 2014).
 Higher extreme temperatures may reduce the lifetime
transformers and reduce transformer overloading
capacity (Hashmi et al. 2013, USBR 2000).
Higher temperatures can cause transmission operators to
decrease the current-carrying capacity of transmission lines
in order to protect the equipment (Sathaye et al. 2013).
High temperatures cause thermal expansion of transmission
line materials, and sagging can permanently damage lines
and increase the likelihood of power outages when the lines
make contact with other lines, trees, or the ground (see
sidebar) (DOE 2013). In Ohio, heat events have resulted in
transmission outages for about 25,000 customers from
1992–2009 (DOE 2015b). The combined impacts of
increasing demand and reduced capacity increase the
likelihood that transmission operators will be forced to
impose brownouts (Sathaye et al. 2013). Additionally, in the
summer, overheated power lines rely on cooler overnight
temperatures to reduce thermal load. Projected climate
changes include heat waves with higher nighttime
temperatures that hinder overnight cooling and may lead to
more overheated power lines (DOE 2013, USGCRP 2014).
Reduced transmission capacity, when combined with
projected increases in demand for cooling energy and
reductions in available generating capacity associated with
higher air and water temperatures, can also affect regions
that depend on power imports from the Midwest.
Higher ambient temperatures can increase the likelihood
that power transformers will be damaged, especially on
extremely hot days when electricity demand is highest
(Hashmi et al. 2013, USBR 2000). Power transformers are
typically rated for 24-hour average ambient temperatures
of 86°F (when temperatures do not exceed 104°F) (PJM
2011). Above a transformer’s rated temperature, its paper
insulation breaks down at exponentially higher rates, so

even incremental increases in ambient temperature can
harm transformers, especially if high temperatures occur
during grid emergencies when transformers must be
overloaded for safety or reliability purposes (Bérubé 2007,
Hashmi et al. 2013, USBR 2000). To protect transformers,
operators may be forced to reduce loading capacity (USBR
2000).
Electric Grid
Resilience Solutions
New and existing transmission infrastructure can be made
more resilient through the use of smart technologies that
better respond to grid emergencies by isolating outages
before they can cause cascading failures (Ameren 2013,
DOE 2004, DOE 2013). These advanced technologies
provide increased redundancy in transmission networks and
substations. New transmission lines can also be designed to
accept emergency loading conditions at higher
temperatures, and operators can use realistic assumptions
about weather conditions when defining emergency
conditions (DOE 2004, DOE 2013).
Building a resilient electric grid in Chicago
Commonwealth Edison, a unit of Exelon Corporation,
has partnered with American Superconductor
Corporation (AMSC) on the Resilient Electric Grid (REG)
effort, a plan to deploy AMSC’s high-temperature
superconductor technology (AMSC 2014). This
technology will be used to build a superconducting
cable system to connect substations in Chicago’s grid
and build redundancy that allows multiple substations
to share the extra load in the event of a substation
going offline (AMSC 2014, DHS 2015). By splitting the
load among operational substations, REG can help
prevent outages (DHS 2015). REG is a part of the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security Science and
Technology Directorate’s efforts to improve the
security and resilience of electric grids in the United
States, and was validated at Oak Ridge National
Laboratory (AMSC 2014, DHS 2015).
Improved operations can also increase grid resilience.
Vegetation management is an important means of
preventing line outages caused by tree strikes, as well as
fires that can be started by such events (DOE 2013). For
example, American Electric Power (AEP) has invested more
than $1 billion in vegetation management around
transmission lines and is designing new and replacement
poles to withstand damage greater than its National Electric
Safety Code (NESC) requirement in the service territory
(AEP 2014). In some cases, grid resilience can be improved
through undergrounding of lines, although it is costly. For
example, Ameren is burying power lines in the region to
increase physical resilience and is working to incorporate
smart technology such as intelligent switches that can
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isolate outages and respond to failures when damage
occurs (Ameren 2013).
The resilience of transformers to higher air temperatures
and higher nighttime temperatures can be increased by
installing or upgrading forced-air or forced-oil cooling in
transformers (Hashmi et al. 2013, USBR 2000). Operators
can derate transformers during periods of elevated ambient
temperatures to lower the thermal loading and protect the
transformers from damage (USBR 2000). In the long term,
operators can replace existing transformers with thermally
upgraded transformers to increase resilience (Bérubé et al.
2007).
Local power generation can improve resilience by reducing
reliance on long-distance delivery of electricity via the grid.
Local or distributed generation, such as onsite solar panels
or small-scale wind power (Figure 6-7), reduces exposure to
grid outages. In addition, critical facilities such as
emergency response services and water utilities can install
backup power generators with sufficient capacity to
operate continuously for extended outages.

Figure 6-7: Small scale wind turbines at Dull Homestead Farm in
Brookville, Ohio
Source: DOE 2015a

Bioenergy
Subsector Vulnerabilities
As a major producer of agricultural products, the Midwest is
critical to the nation’s supply of biofuels. Ethanol
production from corn dominates regional bioenergy
production and consumption. It also includes a small
amount of biodiesel production from canola oil, and
captured landfill and wastewater gases are used to
generate electricity and produce renewable natural gas
(biomethane).
The Midwest region is home to over half of the nation's
ethanol refining capacity, with operational facilities capable
of producing 7.3 billion gallons of ethanol per year (NEO
2014). Of the 121 ethanol biorefineries in the region, all but
one rely on corn as a feedstock (RFA 2014). While corn is a
commodity and is grown in almost every state, corn

production for biofuel is an especially important product in
the Midwest. Led by Iowa and Illinois (ranked first and
second among states in corn production, respectively), the
region harvested 58% of the nation's corn acres in 2013
(USDA 2014).
Climate change is expected to have the following impacts
on bioenergy in the Midwest:
 Moderately higher temperatures may benefit crops, but
extreme temperatures may harm them; warmer
temperatures may also benefit weeds, disease, and
pests (USGCRP 2014).
 Lower numbers of freezing days and a lengthening of
the frost-free growing season may extend the range
where biofuel crops can be grown (Bjerga 2012, NOAA
2013b, Roberts and Schlenker 2011).
 Moderate increases in seasonal precipitation may
benefit crops, but an increasing probability of seasonal
drought and floods may harm them (NOAA 2013b,
USGCRP 2014).
The projected impacts of climate change on corn growth
are complex, with a mix of outcomes depending on region
and climate uncertainty, and are expected to evolve over
time. Changes in the length of the frost-free season are
projected to be large and positive, aiding corn cultivation,
with increases of 15–30 days per year by the middle of the
century, depending on the location (NOAA 2013b). Plant
growth can also be aided by increased CO2 levels. In the
long run, however, temperature increases are projected to
shorten the duration of reproductive development of corn
and lead to declines in yield (USGCRP 2014). Additionally,
any beneficial effects to crops may be outpaced by
increased weeds, diseases, and pests, making cultivation
more difficult and less productive (USGCRP 2014).
Projected increases in winter and spring precipitation may
also benefit agricultural productivity, as soil moisture is
recharged. However, springs that are too wet may also
reduce crop yields, forcing growers to switch to shorterseason varieties. The region is expected to experience
increased intensity of extreme precipitation events, which
can erode soils and flood fields. Finally, higher
temperatures (which increase evapotranspiration),
declining summer precipitation, and an increase in the
average number of days without precipitation may increase
the region's vulnerability to periodic seasonal drought
(USGCRP 2014).
Crop yields in the Midwest will be more strongly influenced
by anomalous weather events than by changes in average
temperature and annual precipitation. Increasing intensity,
frequency, and length of heat waves may also reduce yields
by preventing the effective pollination of crops (Figure 6-8)
(USGCRP 2014).
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Figure 6-8. Drought-stressed corn
Source: Station 2012

Figure 6-9 shows the effects of changes in maximum
summer temperature on yields for two major crops in the
region.

Bioenergy
Resilience Solutions
A number of resilience-building options are available to
growers of biofuel crops. In the Midwest, a longer freezefree season could allow more northern farmers to grow
corn. Nationally, adaptation strategies for agriculture
include diversification of crops and crop rotation (including
heat- and drought-tolerant varieties), increased use of
pesticides, and additional practices associated with
sustainable agriculture, such as improving soil quality and
minimizing off-farm flows of nutrients and pesticides
(USGCRP 2014). Bio-refining technologies that use less
water to produce fuels can also help increase resilience in
cases of seasonal water shortages.
Wind Energy
Subsector Vulnerabilities
The Midwest region has over 15,000 MW of operational
wind generating capacity, or 5% of total capacity in the
region (EIA 2013b). In the Midwest, 146 utilities and
producers operate 261 wind farms (EIA 2013b). Some of the
best onshore wind resources in the country are located in
Illinois, Iowa, and Minnesota, and all of the states in the
region except Indiana incentivize wind power with
renewable portfolio standards (EIA 2012a, NREL 2014a).
Although some models have suggested that climate change
may lead to declines in average wind speeds, there is not
yet substantial agreement among researchers as to how a
changing climate will ultimately affect wind resources in the
United States (DOE 2013). It is uncertain whether wind
power production will be disrupted by climate-driven
changes to wind patterns or if it will see an increase in
available capacity.

Figure 6-9. Differences in corn (top) and soybean (bottom) yields
based on maximum summer temperatures in Illinois and Indiana
Source: USGCRP 2014

Biorefineries may also be vulnerable to climate change
impacts. Biorefineries—which convert biomass
(predominately corn) to ethanol or other fuel—can use a
substantial amount of water. Water needs in biorefineries
have fallen significantly over a ten-year timeframe from an
average of 6 gallons of water per gallon of ethanol
produced down to 2.7 (Wu and Peng 2011). Declines are
largely due to new efficient designs; however, similar to
petroleum refineries, biorefineries could face water
shortfalls if seasonal droughts occur more frequently (DOE
2013, USGCRP 2014).

Wind Energy
Resilience Solutions
Various measures can be taken to increase the resilience of
wind energy. In general, if wind speeds decline, operators
can increase the resilience of wind energy by increasing the
efficiency of operating turbines, although these
improvements would be beneficial regardless of reductions
in wind resources. Generation by a single turbine can be
increased by increasing turbine height and blade length
(AWEA 2014). A wind farm can also operate more efficiently
if turbines are sited to reduce the impact of a single
turbine’s wake on other turbines (NREL 2014b).
Advances in wind turbine technology can also enhance
resilience to more extreme wind conditions. For example,
because utilities cannot control when wind is available, it
has been difficult to fully incorporate wind power into the
electricity grid, but innovative battery designs and other
grid-scale storage technologies designed to store energy
produced by wind could enhance the use of wind turbine
technology.
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Regional Climate Change Observations
and Projections in Detail
Higher Temperatures
Historical observations
 Since 1895, average temperatures have increased
0.14°F per decade, or almost 1.5°F (NOAA 2013a).
 Spring temperatures have increased 0.17°F per
decade, or almost 1.9°F (NOAA 2013b).
 Frost-free season has been lengthening: The average
length of the frost-free season across the Midwest
region increased by about nine days (comparing 1991–
2012 to 1901–1960) (USGCRP 2014).
 Water temperatures on the Great Lakes have
increased by more than 5°F from 1968 to 2002 (NOAA
2013a).
 Ice coverage on the Great Lakes has decreased: The
average annual maximum ice coverage during 2003–
2013 was less than 43%, whereas the average ice
coverage during 1962–2013 was 52% (USGCRP 2014).
Future projections
 Average temperatures are projected to increase at a
faster rate: Depending on the region and greenhouse
gas emissions, increases of 4.5°F–9.5°F are projected by
2070–2099 compared to 1971–1999 levels, with the
largest increases in Michigan, Minnesota, and
Wisconsin (NOAA 2013b).
 Extremely hot days are projected to become more
common: Across most of the region, up to 25 more
days with daily maximum temperatures >95°F are
projected by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to
1980–2000); portions of southern Missouri and Illinois
are likely to be the most affected and may see as many
as 30 more extremely hot days per year (NOAA 2013b).
 Consecutive number of days of extreme heat are
expected to become longer: The annual maximum
number of consecutive days with a daily high >95°F is
projected to increase by up to 16 days by mid-century
(2041–2070, compared to 1980–2000) across the
region; the southern portion of the region is likely see
the greatest increases (NOAA 2013b).
 Extremely cold nights are projected to become less
common: Across the region, 5–25 fewer days with daily
minimums <10°F are projected by mid-century (2041–
2070, compared to 1980–2000) (NOAA 2013b).
 Frost-free season is projected to lengthen: The frostfree season is projected to be 15 to more than 30 days
longer by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to 1980–
2000) across the region, with the largest increases in
Michigan (USGCRP 2014).
 Cooling degree days (CDDs) are expected to increase:
Across the region, an increase of 150–900 CDDs is



projected by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to
1980–2000) (NOAA 2013b).
Heating degree days (HDDs) are expected to decrease:
Across most of the region, declines of 700–1,300 HDDs
are projected by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to
1980–2000); Michigan is projected to be the most
affected, with declines of up to 1,500 HDDs by midcentury (NOAA 2013b).

Changing Water Availability
Historical observations

Since 1895, annual precipitation has increased by 0.31
inches per decade, or almost 3.4 inches (NOAA 2013b).

Across the Midwest, extreme precipitation events
have occurred more frequently: An index of two-day
extreme precipitation events expected to occur once
every five years shows a statistically significant upward
trend since 1895 (NOAA 2013a).
Future projections

Annual precipitation is projected to increase: By the
end of the century (2070–2099), precipitation in the
northern portion of the region is projected to increase
by 3%–9% under a high emissions scenario (compared
to the period 1971–1999); Minnesota is projected to be
the most affected and may see an increase as high as
12% (NOAA 2013b).

Winter and spring precipitation is projected to
increase; summer precipitation may decline: Midwest
winters, springs, and falls are projected to see
increased precipitation by mid-century (2071–2099,
relative to 1971–2000) under a higher emissions
scenario, while summer precipitation may decline by
10% or more in southwestern parts of the region
(USGCRP 2014).

Extreme precipitation events are projected to
increase, particularly in the northern portion of the
region: The number of days per year with precipitation
greater than one inch is projected to increase by 10%–
50% by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to 1980–
2000) under a high emissions scenario; Minnesota is
projected to be the most affected, and portions of the
state may see an increase of over 50% (NOAA 2013b).

Consecutive number of days with little or no
precipitation are likely to become longer: The annual
maximum number of consecutive days with less than
0.01 inches of precipitation is expected to increase by
mid-century (2041–2070, relative to 1971–2000), with
Missouri and Illinois projected to experience the largest
changes (USGCRP 2014).
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Chapter 7: Northeast

Climate Change and the Energy Sector

7. Northeast

Overview

QUICK FACTS
The Northeast consists of a number of large and densely
Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Maine,
populated urban and industrial areas, as well as wide-ranging
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
Northeast States:
Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
rural areas and deciduous forestland. The climate is
Vermont, West Virginia
characterized by cold winters and warm, humid summers. The
Population (2013)
65,000,000 (21% of U.S.)
region relies primarily on thermoelectric power, including
Area (square miles)
198,000
(6% of U.S.)
natural gas-fired, nuclear, and coal-fired plants. The Northeast
Energy expenditures
$257 billion
% for
produces large amounts of coal, mainly in West Virginia and
ENERGY SUPPLY
Annual
Annual
electric
Pennsylvania, and has a significant number of natural gas wells.
& DEMAND
Production Consumption
power
Major climate change impacts projected to increasingly
Electric power
TWh
665
599
n/a
threaten the region’s energy infrastructure include the
Petroleum
MMbbls
7
1,050
<1%
Coal
million tons
178
95
89%
following:
Natural gas
Bcf
2,820
4,270
39%
 Temperatures are projected to increase, and heat waves
Annual
Power
a
ELECTRIC
% of Total
Capacity
are projected to occur more frequently and last longer.
Production
plants
POWER
Production
(GW)
Warmer temperatures and longer, more frequent, and
(TWh)
>1 MW*
more severe heat waves are expected to increase both
Natural gas
215
32%
69
280
Coal
186
28%
48
86
average and peak demand for cooling energy, while
Nuclear
199
30%
26
17
causing available generation and transmission capacity to
Hydroelectric
37
6%
8
369
b
decline.
Wind
8
1%
4
84
 Atlantic hurricane intensity is projected to increase, and
Biomass
13
2%
3
163
Solar
<1
<1%
<1
129
the most intense hurricanes (Category 4 and 5) are
CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE
projected to occur more frequently. Combined with
Petroleum
Electric Power
projected sea-level rise, hurricane-associated storm surge
Wells (>1 boe/d):
2,360 Power plants (> 1 MW):
1,270
c
is likely to cause greater coastal damage. Coastal power
Refineries:
10 Interstate transmission lines:
37
Liquids pipelines:
12 Coal
plants, electrical grid components, and fuel transport
Ports (>200 tons/yr):
20 Mines:
520
infrastructure are at risk of damage from more intense
Natural Gas
Waterways
d
hurricanes and sea level rise-enhanced storm surges.
Wells:
113,000 Coal and petroleum routes:
25
 Heavy precipitation events are projected to occur more
Interstate pipelines:
25 Railroads
Market hubs:
2 Miles of freight track:
16,200
frequently, with the number of days with more than one
e
Note: Table presents 2012 data except for the number of oil wells, which is 2009 data.
inch of rain increasing 12%–30% by mid-century. Inland
*Some plants use multiple fuels, and individual generating units may be <1 MW.
flooding from increasingly frequent and intense heavy
Sources: AAR 2014, EIA 2011, EIA 2013b, EIA 2013c, EIA 2013d, EIA 2014a, EIA 2014b,
EIA 2014c, EIA 2014e, EIA 2014f, EIA 2014g, USACE 2014, US Census Bureau 2014
precipitation events heightens the risk of damage and
f
disruption to roads, railroads, power lines, pipelines, and other low-lying infrastructure.
Table 7-1: Examples of important energy sector vulnerabilities and climate resilience solutions in the Northeast
Subsector

Vulnerability

Magnitude

Illustrative Resilience Solutions

Energy Demand and
Thermoelectric
Power Generation

Higher temperatures reduce system
efficiency and increase total and
g
peak electricity demand

Air temperature increases of 3.5°F–
6.5°F and CDD increases of 100–700
h
projected by mid-century

Capacity additions, demand-side load
management, energy efficiency

Electric Grid

Increased intensity of storms and
heavy rainfall, causing wind damage
and flooding to power lines and
i
low-lying substations

Recent hurricanes resulting in widespread regional power outages to
j
more than 8 million customers

Physical hardening, submersible
equipment, redundant transmission,
smart grid and distributed generation,
and vegetation management

Fuel Transport and
Storage

Increased exposure to damage and
disruption from flooding during
heavy precipitation events and sea
level rise-enhanced storm surge
k
during more intense hurricanes

Sea level rise expected to exceed
global average of 1–4 feet by 2100
and coastal flooding impacts from
higher frequency of intense
l
hurricanes

Reinforcing shorelines of critical
waterways; dredging to maintain
shipping access; elevating or
rerouting critical rail, road, or pipeline
arteries
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Regional Energy Sector Vulnerabilities
and Resilience Solutions
Key energy subsectors and illustrative examples of
resilience solutions in the Northeast are discussed below.
System components that are most vulnerable to climate
change are described first.
Electricity Demand
Subsector Vulnerabilities
With cold winters and warm, humid summers, the
Northeast relies on energy for both heating and cooling.
The region’s electricity consumption is distinctly seasonal.
Summer peak demand served by the average utility in the
region is about 30% higher than winter peak demand (EIA
2013a). More than four out of five households in the region
report using air conditioning, although they use it
significantly less frequently than the national average (EIA
2013e).

The projected increase in CDDs in the Northeast is
comparable to CDD increases in most of the northern
United States. However, the region hosts many densely
populated metropolitan areas that magnify the intensity of
summer heat through the urban heat island effect.
Temperatures in densely populated towns and cities can be
significantly higher than surrounding areas (EPA 2014). An
example of this effect can be seen in a heat map of New
York City (Figure 7-1). This effect, combined with the
region’s relatively humid summertime climate, is expected
to amplify the region’s electricity demand for cooling
(USGCRP 2014).

Winter space heating in the region is provided primarily by
natural gas and fuel oil (EIA 2014h). The region hosts the
oldest building stock in the nation, and therefore recent
improvements in energy codes for new buildings may not
benefit a large share of consumers (DOE 2008, NAHB 2012,
USGCRP 2014).
Climate change is expected to have the following impacts
on electricity demand:
 Higher average temperatures (including warmer
overnight lows) and extreme high temperatures,
including more frequent, more severe, and longerlasting heat waves, are expected to increase average
and peak electricity demand for cooling (NOAA 2013,
USGCRP 2014).
By the end of this century, average temperatures in the
Northeast are projected to increase by 3.5°F–8.5°F
(compared to 1971–1999). By mid-century, increases of
2.5°F–5.5°F could produce 400–700 additional CDDs per
year in the southern portion of the region and along the
coasts from Massachusetts to Maryland (i.e., the location of
the region’s largest metropolitan areas). Changes in CDDs in
the interior of New York and New England are projected to
be smaller, adding 100–400 CDDs by mid-century (NOAA
2013).
Changes to temperature extremes, including heat waves,
are expected to increase peak electricity demand in the
region. This may limit the electricity sector’s ability to
deliver energy when it is most needed (DOE 2013a). Across
most of the region, extremely hot days are expected to
occur more often, and heat waves are expected to occur
more frequently and last longer (USGCRP 2014, NOAA
2013). Conversely, warmer winter temperatures and fewer
numbers of days below freezing are expected to reduce
demand for heating energy (NOAA 2013, USGCRP 2014).

Figure 7-1. Urban heat islands magnify ambient temperatures. In
this example, temperatures in urban areas of New York City are
approximately 10°F warmer than the forested parts of Central
Park
Source: USGCRP 2014

Increases in CDDs will likely cause homeowners and
businesses to use air conditioning more often, as warmer
daytime and nighttime temperatures will occur more
frequently (DOE 2013a). More households and businesses
may install air conditioning or upgrade from window units
to whole-building systems. Large increases in summer air
conditioning—along with associated technology and
structural investments—could be a transformational change
for much of the region. These changes could contribute to
nonlinear increases in total and peak electricity demand
(Auffhammer 2011). The New York Independent System
Operator (NYISO) expects peak demand to grow an average
of five times faster than total demand over the next decade
1
(NYISO 2014). The most significant changes in the
projected number of extremely hot days occur in and near
coastal areas where the region’s populations are
concentrated (Figure 7-2).
1

Peak demand is forecast to grow 0.83% per year on average,
while overall electricity demand is forecast to grow 0.16% per year
on average from 2014 to 2024 in New York State.
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In addition to future energy savings from federal energy
efficiency programs, many Northeast states have adopted
aggressive energy efficiency resource standards for
investor-owned utilities and other power producers.
Massachusetts, in particular, has one of the most ambitious
targets for energy savings, requiring utilities to achieve
annual savings of 2.4% per year through 2015, resulting in
energy efficiency investments that are projected to reduce
energy demand by over 3,700 GWh in 2015 (ACEEE 2014).
New York requires a 20% energy efficiency improvement in
buildings owned or managed by the state by the year 2020
(BuildSmartNY 2015).

Figure 7-2. Average mid-century increases in hot days (>90°F) per
2
year
Source: USGCRP 2014

Growth in electricity demand will reduce power system
resilience unless mitigated by successful demand side
management or increased generation capacity. These
increases in peak and annual demand heighten the risk of
service outages, particularly when combined with the
impacts of climate change on electricity generation and
transmission infrastructure (see Thermoelectric Power
Generation and Electric Grid sections).
Electricity Demand
Resilience Solutions
Energy efficiency, capacity expansion, and market
mechanisms such as demand response could improve the
electric power sector’s resilience to future increases in
electricity demand.
Energy efficiency can help reduce total electricity demand,
even as the need for cooling energy increases. Federal
energy efficiency programs such as the U.S. Department of
Energy’s (DOE’s) Weatherization Assistance Program reduce
energy demand by partnering with utilities (including the
Northeast Utility System) to provide weatherization services
to low-income families. Through DOE’s Better Buildings
Challenge, organizations in the region and across the
country are taking on important commitments to improve
the energy intensity of their buildings by at least 20% over
10 years and sharing strategies that work. Nationwide,
more than 190 organizations are participating in the
Challenge, representing more than 3 billion square feet of
building space, over 600 manufacturing facilities, and close
to $2 billion in energy efficiency financing (DOE 2014f).

2

Projected changes for mid-century (2041–2070) relative to the
end of the last century (1971–2000) under an A2 emissions
scenario.

Capacity expansion can alleviate the pressure that
increasing peak electricity demand from warmer
temperatures will place on the region’s electricity
generators. Population shifts, economic growth, and new
technologies, such as electric vehicles, could also contribute
to increasing electricity use. In addition to meeting
increased electricity demand, the electric power sector in
the Northeast may need to replace a substantial number of
baseload coal plants that are nearing retirement and
nuclear plants that are approaching the end of their
operating license and may not apply for renewal (ISO-NE
2014). The bulk of new capacity is likely to come from
natural gas. This transition from coal to gas can potentially
reduce both greenhouse gas emissions and water
withdrawals for cooling thermoelectric power plants.
Between 2000 and 2012, the Northeast added more than
30 GW of natural gas capacity, while retirements of coal
and petroleum power plants resulted in a net decrease
from those fuels (Figure 7-3) (EIA 2013c).

Figure 7-3. Recent changes in Northeast electricity generation
nameplate capacity by fuel type, 2000–2012
Source: EIA 2013c

Renewable energy represents a significant potential
resource for new capacity. For example, wind power
provided 11% of new capacity additions between 2000 and
2012 (EIA 2013c). DOE has used loan guarantees to support
deployment of innovative technologies that enable greater
use of regional wind generation (see text box). Efforts also
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include enhanced hydropower deployment, including
efficiency upgrades of existing hydropower infrastructure.
For example, more than 70% of the electricity New York
Power Authority (NYPA) produces is from hydropower
facilities (NYPA 2013). NYPA has conducted significant
efficiency improvements over the last several years,
including replacing and refurbishing major components and
equipment, such as pump-turbines, that will enable the
plants to operate at maximum efficiency well into the 21st
century (NYPA 2013).
Electric trading with other regions, including across the
border with Canada, allows pooling of resources and can
improve electric reliability. Although power imports can
introduce vulnerabilities, as seen in the 2003 blackout that
was triggered by an event in the Midwest, on balance
interconnection improves reliability, both in sharing
reserves and in guarding against cascading outages. Peak
power use in Canada is during the winter, which enables
additional imports to the United States in the summer (EIA
3
2012b).
Examples of U.S. Department of Energy support for
deployment of wind generation technologies




In August 2011, DOE issued a loan guarantee
enabling Record Hill Wind to build a 50 MW wind
farm in Maine. This plant uses new technology that
reduces the need for curtailments and allows
consistent power output during extreme wind
conditions, reducing wear and tear on the turbines
and preserving the lifetime of the turbine
components (DOE 2014a).
In September 2011, DOE issued a partial loan
guarantee to Brookfield Renewable Power to
construct the Granite Reliable wind power
generation facility in New Hampshire. The facility is
one of only a few land-based wind farms in the
United States that use a 3.0 MW wind turbine
(rather than a 1.7 MW turbine), reducing project
costs on a per-megawatt basis (DOE 2014b).

Demand response in the power market is a strategy that
reduces the risk from increasing peak electricity demand.
Many operators in the Northeast are already leveraging
demand response to address increasing peak demand.
Compared to all other independent system operators (ISOs)
and regional transmission organizations (RTOs) surveyed by
the Federal Energy Regulatory Committee in 2012, the New
England ISO had the highest rate of demand response
capacity as a percentage of total peak load (10.7%), and
3

Although it is outside the scope of this study, it is plausible that
warmer temperatures in Canada will affect summer electricity
demand and reduce the amount of power available for export to
the United States.

PJM Interconnection had the largest absolute response
capacity, with 10,825 MW in reserve (FERC 2013).
Thermoelectric Power Generation
Subsector Vulnerabilities
The Northeast region generates almost all of its power from
thermoelectric power plants. The region’s fuel mix is
relatively evenly split between natural gas, nuclear, and
coal, but important differences exist between New England
and the Mid-Atlantic states (Table 7-2). Coal is the largest
source of power for the Mid-Atlantic (33%) but is a small
(3%) fraction of New England’s fuel mix, which relies on
natural gas for more than half of its total electricity. Nuclear
energy supplies 30% of the region’s power, a greater
fraction than in any other region in the United States (EIA
2013c).
Table 7-2. Electric power generation in the Northeast by
technology

Generator Type
Coal
Natural Gas
Nuclear
Hydroelectric
Biomass
Wind
Solar
Other

New
England
3%
52%
30%
6%
6%
1%
<1%
2%

MidAtlantic
33%
28%
30%
6%
1%
1%
<1%
1%

Total
Northeast
28%
32%
30%
6%
2%
1%
<1%
1%

Source: EIA 2013c

Over the next several decades, the region’s fuel mix is
expected to change. Many of the nuclear power plants in
the region are scheduled to retire. The contribution of coal
to the region’s generation mix is also expected to decline as
more plants are closed (ISO-NE 2014, NYISO 2014).
Climate change is projected to have the following impacts
on thermoelectric power generation in the Northeast:
 Increasing air and water temperatures could reduce the
available generation capacity of thermoelectric power
plants (DOE 2013a).
 Increased hurricane intensity, and more frequent
intense (Category 4 and 5) hurricanes, combined with
the effects of sea level rise, increase the vulnerability of
coastal power plants to wind and coastal flooding
damage (DOE 2013a, USGCRP 2014).
 More frequent and intense heavy precipitation events
increase the vulnerability of low-lying inland and
coastal power plants to damage and disruption from
flooding (DOE 2013a, USGCRP 2014).
 Higher temperatures, decreasing summer precipitation,
and increasing periods of time between precipitation
events may increase the likelihood of thermoelectric
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power plants experiencing water shortages (DOE
2013a, NOAA 2013, USGCRP 2014).
The majority of thermoelectric power plants in the
Northeast use fresh surface water for cooling (UCS 2012,
Figure 7-4). Although many of the coal and nuclear power
plants in the Northeast use advanced cooling technologies
that recirculate cooling water, approximately 30% of
generating capacity in the region (including one third of
coal-fired plants and a quarter of nuclear plants) use oncethrough cooling systems that draw from and discharge into
4
freshwater sources (UCS 2012).

Figure 7-4. Distribution of thermoelectric power plants greater
than 70 MW by type of cooling system; larger circles on the map
indicate higher net summer capacity
Source: EIA 2012a

Climate change is expected to increase the temperature of
bodies of water used for cooling (NOAA 2013). Higher
surface water temperatures decrease generation efficiency
and, therefore, available capacity. This effective decrease in
generation capacity may increase the likelihood of power
disruptions; power plants may be forced to shut down to
avoid exceeding the thermal water discharge limits imposed
by law to protect ecosystems (DOE 2013a).
Warmer surface water temperatures may also increase the
likelihood of forced shutdowns of nuclear power plants.
Nuclear plants are licensed to operate under a range of
conditions. If water temperatures exceed this range, they
may be required to shut down. For example, in 2010, and
again in 2012, nuclear plants in the region faced mandatory
curtailments or shutdowns in response to elevated cooling
water temperatures (DOE 2013a).
In addition to warmer water temperatures, higher air
temperatures also reduce efficiency in power plants. For
example, natural gas power plants may lose 0.3%–0.7% of
power output for every 1.8°F increase in air temperature
(DOE 2013a).

associated storm surge will likely be intensified by rising sea
levels (USGCRP 2014). Estimates suggest that 19 power
plants in the Northeast are located less than four feet
above sea level (Climate Central 2014).
Inland power plants are threatened by more frequent heavy
precipitation and increased rainfall during the heaviest
downpours (NOAA 2013, USGCRP 2014). Flooding in
mountain valleys and floodplains can inundate vulnerable
power plants and disrupt surface cooling water sources
(DOE 2013a, USGCRP 2014).
While more frequent heavy downpours are expected to
increase the likelihood of flooding, total summer
precipitation is projected to decline (NOAA 2013, USGCRP
2014). The largest changes are projected for western
Pennsylvania and West Virginia, where rainfall may decline
by 4%–8% in the summer (NOAA 2013). Combined with
higher temperatures that lead to greater evaporation rates,
the likelihood of seasonal water shortages may increase.
Decreasing surface water availability resulting from lower
summer rainfall, increased evaporation rates from higher
temperatures, and competing uses (e.g., irrigation for
agriculture and municipal water for metropolitan areas)
may reduce the available generation capacity of
thermoelectric power plants in the summer (DOE 2013a,
USGCRP 2014).
The once-through freshwater cooling systems used by many
Northeast power plants (Figure 7-4) require a significant
and consistent supply of water from lakes, rivers, and
streams. Plants using these types of cooling systems are
more vulnerable to deratings or outages due to low water
levels. During periods of drought, plants using these cooling
systems can become nonoperational if the water level
drops below water intake structures (NERC 2013).
Thermoelectric Power Generation
Resilience Solutions
Reduced efficiency and capacity from higher air and water
temperatures can be addressed by capacity additions or
through demand reduction measures such as load
management and energy efficiency. New generation
capacity with sources and supply chains less affected by
increasing temperatures and decreased water availability
(e.g., wind and solar photovoltaics) can help make the
region’s power sector more resilient to climate change.

Climate change is projected to increase the frequency of
intense hurricanes, hurricane-associated storm and rainfall
intensity, and heavy precipitation events (USGCRP 2014).
Intense hurricanes can cause significant wind and flood
damage to coastal power plants. In addition, hurricane4

Excluding oil-fired capacity.
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Hardening power generation in New York City
By 2050, 97% of New York City’s power plants are
projected to be in the 100-year flood plain. New York
City has developed a plan to work with plant owners,
utilities, and regulators to harden assets against 100year floods. The City has called on the New York Public
Service Commission to require that new and upgraded
generation facilities be hardened if they cannot
demonstrate they would be able to remain operational
during a 500-year flood event (NYC 2013).

Generators can also pursue alternative water supplies for
once-through power plants. For example, to mitigate the
risk of low river levels in the region, Exelon Generation is a
co-owner of the Merrill Creek Reservoir in New Jersey,
which acts as water storage for Exelon’s generating stations
when river flow on the Delaware River is low (Exelon 2014).
Electric Grid
Subsector Vulnerabilities
Energy transmission and distribution infrastructure in the
Northeast is both extensive and aging (ISO-NE 2014, Pepco
2014). The region’s population and electric power
infrastructure are concentrated in coastal cities and lowlying river valleys (USGCRP 2014), making the Northeast
electric grid vulnerable to flooding from both heavy
precipitation events and coastal storm surge during
hurricanes, both of which are projected to increase as a
result of climate change.
The Northeast region’s electric grid is operated by three
independent system operators: the New England ISO, New
York ISO, and PJM Interconnection. In many areas, the
electric grid is characterized by an extensive network of
older, lower-capacity transmission lines serving as feeder
lines to transformers and other critical system components
(ISO-NE 2014).

Figure 7-5. Projected increase in FEMA 100-year flood zone
for New York City
Source: NOAA 2014

Engineered barriers such as levees can be effective in
protecting thermoelectric power plants that are vulnerable
to flooding from hurricanes and heavy precipitation events.
For example, ConEdison has installed new floodgates and
doors in new walls and moats to access isolation zones at
three generating stations in New York City and has installed
new flood pumps on mobile skids that can remove excess
water from isolation zones and moats (ConEd 2014b).
Utilities may also elevate critical components to protect
against flooding or upgrade plants with submersible
equipment. Long-run changes to planning processes
account for sea level rise, and increased storm surges are
necessary to protect future power plants from coastal
flooding.
Introducing more advanced cooling technologies into the
region’s power production infrastructure may be an
effective strategy to reduce its vulnerability to periodic
drought. For example, American National Power installed a
dry cooling system in a natural gas-fired plant in
Connecticut, cutting projected water consumption by 70%
(UCS 2011).

Climate change is projected to have the following impacts
on the electric grid:
 Increasing hurricane intensity (and frequency of
Category 4 and 5 storms) and frequency of heavy
precipitation events will increase the likelihood of wind
damage, flooding, and inundation of coastal and inland
electric grid infrastructure (DOE 2013a, USGCRP 2014).
 Sea level rise is expected to magnify the height and
reach of storm surges, exacerbating the impact of
hurricanes on coastal transmission and distribution
infrastructure (DOE 2013a, USGCRP 2014).
 Increasing air temperatures and higher nighttime
temperatures are projected to reduce the electric grid’s
transmission capacity and increase the risk of damage
to transformers (Bérubé 2007, DOE 2013a).
 Increasing frequency of extreme temperatures will
increase the risk of physical deformation of power lines
and disruptions to service (DOE 2013a, USGCRP 2014).
Components of the electric grid may be damaged by
flooding and storm surge during extreme precipitation
events and hurricanes (see Figure 7-6 and sidebar on next
page: Northeast hurricanes and electric grid infrastructure),
and overhead power lines are vulnerable to wind damage
from intense storms (DOE 2013a, USGCRP 2014). For
example, transmission lines damaged by hurricanes
resulted in outages for almost 1.5 million Maryland
customers from 1992–2009 (DOE 2015a). In coastal areas,
substations may be flooded, critically undermining electric
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grid operations. When components of electric transmission
and distribution infrastructure are flooded with seawater
during storm surge events, the salt water may permanently
damage electrical components (ConEd 2013). In general,
more frequent and intense coastal flooding is expected to
result in an increased frequency of longer-term localized
outages due to flooded and corroded equipment, as well as
increased damage from saltwater encroachment and
structural damage due to wave action (USGCRP 2014).
More severe storms and flooding also impair the ability of
repair crews to respond and restore service (DOE 2013d).

Figure 7-6. Significant damage to New Jersey distribution
infrastructure caused by Hurricane Sandy

Northeast hurricanes and electric grid infrastructure
Hurricanes Sandy and Irene had severe impacts on the
electric grid in the Northeast. During Sandy, more than
100 electric substations in four states were inundated,
and almost 9 million customers were left without
power (Table 7-3). Substation flooding during
Hurricanes Sandy and Irene led to outages and severe
disruptions to electric power service in the region
(Figure 7-6 and Figure 7-7) (ConEd 2013, USGCRP
2014).

Figure 7-7. Areas of New York metro region inundated by
Hurricane Sandy

Source: DOE 2014e

Average sea levels are projected to rise between one and
four feet by the year 2100, compounding the coastal
flooding impacts of storm surge from intense hurricanes
(USGCRP 2014). Moreover, local land subsidence is
expected to increase the local rate of sea level rise across
much of the northeastern coastline, especially in the
southern portion of the region (USGCRP 2014). States in the
southern portion of the region have relatively flat (lowsloping) coastlines and are particularly vulnerable to the
amplifying effect of sea level rise on the height and reach of
hurricane storm surge (USGCRP 2014). Although states
farther north, such as Massachusetts and New York, have
higher sloping coastlines, the presence of major cities and
the high concentration of infrastructure bordering the coast
increase the potential for storm surge-related damage and
disruption to essential electric grid infrastructure (USGCRP
2014).
Extremely high temperatures can force transmission
operators to reduce the current-carrying capacity of
transmission lines (DOE 2013a, Sathaye et al. 2013). Hot
weather conditions also reduce the capacity of power
substations and increase the risk of damaging transformers
(Bérubé 2007, DOE 2013a). These effects can be
exacerbated by higher nighttime temperatures, which
prevent power lines and other grid infrastructure from
cooling off. Higher temperatures cause thermal expansion
of transmission line materials, and sagging lines increase
the risk of damage to the lines and cause outages if they

Source: DOE 2013b

The damage to the electric grid from Hurricane Sandy
rippled through other sectors, including transportation,
communications, wastewater treatment, and health
care. For example, loss of power to pipelines in the
region temporarily disabled pipeline transport of
critical fuels to the region (Table 7-3, DOE 2013b).
Subsequently, power outages also prevented gas
stations from being able to pump gasoline, resulting in
widespread fuel shortages in New York and New Jersey
(see Fuel Transportation and Storage section). In
addition, power outages at treatment plants sent
billions of gallons of raw and partially treated sewage
into the region’s waterways, affecting public health and
aquatic habitats (Climate Central 2013).
Table 7-3. Energy impacts of Hurricane Irene and Hurricane
Sandy

Impact
Electric Customer Outages
(millions)
Petroleum Refining Capacity
Shut Down (barrels per day)
Petroleum Product
Terminals Shut Down
(number)

Irene
6.69

Sandy
8.66

238,000

308,000

57

25

Source: DOE 2013b
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make contact with other lines, trees, or the ground (DOE
2013a).
The risk of damage to transformers from higher ambient
temperatures and higher nighttime temperatures can also
force operators to reduce the capacity of transformers
(USBR 2000). Typical power transformers in the region are
rated to 24-hour average ambient temperatures of 86°F,
with a maximum of 104°F (PJM 2011). Above the rated
ambient temperature, the paper insulation used in
transformers begins to break down at an exponentially
increasing rate (Bérubé 2007, Hashmi et al. 2013).
Transformers are critical to system operations and may be
overloaded during system emergencies, pushing
temperatures to critical limits. Elevated ambient
temperatures on the hottest days of the year may limit the
emergency overloading capacity available to operators
(Hashmi et al. 2013, USBR 2000).
Electric Grid
Resilience Solutions
A number of measures are available for grid operators to
improve the resilience of transmission and distribution
infrastructure to extreme weather and temperatures.
Measures include physical and engineering modifications to
hardware to better withstand the impacts of climate change
(hardening) and improvements in the tools available to grid
operators to improve flexibility and response options during
extreme weather events.
In flood-prone areas, infrastructure owners may choose to
replace existing equipment with submersible equipment or
elevate components above expected flood stages (NY Storm
Recovery 2014). For example, ConEdison has installed
submersible switches on the distribution grid (NEMA 2013).
Additionally, ConEdison considers a number of modeled
and observed flooding scenarios to set the minimum
elevation of new and existing grid infrastructure (ConEd
2013). Public Service Electric & Gas Company (PSE&G) is
elevating or physically hardening 21 transmission switching
stations that would benefit from flood and/or storm surge
mitigation, such as those located below the newly defined
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) advisory
base flood elevations.
System-wide resilience to reduced capacity and increased
risk of disruption from elevated temperatures can be
improved by adding additional capacity and redundancy to
the transmission grid (DOE 2013a). Transformers can be
protected from higher ambient temperatures by installing
or upgrading cooling systems, or by replacing existing units
with thermally upgraded transformers (Bérubé 2007, USBR
2000). Operators can increase transformers’ resilience to
increasing air temperatures by derating transformers when
air temperatures are high to prevent damage (Hashmi et al.
2013).

National Grid focuses on microgrids
National Grid has partnered with Clarkson University on
an underground microgrid pilot project in Potsdam,
New York, that would increase the resilience and
efficiency of New York’s electricity grid. The microgrid
could be islanded in an emergency and would serve
critical loads with local generation from existing natural
gas, fuel oil, hydroelectric, and photovoltaic sources
(National Grid 2014).
The deployment of improved system controls can enable
more flexible and targeted grid operator response to critical
events, regardless of their cause. Grid sectionalizing is one
solution that infrastructure managers can use to increase
the resilience to climate change. ConEdison is implementing
an overhead system upgrade in the region that will reduce
the number of customers served by a single circuit to fewer
than 500. It is anticipated that 15%–20% fewer homes and
businesses will lose power during major storms as a result
of the measure (ConEd 2014b). The use of isolation
switches at local levels, for example, enables operators to
section off vulnerable locations during emergencies without
disrupting the larger network. Iberdrola USA has adopted
the goal of increasing the number of distribution circuits in
order to decrease the number of customers served per
circuit. Grid sectionalizing will also improve resilience to
impacts of extreme heat on overhead transmission and
distribution lines (ConEd 2013).
In May 2014, the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities
approved an investment program of resilience solutions to
be implemented by PSE&G. The program includes efforts to
harden infrastructure and restore service to customers
quicker following major storm events. In the approved
program, 29 switching and substations that were damaged
by water in recent storms will be raised, relocated, or
otherwise protected, and smart grid technologies will be
deployed to better monitor system operations and facilitate
swifter mobilization of repair teams.
In Maine, Central Maine Power’s (CMP’s) smart metering
network allows for remote verification and diagnosis of
outages reported by customers, speeding the assessment
and restoration and reducing the recovery times.
New York’s vision for a future “Energy Highway” is one
example of an integrated approach to system resilience.
The state’s long-term plan for its transmission grid includes
a number of strategies to prepare for climate change and
higher peak energy demand. New York plans to increase its
investment in smart grid systems to improve resilience
through enhanced power systems operation, security, and
energy storage. The plan also includes increasing the
capacity of power transmission lines to allow access to new
generation sources, particularly wind power (NYEHTF 2012).
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DOE and Sandia National Laboratories are collaborating
with the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities, City of
Hoboken, and PSE&G to develop and implement a plan for
the first-ever transit system microgrid as part of Hurricane
Sandy recovery efforts (City of Hoboken 2013, DOE 2013c,
NJ Transit 2014). NJ TransitGrid (NJT) is being designed as a
dynamic microgrid spanning rail lines and critical stations
and maintenance facilities across New Jersey Transit’s busy
northeastern corridor between Newark and New York City.
NJT will help to ensure trains keep running even if the
centralized grid goes down (City of Hoboken 2013, DOE
2013c, NJ Transit 2014). Beyond being America’s thirdlargest transportation system and serving nearly 900,000
passengers daily, the stretch of rail covered by NJT is both
an important access point to Manhattan and one of the
most at risk from flooding.

Port of Baltimore is the third largest coal export port in the
United States (EIA 2014b). Coal is brought to the port by rail
from mines in the Appalachian region (EIA 2014b).

Fuel Transport and Storage
Subsector Vulnerabilities
Transportation and storage infrastructure are integral to
the Northeast’s energy systems. The region imports very
nearly all of the petroleum it consumes, and while
production of natural gas is growing in the Marcellus shale,
significant quantities are still imported. Coal transportation
is also critical to meeting the region’s energy demand.

Coastal energy transportation infrastructure across the
Northeast seaboard is vulnerable to storm surge and heavy
winds associated with hurricanes (DOE 2013a, EIA 2014b).
Included are petroleum, LNG, and coal terminals, port
facilities, aboveground storage facilities, pipeline pumping
stations, and petroleum refineries. Over this century,
models project a slight decrease in the average annual
number of tropical storms but an increase in hurricaneassociated storm intensity and rainfall rates, as well as in
the number of Category 4 and 5 hurricanes (USGCRP 2014).
Storm surges associated with hurricanes will likely be
enhanced by rising global sea levels, which are projected to
rise between one and four feet by the end of the century,
with even higher local rates of relative sea level rise
(USGCRP 2014). Storm surge can cause structural damage
(due to wave impact and erosion) and saltwater corrosion
and lead to extended service disruptions to critical facilities
(CCSP 2008, USGCRP 2014).

Petroleum transportation infrastructure varies within the
region. Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and
West Virginia receive most refined petroleum products by
pipeline from the Gulf Coast and Midwest or from local
refineries. Refineries in northwest Pennsylvania rely on
imports of crude oil by pipeline from Canada, while
refineries in Delaware, New Jersey, and around Philadelphia
rely on shipments by tanker from other countries and
increasingly on crude-by-rail shipments from shale
formations in the United States and Canada (EIA 2014b).
New England has no product pipelines from outside the
region and is entirely reliant on marine terminals to receive
petroleum products, which are then transported further
inland by rail, truck, pipeline, and barge. Road infrastructure
in the Northeast is also critical for delivery of retail
petroleum products.
The Northeast, particularly New England, relies on
aboveground liquefied natural gas (LNG) storage more than
any other region in the United States (DOE 2014d). New
England does not contain any underground natural gas
storage sites but is home to almost 75% of the nation’s
aboveground LNG storage capacity (DOE 2014d, EIA 2014d).
Natural gas storage is critical for meeting peak winter gas
demand for heating and is increasingly important for
electricity generation (NERC 2011).
Coal is transported from domestic producing regions by rail
and is imported from South America by ship (EIA 2014b).
Coal is also transported through the region for export: the

Climate change is projected to have the following impacts
on transport of energy products:
 Projected increases in the storm intensity of hurricanes
and frequency of intense the most intense hurricanes
(Categories 4 and 5) are expected to heighten the risk
of damage and disruption of coastal transportation and
storage infrastructure, including ports, refineries, and
pumping stations (DOE 2013a, USGCRP 2014).
 More frequent extreme precipitation events can cause
flooding and damage to transportation infrastructure
running along rivers and in low-lying areas, leading to
service disruptions (DOE 2013a, USGCRP 2014).

Inland flooding caused by extreme precipitation events is a
major threat to Northeast transportation infrastructure and
systems (USGCRP 2014). Roads and bridges, railroads,
pipelines, and other energy transportation and storage
infrastructure located alongside rivers or in river floodplains
are vulnerable to disruption of service and damage from
flooding and debris. For example, two pipeline ruptures in
April 2015 in Marshall County, West Virginia, were caused
by shifting soil after heavy rains (AP 2015). Natural forces
are the leading cause of damage to petroleum product
pipelines in West Virginia (DOE 2015b). The Northeast has
already experienced significant increases in the amount of
rain that falls during the heaviest downpours. Compared to
the middle of the last century, extreme precipitation events
5
in the Northeast are already 70% heavier (USGCRP 2014).
By the middle of this century, the average number of days
per year with precipitation of more than one inch is
5

Comparison is between 1958 and 2010. Extreme precipitation
events are defined as the heaviest 1% of all daily events.
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projected to grow 12%–30% under continued emissions
growth (compared to the 1980–2000 average) (NOAA
2013). Intense hurricanes can also contribute to inland
flooding as hurricane-associated rainfall increases (USGCRP
2014).

track subgrade that will weaken the track’s foundation.
Saltwater inundation of coastal rail infrastructure can also
damage infrastructure, causing corrosion of rail lines,
electrical distribution systems, and signaling equipment
(Figure 7-8) (USGCRP 2014).

Through wave action and erosion, storm surges affecting
port and terminal facilities can knock down terminal
buildings and dislodge cargo containers, damage specialized
terminal equipment, and damage wharf and pier structures
and undermine the foundation of terminals (CCSP 2008).
Facilities can also be inundated, rendering them inoperable
and damaging equipment with saltwater contamination.
High winds can damage refinery structures, aboveground
tanks at storage terminals, and retail outlets (API 2014, DOE
2010). For example, during Hurricane Rita in 2005,
approximately half of the cooling towers at refineries in
Port Arthur, Texas, and Port Neches, Texas, were damaged,
some with fan blades that were dislodged and launched by
intense winds (DOE 2010).

Further inland, increasing frequency of heavy precipitation
events may lead to washout of roads and railroads and
damage to rail yards and bridges important for the
transportation of energy products (see sidebar: Coastal and
inland flooding: A Tale of Two Storms) (DOE 2013a).

Terminals and aboveground facilities are forced to stop or
delay operations prior to and during hurricanes, affecting
the transport of oil and gas throughout the region (CCSP
2008). Storm-associated currents and flood debris can block
or render inoperable navigation channels, extending delays
(CCSP 2008). One analysis of U.S. Department of
Transportation data found that 28 intermodal freight
terminals across the region were located less than four feet
above sea level, with 13 of these terminals located in New
Jersey (Climate Central 2014).
Many of the key highways and railroads in the Northeast
are located in areas prone to coastal flooding and are
vulnerable to damage and disruption from more frequent
intense hurricanes (USGCRP 2014). By one estimate, more
than 4,500 miles of roads in the region lie below four feet
above sea level (Climate Central 2014). Short-term impacts
of coastal flooding may temporarily take roads out of
service and damage culverts and bridge decks, but
prolonged flooding may weaken roadways over the long
term (CCSP 2008). Similarly, railroads are susceptible to
long-term damage from flooding, including erosion of the

Figure 7-8. Corroded electrical substation equipment
damaged by saltwater following Hurricane Sandy

Coastal and inland flooding: A Tale of Two Storms
Successive tropical storms struck the Northeast in 2011
and 2012, unleashing both inland and coastal flooding
on the region’s transportation infrastructure. Hurricane
Irene dumped more than 10 inches of rain on large
areas of New Jersey, upstate New York, and southern
Vermont in a short period of time, causing recordbreaking flood stages in mountain valleys across the
region (NOAA 2011). While coastal impacts were less
severe than expected, the inland floods destroyed or
damaged nearly 2,400 roads and over 300 bridges,
including major interstates, as well as over 200 miles of
railroad in Vermont alone (NOAA 2011, VANR 2014).
Subsequent efforts to restore power were hampered
by widespread road closures, leading to lengthy delays
in full power restoration (NJBPU 2011).
Hurricane Sandy made landfall in New Jersey and
brought tropical storm conditions and record storm
surges to a large portion of the East Coast. As tides well
above 13 feet were measured across New York Harbor,
coastal flooding associated with Hurricane Sandy
damaged buildings, equipment, and cargo at ports in
New York and New Jersey. Flooding and power outages
closed fuel terminals in New York City for four days to
more than a week following the storm, resulting in
long-term delays (ICF 2014, NYC 2013). Ocean water
flooded and heavily damaged three of the four major
tunnels into Manhattan, and two Class I railroads with
service into the Northeast, CSX and Norfolk Southern,
embargoed traffic into the region (Progressive
Railroading 2012, USGCRP 2014). The Colonial Pipeline
(a major source of gasoline and petroleum products for
the New York City metropolitan area) was shut down
for four days, and National Grid’s natural gas
distribution mains in portions of New York were
severely damaged and had to be rebuilt (DOE 2013a,
NYC 2013). Extensive power outages from Sandy also
caused crippling fuel shortages in New Jersey, New
York City, and Long Island, leading to fuel rationing.
Even after many stations were resupplied, electricity
was not available to power pumps (Nahmias 2013).

Source: Port Authority of NY & NJ 2015
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Flooding of river valleys can wash out road and railroad
culverts and embankments, bridge piers, and pipelines that
follow river courses or cross underneath riverbeds. For
example, flooding has already been a problem for
important coal railroads in the Appalachian Mountains that
follow riverbanks (DOE 2013a). Hurricane Irene was a major
precipitation event that produced destructive flash flooding
across upstate New York and southern Vermont in 2011
(Figure 7-9) (NOAA 2011). Resulting floods damaged
hundreds of miles of roads and rail and significantly
disrupted transportation in the region (USGCRP 2014, VANR
2014).

Holland Tunnel to prevent future flooding (NY Storm
Recovery 2014). At fuel terminals and pipeline pumping
stations, critical equipment, including substations, control
rooms, and pumps, can be elevated or sealed in waterproof
structures (DOE 2010). In preparation for expected flooding,
small pump motors can be wrapped for protection or
mounted on skids to allow operators to lift the motors prior
to flooding events (DOE 2010). To prevent tank movement
during flood events, operators can anchor tanks or add
product to increase the tanks’ weight and prevent floating,
and ensure that containment dike drainage valves are
opened to allow flood waters to exit the diked area (DOE
2010). ConEdison has undertaken several measures to
harden its LNG peak-shaving facility in New York, such as
installing dockside auxiliary diesel pumps for use after
storm events and constructing elevated corrosion-resistant
platforms to install transformers, the diesel-driven backup
pump, and a diesel black start generator (ConEd 2014a).
Fuel shipping operations can be protected by hardening the
shorelines of critical waterways to prevent and offset
erosion, and dredging can be employed to maintain
shipping access and accelerate a return to normal
operations.

Figure 7-9. Vermont Route 131, washed out from flooding
following extreme precipitation during Tropical Storm Irene
Source: USGCRP 2014

Some climate change impacts may benefit energy sector
transportation in the future. Winter temperatures are
expected to increase, reducing cold weather risks to
transportation infrastructure and winter pipeline
congestion (NERC 2013, USGCRP 2014). For example,
increasing average temperatures and decreasing heating
degree days may alleviate constraints on natural gas
pipeline capacity during the winter months as heating
energy demand falls (NERC 2013). Furthermore, freezing
temperatures can interrupt gas wells and pipelines;
naturally occurring hydrates can freeze wellheads,
pipelines, and pipeline equipment, causing temporary
shutdowns in extremely cold weather (NERC 2011).
Fuel Transport and Storage
Resilience Solutions
Similar to other low-lying and coastal infrastructure, some
fuel storage and transport assets can be hardened to better
withstand more intense hurricanes and associated storm
surge, and management measures can reduce the risk of
damage and shorten resulting disruptions. Examples of
hardening measures include elevating critical equipment,
using submersible equipment, building or improving the
design of levees and floodwalls, and installing watertight
doors on vulnerable structures. For example, the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey is installing
waterproof doors at flood elevation levels and increasing
the height of retaining walls by four to six feet in the

To protect infrastructure from wind impacts, refineries can
ensure that fan blades are secured prior to storms.
Installing girders on storage tanks to reinforce their
structural integrity can harden the tanks against hurricaneforce winds (DOE 2010).
Natural gas and steam distribution systems can be
hardened to better withstand flooding events and intense
hurricanes. Example measures include replacing cast iron
and bare steel distribution pipes with coated steel pipes,
upgrading low-pressure facilities to high-pressure facilities
to minimize water infiltration, and developing devices that
customers can use to mitigate water infiltration in flooded
homes. Utilities may also harden infrastructure surrounding
distribution systems. For example, the First Avenue Tunnel
in New York City, which contains both steam and gas mains
and high-voltage electric feeders, was flooded with 500,000
gallons of water during Hurricane Sandy (ConEd 2013).
ConEdison is designing vent cover plates for the First
Avenue Tunnel and replacing head houses on other tunnels
with hardened and reinforced concrete structures to
prevent damage from future flooding (ConEd 2013). PSE&G
is replacing and modernizing 250 miles of low-pressure cast
iron gas mains in or near flood areas, and protecting an LNG
station and five natural gas metering stations located in
flood zones.
To prevent power outages from leading to temporary fuel
shortages, pipeline and storage facility operators and fuel
retailers can ensure adequate backup is available at critical
locations. For example, Colonial Pipeline operators pre-
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positioned the company’s mobile generators to New Jersey
in anticipation of Hurricane Sandy (GAO 2014). States can
also ensure that gas stations and fuel retailers have
sufficient access to backup generation.
Fuel station resilience in New York
In 2013, New York State passed a law that requires
retail fuel stations located adjacent to evacuation
routes and controlled access routes to maintain fueling
operations. Stations must have equipment allowing
them to connect to generators during power outages
and must enter into supply contracts for emergency
generators (NYS 2013).
The Northeast is home to federal reserves of both heating
oil and gasoline, established to minimize the region’s
vulnerability to shortages and disruptions in fuel product
supply. The reserves store almost two million barrels of
petroleum products at sites in Connecticut, Maine,
Massachusetts, and New Jersey. In the aftermath of
Hurricane Sandy, the U.S. Department of Defense
distributed diesel fuels from the heating oil reserve to state,
local, and federal responders in New York and New Jersey
to fuel emergency equipment such as generators and
vehicles (DOE 2013a). New York State, NYPA, and other
entities are planning to set up a strategic fuel reserve with
2.5 million gallons of gasoline and diesel fuel to provide
emergency short-term supply. In the event of a shortage,
the fuel reserves will be dispersed at strategic locations in
New York to ensure sufficient fuel is available for
emergency responders, including transmission and repair
crews (NY Storm Recovery 2014, NYPA 2014).

Resilience solutions for inland infrastructure include design
changes and upgrades to prevent erosion, improve
drainage, and harden assets. Road and rail bridges and
culverts can be protected from erosion and scour by
improving flow around bridge foundations, increasing the
size of hydraulic openings, and increasing culvert capacity,
or by installing riprap to protect piers and abutments (DOT
2009, State of New York 2013). Improved drainage can
reduce flooding of road surfaces and railbeds, and
increased pumping capacity can protect tunnels (DOT
2009). River embankments can be protected with manmade
or natural barriers to erosion to prevent undercutting of
road and track beds or exposure of buried pipes. Pipelines
under river crossings can be protected by using horizontal
drilling techniques to bury the pipe significantly deeper
than traditional trenching methods, and by upgrading pipes
with more robust materials that are less likely to leak or
rupture from impacts (Miller and Bryski 2012).
FEMA recently awarded New York State $74 million to
improve the resilience of 29 bridges across the state to
scour of bridge foundations due to increasing flooding
impacts (State of New York 2013). The State is planning to
upgrade a total of 105 scour- and flood-prone bridges by
elevating and improving flow around bridge piers at a
projected total cost of $518 million (State of New York
2013).
Management measures can also improve the resilience of
infrastructure to inland flooding. By performing adequate
maintenance and reducing repair backlogs, managers can
reduce the risk of damage to assets (DOT 2009). Managers
can also prepare contingency plans, undertake risk
assessments of existing assets, and use flood monitoring
sensors to improve their understanding of risks (DOT 2009).
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Regional Climate Change Observations
and Projections in Detail
Higher Temperatures
Historical observations
 Since 1895, average temperatures have increased
0.16°F per decade, or almost 1.8°F (NOAA 2013).
 Since 1895, summer temperatures have increased
0.11°F per decade, or almost 1.2°F (NOAA 2013).
 Frost-free season has been growing: The average
length of the frost-free season across the Northeast has
increased by about ten days (1991–2012, compared to
1901–1960) (USGCRP 2014).
Future projections
 Average temperatures are expected to increase at a
faster rate: Depending on the location and emissions
scenario, increases of 3.5°–8.5°F are projected by
2070–2099 compared to 1971–1999 levels (NOAA
2013).
 Extremely hot days are projected to become more
common: Across most of the region, up to 15 more
days with a daily maximum temperature >95°F are
expected by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to
1980–2000); West Virginia and Maryland are likely to
be the most affected and may see as many as 20 more
extremely hot days per year (NOAA 2013).
 Consecutive number of days of extreme heat are
expected to become longer in West Virginia and
Maryland: The annual maximum number of
consecutive days with a daily high >95°F is projected to
increase by 4–8 days by mid-century (2041–2070,
compared to 1980–2000) in southern portions of the
region (NOAA 2013).
 Extremely cold nights are expected to become less
common: Across the region, 5–25 fewer days with daily
minimums <10°F are expected by mid-century (2041–
2070, compared to 1980–2000) (NOAA 2013).
 Freeze-free season is expected to lengthen: The
freeze-free season is expected to be 20–30 days longer
by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to 1980–2000)
across the region (NOAA 2013).
 Cooling degree days are expected to increase: Across
most of the region, an increase of 200–600 CDDs is
expected by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to
1980–2000) (NOAA 2013).
 Heating degree days are expected to decrease: Across
most of the region, declines of 900–1,500 HDDs are
expected by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to
1980–2000) (NOAA 2013).

Changing Precipitation Patterns
Historical observations
 Since 1895, annual precipitation has increased by 0.39
inches per decade, or almost 4.3 inches (NOAA 2013).
 Between 1958 and 2010, the region saw over a 70%
increase in the amount of precipitation falling in very
heavy events (USGCRP2014).
Future projections
 Annual precipitation is projected to increase: By the
end of the century (2070–2099), precipitation across
the region is expected to increase by 3%–12% across
most of the region compared to the period 1971–1999
(NOAA 2013).
 Drier summers are expected in Pennsylvania and West
Virginia: Summer precipitation is expected to decrease
by 5%–10% by the end of the century (2071–2099,
compared to 1971–1999) under a high emissions
scenario (USGCRP 2014).
 Extreme precipitation events are projected to
increase: The number of days per year with
precipitation greater than one inch is projected to
increase by 12%–30% by mid-century (2041–2070,
compared to 1980–2000) under a high emissions
scenario across most of the region (NOAA 2013).
 Seasonal drought risk is projected to increase in
summer and fall: High temperatures are expected to
lead to greater evaporation and earlier snowmelt,
resulting in seasonal drought (USGCRP 2014).
Hurricanes and Sea Level Rise
Historical observations
 Relative mean sea level has risen because of a
combination of global sea level rise and land
subsidence in the region: Relative mean sea level on
the Northeast coast rose 0.07–0.22 inches per year,
depending on the location, between the beginning and
th
middle of the 20 century and 2013 (NOAA 2015).
Future projections
 Sea level rise is expected to accelerate: Between 1992
and 2050, sea level on the coast in the Northeast is
projected to rise at an average rate of 0.06–0.27 inches
per year (no ice sheet melt) or 0.21–0.41 inches per
year (ice sheet melt), depending on the location
(USGCRP 2014).
 Frequency of intense hurricanes (Category 4 and 5) is
projected to increase (USGCRP 2014).
 Hurricane-associated storm intensity and rainfall are
projected to increase: Rainfall rates within 100 km of
tropical storm centers are projected to increase by 20%
by 2100 (USGCRP 2014).
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Chapter 8: Southeast

Climate Change and the Energy Sector

8. Southeast

Overview

QUICK FACTS

The Southeast region, characterized by hot and humid
summers and mild winters, is predominantly powered by coal,
natural gas, and nuclear power plants. The region contains
extensive oil and gas infrastructure that is essential to the
nation’s energy supply. Primarily located near the Gulf Coast,
this infrastructure includes oil refineries, natural gas processing
plants, offshore platforms, and energy transport infrastructure.
Major climate change impacts projected to increasingly
threaten the region’s energy infrastructure include the
following:
 Hurricane storm intensity and rainfall are projected to
increase, and the most intense hurricanes (Category 4 and
5) are projected to occur more frequently. Coastal
flooding is likely to worsen as sea level rise and local land
a
subsidence enhance hurricane-associated storm surge.
Critical oil and gas wells, refineries, and ports located along
the Gulf Coast, as well as coastal power plants,
transmission lines, and transportation infrastructure, are at
risk of damage from intense hurricanes and sea level riseenhanced storm surges. Heavy rainfall and high winds may
damage power lines, power plants, and other energy
assets. Transportation infrastructure such as ports, major
roads, and rail lines along the Gulf and Atlantic coastlines
are vulnerable to storm surges enhanced by rising sea
b
levels.
 Average and extreme temperatures are projected to
increase, and heat waves are likely to become more
c
severe, occur more often, and last longer. Electricity
demand for cooling rises with increasing air and water
temperatures, yet higher temperatures reduce the capacity
d
of thermoelectric power plants and transmission lines.

Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Virginia
Population (2013)
79,000,000 (25% of U.S.)
Area (square miles)
503,000 (14% of U.S.)
Energy Expenditures
$343 billion
% for
ENERGY SUPPLY
Annual
Annual
electric
& DEMAND
Production Consumption
power
Electric power
TWh
1,170
1,120
n/a
Petroleum
million barrels
116
1,680
2%
Coal
million tons
140
208
94%
Natural gas
Bcf
4,640
6,410
49%
Annual
Power
ELECTRIC
% of Total
Capacity
Production
plants
POWER
Production
(GW)
(TWh)
>1 MW*
Southeast States:

Natural gas
432
Coal
399
Nuclear
275
Hydroelectric
30
Wind
<1
Biomass
24
Solar
<1
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
Petroleum
Wells (>1 boe/d):
12,400
Refineries:
31
Liquids pipelines:
18
Ports (>200 tons/yr):
27
Natural Gas
Wells:
62,300
Interstate pipelines:
60
Market hubs:
5

37%
34%
24%
3%
<1%
2%
<1%

155
103
39
23
<1
6
<1

325
134
22
214
2
166
51

Electric Power
Power plants (> 1 MW):
Interstate transmission lines:
Coal
Mines:
Waterways
Coal and petroleum routes:
Railroads
Miles of freight track:

1,024
32
516
56
32,800

Note: Table presents 2012 data except number of oil wells, which is 2009 data.
*Some plants use multiple fuels, and individual generating units may be <1 MW.
Sources: AAR 2014, EIA 2011, EIA 2013a, EIA 2013b, EIA 2013c, EIA 2014a, EIA 2014c,
EIA 2014d, EIA 2014e, EIA 2014f, EIA 2014g, EIA 2014h, US Census Bureau 2014,
USACE 2014

Table 8-1. Examples of important energy sector vulnerabilities and climate resilience solutions in the Southeast
Subsector

Vulnerability

Magnitude

Illustrative Resilience Solutions

Oil and Gas
Exploration and
Production

Increased exposure to damage and
disruption from an increasing
frequency of powerful hurricanes
e
combined with sea level rise

Increasing number of Category 4
and 5 hurricanes by the end of the
f
century

Fuel Transport

Increased exposure to damage and
disruption from sea level riseenhanced storm surge during intense
h
hurricanes

Increasing sea level rise by 0.06–0.48
inches per year from 1992–2050,
depending on the location and
i
magnitude of ice sheet melt

Elevating and hardening
infrastructure, improving
emergency preparedness
protocols, restoring coastal
g
habitats
Reinforcing shorelines of critical
waterways; dredging to maintain
shipping access; elevating or
rerouting critical rail, road, or
j
pipeline arteries

Thermoelectric
Power Generation;
Electric Grid;
Electricity Demand

Higher temperatures resulting in
increased average and peak
electricity demand and reduced
generation and transmission
k
capacity

Increasing air temperatures by 2.5°F
–8.5°F and increasing numbers of
cooling degree days (CDDs) by 450–
l
1,150 degree days by mid-century

Increasing energy efficiency,
demand-response programs,
installing new generation and
transmission capacity
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Regional Energy Sector Vulnerabilities
and Resilience Solutions
Key energy subsectors and illustrative examples of
resilience solutions in the Southeast are discussed below.
System components that are most vulnerable to climate
change are described first.
Oil and Gas Exploration and Production
Subsector Vulnerabilities
The Southeast region contains extensive oil and gas
exploration and production infrastructure, with almost a
quarter of the nation’s oil refining and natural gas
processing capacity. Some of the United States’ largest oil
fields are located off the coast of Louisiana. Most of this
offshore production, which constituted 17% of all oil
production in the United States in 2013, comes onshore in
Louisiana (EIA 2014a).
Climate change is projected to have the following impacts
on the Southeast’s oil and gas industry:
 Increasing frequency of the most intense hurricanes
increases the risk of damage and disruption to coastal
and offshore oil and gas facilities (DOE 2013, USGCRP
2014).
 Rising sea level combined with projected increases in
hurricane and associated storm intensity, storm surge,
and heavy rainfall may lead to intensified flooding
along coasts (USGCRP 2014).
 Decreasing water availability may increase the cost of
onshore unconventional oil and gas production (DOE
2013).

Oil and gas infrastructure affected by 2005 hurricanes
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita disrupted production
operations and caused widespread damage along the
Gulf Coast in 2005. The storms temporarily took offline
100% of Gulf of Mexico oil production and more than
88% of Gulf of Mexico natural gas production, and power
outages knocked out three major petroleum pipeline
systems (Colonial, Plantation, and Capline) (DOE 2009,
Grenzeback and Lukmann 2008). The hurricanes caused
significant damage to parts of the Port of New Orleans
and silted in nearby waterways, preventing deep-draft
ships from passing through. Parts of the Lower
Mississippi River were closed to traffic for over a week,
and more than 300 barges along the river were
significantly damaged, set adrift, or sunk. Damaged
vessels and power outages disrupted freight transport
along the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway. Commercial barge
traffic could not use locks, as they were being operated
for floodwater drainage. Together, Hurricane Katrina and
Rita led to a $15 billion loss to energy markets, twothirds of which was associated with physical damage to
infrastructure (Grenzeback and Lukmann 2008).

Offshore oil and gas platforms are vulnerable to high winds
and damaging surf caused by hurricanes. One study found
that approximately 3%–6% of offshore platforms exposed
to hurricane-force winds typically experience damage that
could take anywhere from less than a month to at least 6
months to repair, and an additional 2%–4% are typically
destroyed (Kaiser and Yu 2009). As the frequency of
Category 4 and 5 hurricanes increases, the risk of damage
from these intense storms is likely to increase as well.
Offshore platforms typically follow the design specifications
of the American Petroleum Institute (API), which sets
performance standards for withstanding stresses such as
wind speeds and wave heights for a 100-year storm.
However, some of these threshold limits have been
significantly surpassed in recent years (Cruz and Krausmann
2008). Furthermore, as oil exploration and production
operations move farther offshore into deeper waters, the
potential for damage increases (DOE 2013).

Figure 8-1. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita destroyed 113 offshore
platforms, damaged another 52 platforms, and damaged more
than 450 pipelines.
Source: USGCRP 2014
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Coastal energy infrastructure—including processing plants
and refineries—are vulnerable to physical damage from
inundation and waterborne and airborne debris during
hurricanes. Storm surges associated with intense hurricanes
destroy equipment, damage building foundations, and
knock buildings down. Even if exploration and production
facilities are not physically damaged, they can be forced
offline for extended periods following hurricanes when
damage to refining and processing infrastructure and the
electric grid prohibits access to crude oil, natural gas,
and/or power (EIA 2009).
Hurricanes can destroy wetlands and other natural features
that help protect coastal infrastructure (Figure 8-2). Natural
barriers absorb hurricane-generated storm surges and
waves, and their destruction increases the vulnerability of
coastal and inland infrastructure to future storms. Coastal
development can also destroy natural barriers, and
Louisiana has lost 1,880 square miles of land along the coast
in the past 80 years owing to management of river flow,
dredging, and other natural and manmade problems
(USGCRP 2014).

Figure 8-2. Aerial photos of Isle de Jean Charles in Louisiana
taken in 1963 (top) and 2008 (bottom) show the effects of sea
level rise, land subsidence, and human development on the Gulf
Coast
Source: USGCRP 2014

The exposure of coastal energy facilities to hurricanes is
magnified by sea-level rise, which amplifies the height of
storm surges. Depending on location, relative mean sea
level in some locations along the Gulf Coast has already
increased by almost three inches per decade because of a
combination of global sea-level rise and land subsidence
(NOAA 2009). Future sea-level rise is projected to climb
between one and five inches per decade in the first half of
st
the 21 century and to accelerate over time (USGCRP
2014). In the Southeast, 187 major energy facilities are
located below four feet above sea level; 148 of these
facilities are located in Louisiana (Climate Central 2014).

Shale oil and gas exploration and production may face
decreasing water availability. Shale oil production in the
United States requires between 4.2 and 8.5 million gallons
of water per day to produce 2.1 million gallons of oil per
day. Production in the Haynesville Shale in Louisiana and
Texas requires about 3.75 million gallons of water per well
(Burke 2013, Stark et al. 2012), most of which is used for
hydraulic fracturing. More than 2,600 wells have been
drilled in this shale as of September 2014 (LDNR 2014).
About 20% of the water that is used in shale production in
the Haynesville Shale is groundwater. Louisiana requires
permits for groundwater withdrawals. Production in the
Fayetteville Shale in Arkansas requires closer to 3 million
gallons of water per well (Stark et al. 2012).
Oil and Gas Exploration and Production
Resilience Solutions
Oil and gas operators along the Gulf Coast, experienced
with risk management from natural hazards, can adopt a
number of solutions to enhance resilience to more frequent
Category 4 and 5 hurricanes and associated storm surge.
These solutions include expanding the use of mobile
equipment (Entergy 2010) and practices for improving
resilience of offshore platforms to hurricanes. Floating
production systems are already in use in deepwater drilling
operations in the Gulf of Mexico (BSEE 2014); these systems
can be disconnected and removed from a site in advance of
a hurricane, reducing the risk of damage and destruction to
the platform. New engineering and operations guidance
developed by the American Petroleum Institute provides
modified design specifications for new platforms;
operations protocols for hurricane season, such as
positioning platform decks higher above the sea surface,
methods for securing platform equipment to rigs, and
locating mobile “jack-up” rigs on more stable areas of the
sea floor; improved data for wind, wave, current, and surge
conditions at higher spatial resolution; and protocols for
post-hurricane structural assessment (API 2014a).
Engineered barriers such as levees can be effective in
protecting vulnerable coastal areas. In addition, wetland
restoration and development of other natural barriers may
be a cost-effective resilience technique (TNC-DOW 2012).
These types of structures—natural and manmade—help
protect coastal infrastructure from storm surges and wave
impacts (DOE 2013). Historically, the economic value of
coastal protection and other ecological services provided by
natural landscape features has not been consistently
incorporated into the risk management decisions involved
in the planning and construction of coastal infrastructure.
Recently, however, projects undertaken between private
industry and natural resource conservation stakeholders
have shown that collaboration and data sharing can be
successful strategies for integrating the value of
environmental features into coastal facilities planning (TNCDOW 2012).
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Shell efforts to harden offshore oil platforms
Shell researched damage done to the Mars platform in
the Gulf of Mexico during Hurricane Katrina to develop
measures to increase resilience of offshore platforms to
hurricane damage. Most of the above-water damage to
the platform occurred when clamps holding the rig’s
structure failed under 270-kilometer-per-hour winds.
Shell installed re-designed clamp systems on all
offshore platforms in 2006; the new systems are four
times stronger than the older ones (Shell 2013).
As competition for limited water resources increases in
some areas, oil and gas companies can take measures to
reduce vulnerability to water scarcity. Resilience solutions
include water recycling and reuse as well as utilizing sources
of lower-quality water, such as degraded water,
wastewater, or brackish groundwater. These sources do not
compete with irrigation and municipal needs, but they do
require additional treatment steps and add to costs.
Fuel Transport and Storage
Subsector Vulnerabilities
The Southeast region is home to critical oil and gas
transport and storage infrastructure, including ports,
terminals, storage facilities, highways, railroads, and
pipelines. In the central Gulf Coast region, 72% of ports,
27% of major roads, and 9% of rail lines are at or below 41
foot elevation (CCSP 2008).
The region contains 27 petroleum ports and energy
fabrication ports—which build the structures used in
offshore oil and gas exploration and production—including
the Port of South Louisiana, the largest port in the United
States. The region also includes Port Fourchon, Louisiana,
an energy supply port that serves as the launching point to
supply rigs producing about 90% of the deepwater oil in the
Gulf of Mexico and the land base for the Louisiana Offshore
Oil Port (LOOP) (Figure 8-3) (DHS 2011). LOOP is the only
deepwater port in the United States and the single largest
point of entry for crude oil coming into the United States via
tanker (EIA 2014a).
Five of the ten currently-operating LNG import terminals in
the United States are located in the Southeast, and many
are in the process of applying to export LNG (EIA 2014a,
FERC 2012). Louisiana is also the location of Henry Hub, a
major natural gas market hub where more than a dozen
pipelines converge and that serves as the national
benchmark for natural gas pricing (EIA 2014a).

1

In the referenced study, the Central Gulf Coast includes the coast
between Galveston, TX and Mobile, AL (CCSP 2008).

Figure 8-3. LOOP’s two onshore facilities, the Clovelly Dome
Storage Terminal (above) and Fourchon Booster Station, which
are located in coastal Louisiana
Source: DOTD 2015

Louisiana hosts two of the nation’s four Strategic Petroleum
Reserve (SPR) storage sites. The SPR provides the United
States with energy and economic security through the
emergency stockpile of crude oil.
Climate change is projected to affect fuel transport and
storage in the Southeast in the following ways:
 Projected increases in the frequency of the most
intense hurricanes (Category 4 and 5) and associated
storm surge and intense winds increase the risk of
damage and disruption to coastal and offshore oil and
gas transport and storage infrastructure (DOE 2013,
USGCRP 2014).
 Rising sea levels and land subsidence combined with
projected increases in hurricane intensity and
associated storm surge and heavy rainfall, are expected
to increase flood regimes along coasts, affecting coastal
transportation and storage infrastructure (USGCRP
2014).
 Barge transport of energy products on inland
waterways may be at increased risk of disruption from
lower water levels associated with decreasing
precipitation, increasing evapotranspiration, and
competing demand for water (DOE 2013, Ingram et al.
2013).
Coastal ports and facilities are vulnerable to high wind
speeds and storm surge associated with intense hurricanes.
Storm surge has the capacity to knock down terminal
buildings, dislodge cargo containers, damage terminal
equipment, and damage wharf and pier structures (CCSP
2008). When terminals and aboveground facilities are
forced to stop or delay operations, oil and gas markets
nationwide can be affected.
The impact of intense hurricanes on coastal ports and
facilities in Florida may be particularly acute, as Florida is
entirely dependent on petroleum products delivered by
tanker and barge and has no interstate crude oil or
petroleum product pipelines (EIA 2014a). During previous
hurricanes, petroleum supplies have been delivered by
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truck and rail to compensate for closures of ports and
terminals (DOE 2005).
Accelerating sea-level rise (Figure 8-4) and more intense
hurricanes are likely to further affect coastal facilities
through damage to low-lying roads that provide access to
coastal energy infrastructure. Sea-level rise contributes to
more damaging storm surges by amplifying their height and
reach. In the short term, roads may be closed, but
prolonged flooding can weaken roadways over the long
term. Over half of the interstate and arterial-road miles
along the Gulf Coast are vulnerable to a storm surge of 18
feet (CCSP 2008). An 18-foot storm surge would inundate
98% of the Gulf Coast’s ports (CCSP 2008). A storm surge of
23 feet has the ability to inundate 66% of interstate
highways, 57% of arterial roads, and almost half of the
railroad miles along the Gulf Coast (CCSP 2008). These levels
are below the storm surge levels of 25–28 ft produced by
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 along the Mississippi coast (NOAA
2014a).

Figure 8-5. Highway 1 in Louisiana, which provides the link to a
critical U.S. oil facility, Port Fourchon, and is vulnerable to
climate impacts
Source: USGCRP 2014

Sea level rise may pose the greatest danger to the dense
network of marine and coastal facilities in the central Gulf
Coast region between Mobile Bay, AL, and Galveston, TX.
An increase in relative sea level of 2 feet has the potential
to affect 64% of the region's port facilities, while a 4-foot
rise in relative sea level would affect nearly three-quarters
of port facilities (CCSP 2008). By 2100, global average sea
levels are expected to rise 1–4 feet above current levels,
and rates of increase are expected to be even higher in the
Southeast (USGCRP 2014).

Figure 8-4. Relative risk from sea level rise according to a Coastal
Vulnerability Index, which is based on coastal system
susceptibility to change and the area’s natural ability to adapt
Source: USGCRP 2014

Due to sea level rise and land subsidence, Louisiana State
Highway 1, the only road that provides land access to Port
Fourchon, Louisiana, could be inundated and inaccessible
more than 155 days by 2040, and more than 300 days per
year by 2050 (Figure 8-5) (DHS 2011, Needham et al. 2012).
An analysis by the Department of Homeland Security found
that a 90-day washout of Highway 1 in Louisiana, due to
either washout of the road following a storm or gradual
submersion due to sea-level rise and land subsidence,
would reduce production by 120 million barrels of oil and
250 billion cubic feet of gas over a 10-year period (DHS
2011). Other ports would be able to replace only
approximately 25% of the service provided by Port
Fourchon (DHS 2011).

Offshore pipelines that provide crude oil and natural gas to
Gulf Coast refineries from offshore production are
vulnerable to large surface waves and strong near-bottom
currents associated with hurricanes. The currents scour the
seafloor, creating underwater mudslides that damage
subsea pipes and other equipment that rests on the
seafloor. During the 2005 hurricane season, most of the
damage to offshore pipelines occurred at the interface
between pipelines and offshore platforms and subsea
pipelines were identified by industry experts as the major
cause of delays in bringing production back online (Cruz and
Krausmann 2008, DOE 2015). Onshore pipelines are
vulnerable to damage from coastal and inland flooding
events, which can expose buried pipe that can then be
impacted by flood-borne debris (GAO 2014, CCSP 2008).
Onshore pipes are also vulnerable to corrosion as rising sea
levels and coastal flooding increase saltwater intrusion of
groundwater, and aboveground structures associated with
pipelines may be damaged by high winds and flooding
during hurricanes (DOT 2014).
The Gulf Intracoastal Waterway is a key asset in the
distribution of petroleum products (CCSP 2008). Increasing
intensity of hurricanes and sea level rise-enhanced storm
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surge may increase the risk of damage and disruption to
waterway assets and operations. Storm debris can block
navigation channels, and markers and barrier islands can be
affected (CCSP 2008). Rail terminals, docks, and ships
located along the coast in the Southeast are also vulnerable
to high winds and storm surge from intense hurricanes.
Aboveground storage facilities are also vulnerable to
storm surge and high winds associated with intense
hurricanes. Storm surge and flooding can inundate
facilities, and high winds can damage aboveground tanks
at storage terminals and lead to spills in hazardous
materials (API 2014a, Santella et al. 2010). Additionally,
aboveground storage tanks can float off of their
foundations during hurricanes, leading to spills (DOE
2015a). For example, flooding associated with Hurricane
Katrina dislodged and damaged an above-ground storage
tank at the Meraux Refinery in St. Bernard Parish,
Louisiana, resulting in a release of more than 25,000
barrels of crude oil that impacted an adjacent residential
neighborhood (EPA 2014).
During Hurricane Ike in 2008, the SPR site in West
Hackberry, Louisiana, was flooded with debris, and the
electrical systems sustained significant damage. Two
additional SPR sites in Texas were damaged by storm surge
from the hurricane, and costs for the repairs to all three SPR
sites amounted to about $22 million (DOE 2010a). Supply
disruptions during hurricanes can cause natural gas and
petroleum product spot prices to spike (API 2014b, DOE
2009). Damage and disruption to the region’s oil and gas
infrastructure associated with a projected increase in
intense hurricanes and accelerating sea level rise may
contribute to short-term price volatility throughout the
country (API 2014b, DOE 2009).

Fourchon beach repair and renourishment project
In 2013, the Greater Lafourche Port Commission
initiated a $5.4 million project to restore 6 miles of
beach and dunes on Fourchon Beach to provide storm
surge protection to Port Fourchon and the surrounding
area (Houma Times 2012, Buskey 2013). The Federal
Emergency Management Office (FEMA), Shell, and the
Port Commission provided funding for the Fourchon
Beach Repair/Renourishment Project, also known as
the GeoTube Project (Shell 2012). Under this initiative,
contractors installed geotubes, large tubes that are
made of fabric and filled with sand, along the beach and
covered the geotubes with sand to create an over-10foot dune (Houma Times 2012).

Figure 8-6. The landscape of coastal Louisiana, including the
Port Fourchon area (red circle), which has been significantly
altered since 1932
Brown indicates land that was lost or converted to water from
1932–2010 and green indicates land that was gained from
1932–2010 through coastal improvements such as shoreline
revetments and beach enrichment. Blue indicates open water.
Source: NOAA 2012

Coastal Virginia vulnerable to sea level rise and storm
surge
In the Norfolk, Virginia, metropolitan area, a Category 4
storm in conjunction with a one-foot sea level rise could
inundate critical energy assets. Under such a scenario, a
DOE analysis identified exposure of the following fuel
transport infrastructure: 11 petroleum terminals
(>100,000 bbl), two natural gas pipelines, an LNG
storage facility, and a petroleum pipeline. In addition,
39 substations (>230kV) and four power plants (>100
MW) are threatened in such a scenario (DOE 2014).
Lower waterway levels may disrupt barge transport of
energy commodities, particularly in the western portion of
the region where some models project an increasing
likelihood of drought (DOE 2013, Ingram et al. 2013). Less
rainfall and increasing evapotranspiration due to higher
temperatures contribute to reduced runoff into navigable
waterways. In addition, withdrawals for competing uses,

such as agricultural, industrial, and municipal use, can
contribute to lower water levels. In August 2012, the
Mississippi River approached historically low water levels in
several places and barges ran aground in the main river
channel near Greenville, Mississippi (NASA 2012). Water
availability may decline by 2.5%–6.4% by 2060 for most of
Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Tennessee (USGCRP 2014). One study found that the largest
decrease in river flow magnitude is projected to occur in the
Appalachian-Cumberland subregion, which includes,
Kentucky and Tennessee, and the Mississippi Alluvial Valley,
which spans the Mississippi River from Kentucky to the Gulf
Coast (Ingram et al. 2013). Low flow conditions along rivers
may cause barge operators to reduce their loads, with
estimates suggesting that in some cases a one-inch drop in
river level could reduce tow capacity by 255 tons (DOE
2013).

Regional Vulnerabilities and Resilience Solutions | Southeast

8-6

Fuel Transport and Storage
Resilience Solutions
In many cases, fuel storage and transport assets can be
hardened to better withstand more intense hurricanes and
storm surges. Examples of infrastructure hardening include
installing water-tight doors, elevating critical equipment,
using submersible equipment, and building or improving
the design of levees. Railroad and road bridges can be
raised above storm surge levels or engineered to withstand
lateral and uplift forces resulting from flooding and wave
action (Cauffman 2006, DOT 2014). Shorelines of critical
waterways can be hardened to prevent and offset erosion.
Dredging, flood control, and water management practices
can be employed to maintain shipping access, including
appropriate upstream reservoir management to maintain
water levels for shipping without impacting the other
purposes of the reservoirs.
Portions of Louisiana State Highway 1 were elevated in
2009 to protect the road from 100-year flood events, and
bridge designers used restraining devices and anchor bolts
to protect the road from storm surge forces. The raised
segment of the road was unaffected by Hurricane Isaac,
however the bridge approaches—the portions of the road
to the north and south of the raised section—and adjacent
land were inundated by storm surge and suffered damage
from erosion (GAO 2013).
Strategies for improving resilience of onshore pipelines
include installing manmade or natural barriers to reduce
risk of erosion, which could expose buried pipes. Another
risk reduction measure is upgrading pipes with more robust
materials that are less likely to leak or rupture from
seawater-induced corrosion—such as coated steel pipes
instead of cast iron or steel.
Barge transport of energy commodities can be more
resilient to disruptions from low flow conditions by
implementing dredging and water management practices,
such as upstream reservoir management to maintain river
flow levels (Ingram et al. 2013).
Electric Grid
Subsector Vulnerabilities
Most of the Southeast electricity markets operate under a
traditional vertically integrated utility model, with the
exception of Virginia, which is part of the PJM
Interconnection, and parts of Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Arkansas, which are part of the Midcontinent Independent
System Operator (MISO) market. For states dominated by
the traditional utility model, utilities own the transmission
network. Many transmission investments in the Southeast
are driven by future load growth and reliability needs rather
than by power plant retirements or connecting to
distributed renewables, which are important drivers in
other regions (EEI 2013).

Climate change is projected to have the following impacts
on the electric grid in the Southeast:
 Increasing hurricane intensity and frequency of the
most intense hurricanes (Category 4 and 5), along with
hurricane-associated storm surge enhanced by sea
level rise, may increase the risk of physical damage or
disruption to transmission and distribution
infrastructure, including substations and transformers,
near the coast (DOE 2013, USGCRP 2014).
 Increasing average and extreme temperatures reduce
transmission efficiency, increase the risk of damage to
transformers, and may reduce available transmission
capacity (Bérubé et al. 2007, DOE 2013, USBR 2000,
USGCRP 2014).
Table 8-2. Damage to the electric grid from recent hurricanes
Katrina
(2005)

Rita
(2005)

Wilma
(2005)

Gustav
(2008)

Ike
(2008)

Customers
Affected
(in millions)

2.7

1.5

3.5

1.1

3.9

Utility Poles
Destroyed

72,447

14,817

~14,000

11,478

10,300

Transformers
Damaged

8,281

3,580

NA

4,349

2,900

Transmission
Structures
Damaged

1,515

3,550

NA

241

238

300

508

241

368

383

Substations
Offline
Source: DOE 2009

Intense hurricanes produce high winds and increase
incidents of damage and disruption to power lines (Figure
8-7 and Table 8-2). Severe weather is the leading cause of
electric power disturbance events in the United States, and
as intense hurricanes (Category 4 and 5) become more
common as a result of climate change, the Southeast
region’s electric transmission and distribution infrastructure
will be increasingly threatened (DOE 2013, EOP 2013,
USGCRP 2014). Transmission outages from hurricanes and
tropical storms affected more than 10 million customers in
Florida from 1992–2009 (DOE 2015b).
Substations and underground distribution systems are
vulnerable to damage from storm surge and coastal
flooding during hurricanes. The most prevalent cause of
damage to substations in coastal regions is flooding from
storm surge (DOE 2009). According to one study, projected
sea level rise by 2030 could increase the number of
substations exposed to storm surge from a Category 1
hurricane by 82 (from 255 substations in a scenario without
sea level rise to 337 substations in a scenario with a 10 inch
sea level rise) (DOE 2015a). Any significant increase in
hurricane intensities would greatly exacerbate exposure to
storm surge and wind damage. During Hurricanes Katrina

Regional Vulnerabilities and Resilience Solutions | Southeast

8-7

and Rita, low-lying power substations in Mississippi and
Louisiana suffered significant damage to controllers,
switches, and other components as a result of storm surge
and waves (DOE 2009). Even equipment that was pressurewashed with fresh water immediately after the storm was
destroyed from salt water exposure (NIST 2006). More than
one million distribution poles were damaged during
Hurricane Katrina, and during Hurricane Gustav, damage to
high-voltage transmission lines caused the transmission
system south of Lake Pontchartrain, including the city of
New Orleans, to be islanded from the supply network for
two days (DOE 2009, DOT 2014).

Figure 8-7. High winds and flooding during Hurricane Katrina
downed power lines and poles in New Orleans
Source: FEMA 2005

During periods of high air temperatures, operators reduce
the carrying capacity of transmission lines and power
substations, and higher air temperatures may compound
capacity constraints during extreme heat events when
demand for power for air conditioning is the highest (DOE
2013). This effect can be exacerbated by higher nighttime
temperatures, which prevent power systems from cooling
off. Higher temperatures also cause thermal expansion of
transmission line materials, and sagging lines increase the
risk of power outages when the lines make contact with
other lines, trees, or the ground (DOE 2013).
Higher temperatures can damage power transformers and
force operators to reduce transformer loading on extremely
hot days (Bérubé et al. 2007, USBR 2000). Power
transformers in the United States are typically designed to
operate at an average ambient temperature of 86°F over a
24-hour period where maximum temperatures do not
exceed 104°F (PJM 2011, Hashmi et al. 2013). As
temperatures increase above the rated temperature, the
paper insulation in traditional power transformers begins to
break down. Transformers are critical to system operation,
and during emergency conditions, they may be overloaded
forcing temperatures as high as 284°F and causing
breakdown to occur as much as 100 times faster than
normal (USBR 2000, Bérubé et al. 2007). Higher ambient
temperatures increase the likelihood of transformers

reaching critical temperatures during emergency
overloading (Hashmi et al. 2013).
Electric Grid
Resilience Solutions
Resilience could be improved through hardening measures
that help the grid withstand higher winds and flooding, as
well as additional capacity in the transmission networks
(DOE 2013). In some circumstances, new conductor
technologies could be installed that withstand higher
temperatures with fewer losses and less sag (NARUC 2011).
Although it is expensive, undergrounding power lines is one
measure that can protect power lines from wind impacts. In
order to protect its distribution system from storm impacts,
Dominion Virginia Power initiated a decade-long program in
2014 to place underground approximately 4,000 miles of
the utility’s most outage-prone distribution lines: about 7
percent of the 57,100-mile system. This $175 million-peryear undergrounding program is expected to substantially
increase system reliability and resilience to climate change
and extreme weather (Dominion 2014).
For infrastructure located near the Gulf Coast, hardening
measures include activities such as replacing wood power
poles with steel, concrete, or composite structures, burying
critical power line segments, and relocating equipment
away from flood zones or building levees around equipment
(EOP 2013). For example, Entergy has invested in elevating
substation control equipment, such as the Leeville
substation in southern Louisiana, above the 100-year flood
level (Entergy 2013, Kusnetz 2012). Elevating critical
equipment such as substations is a common hardening
practice to protect against storm surge (Figure 8-8). To
determine how high to elevate substations, control rooms,
and other vital assets, utilities often use the Seas and Lakes
Overland Surges (SLOSH) model (DOE 2010). SLOSH is a
computerized model developed by the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) that estimates
storm surge heights and winds from hurricane scenarios
(NOAA 2014b).

Figure 8-8. Elevated substation in Vermilion Parish, Louisiana
Source: DOE 2010b
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unlock barriers to increasing industry resilience would be
important elements of a coordinated response (Entergy
2010).

Florida Power & Light Electric Infrastructure Storm
Hardening Plan
Following the damaging 2004–2005 hurricane season,
Florida Power and Light (FPL) announced their Storm
Secure Plan to strengthen the electric grid against
hurricanes. FPL announced that they would be adopting
extreme wind velocity zone criteria (up to 150 mph) as
a new standard for distribution construction and system
upgrades. This plan also includes encouraging
undergrounding of distribution lines by investing in
local government-sponsored overhead-to-underground
conversion projects, and calls for increasing pole
inspections and line clearing and vegetation
management activities (FPL 2006).
In 2013, FPL announced the 2013–2015 Electric
Infrastructure Storm Hardening Plan. The company
expects to invest $428 million to $646 million to
improve the resilience of its electric infrastructure (FPL
2013a). This plan includes an initiative to protect 15
above-grade vaults in the Miami downtown electric
network distribution system (FPL 2013b). The vaults will
be retrofitted with submersible equipment, and existing
equipment will be replaced with new sealed, stainless
steel equipment (FPL 2013b). FPL is also accelerating its
program to replace wood transmission structures with
concrete structures and upgrade ceramic post
insulators with polymer material, and replaced over
4,000 wood transmission structures and upgrade more
than 3,600 ceramic post insulators from 2007–2012
(FPL 2013a).
Entergy and America’s Wetland Foundation collaborated on
the development of a framework to inform economically
sensible approaches to address risks and to build a resilient
Gulf Coast (Entergy 2010). The study covered a wide region,
including Texas, Louisiana, and coastal counties in
Mississippi and Alabama, and was comprehensive across
key economic sectors, including fuel supply, electricity
generation, and residential and commercial demand
sectors. The study projected that by 2030 there may be
nearly $1 trillion in energy assets at potential risk from
rising sea levels and more intense hurricanes. Based on an
analysis of hazards, assets, and vulnerabilities, the Gulf
Coast energy sector faces an average annual loss from
climate change and extreme weather of $8 billion in 2030
(Entergy 2010). The study identified key “no regrets”
options for adaptation that have low investment needs,
high potential to reduce expected losses, and additional
strong co-benefits such as wetlands restoration. The study
also concluded that supporting and enforcing a range of
actions to reduce the risks that individuals bear (e.g.,
through building codes and development decisions) and to

To increase the resilience of transformers to high ambient
temperatures, operators may derate existing transformers
or install or upgrade forced-air or forced-oil cooling in
transformers (Hashmi et al. 2013, USBR 2000). When
replacing existing transformers, operators can increase
system resilience to increasing temperatures by installing
thermally upgraded transformers (Bérubé et al. 2007).
Thermoelectric Power Generation
Subsector Vulnerabilities
Fossil fuel-fired power plants dominate the electricity
source mix in the Southeast, with coal and natural gas
accounting for about 70% of total generation and
nuclear representing about a quarter of total generation
(Table 8-3). The source fuel varies within the region, with
natural gas supplying the majority of electric power to
states along the Gulf Coast. For example, about 68% of
Florida’s power is generated from gas-fired power plants.
Other states in the Southeast have a higher contribution
from coal and nuclear power. Coal-fired generation makes
Table 8-3. Electricity generation fuel mix in the Southeast

Gulf Coast
States*
Coal
Natural Gas
Nuclear
Hydroelectric
Other

22%
57%
15%
2%
4%

Other
Southeast
44%
20%
30%
3%
2%

Total
Southeast
34%
37%
24%
3%
3%

* Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi
Source: EIA 2013a

up 92% of generation in Kentucky and provides the majority
of generation in Arkansas, Tennessee, and North Carolina.
About half of South Carolina’s power comes from nuclear
plants.
Climate change may have the following impacts on
thermoelectric power generation in the Southeast:
 Increasing air and water temperatures decrease the
efficiency and the available capacity of thermoelectric
power plants (DOE 2013).
 Increasing water temperatures could cause
thermoelectric power plants to exceed thermal
discharge limits and force temporary curtailments at
plants (PNNL 2012).
 Decreasing summer precipitation in some locations and
higher evaporative losses from surface water resources
could reduce water available for cooling (USGCRP 2014,
NOAA 2013, NETL 2010).
 Increasing hurricane intensity and frequency of intense
hurricanes, sea-level rise-enhanced storm surge, and
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heavy rainfall threaten low-lying and coastal power
generation facilities (GAO 2014, DOE 2013).
As the temperatures of ambient air and water used for
cooling increase, the thermal efficiency of power
generation decreases (DOE 2013). Reduced thermal
efficiencies can result in reduced power output and/or
additional fuel consumption. With more than 90% of the
electricity in the Southeast generated from thermoelectric
power plants (Table 8-3), such decreases in power output or
increases in fuel consumption will hinder system flexibility
or increase costs across the region (EIA 2013a, DOE 2013).
Higher surface water temperatures heightens the risk that
power plants will exceed thermal discharge limits mandated
to protect aquatic ecosystems, which could cause plants to
temporarily reduce their power generation. For example,
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant was forced to curtail operations
after heat waves in 2007, 2010, and 2011 caused the
temperature of the Tennessee River to exceed 90°F, as
cooling water discharge from the plant would exceed the
thermal limit (PNNL 2012).

Water availability for most of the Southeast is trending
downward, particularly for the areas in the region west of
the Appalachian Mountains and west of the Chattahoochee
River (Figure 8-9). Decreasing surface water availability
resulting from lower rainfall, increased evaporation rates,
and competing uses (e.g., irrigation for agriculture and
municipal water for a growing population) may threaten the
available generation capacity of thermoelectric power
plants. Drier summers are expected across most of the
region (NOAA 2013, USGCRP 2014).
Many power plants in the Southeast region use oncethrough freshwater cooling systems (Figure 8-10), and
because of their need to withdraw large amounts of water
from lakes, rivers, and streams, these plants are more
vulnerable to deratings or outages due to low water. During
periods of drought, plants using these cooling systems can
become nonoperational if the water level drops below
water intake structures (NERC 2013).

Figure 8-10. Distribution of thermoelectric power plants greater
than 70 MW by type of cooling system in the Southeastern
United States; larger circles on the map indicate higher net
summer capacity
Source: EIA 2012a

Figure 8-9. a) Projected trend in water availability in the
Southeast; green area indicates range of emission scenarios and
b) decadal trend for 2010–2060 relative to 2010; hatching
indicates projected negative trend is statistically significant
Source: USGCRP 2014

Changes in the number of intense hurricanes could increase
the vulnerability of low-lying and coastal power plants to
flooding and inundation. Flooding can interfere with power
plant operations and floodwaters and flood-borne debris
can damage structures that draw cooling water from rivers
(DOT 2014, GAO 2014). Rising sea levels will magnify the
destructive power of hurricanes. One study estimates that
even with no sea-level rise, there are 69 electricity
generation facilities in the Southeast potentially exposed to
a Category 1 hurricane storm surge and 291 facilities
exposed to a Category 5 storm (Maloney and Preston
2,3
2014). However, with just 1.6 feet of relative sea-level
rise, the number of facilities vulnerable to a Category 1
storm surge increases by 41%. Depending on the sea-level
rise scenario (ranging from 1.6 feet to 2.7 feet) and the
2

Southeast region as defined in the study differs from the region
definition in this profile. The study includes Texas but excludes
Virginia.
3
The capacity of the 69 power plants exposed to a Category 1
storm is about 15,000 MW, and the capacity of the power plants
exposed to a Category 5 storm is about 86,000 MW.
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intensity of the hurricane, the number of exposed power
plants increases by 6%–60% (Maloney and Preston 2014).

Evaluating the risk of sea level rise to nuclear reactors
in Florida

More intense hurricanes can also increase the risk of
flooding to power plants in low-lying inland locations.
Hurricanes can bring massive amounts of rainfall hundreds
of miles from the coast. The rainfall produced by Atlantic
hurricanes may increase by as much as 20% as a result of
climate change (USGCRP 2014).

Florida Power & Light (FPL) has begun incorporating sea
level rise into siting and hazard assessments for nuclear
reactors. In June 2009, FPL submitted an application to
evaluate the construction of two new nuclear reactor
units at Turkey Point that incorporated potential sea
level rise over the next 100 years. In a 2013
reevaluation of flooding hazards for two existing
nuclear reactor units at Turkey Point, FPL incorporated
projected sea level rise over the next 20 years (GAO
2014).

Thermoelectric Power Generation
Resilience Solutions
New generation capacity with sources and supply chains
less affected by increasing temperatures and decreased
water availability, such as wind power and solar
photovoltaic (PV), may help make the region’s power sector
more resilient to climate change.
Introducing more advanced cooling technologies into the
region’s power production infrastructure may also be an
effective strategy to reduce its vulnerability to decreasing
water availability or generation reductions due to discharge
water temperature restrictions. A large number of the
power plants in the region rely on older once-through
cooling systems. Nuclear and coal-fired power plants using
these systems require the largest amounts of water
compared to other fuels (DOE 2013). A transition to natural
gas-fired power plants, which require relatively less cooling
water, will enhance resiience. Equipping power plants with
cooling ponds, recirculating systems, or advanced cooling
technologies such as hybrid wet–dry and dry cooling
systems will also reduce power plant exposure to water
scarcity-related vulnerabilities. For example, Plant Yates, a
coal-fired generator in Georgia that operated using a oncethrough system, added cooling towers and cut water
withdrawals by 93%, dropping withdrawals to 32 million
gallons per day (UCS 2011). Additionally, Duke Energy is
modifying equipment and procedures at nuclear and coalfired generating plants to reduce drought-related risks to
generation (Duke Energy 2014).
Policy measures could also help address water availability
issues. Some areas have established market-driven
solutions to address the vulnerability of critical shortages in
supply.
Coastal thermoelectric power plants can be hardened
against hurricanes and heavy precipitation events and
associated flooding through relocating or elevating critical
equipment, upgrading plants with submersible equipment
or watertight doors, and building improved levees around
existing infrastructure. Planners can protect new capacity
by locating new generators at higher elevations which are
not at risk of flooding due to hurricanes or increased
precipitation.

Electricity Demand
Subsector Vulnerabilities
Among regions, the Southeast is the greatest energy
consumer and has the highest per capita electricity use in
the United States (EIA 2014a). On average, more than 10%
of the energy consumed in homes is used for air
conditioning in the Southeast, compared to a national
average of 6% (EIA 2014a). Hotter temperatures and a
higher frequency of extreme temperatures are projected
for the region, which is expected to increase use of air
conditioning and contribute to an overall increase in net
energy use (USGCRP 2014).
Climate change is expected to affect electricity demand in
the following way:
 Increasing average temperatures and occurrences of
extreme temperatures are expected to increase
average and peak demand for cooling energy (DOE
2013).
Although projected temperature increases are generally
smaller for most parts of the Southeast than for other
regions of the United States, higher temperatures are
expected to be an important contributor to increased
electricity use (USGCRP 2014). The Southeast may require
the steepest increases in electricity transmission and
distribution to meet cooling demand (USGCRP 2014).
Climate change is expected to increase CDDs throughout
the region, ranging from 450 to 750 additional CDDs in the
northeastern part of the Southeast region to between 750
and 1,150 additional CDDs per year projected for Florida,
the Gulf Coast, and the Mississippi River Valley by the
middle of this century (compared to 1980–2000) (NOAA
2013). Florida is expected to see a sharp increase in the
number of extreme temperatures (>95°F), quadrupling to
over 60 days per year by mid-century (
Figure 8-11).
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Electricity Demand
Resilience Solutions
Energy efficiency, demand-response programs, and capacity
expansion play an important role in reducing the exposure
of the Southeast’s power sector to increasing energy
demand.

Figure 8-11. Number of days per year with daytime high
temperatures exceeding 95°F historically (left) and by midcentury (right) under a higher emissions scenario
Source: USGCRP 2014

Market penetration of air conditioners in the South is
currently 98% (EIA 2013d), so an increase in CDDs will likely
drive an increase in the energy use of existing air
conditioners, an increase in the hours of operation, or both.
Higher temperatures could have significant repercussions
for the power sector, as the predicted increases cooling
energy demand may require major system upgrades to
handle increases in peak load.
Higher temperatures can have a compounding effect on the
water use in the region, as higher temperatures increase
overall demand for water, increasing energy required for
pumping, treatment, drainage, and desalination. For coastal
communities that rely upon groundwater for their water
supply, rising sea levels can contribute to saltwater
intrusion of underground freshwater aquifers. Preventing
saltwater intrusion requires additional energy for pumping.
Energy demand for additional pumping in heavily managed
water systems is projected to grow rapidly (Berry 2012).
Alongside technological change and economic growth,
population growth is an important factor driving future
electricity demand in the region. The population in the
Southeast is projected to increase by 57% between 2000
and 2030, compared to a national average projected growth
of 29% over the period (US Census Bureau 2005). The
region has four of the ten fastest-growing metropolitan
areas (Mackun 2010).
Increases in electricity demand could exacerbate
vulnerabilities to the broader energy system in the region,
particularly during peak demand for cooling. Periods of high
temperatures coincide with reduced power plant and
transmission line efficiency and capacity and potentially
coincide with decreased water availability for cooling at
power plants.
As temperatures increase, the demand for heating energy is
expected to decline. Electricity is the primary fuel used for
space heating in the Southeast (EIA 2013d), although with
mild winters, the region’s peak electricity demand is about
10% less in the winter than in the summer (EIA 2013e).

Anticipating the need to increase system resilience, several
states in the region have enacted legislation to reduce
future demand for electricity by requiring energy efficiency
measures. For example, Florida and Georgia—states which
are expected to see the largest increases in extremely hot
days in the region—require that new homes meet
International Energy Conservation Code building standards
(ACEEE 2014a). Only two of the region’s thirteen states
(Arkansas and North Carolina) have adopted an energy
efficiency resource standard as a legislated target for
energy savings. Arkansas requires a 0.75% annual reduction
in investor-owned utility electricity sales, and North
Carolina has a combined energy efficiency and renewable
portfolio standard, requiring a 12.5% offset by 2021 from
either efficiency savings or renewable energy (ACEEE
2014b).
Improving resilience to greater electricity demand
Entergy has worked to mitigate the effects of increasing
electricity demand by investing in energy efficiency
programs, including programs to weatherize lowincome homes and distribute 1,500 weatherization kits.
Entergy, which has service territory in Arkansas,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas, reduced demand by
40 MW in 2012 and has also added 2,080 MW of new
capacity to meet future demand (Entergy 2013).
In Tennessee, the city of Knoxville was recognized by
the White House as a Climate Action Champion—in part
for its energy efficiency and demand reduction efforts
(White House 2015). The city has adopted the latest
available building energy codes and is developing a
revolving loan pilot program for residential energy
efficiency retrofits. The city is also reducing energy
consumption by upgrading streetlights and deploying
energy management programs (City of Knoxville 2014).
Load management programs include dynamic pricing,
remote-controlled thermostats, and dispatchable demand
programs. Several utilities in the Southeast—including Duke
Power, Georgia Power, and the Tennessee Valley
Authority—have offered demand management programs to
their large customers for a decade or more. For example,
participants in Georgia Power’s real-time pricing program
during the early 2000s reduced peak demand by 17%, or
about 800 MW (MIT 2011). The Florida Public Service
Commission establishes annual goals for seasonal peak
demand and annual energy consumption reductions, and
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conservation and load management programs are projected
to reduce Florida utilities’ total summer peak demand by
over 9,200 MW and annual energy consumption by over
14,500 GWh (FPSC 2013). Almost 2.6 million residential
customers and 65,000 commercial and industrial customers
in the Southeast were enrolled in demand response
programs in 2013, resulting in energy savings of more than
99,000 MWh (EIA 2014i).
In addition to energy efficiency and load management
programs, new electric generation capacity may help the
Southeast region reduce its vulnerability to increasing
energy demand. Virtually all of the new capacity additions
to the electric power sector between 2000 and 2012 are
natural gas-fired units (EIA 2013c). Natural gas-fired
generating units are projected to constitute a majority of
the generation additions through 2040.
Hydroelectric Generation
Subsector Vulnerabilities
The Southeast generates 3% of its electricity from 214
federally and privately-owned hydroelectric facilities in the
region (Figure 8-12) (EIA 2013a). These facilities make up a
combined 23 MW of installed capacity and are typically
located in low-elevation areas with heavily vegetated land
cover (DOE 2012a, EIA 2013c). Compared to other regions
with federally-operated hydropower resources, the
Southeast climate typically has the highest amounts of
precipitation and runoff, but is also the hottest region with
large evaporative losses (DOE 2012a). As in other regions,
hydroelectric power generation in the Southeast is only one
of many competing users of water resources. Other major
uses of water in the region include agricultural use,
ecological flows, navigation, and growing demand for
municipal and industrial users—particularly in Atlanta and
northern Georgia (DOE 2012a, 2012b).

Figure 8-12. The Raccoon Mountain project outside of
Chattanooga, Tennessee, which is the Tennessee Valley
Authority’s (TVA’s) largest hydroelectric facility where water is
pumped to the reservoir on top of the mountain and then used
to generate electricity when additional power is needed by the
TVA system
Source: TVA 2015

Climate change may affect hydropower production in the
following ways:
4
 Throughout the Southeast, dry years are projected to
occur more frequently, and the severity of low flow
5
conditions is projected to increase (DOE 2012a,
2012b).
 Decreasing precipitation, increasing
evapotranspiration, as well as competing demand for
water, may decrease water availability for hydropower
generation (DOE 2012a, Ingram et al. 2013).
According to one study, the Southeast is projected to
experience an increase in extremes in hydrology, primarily
as a substantial increase in the number of dry years and
decrease in the number of normal years, although some
basins are projected to experience only a small change in
6
the number of wet years (DOE 2012a). According to the
same study, future low-flow periods may be 10%–30% more
severe than current low-flow periods. Despite these
changes to runoff, annual hydropower generation in the
Southeast is projected to decrease only slightly, with
median annual federal hydropower in the region decreasing
by 0.5% in the mid-term (2025–2039, relative to 1960-1999)
(DOE 2012a, DOE 2012b). However, seasonal trends may be
more relevant than annual trends in impacting hydropower
generation. Projected hotter-drier summers amy result in
more significant decreases in hydropower generation,
coinciding with increases in electricity demand for cooling.
Across the region, changes to inter-annual variability will
likely have a greater effect on the region’s hydropower
resource than total reductions, as competition for water
resources increases in dry years.
When considered in the context of other water users, the
increasing occurrence of low-water years may have a larger
impact than indicated by models that only consider
hydropower resources. One water resource assessment of
the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint (ACF) River basin
considered both climate change impacts and current water
management procedures. The study indicated that under
various emissions scenarios, the basin may be vulnerable to
severe stress resulting in deeper reservoir drawdowns and
reduced firm hydropower generation (Ingram et al. 2013).
Federal hydroelectric facilities in the basin—including the
Buford Dam and W.F. George Dam—typically provide
power during peak demand periods but would be unable to
operate if water levels drop below water intake conduits
due to decreased water availability (CRS 2007).
4

Dry years are defined as those with annual runoff values in the
lowest 20% of years in the baseline period (1960–1999)
5
Low flow conditions are estimated by 10 year return-level
quantiles of seasonal low runoff
6
Comparing projected runoff in the period 2025–2039 to a
baseline period of 1960–1999, based on a 2.7°F temperature
increase.
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Hydroelectric Generation
Resilience Solutions
To increase resilience to decreasing water availability,
operators may consider hydropower generation as part of
an integrated water management and planning approach.
With competing demand from other users, hydropower
may not be the highest-priority water user during periods of
low flow. Operators may be able to maximize generation
during low-flow periods by increasing efficiency of current
facilities. For example, federal operators are working to
replace older turbines with models that are more efficient
at lower head levels (DOE 2012a). In addition, pumped
storage can reduce vulnerabilities by pumping water to an
elevated reservoir during low demand periods and then
releasing the water to generate electricity when additional
power is needed.
Operators may also benefit from improved monitoring and
forecasting tools (DOE 2012a). Following the 2007 drought
in North Carolina, which forced Duke Energy to cut
hydroelectric generation 67%, Duke Energy established a
drought mitigation team to monitor and forecast drought
effects throughout Duke Energy Carolinas’ service area
(Duke Energy 2008). Duke Energy also partnered with public
water system owners in the region to form the CatawbaWateree Water Management Group to establish a
groundwater monitoring network, modify water intakes at
hydroelectric facilities, optimize water intake and return
locations, and establish demand-side management goals for
water (Duke Energy 2008).
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Regional Climate Change Observations
and Projections in Detail
Higher Temperatures
Historical observations
 Since 1970, average temperatures have increased 2°F
(USGCRP 2014).
 Frost-free season has been growing: The average
length of the frost-free season across the Southeast
region increased by about six days (1991–2012,
compared to 1901–1960) (USGCRP 2014).
Future projections
 Average temperatures are expected to increase at a
faster rate: Depending on the location and GHG
emissions, increases of 2.5°F–8.5°F are expected by
2070–2099 compared to 1971–1999 levels (NOAA 2013).
 Extremely hot days are projected to become more
common: Across most of the region, 20–30 more days
with a daily maximum temperature > 95°F are
projected by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to
1980–2000); Florida is likely to be the most affected
and may see as many as 40 more extremely hot days
per year (NOAA 2013).
 Consecutive number of days of extreme heat are
expected to become longer: The annual maximum
number of consecutive days with a daily high > 95°F is
projected to increase by up to 20 days by mid-century
(2041–2070, compared to 1980–2000) across the
region; the western portion of the region is likely to be
the most affected (NOAA 2013).
 Extremely cold nights are expected to become less
common: In the northern portion of the region, 2–10
fewer days with daily minimums <10°F are expected by
mid-century (2041–2070, compared to 1980–2000)
(NOAA 2013).
 Freeze-free season is expected to lengthen: The
freeze-free season is expected to be 20–30 days longer
by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to 1980–2000)
across most of the region (NOAA 2013).
 CDDs are expected to increase: Across most of the
region, an increase of 450–950 CDDs is expected by
mid-century (2041–2070, compared to 1980–2000);
Florida is likely to be the most affected with increases
of up to 1,150 CDDs by mid-century (NOAA 2013).
 Heating degree days (HDDs) are expected to decrease:
Across most of the region, declines of 100–900 HDDs
are expected by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to
1980–2000); the northern portion of the region is likely
to be the most affected, with declines of up to 1,100
HDDs by mid-century (NOAA 2013).
Changing Water Patterns
Historical observations

Since 1895, summer precipitation has decreased by
0.10 inches per decade, or 1.1 inches (NOAA 2013).

Since 1895, fall precipitation has increased by 0.27
inches per decade, or almost 3 inches (NOAA 2013).



Across the Southeast, extreme precipitation events
have occurred more frequently: An index of 2-day
extreme precipitation events expected to occur once
every five years shows a statistically significant upward
trend since 1895 (NOAA 2013a).
Future projections
 Depending on the emissions scenario and region,
annual precipitation is projected to increase or
decrease: By the end of the century (2070–2099),
annual average precipitation is expected to increase by
3%–6% in the northern portion of the region under a
low emissions scenario compared to the period 1971–
1999. Under a high emissions scenario, precipitation is
projected to decrease by 3%–9% in the western and
southern portions of the region compared to the
period 1971–1999 (NOAA 2013).
 Drier summers are expected across most of the
region: Summer precipitation is expected to decrease
by up to 15% by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to
1971–2000) under a higher emissions scenario in the
northern and far southern portions of the region
(NOAA 2013).
 Extreme precipitation events are expected to increase
in the northern portion of the region: The number of
days per year with precipitation greater than one inch
is expected to increase by up to 25% by mid-century
(2041–2070, compared to 1980–2000) under a higher
emissions scenario (NOAA 2013).
 Consecutive number of days with little or no
precipitation are likely to become longer in Louisiana:
The annual maximum number of consecutive days with
less than 3 mm of precipitation is expected to increase
up to 10 days by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to
1980–2000) (NOAA 2013).
Sea Level Rise and Hurricanes
Historical observations
 Relative mean sea level has risen because of a
combination of global sea level rise and land
subsidence in the region: Relative mean sea level on
the coast of the Southeast region rose 0.03–0.38
th
inches/year between the middle of the 20 century
and 2006, depending on the location (NOAA 2009).
Future projections
 Sea level rise is expected to accelerate: Sea level on
the coast in the Southeast is projected to rise at an
average rate of 0.06–0.27 inches/year (no ice sheet
melt) or 0.21–0.48 inches /year (ice sheet melt)
between 1992 and 2050 depending on the location
(USGCRP 2014).
 Frequency of intense hurricanes (Category 4 and 5),
hurricane-associated storm intensity, and rainfall
rates are projected to increase (USGCRP 2014): Rainfall
rates within 100 km of tropical storm centers are
projected to increase by 20% by 2100 (USGCRP 2014).
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Chapter 9: Alaska

Climate Change and the Energy Sector

9. Alaska

Overview

QUICK FACTS
Alaska consists of a vast, sparsely populated land area with over
Population (2013)
740,000 (<1% of U.S.)
30,000 miles of ocean coastline. Diverse ecosystems span the
Area (square miles)
571,000 (16% of U.S.)
Energy expenditures
$8 billion
state, ranging from Arctic tundra in the far north to temperate
% for
continental in the interior to maritime coastal in the south. The
ENERGY SUPPLY
Annual
Annual
electric
state is a major oil and gas exporter, with critical oil production
& DEMAND
Production Consumption
power
assets, pipelines and roads, and export facilities. Key climate
Electric power
TWh
7
6
n/a
change trends that may affect the energy sector in the region
Petroleum
million barrels
188
45
2%
include the following:
Coal
million tons
2
1
43%
Natural gas
Bcf
351
332
10%
 Air temperatures in Alaska have increased rapidly over
Annual
Power
the last half-century and are projected to continue rising
ELECTRIC
% of Total
Capacity
Production
plants
at a rate faster than anywhere else in the United States.
POWER
Production
(GW)
(TWh)
>1 MW*
Permafrost across much of the state is thawing, and
Natural gas
4
52%
1
13
a
permafrost loss is expected to continue in the future.
Coal
1
10%
<1
5
Thawing permafrost alters the foundations of much of
Nuclear
0
0%
0
0
Hydroelectric
2
23%
<1
28
Alaska's infrastructure, such as the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
Petroleum
1
15%
<1
89
System (TAPS), roads and airstrips, transmission lines, fuel
Wind
<1
1%
<1
4
storage tanks, and generators, and it can increase the
Biomass
<1
<1%
<1
1
b
vulnerability of riverbanks and coastlines to erosion.
Solar
0
0%
0
0
 Arctic sea ice is retreating and is projected to decline
CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE
c
substantially in the future. Sea ice protects coastlines
Petroleum
Electric Power
Wells (>1 boe/d):
1,284 Power plants (> 1 MW):
130**
from erosion and reduces the height of storm surge,
Refineries:
6 Interstate transmission lines:
0
reducing coastal flooding. Erosion of coastlines undercuts
Liquids pipelines:
5 Coal
the structural footing of energy infrastructure, including
Ports (>200 tons/yr):
7 Mines:
1
barge landings, power lines, and fuel storage tanks.
Natural Gas
Waterways
Reduced sea ice can increase the offshore oil drilling and
Wells:
185 Coal and petroleum routes:
13
shipping season but also increases the vulnerability of
Interstate pipelines:
0 Railroads
d
Market hubs:
0 Miles of freight track:
506
coastal communities to flooding during autumn storms.
Note: Table presents 2012 data except number of oil wells, which is 2009 data.
 Wildfires may burn more extensively and frequently as
*Some plants use multiple fuels, and individual generating units may be <1 MW.
projected higher temperatures, longer growing seasons,
**Total is less than sum of plants by fuel as some plants use more than one fuel.
e
Sources: AAR 2014, EIA 2011, EIA 2013b, EIA 2013c, EIA 2013d, EIA 2014a, EIA 2014b,
and drier conditions enable fires. Fire threatens
EIA 2014c, EIA 2014d, EIA 2014e, EIA 2014f, EIA 2014g, U.S. Census Bureau 2014b,
infrastructure across Alaska's interior, including roads,
USACE 2014
transmission and distribution lines, and the TAPS. Wildfires
f
and associated changes in vegetation cover can also lead to rapid, lasting permafrost thaw in some areas.
 Precipitation is projected to increase, and glaciers are expected to continue receding at increasing rates, likely increasing
g
streamflow in the near term but causing long-term reductions. The continuing increase in river discharge from glaciers in
southeastern and south central Alaska may increase hydropower potential but may also increase challenges associated with
sedimentation and affect seasonal variability, complicating hydropower planning. In the long term, increases in rain (rather
h
than snow) and associated changes in mountain snowpack, as well as the decline of glaciers, may reduce hydropower resources.
Table 9-1: Examples of important energy sector vulnerabilities and climate resilience solutions in Alaska
Subsector

Vulnerability

Magnitude

Illustrative Resilience Solutions

Fuel Transport
and Storage

Increased risk of damage to foundations
of transportation infrastructure from
thawing permafrost, erosion of coastal
i
and riparian fuel systems
Reduced load-bearing of drilling pads
due to permafrost thaw, shorter work
season due to later freeze-up and earlier
l
thaw of tundra
Possible changes to snowpack,
streamflow timing, and sediments;
n
long-term decline of glaciers

Average annual shoreline erosion rates
of 68 feet per year for the period 1954–
2003 in Newtok, Alaska, due to reduced
j
sea ice and thawing permafrost
Reductions of continuous permafrost
load-bearing capacity of up to 20%; 100
fewer working days per year in 2002
m
compared to 1970s
Glacier meltwater comprises
approximately half of all streamflow
o
volume in Alaska

Maintenance of support structures
and embankments, rerouting around
permafrost, protection of shorelines,
k
or relocation of assets

Oil and Gas
Exploration
and Production
Hydropower
Generation

Appropriate structures for
construction on “continuous
permafrost,” including insulation to
protect from thaw
Water resource management
practices, including monitoring and
p
forecasting snowmelt availability
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Regional Energy Sector Vulnerabilities
and Resilience Solutions
Key energy subsectors and illustrative examples of
resilience solutions in Alaska are discussed below. System
components that are most vulnerable to climate change are
described first.
Fuel Transport and Storage
Subsector Vulnerabilities
Alaska's expansive territory separates its ample energy
resources from rural communities and from easy access to
wider energy networks. Alaska's remote communities rely
on regular shipments of fuel–primarily by barge, but also by
airplane–across long distances, often in difficult conditions
(see sidebar). Highways and rail are used for fuel transport
in Alaska's relatively populous Railbelt region, which spans
from Fairbanks in the north to Anchorage, Valdez, and the
Kenai Peninsula in the south. Oil products shipped by rail
are increasingly important since the closing of the Flint Hills
refinery in 2014, and petroleum products for Alaska's
interior are now refined in Kenai and are shipped north to
the Fairbanks area on the Alaska Railroad (Cole 2014).
Transport of fuel for export is critical for Alaska’s economy,
as Alaska is one of the top oil-producing states in the
country (EIA 2014b). Most of Alaska's energy production
operations are located on the North Slope of the Brooks
Range along Alaska's northern coastline, although
production has been falling steadily since 1988 as existing
North Slope oil wells mature (EIA 2014a). The North Slope is
one of the most remote places in the world, and oil
produced from this region relies on the TAPS to access
markets in Alaska and beyond. The TAPS consists of a
network of gathering pipelines in the Prudhoe Bay area of
Arctic Alaska, a single 48-inch-diameter pipeline stretching
800 miles south to the port of Valdez, and a series of 12
pumping stations and other support equipment and
facilities located along its length. The pipeline carries nearly
all of the oil produced in the North Slope each year
(approximately 175 million barrels in 2014) (Alyeska 2014,
EIA 2014a). Oil from the TAPS is transferred to tanker ships
at the Valdez Marine Terminal.
Several Alaskan communities rely on natural gas pipelines
for deliveries of locally produced natural gas, and some of
the natural gas produced on the Kenai Peninsula is exported
to Asian markets through a liquefied natural gas (LNG)
export terminal in Nikiski (EIA 2012, EIA 2014b, EIA 2014d).
Nikiski is also the likely location for a future export terminus
of a proposed gas pipeline from the North Slope gas fields
(Bradner 2013).

Figure 9-1. Map of Alaska

Alaska’s multi-modal transport network delivering fuel
and supplies to rural populations
Fuel transport for Alaska's remote rural communities
outside of the Railbelt region requires significant effort
and frequently comes at a high cost (Bradner 2012,
USGCRP 2014). Over 80% of Alaska's communities have
populations smaller than 1,000, many with no
connection to wider energy or electrical networks (AFN
2012, US Census Bureau 2014a, USGCRP 2014). Heating
fuel, transportation fuel and diesel for electricity
generation are all critical supplies for these remote
communities. Diesel generators supply the large
majority of Alaska's electricity outside of the Railbelt
(AEA 2013a).
Fuel shipments to Alaska's rural communities often
require specialized equipment and multiple stages
involving different vehicles (Bradner 2012). Over short
distances, roads within and around towns serve as
crucial links for Alaska's transportation networks.
However, most remote communities are not connected
via long-distance roads, and shipping by barge is the
primary means of transporting fuel to Alaska's isolated
coastal and interior riparian communities. For some
communities beyond the reach of barge transport, fuel
is shipped by air, often at extremely high cost (Bradner
2012, USARC 2003). For these communities, the local
airstrip is an essential part of their energy
transportation infrastructure. Furthermore, because of
seasonal constraints and the high cost of shipments,
communities rely on large storage containers to reduce
the number of necessary shipments. Many communities
receive only one fuel shipment per year.
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Some long-distance roads serve as crucial
transportation links for providing energy
infrastructure support. For example, the
Dalton Highway stretches 414 miles
between Fairbanks and Deadhorse,
located on Prudhoe Bay, and is used to
carry supplies and heavy machinery for
North Slope oil production as well as for
servicing the TAPS (Alaska Geographic
2014).
Climate change is projected to have the
following impacts on fuel transport in
Alaska:
 Warming temperatures are expected
to contribute to the continued thaw
Figure 9-2. Extent of permafrost affecting Alaska's communities and highways
of permafrost, compromising the
Source: USARC 2003
structural stability of transportation
and storage infrastructure, including
reaches of the zone (ACIA 2005). In one study of permafrost
oil and gas pipelines, storage tanks, runways, railroads,
north of Fairbanks, researchers found that 38% of their sites
and roads in northern and interior Alaska (USARC 2003,
indicated thawing or unstable permafrost layers (LTER
USGCRP 2014).
2006).
 Reduced sea ice and thawing permafrost are expected
to lead to accelerated rates of coastal and riparian
Almost the entire length of the TAPS is constructed in
erosion, affecting northern and western Alaska's
continuous or discontinuous permafrost zones. Thawing
shoreline energy assets, such as the extensive shipping
permafrost layers can reduce the load-bearing capacity of
infrastructure including ports and terminals; reductions
the ground under the TAPS supports, and frost heave and
in sea ice may also benefit shipping by extending the
uneven settlement may damage TAPS segments (DOE 2013,
ice-free season (Alaska AAG 2010, DOE 2013, USGCRP
USARC 2003). Segments of the TAPS that are elevated
2014).
above permafrost layers (over half of the pipeline length)
1
 Increased temperatures, drier conditions, and
utilize heat pipes called thermosyphons that passively
increased vegetation are expected to increase the
transfer heat from the permafrost layer into the air, thus
extent and severity of forest fires, which can disrupt
stabilizing the permafrost foundation (Alyeska 2014, DOE
road and rail transport and contribute to rapid local
2013, USARC 2003). As ambient temperatures warm,
permafrost thaw (LTER 2006, USGCRP 2014).
existing thermosyphons may become insufficient to provide
the necessary cooling to protect permafrost layers from
Permafrost across the state is expected to experience
thawing (ACIA 2005). The design of existing thermosyphons
continued warming, reduced thickness, and thawing,
was based on the average permafrost and climate
depending on the permafrost zone and soil factors. In zones
conditions of the period 1950–1970, a period featuring a
2
of continuous permafrost (primarily occurring north of the
much colder climate than today, and did not take a
Brooks Range, including the North Slope; Figure 9-2),
warming climate into account (NOAA 2013, USARC 2003,
permafrost thickness is expected to decline (ACIA 2005). In
USGCRP 2014). A 2001 study indicated that upwards of one
discontinuous permafrost zones—where permafrost
third of all vertical support members along the pipeline
temperatures are much closer to 0°C, including most of the
route had possible problems caused by climate change
Alaskan interior and western coastline—permafrost may
(USARC 2003).
thaw much more rapidly, especially in the southernmost
Permafrost thaw is already affecting segments of the
1
In Alaska's interior, landscapes have become drier even as
pipeline. In one case, a reduction in permafrost thickness
precipitation has increased. While the relative importance of
caused a vertical support member to tilt by seven degrees
different mechanisms contributing to drier conditions is not clear
over a period of approximately three years. The vertical
(including permafrost thaw and increased evapotranspiration), the
support member was replaced in 2000 (USARC 2003).
National Climate Assessment has expressed high confidence that
landscapes are getting drier (USGCRP 2014).
2
Continuous permafrost zones are defined as those with >90% of
the land area underlain by permafrost. Discontinuous zones are
those underlain by 50%–90% permafrost. Sporadic permafrost
regions are those underlain by 10%–50% permafrost (ACIA 2005).

In addition to structural vulnerabilities related to
permafrost, climate change may also alter the stability of
soil in the permafrost-free areas where the TAPS is buried.
Changes in precipitation, temperature, and groundwater
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availability may affect the annual frost depth of the soil's
active layer in these areas, affecting soil stability and loadbearing capacity (NOAA 2013, USARC 2003, USGCRP 2014).

DeMarban 2012). For example, in Newtok, Alaska, thawing
permafrost is contributing to the subsidence of land under
fuel tanks and generators (Figure 9-3) (ADEC 2013a,
DeMarban 2012).

One study projected that permafrost warming of 5°C at a
10-meter depth in Barrow, Alaska (in the continuous
permafrost zone), would correspond to a decline in loadbearing strength of 23% (ACIA 2005). The study also
projected that permafrost warming of only 2°C in Bethel,
Alaska (in the discontinuous permafrost zone), could be
sufficient to reach thawing temperatures, resulting in the
potential complete loss of permafrost and a projected 40%
drop in load-bearing strength (ACIA 2005).
Thawing permafrost also undercuts the stability of roads
and airstrips. Most of Alaska's road miles are in
Southcentral Alaska, which includes the Railbelt region and
other areas where permafrost is less common (USARC
2003). However, many of Alaska's long-distance highways
are located in interior regions with discontinuous
permafrost, which is more vulnerable to thaw and resulting
instability (see Figure 9-2 on previous page) (ACIA 2005,
USARC 2003). Furthermore, a large number of Alaska's
remote communities are in areas with continuous or
discontinuous permafrost coverage, and local roads are
vulnerable to permafrost thaw and land settling. Roads
underlain with ice-rich permafrost (such as sections of the
Dalton Highway) may require substantial rehabilitation or
relocation if thawing occurs (USARC 2003). In zones of
warm, discontinuous permafrost, thawing beneath road
embankments may occur in the next 20–30 years, within
the lifetime of most embankments (ACIA 2005). While roads
built on lower-ice permafrost may not necessarily require
relocation, expensive, continuous repairs are likely to be
necessary (ACIA 2005, USARC 2003).
The state's only freight railroad company, the Alaska
Railroad, operates a line that extends from Seward on the
southern coast to the Fairbanks area in the state's interior.
The railway line defines the relatively densely populated
Railbelt region. The Alaska Railroad crosses sporadic and
discontinuous permafrost zones and has historically been
affected by differential frost heave and thaw settlement
(USARC 2003). Continuing thaw of permafrost may increase
these challenges, including increasing the risk of damage to
track and railbed, as well as higher maintenance costs
(USARC 2003).
For many of Alaska's rural communities, thawing
permafrost also threatens inland fuel transport and storage
infrastructure, including airstrips, roads, and fuel storage
tanks. Alaska has over 160 communities in continuous or
discontinuous permafrost zones (USARC 2003). In these
communities, thawing permafrost can cause the
foundations of structures to settle inconsistently, leading to
loss of support or damage to the structures (ACIA 2005,

Figure 9-3. Shifting fuel tanks in Newtok
Source: Newtok Planning Group 2014

Runways face the same vulnerabilities to permafrost thaw
as other terrestrial infrastructure, including the risk of
uneven land settling and loss of foundation strength.
Runways in communities built on discontinuous or
continuous permafrost may require major repairs or may
have to be entirely relocated (USARC 2003). The village of
Noatak in Alaska's northwestern interior relies exclusively
on air transport for fuel shipments since falling water levels
in the Noatak River have made barge shipments impossible
(ANTHC 2011, USA Today 2012). Because of the high cost of
shipping fuel by air, Noatak also sees the highest electricity
costs in Alaska's northwest region (NANA Regional
Corporation 2010).
Air strips in coastal communities may also be vulnerable to
coastal erosion and flooding. The community of Point Hope
on the Bering Strait relocated to higher ground in the
1970s, but climate change-related erosion and flooding
remains a threat to the community's air strip (ANTHC 2010,
GAO 2003).
Thawing permafrost combined with declining sea ice can
increase the rate of coastal erosion along Alaska's northern
and western coastlines. Rapid coastal erosion can occur
during severe storms when sea ice is not present to protect
the shoreline from wave action and storm surge.
Additionally, inland permafrost thaw can contribute to
accelerated erosion of infrastructure along riverbanks
(Alaska AAG 2010, USGCRP 2014). For Alaska's rural
communities that rely on periodic shipments of fuel for
heating, transportation, and electricity generation,
permafrost thaw and erosion that damages transportation
infrastructure can cause temporary or long-term
disruptions to fuel deliveries and increase the costs of these
essential products.
Coastal erosion exacerbated by receding sea ice in Alaska is
threatening fuel transport infrastructure for numerous
small native communities. Since consistent satellite imagery
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of Arctic sea ice became available in 1979, the extent and
thickness of summer sea ice along Alaska’s coastlines has
decreased substantially, and currently there is only about
half as much as at the beginning of the record (USGCRP
2014). Decline of sea ice cover is expected to continue:
summer sea ice may disappear completely before midcentury, and winter sea ice may no longer reach Alaska's
southwest coast on the Bering Sea by the end of the
century (ACIA 2005, USGCRP 2014). Coastal sea ice in the
Arctic Ocean and Bering Strait protects shorelines from
storm-driven wave action and flooding associated with
storm surge (Alaska AAG 2010). As sea ice recedes earlier in
the summer and returns later in the winter, communities
are more vulnerable to storm-driven erosion. Permafrost
thaw further allows greater coastal erosion, as coastal bluffs
that have been historically "cemented" by ice-rich
permafrost are beginning to thaw (USGCRP 2014). Some
inland riparian communities may also experience greater
erosion of riverbanks due to climate change as thawing
permafrost allows more rapid erosion, especially if
riverflows are increased by accelerating glacier melt or
increased precipitation (ACIA 2005, Alaska AAG 2010, NOAA
2013, USACE 2006b, USARC 2003).
Coastal and riparian erosion can destroy barge landings,
fuel connections, and other infrastructure used for
offloading fuel shipments from barges. In cases in which
fuel barges cannot offload, communities must transfer fuel
to smaller, shallow draft ships capable of landing, adding to
the cost (Bradner 2012, USGCRP 2014). In some cases,
communities must rely on air shipments of fuel, which is
extremely expensive (Bradner 2012, USARC 2003).

lead to rapid local permafrost thaw, or even long-term
transition to permafrost-free soil (LTER 2006). When
combined with warming, fire-related changes to local
permafrost conditions may affect soil stability.
Newtok erosion leading to energy crisis
The Yup'ik Eskimo village of Newtok is facing erosion
threats that have already destroyed its barge landing
and disrupted fuel shipments (USACE 2008a, USGCRP
2014). Located on the tidal Ninglick River just inland of
the western coast of Alaska on the Bering Sea, the
village is experiencing thawing permafrost and loss of
sea ice that increases its vulnerability to rapid erosion
during storms (USACE 2008b, USGCRP 2014). In 2005,
the village's barge landing on the Ninglick was
destroyed, and in April 2006, a fuel barge was grounded
for three days, after which deliveries were suspended
and the fall 2006 fuel delivery was not made (USACE
2008a). The village experienced a fuel crisis in the
winter of 2006–2007, and emergency shipments of fuel
were flown in to supplement dwindling supplies until a
solution could be found (D'Oro 2007, USACE 2008a).
Fuel storage tanks—including tanks for the village's
generator station and school, for home heating, and for
marine and aviation fuel—are also threatened by
erosion of both the Ninglick and the Newtok rivers
(ADEC 2013a, DeMarban 2012).

Declining sea ice may also aid fuel deliveries for some
communities, as the ice-free season grows longer. For
coastal villages that are ice-bound for some portion of the
year, declining sea ice may allow more flexible or more
frequent fuel deliveries.
Increasing incidence of forest fires may also affect the TAPS.
The pipeline is designed to resist forest fires and is
protected by a galvanized steel jacket and insulation, as
well as its placement within a 64-foot wide right-of-way
clear-cut of vegetation. Past fires have not affected the
pipeline's operations; however, the costs associated with
protecting the pipeline may increase, as climate change is
projected to increase the risk of forest fires in Alaska (BLM
2007, D'Oro 2003, News-Miner 2014). For example, in
response to a fire that approached the TAPS in 2014 near
the Yukon River Crossing, pipeline operators mobilized
sprinkler systems, water trucks, and bulldozers in case the
fire threatened the pipeline or support structures (NewsMiner 2014). Fires can also affect the health and depth of
permafrost. By reducing insulating vegetation from the
active layer of soil (the topmost layer that freezes and
thaws annually) and by increasing soil drainage, fires can

Figure 9-4. Shoreline erosion in Netwok
Source: USACE 2008b

Fuel Transport and Storage
Resilience Solutions
As temperatures increase, the TAPS may require additional
operational, maintenance, design, and construction
techniques to prepare for rapid thawing permafrost.
Currently, the TAPS and its supporting infrastructure are
actively monitored for structural problems resulting from
thawing permafrost, and vertical support members are
inspected once every three years (Alyeska 2008, USARC
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2003). The frequency or robustness of monitoring and
inspecting may need to be increased in the face of climate
change. In cases in which underlying permafrost has
become insufficient to support the TAPS, new, deeper
supports or rigid support structures can be used (USARC
2003). Additionally, proactive maintenance and upgrading
of thermosyphons avoids damage to underlying permafrost
(Figure 9-5) (Alyeska 2008). Currently, the majority of
repairs to thermosyphons are done in the Copper River
Basin, an area in the southern reaches of the pipeline's
range that is undergoing a transition from a discontinuous
permafrost zone to a sporadic permafrost zone (Alyeska
2008).

Figure 9-5. An elevated section of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
System uses thermosyphons, which draws heat out of the ground
and vents it into the air to prevent permafrost thaw
Source: FBI 2012

For communities facing rapid erosion, options for
protecting coastal fuel transport and storage infrastructure
may be limited. Many communities have invested millions
of dollars in walls to reduce or stop erosion. For example,
Bethel, which has about 6,000 residents, has deployed an
extensive seawall along 8,000 feet of its riverbank at a total
estimated cost of $24 million (GAO 2003). Bethel serves as a
major regional fuel hub for several rural communities on
the Kuskokwim River, and the seawall protects storage
tanks capable of holding over 20 million gallons from
eroding riverbanks (ADEC 2013b, Bradner 2012).
In other communities, coastal energy assets may require
relocation inland. For example, in Port Heiden and Levelock,
fuel headers (connections used for refilling fuel storage
tanks from barges) may need to be relocated inland, as
shorelines are eroding (ADEC 2012, ANTHC 2014, LPB 2013).
However, in other cases, the only solution to the challenges
presented by erosion may be complete relocation of an
entire community. Several communities, including Newtok,
Kivalina, and Shishmaref, have voted to relocate, often at
extremely high costs (GAO 2003). After efforts to build an
erosion barrier from sandbags failed, the village of Newtok

began the process of migration to a new village site in 2003
(GAO 2003). In the village of Shishmaref, various attempts
to address erosion of coastal bluffs—including seawalls
constructed from sandbags, gabions, and concrete mats—
have failed to stop the threat to the community. The
residents had to relocate 19 homes following storms in
1997 and 2002. After the latter storm, the village voted to
relocate in its entirety (GAO 2003). Relocation is expected
to take 15–20 years and cost at least $180 million (USACE
2006a). In the interim, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
built additional seawall protection in Shimsharef in 2007 at
an estimated cost of $6.5 million (Weyiouanna 2007).
Roads, railroads, and airstrips subject to shifting permafrost
foundations may require increased maintenance,
rehabilitation, rerouting, or relocation, depending on
location-specific factors (USARC 2003). Future projects
should take projected temperature increases into account
when designing on or around permafrost. For example, new
projects built on continuous permafrost can anticipate
reduced load-bearing capacity and utilize thicker
embankments when necessary (ACIA 2005). Because of the
short summer building season, constructing a new rural
airport in Alaska is an expensive and lengthy project,
costing $15–$20 million and ordinarily taking 3–5 years—
and sometimes as much as 10 years (TRB 2012). Alaska has
an airport system planning process in place that seeks to
continually monitor Alaska’s airports and prioritize funding
based on need and economic benefits (TRB 2012). For
example, the Federal Aviation Administration provided
$10.3 million to raise and lengthen the airstrip in Koyukuk, a
village in Alaska's interior plagued by regular spring flooding
(GAO 2003).
The Alaska Village Electric Cooperative (AVEC) serves many
of Alaska's most remote rural communities. AVEC is
expanding the use of village interties (low-voltage
transmission lines between villages) to reduce the
likelihood of power outages if fuel storage tanks and
generating equipment are affected by flooding and erosion
impacts (AVEC 2013). By connecting nearby villages, AVEC
can centralize energy generation and reduce the need for
bulk fuel deliveries and storage for difficult-to-reach
communities (AVEC 2013). Development of local renewable
energy resources such as wind and ocean power may also
increase the resilience of rural communities by reducing the
need for remote fuel deliveries (AVEC 2013).
Oil and Gas Exploration and Production
Subsector Vulnerabilities
For the last four decades, Alaska has been one of the top
oil-producing states in the country, and oil production is a
key driver of the state's economy. Alaska produced 8% of
the nation's oil in 2012. Although that percentage is down
from a peak of 25% in 1988 (EIA 2014a), Alaskan oil still
serves a large share of the western United States' demand
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for oil, and Alaska's remaining oil reserves constitute 8.7%
of the nation's proven reserves (EIA 2015a, EIA 2014b). As
Alaska's North Slope oil fields mature, exploration and
drilling is reaching farther inland, and new wells are located
farther apart (DeMarban 2014).
Alaska's natural gas is produced primarily in the Cook Inlet,
with additional production in the North Slope and outside
Barrow. Unlike Alaska's oil sector, the state's natural gas
resources are primarily used locally for electricity
production, refining, and heating. Historically, 8%–15% of
the state's total marketable gas production has been
exported via the Kenai LNG export terminal, primarily to
Japan (EIA 2012, EIA 2014b, EIA 2014d, EIA 2015b). Gas on
the North Slope cannot be transported outside the region
and is therefore consumed locally, or is reinjected.
Because of the dominant role Alaska's oil industry plays in
the state's economy, climate change impacts that affect the
sector's productivity are likely to have negative effects on
Alaska's economy. Oil production and other extractive
industries constitute the largest single share of Alaska's GDP
(21% in 2012), and taxes and royalties affiliated with the
industry contribute over 90% of the state's unrestricted
revenue (ADCCED 2014).
Climate change is projected to have the
following impacts on oil and gas exploration
and production in Alaska:
 Warming temperatures are expected to
contribute to the continued thaw of
permafrost, weakening the soil and
causing differential settling underneath
drilling pads and supporting
infrastructure (ACIA 2005, USARC 2003,
USGCRP 2014).
 Increasing temperatures are likely to
reduce the number of days of allowable
road travel on frozen tundra, while
dependence on ice roads for oil and gas
production in the North Slope is
increasing (ADNR 2004, DOE 2013).
 Declining sea ice may benefit offshore
oil exploration off the North Slope by
providing a longer ice-free season and
expand the spatial extent of offshore
exploration in the Arctic (DOE 2013).

reduce the load-bearing capacity of soils and lead to
differential settling, undermining the foundations of
structures, including drilling pads, production installations,
and supporting structures (DOE 2013, USARC 2003).
Off-road transportation in Alaska's far north is essential for
oil exploration and production on the North Slope, but is
limited to the winter season to protect the sensitive tundra
ecosystems. The Alaska Department of Natural Resources
(ADNR) determines the annual opening and closing dates
for off-road travel on tundra, basing its decisions on the
thickness and hardness of the ground frost (ADNR 2004).
Higher temperatures and thawing permafrost can shorten
the winter operating season, decreasing productivity and
increasing costs (DOE 2013, NOAA 2014). Since the 1970s,
both warmer conditions and changes in regulatory criteria
have shortened the tundra travel season by an average of
100 days (Figure 9-6) (ADNR 2004, DOE 2013, NOAA 2014).
The challenges of shorter winter working seasons are
compounded by record demand for tundra travel as the
extent of active North Slope oil and gas wells grows and
becomes less geographically concentrated. In the winter of
2013–2014, a record-high number of miles of ice roads
were approved for construction (DeMarban 2014).

Figure 9-6. Alaska tundra travel season 1970–2004
Source: NOAA 2014

Warming temperatures in the North Slope are expected to
reduce the thickness of the permafrost layer and increase
the depth of the active soil layer (the layer that freezes and
thaws annually). North Slope drilling occurs on the colder,
thicker tundra north of the Brooks Range that may not be
as susceptible to thawing as the warm permafrost in
Alaska's interior (USARC 2003). But even if permafrost is not
completely lost, partial thawing of the permafrost layer can

In addition to a shorter season, the area of tundra that is
expected to be sufficiently frozen to support ice roads is
projected to fall. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) projects that, by mid-century, the average
land area accessible by winter season ice roads in Alaska
will fall by 29% compared to today (2045–2059 compared
to 2000–2014) (IPCC 2014a).
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Oil and Gas Exploration and Production
Resilience Solutions
Reductions in permafrost load-bearing capacity can be
addressed by engineering structures with appropriate
design criteria for the life of the foundation. Additionally,
measures to insulate or ventilate underlying permafrost,
such as construction of a gravel pad of appropriate depth or
the use of thermal piles, can help maintain the permafrost
temperature and protect foundations from thawing (Seifert
2011).
As understanding of tundra damage and regulations
regarding tundra travel evolve, new technologies and
approaches to protecting the tundra are emerging. For
example, pre-packing of tundra snow prior to road opening
may allow more rapid freezing of active layer soils and
earlier opening of tundra travel (Byrne and Shultz 2015).
Hydropower
Subsector Vulnerabilities
Hydropower systems in Alaska constitute an important
share of electricity generation, providing about one quarter
of all electricity in the state (EIA 2013a). Reliance on
hydropower for electricity is distinctly regional, with the
great majority of hydropower capacity located in the
Railbelt region and southeast parts of the state. In the
southeast, hydropower constitutes about one-half of
installed capacity (AEA 2013a). However, apart from small
hydropower facilities near Bristol Bay and in the Aleutian
Islands, there is no installed hydroelectric capacity in the
northern or western portions of the state (Table 9-2) (AEA
2013a).
Hydropower projects in Alaska's remote regions are
typically run-of-the-river plants, which divert a portion of
the flow of the river through turbines to generate power.
These projects tend to be smaller operations such as the
105 kW Town Creek Project in the City of Akutan (McMillen
2011). Alaska also uses several lake-tap hydropower
projects, such as the 31 MW Crater Lake Project (part of the
Snettisham Project that powers Juneau), as well as
traditional dams such as the 120 MW Bradley Lake
Hydroelectric Project (AEA 2011, AEA 2014b). Alaska's
larger dams are found in the southeastern and Railbelt
regions of the state.
Table 9-2. Hydroelectric capacity in Alaska, 2011

Region

Southeast
Copper River/Chugach
Railbelt
Kodiak
Bristol Bay
Aleutians
Rest of Alaska

Hydroelectric
Capacity
(MW)
210.1
19.2
184.4
22.9
0.8
0.8
0

% of Total
Capacity in
Region
51%
33%
13%
37%
3%
2%
–

Climate change is projected to have the following impacts
on hydropower in Alaska:
 More precipitation as rain rather than snow and
increasing temperatures, particularly in winter, may
result in earlier spring thaw, which could increase
water availability for hydropower generation in the
spring and reduce water availability in the summer
(ACIA 2005, DOE 2013).
 Accelerating glacial melt may increase water availability
for hydropower generation on glacier-fed waterways in
the short term but is expected to threaten these
resources in the longer term by reducing river
discharge and hydropower generation (DOE 2013,
USGCRP 2014). Near-term increases in streamflow may
also affect sediment loading, potentially reducing
reservoir capacity and hydropower capacity (Cherry et
al. 2010a).
 Thawing permafrost may affect the design of potential
new dams making use of Alaska's untapped
hydropower resources (ACIA 2005, Sayles 1987).
Declining snowpack and earlier snowmelt may shift peak
streamflow timing and reduce water availability and
hydropower generation in the summer at facilities that rely
on snowmelt-fed rivers. This effect may be particularly
acute at run-of-the-river facilities, which are directly
dependent on river discharge (ACIA 2005, Blackshear et al.
2011, IRENA 2012, DOE 2013). The average winter
temperature minimum in southeastern Alaska has been
increasing at an accelerating rate since 1940, and by the
end of the century, average winter temperatures are
projected to stay above freezing (Cherry et al. 2010b, NOAA
2013). Increases in winter temperatures will increase the
amount of precipitation that falls as rain rather than snow
(Cherry et al. 2010b). For watersheds that typically store
water in mountain snowpack from fall through spring, these
effects could reduce the total water available from
snowpack.
In the southern portion of Alaska, precipitation is projected
to increase, but the impact of these changes on
hydropower generation is uncertain. Higher air
temperatures are expected to increase evaporation, and
longer growing seasons for vegetation in Alaska may
ultimately reduce water availability for hydropower despite
increased precipitation (USGCRP 2014). Vegetation changes
associated with a warming climate may withdraw water
from watersheds and reduce streamflow available for
hydropower (ADNR 2014). Furthermore, the seasonality of
storage reservoirs means that not all precipitation can be
used for hydropower production. For example, projected
increases in autumn precipitation may not contribute to
hydropower production if warming temperatures mean
additional precipitation falls as rain rather than snow. Since
reservoirs are already at capacity by the fall, additional rain

Source: Adapted from AEA 2013a
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will likely be spilled over at traditional and lake-tap facilities
(Cherry et al. 2010b).
Accelerating glacial melt is expected to generally increase
streamflow and hydropower potential in Alaska on glacierfed streams in the near term. But as glaciers are expected
to continue to shrink, hydropower production will likely
eventually decline as less water is available (ADNR 2014,
DOE 2013, USGCRP 2014). Currently, approximately half of
Alaska's total runoff begins as glacier meltwater (ADNR
2014). From the mid-1990s to 2000, the rate of glacial melt
in North America tripled relative to the melt rate from the
mid-1950s to the mid-1990s, and Alaska's glaciers currently
exhibit the highest rates of decline anywhere on earth
(ADNR 2014, Zemp and Haberli 2007). While the timing of
each glacier's decline and potential disappearance depends
on a number of factors, determining when a glacier's runoff
is likely to peak and begin to fall is critical for water and
hydropower resource planning (ADNR 2014).
Depending on the hydrology and geology of each basin,
increases in streamflow may increase the amount of
sediment carried in a river (Cherry 2009). Sediment can
affect hydropower facilities by collecting behind a dam,
slowly reducing the storage capacity of a reservoir (Cherry
et al. 2010a). Additionally, sediments present in water that
passes through a turbine can wear down the turbine blades,
reducing the efficiency and total capacity of a hydropower
plant (Cherry et al. 2010a). Additional research is still
needed to understand the role that climate change plays in
affecting sediment loading in Alaska's rivers and basins,
including those currently and potentially useful for
hydropower production (ADNR 2014, Cherry 2009).
Although dams built on permafrost foundations are rare,
some do exist in Alaska (ACIA 2005, Sayles 1987). The
largest of these, a containment structure for a mining
operation outside of Levelock, failed in 1962 after falling
into disuse. Thermal degradation of underlying permafrost
led to seepage and erosion through the dam and
embankments, and the dam was breeched during spring
flooding (Sayles 1987). Although none of Alaska's
permafrost-founded dams houses hydropower facilities,
thawing permafrost would likely affect the design of
potential new dams making use of Alaska's untapped
hydropower resources, as these dams would need to be
much higher than existing permafrost dams and ensure that

the underlying permafrost would not thaw, settle, or shift
(ACIA 2005, EIA 2014b). For example, construction of new
frozen core dams would need to take future warming into
account when planning cooling systems (Miller et al. 2013).
Hydropower
Resilience Solutions
Hydropower operators can increase the resilience of their
facilities by increasing monitoring of snow water resources,
allowing operators to better anticipate changes to riverflow
(Cherry et al. 2010b). In general, increased transmission
capacity can allow water planners and hydropower
operators to take advantage of spatial variability in water
availability as well as better utilize all generation resources.
For example, energy managers in Sitka are planning to
reduce their dependence on local hydropower by building
additional interties to nearby communities (Cherry et al.
2010b).
Another resilience measure suitable for some hydropower
operators is to maintain higher winter carryover reservoir
storage levels and reduce reservoir water releases to adapt
to shifting snowpack levels, snowmelt timing, and glacial
runoff. For example, the dam at Blue Lake is currently 145
feet high, but managers are raising the height of the dam by
83 feet. This would reduce water releases during high
winter flow times and would increase the facility’s
generation capacity by 27% (City of Sitka 2015). Run-of-theriver hydropower operators may increase resilience to
changing seasonal riverflow patterns by increasing pondage
(or small-scale storage) at facilities.
Electric Grid
Subsector Vulnerabilities
Alaska's electricity sector can be divided into two types of
transmission regions: (1) the interconnected transmission
grid in the Railbelt, with diverse generating resources, and
(2) local distribution grids serving rural communities
operating small generation facilities. Utilities in the Railbelt
are interconnected by long-distance power lines that
operate at higher transmission voltages (Figure 9-7).
Outside of the Railbelt, communities rely on locally
produced energy, such as diesel generators, or on nearby
resources such as wind turbines and hydropower facilities.
Some rural communities operate interties that connect the
distribution grids of two or three communities but operate
at lower distribution voltages.
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The Railbelt-area transmission grid
connects the Kenai Peninsula and
Anchorage to communities in the
interior around Fairbanks. This
region includes over 80% of
Alaska's electricity generation and
consumption and six utilities:
Anchorage Municipal Light &
Power, Chugach Electric
Association, Golden Valley Electric
Association, Homer Electric
Association, Matanuska Electric
Association, and Seward Electric
System (ARCTEC 2013, EIA 2013a,
EIA 2013b). Although the grid is
Alaska's largest, the Railbelt relies
on relatively low-voltage
transmission lines compared to the
lower 48 states—mostly 115 kV
lines but also 230 kV, 138 kV, and
69 kV lines (AEA 2014a, ARCTEC
2013). The transmission grid helps
connected utilities share reserve
capacity, but the grid suffers from
significant capacity constraints that
can limit the operation of
generators such as the Bradley
Hydroelectric Project (AEA 2013b,
Brehmer 2014). Several plans have Figure 9-7. Alaska electricity infrastructure
Source: DOE 2015
been developed by utilities in the
region and the Alaska Energy
Climate change is projected to have the following impacts
Authority (AEA) to expand transmission capacity and range.
on the electric grid in Alaska:
The 2013 Railbelt Transmission Plan proposes upgrading
 More frequent and extensive forest fires may increase
several lines to 230 kV, adding new redundancy, and
the risk of damage to transmission lines in the Railbelt,
incorporating other grid improvements including grid-scale
as well as in rural communities (LTER 2006, USGCRP
storage systems (AEA 2013b).
2014).

Thawing permafrost can compromise the foundation of
For many of Alaska's small rural villages, electrical loads are
power line towers and may affect towers in large parts
met by a single central diesel generator and served by local
of northern and interior Alaska (ACIA 2005, USARC
distribution grids. Historically, these communities have
2003, USGCRP 2014).
been considered too far apart and serving loads too small to
 Coastal flooding and erosion resulting from permafrost
justify the cost of long-distance transmission lines (AEA
thaw and declining sea ice cover may increase the risk
2009, NANA Pacific 2008). However, for some rural
of damage to distribution systems in rural villages (GAO
communities, short-distance low-voltage distribution
2003, USGCRP 2014).
interties can prove economic by helping achieve greater
 Higher temperatures and changes to precipitation may
efficiency, including by reducing costs associated with fuel
increase the frequency of avalanches, which, in some
delivery (AVEC 2013). Additionally, communities with access
locations, can threaten transmission lines and other
to renewable resources rely on short-distance transmission
infrastructure (ACIA 2005).
lines to deliver power. For example, much of Juneau's
 Increased precipitation, higher rates of glacier melting,
electricity is generated at the Snettisham Hydroelectric
and greater risk of glacier outbursts may increase the
Project, which relies on a 44-mile high-voltage transmission
likelihood of conditions favorable to flooding, which
line to reach the city (AIDEA 2014).
could damage electrical transmission and distribution
lines (IPCC 2014b, NOAA 2013, USGCRP 2014).
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Alaska's warming climate is driving an increase in the
likelihood, length of wildfire season, and range of wildfires
across much of the state's southern coast and interior
regions (USGCRP 2014). Increased fire activity may threaten
transmission and distribution power lines, as well as
substations and other support equipment and structures.
Warming temperatures have led to a longer growing season
and expanded northward the range of spruce forests and
other vegetation, as well as leading to drier conditions in
interior Alaska (USGCRP 2014). Additionally, higher
precipitation and temperatures have increased growing
rates, accelerating the pace at which rights-of-way can
become overgrown (USGCRP 2014). In the last decade,
more large fires burned across Alaska than in any decade
since recordkeeping began in the 1940s (USGCRP 2014).
Wildfires causing damage to power lines resulting in
lengthy outages
In May 2014, the Funny River fire burned through parts
of the Kenai Peninsula (in the Railbelt region), leading
the Homer Electric Association (HEA) to shut down a
nearby transmission line, causing a widespread outage,
and interrupting power to the incident command
center responding to the fire (Kelly 2014). In 2007,
another fire in the area caused HEA to shut down the
transmission line connecting to the Bradley Lake
Hydroelectric Plant (HEA 2007).

outages, especially if fires affect lines without redundant
capacity or if backup generation is not available. Vegetation
overgrowth can also increase the risk of fires caused by
power line tree strikes. For example, in 2014, a Golden
Valley Electric Association transmission line was struck by a
falling tree, causing a fire that burned an acre around the
power line (AFS 2014a). The following day, an additional 15
fires started in the Fairbanks area, many caused by trees
being blown over onto power lines (AFS 2014b).
Much of the interior Railbelt, including Fairbanks and the
surrounding area, is underlain by discontinuous "warm"
permafrost, which is the most likely to thaw in the coming
decades. For example, the Alaska Intertie, a 138 kV
transmission line connecting Fairbanks to the rest of the
Railbelt region south of Healy, Alaska, is built across 170
miles of warm permafrost (AEA 2014a, Wyman 2009). The
line has suffered significant loss of permafrost along its
right-of-way, resulting in frost heave (vertical lifting of piles
due to freezing of water in the active layer soils) lifting pole
foundations 3–6 feet and necessitating expensive repairs
(Wyman 2009).
Permafrost thaw, uneven settlement, and the risk of frost
heave also affect rural distribution lines and interties. For
example, AVEC is planning an intertie line for the
communities of St. Mary, Pilot Station, and Mountain
Village, located in areas of warm, discontinuous permafrost
along approximately 30 miles of the Yukon River in western
Alaska. To reduce the risk of frost heave, minimum pile
depths of 40 feet are recommended (Duane Miller
Associates 2009). In Atmautluak, poles supporting the
Village's distribution lines began to show signs of frost
jacking and tipping due to permafrost thaw (Figure 9-9)
(Atmautluak Traditional Council 2010).

Figure 9-8. Funny River fire threatening the Soldotna-Homer
transmission line (in purple) on the Kenai Peninsula in 2014
Source: Adapted from AFS 2014c

Figure 9-9. Overhead distribution lines in Atmautluak, Alaska
Source: ADEC 2015

Fires can burn wooden power poles and destroy substations
and transformers, and heat and smoke can degrade the
capacity of a line, as well as increase the risk of arcing
between lines or to ground (DOE 2013). Fire retardants
used to combat fires can also foul transmission lines and
reduce capacity. All of these impacts can lead to extended

In some rural communities threatened by erosion and
coastal flooding, electrical distribution systems may also be
vulnerable to these impacts. The combined effects of
permafrost thaw and declining sea ice can increase wave
height and storm surge during storms, and permafrost thaw
can soften the soil, increasing erosion rates (Alaska AAG
2010, USGCRP 2014). For example, beach erosion and
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flooding enabled by a decrease in sea ice threatens over
one mile of Barrow's subterranean utility corridor, which
carries power distribution lines (as well as water,
wastewater, and television, telephone, and internet utility
lines) throughout the community (BUECI 2015, GAO 2003).
The frequency of avalanches is projected to increase
throughout mountainous regions of Alaska as temperatures
and precipitation increase (ACIA 2005, USFS 2010).
Although power lines and other infrastructure are typically
sited to avoid such hazards, a series of avalanches in April
2008 near Juneau destroyed a mile-and-a-half section of the
transmission line connecting the Snettisham Hydroelectric
Project to the city (ACIA 2005, DOE 2008). Although diesel
generators located in the city were able to provide
sufficient back-up power, repairs to the line took over a
month and a half. During that time, the emergency
electricity rates were almost 500% higher than normal (DOE
2008).
While the influence of climate on flooding is complex and
the specific effects of climate change on Alaska's rivers will
vary across different regions and basins, a combination of
projected changes to Alaska's hydrological systems may
increase conditions favorable to flooding (ACIA 2005,
USGCRP 2014). Projected increases in precipitation and
glacial melt are likely to increase streamflows in Alaska's
rivers (ADNR 2014, NOAA 2013, USGCRP 2014).
Furthermore, accelerating glacial melt is associated with
increased incidence of glacial outbursts, which may increase
the risk of flooding, erosion and landslides, and associated
damage downstream (IPCC 2014b). As glaciers retreat,
frontal moraines can cause unstable glacial lakes to form in
front of the glaciers, leading to increased risk of glacial lake
outburst floods. Combined with increasing rainfall, the
potential for destructive flooding may increase.
Flooding can knock out power in Alaska's population
centers
In 2006, following several days of intense precipitation,
flooding on the Susitna River north of Anchorage
washed out several 230 kV transmission towers
connecting to the Beluga generating station. A week
earlier, a tower on a parallel line also fell into the river,
causing extended power outages (Chugach 2006).
A sudden outburst of a glacial lake forming behind the
front of the Mendenhall glacier in 2011 caused power
outages and property damage in Juneau. By the
summer of 2014, water had once again built up behind
the front, leaving residents at risk (Forgey 2014).

Electric Grid
Resilience Solutions
Measures to improve the resilience of new and existing
electric transmission infrastructure include engineering
structures to better withstand hazards—increased forest
fire activity, thawing permafrost, and coastal erosion where
relevant—as well as management practices to protect
infrastructure from these hazards, and planning to improve
resilience to grid outages. In many places, Alaska's electric
grid is currently vulnerable to disruption, as many of
Alaska's long-distance transmission lines and distribution
interties operate without redundancy (AEA 2013b, AVEC
2013). The AEA and many of Alaska's utilities are currently
considering several plans to increase transmission
redundancy (AEA 2013b, AVEC 2013, Lincoln 2014).
Transmission expansion plans in the Railbelt region would
increase the region's resilience to climate change impacts
and other potential disruptions; however, reliability
concerns must be balanced against the high cost of
transmission infrastructure. For example, one study
estimates that 230 kV lines cost $0.5–$1.5 million per mile,
depending on conditions (NANA Pacific 2008). In rural
regions, AVEC estimates a cost of $0.25–$0.45 million per
mile for distribution interties (AVEC 2013).
Practices to reduce transmission line vulnerability to
wildfire include proactive vegetation management,
especially in areas where ecosystems are transitioning to
greater vegetation and wildfire risk (USGCRP 2014). By
maintaining rights-of-way and trimming back encroaching
trees and underbrush, utilities can minimize not only
wildfire impacts on lines but also the likelihood of fires
started by line strikes (DOE 2013). Since access to rights-ofway can pose a problem to regular maintenance, expanded
use of aerial trimming may also improve performance
(Sheppard 2012, Wyman 2009).
Uneven permafrost thaw, loss of soil support, and exposure
to frost heave can be accounted for when designing new
transmission line towers. The use of tower designs—such as
the X-tower (Figure 9-10)—that can tolerate greater lateral
movement of foundations can reduce the impact of
differential settlement (Wyman 2009). Frost heave of
power line poles and towers can be mitigated by designing
future transmission lines with pile foundations that are
sufficiently deep to counter frost heave forces (Wyman
2009). While this increases the initial cost and may require
a change in typical construction practices, this would avoid
costly maintenance and repair of lines that would otherwise
be necessary with shifting tower foundations (Wyman
2009). Existing towers experiencing frost heave should be
monitored, and when necessary, wood piles can be
replaced with steel pipe or H-piles, which reduces heave
forces (Atmautluak Traditional Council 2010, Polarconsult
Alaska 2009). Additionally, for guyed towers, installation of
breakable links can reduce the risk of compressive tower
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failure when towers undergo heave (Polarconsult Alaska
2009).
For utility corridors, distribution lines, and other grid
equipment threatened by erosion, resilience solutions can
include installing protective barriers to slow the rate of
erosion or relocate infrastructure. In Barrow, efforts to
protect shoreline infrastructure and buildings have included
beach nourishment, construction of berms, and the use of
gabions and geotextile mats to harden the shoreline (USACE
2007). Such measures can be costly; in Barrow, beach
nourishment alone cost $28 million over a 10-year period
(USACE 2007). In recent years, some of Barrow's vulnerable
structures have been relocated due to the high cost of
shoreline maintenance (USACE 2007).
Construction plans for the Northern Intertie include
resistance to permafrost thaw
The Northern Intertie is a new long-distance
transmission project that will increase capacity and
resilience between the Fairbanks and Anchorage/Kenai
regions by providing a second transmission corridor
(AEA 2013b). The line runs 170 miles across extensive
warm, discontinuous permafrost roughly parallel to the
Alaska Intertie (AEA 2013b). By studying the existing
Alaska Intertie's foundations, designers determined
that permafrost thaw was likely and that the resulting
exposure to annual freeze-thaw cycles would threaten
the new project's foundations. The resulting design
addressed these vulnerabilities by deploying flexible
X-tower supports and driving the pile foundations much
deeper than traditional design requirements; piles were
driven a minimum of 36 feet and, in some cases, up to
90 feet deep (Wyman 2009).

For localities in the Railbelt that are connected to the
region's transmission grid and that rely on large, centralized
power plants, the development of decentralized generation
resources may also improve those communities’ ability to
weather electric grid disruptions. Such resources can
include traditional fossil-fired generators, as well as
renewable resources that do not rely on fuel imports,
including wind power, ocean energy, and locally sourced
biofuel resources.
Distribution intertie lines can diversify power supplies
and improve resilience in rural communities
The communities of Tununak, Nightmute, and Toksook
Bay on Nelson Island on the Bering Sea are connected
by 23 miles of low-voltage intertie lines serving a
population of about 1,200 people (AVEC 2013, REAP
2010). These intertie projects allow the Alaska Village
Electric Cooperative to interconnect generation
resources and reduce costs (AVEC 2013, REAP 2010).
Opportunities for additional interties may exist; of
Alaska's 183 villages participating in the AEA's Power
Cost Equalization program (which subsidizes rural
electricity), only 27 operate electrical connections to
another village (AVEC 2013).

Figure 9-10. The X-tower transmission line support, which
allows greater lateral movement of tower foundations
Source: AEA 2013c
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Regional Climate Change Observations
and Projections in Detail
Higher Temperatures
Historical observations
 Average temperatures have increased 3°F since 1949:
Although warming has occurred across Alaska and in all
seasons, historical increases in temperature have been
dominated by warming in the winter and spring seasons
and have primarily occurred in Alaska's interior (NOAA
2013, USGCRP 2014).
 The growing season has lengthened by 45% in interior
Alaska: Over the course of the last century, the growing
season (average annual number of days between first
and last freezing temperatures) in the interior of Alaska
has grown longer, with most of the growth in the last 25
years; in Fairbanks, the frost-free season has grown 2–3
weeks since 1950 (NOAA 2013, USGCRP 2014).
 Extremely cold temperatures have occurred less often,
and extremely warm temperatures have occurred more
often: Over the period 1950–2008, all observed weather
stations in all regions of Alaska except the Southeast
have showed increasing occurrence of the hottest 1% of
days and a decreasing occurrence of the coldest 1% of
days (NOAA 2013).
Future projections
 Average temperatures are projected to increase at a
faster rate than elsewhere in the United States: By the
end of this century (2070–2099) under a higher
emissions scenario (A2), temperatures across Alaska are
expected to increase 7.5°–13.5°F compared to 1971–
1999 levels, with the largest projected increases in the
north and the smallest in the south (USGCRP 2014).
 The growing season is projected to continue to expand:
Across large parts of southwestern and interior Alaska,
increases of 15–25 days are projected by 2060–2069
(compared to 2010–2019), and in a large part of
southwestern Alaska, the growing season lengthens to
more than 200 days (NOAA 2013).
 Spring thaw is projected to arrive earlier, and fall
freezes are projected to occur later: Spring thaw over
much of Alaska is projected to advance by 2–3 weeks by
2090–2099, relative to 1961–1990. Along the western
and northern shorelines, autumn freeze is delayed 40–
60 days as a consequence of sea ice loss (NOAA 2013).
Increasing Precipitation and Changing Water
Patterns
Historical observations
 Average annual precipitation has increased: Across the
state, average annual precipitation has increased about
10% over the period 1949–2005 (NOAA 2013).
 Glaciers have retreated substantially across Alaska:
Current rates of glacial mass loss from Alaska and British
Columbia total 40–70 gigatons per year (USGCRP 2014).

Future projections
 Total annual precipitation is projected to increase
across the state: In a higher emissions scenario,
increases of 15%–35% are projected by 2070–2099
(compared to 1971–1999), with larger increases in the
north and interior, and smaller increases in the (already
wet) south; under a lower emissions scenario, increases
may range from 5% to 20% (NOAA 2013).
 Seasonal changes are projected to be fairly consistent:
Across the state, increases are projected in all seasons,
with the largest increases in winter, and smaller but
positive changes in all other seasons. Winter average
annual precipitation is projected to increase an average
of 30% under a higher emissions scenario, with spring,
summer, and fall increases of 22%, 21%, and 24%,
respectively (NOAA 2013).
 Glaciers are expected to continue shrinking: Increasing
temperatures are expected to drive continued glacial
retreat, with glaciers that empty into the ocean at the
highest risk (ACIA 2005, USGCRP 2014).
Extreme Precipitation, Wildfires, and Sea Level Rise
Historical observations
 Wildfires have burned more acres: During the 2000s, an
average of 1.9 million acres were burned by wildfires
each year, an amount 50% higher than any previous
decade since the 1940s (NOAA 2013).
Future projections
 Increasing fire activity is expected to continue in the
future: Drying landscapes, as well as increases in
vegetation, are expected to increase the risk of fire in
the future (USGCRP 2014).
 Permafrost temperatures are projected to increase,
and permafrost thickness is expected to decline across
the state: In zones of discontinuous and sporadic
permafrost where temperatures are near freezing,
increasing temperatures are expected to lead to loss of
permafrost; in areas of continuous permafrost, warming
temperatures are expected to lead to declines in
permafrost layer thickness and increases in active soil
layer thickness (ACIA 2005, USGCRP 2014).
 The extent of sea ice is expected to decline
substantially: By the end of the century, the extent of
winter sea ice is expected to decline substantially,
leaving much of Alaska's southwestern coastline on the
Bering Sea ice-free. Summer sea ice may disappear
completely before mid-century (ACIA 2005, USGCRP
2014).
 Relative sea level rise is not as severe in the region as
elsewhere in the United States: Uplift across most of
the Alaskan coastline and rebound from melting glaciers
are countering the effects of sea level rise, meaning local
sea levels are falling relative to land, although more
research is needed for much of Alaska's coastline
(Freymuller 2010).
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Chapter 10: Hawaii and Puerto Rico
Climate Change and the Energy Sector

10. Hawaii and Puerto Rico

Overview

QUICK FACTS

Hawaii and Puerto Rico are the largest U.S. islands in population,
1
size, and energy consumption. These islands are isolated from
larger mainland energy supply networks, including pipelines,
railroads, and transmission grids. Both are located in tropical
climates—Hawaii in the Pacific Ocean and Puerto Rico in the
Caribbean—and since they are critically reliant on coastal
infrastructure, they are vulnerable to similar climate change impacts
such as large storms and sea level rise. Key climate trends affecting
the energy sector in the region include the following:
 Atlantic hurricanes are projected to increase in intensity, and
the most intense hurricanes are projected to occur more
frequently. Pacific hurricane storm tracks are projected to shift
a
toward Hawaii. Increasing hurricane intensity and frequency
increases the risk of damage to energy infrastructure,
disruptions to fuel shipments caused by coastal and inland
b
flooding and erosion, wind and wave damage, and landslides.
c
 Average sea levels are projected to rise. Rising sea levels
increase storm surge flood stages and storm-driven waves,
pushing coastal impacts further inland. Increasing sea levels also
decrease the depth of freshwater lenses underlying islands,
reducing an important source of cooling water for some
d
thermoelectric generators.
 Average temperatures are projected to increase over the
e
course of the next century. Higher temperatures can reduce
the efficiency of thermoelectric power plants and the capacity
of transmission lines—especially on the hottest days—and
cause damage to roads and power transformers, shortening the
lifetime of critical energy infrastructure. Higher temperatures
f
are also likely to increase demand for cooling energy.

Population (2013)
Area (square miles)
Annual energy expenditures
ENERGY SUPPLY AND
DEMAND*
Electric power
TWh
Fuel Consumption
Petroleum
million bbl
Coal
million tons
Natural gas
bcf

Hawaii
1,400,000
10,932
$7.8 billion

Puerto Rico
3,500,000
5,325
N/A*

Hawaii
10.5

Puerto Rico
20.0

42
0.8
2.7

65
1.7
48

*Electricity production and consumption are identical. No fuel is produced.

ELECTRIC
POWER

Annual
Production
(GWh)

Hawaii
Petroleum
7,483
Coal
1,537
Renewables
1,039
Other
410
Puerto Rico
Petroleum
13,000
Natural gas
3,600
Coal
3,200
Renewables
200
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
Oil refineries:
Petroleum ports (>200 tons/yr):
Major power plants (> 1 MW):

% of Total

Capacity
(MW)

71%
15%
10%
4%

2,181
203
517
81

65%
18%
16%
1%
Hawaii
2
6
43

4,778
540
454
224
Puerto Rico
0
3
15**

*Annual energy expenditure for Puerto Rico is not available.
** Includes only commercial plants.
Notes: Energy data for Hawaii is from 2012. Energy data for Puerto Rico is from
2013, except total generation data, which is from 2011. Electricity production by
fuel is calculated based on both 2011 and 2013 data.
Sources: EIA 2015a, EIA 2013b, EIA 2013c, PREPA 2013, US Census Bureau 2014a,
US Census Bureau 2014b

Table 10-1: Examples of important energy sector vulnerabilities and climate resilience solutions in Hawaii and Puerto Rico
Subsector

Vulnerability

Magnitude

Illustrative Resilience Solutions

Fuel Transport and
Storage

Coastal flooding and erosion; wave
and wind damage to ports, ships,
terminals, refineries and storage,
bridges and roads; landslide and
g
heat damage to roads

Hurricane Georges in 1998 destroyed
three bridges and damaged roads
costing $20 million; Hawaii’s Barbers
Point Harbor, the primary interisland
distribution fuel hub, vulnerable to
h
amplified tides and waves

Building seawalls or natural buffer
zones, hardening infrastructure to
resist inundation, replacing
equipment with submersible or
floating infrastructure, relocating
roads

Electricity
Generation

Coastal plants vulnerable to flooding
and structural damage from storms,
i
sea level rise, and erosion
Flooding, erosion, wave, and wind
k
damage to towers and substations

Majority of power plants vulnerable to
j
sea level rise-enabled coastal flooding

Coastal hardening; increased,
diversified, and distributed capacity

Outages caused by Hurricane Georges
for 96% of Puerto Rico's electricity
l
customers in 1998
Projected rise in average temperatures
n
by 2.0°F–5.0°F in Hawaii and by 3.6°F–
o
9°F in Puerto Rico by 2100

Strengthened tower and substation
designs, selective undergrounding of
transmission and distribution lines
Increased capacity, energy efficiency
and load management measures

Electric Grid

Electricity Demand

Increased average and peak demand
m
for cooling energy

1

Other U.S. islands located in the Pacific, including Guam, American Samoa, and Northern Marianas, are not examined in this report but are
likely to have climate trends, energy sector vulnerabilities, and resilience solutions similar to those in Hawaii. Likewise, the U.S. Virgin Islands,
located in the Caribbean, is not separately examined but is likely to have impacts and solutions similar to those in Puerto Rico.
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Regional Energy Sector Vulnerabilities
and Resilience Solutions
Key energy subsectors and illustrative examples of
resilience solutions in Hawaii and Puerto Rico are discussed
below. System components that are most vulnerable to
climate change are described first.
Fuel Transport and Storage
Subsector Vulnerabilities
In both Hawaii and Puerto Rico, separation from the
mainland’s ground transportation networks—including
roads and railroads, electric grids, and pipelines—
necessitates that imported energy resources come via
marine vessel. Imports of petroleum products include
chiefly diesel, gasoline, and distillates, as they are the
primary fuel types for electricity generation and
transportation on the islands; but imports also include coal
from barges and liquefied natural gas (LNG) both from
tankers and in containerized form (EIA 2015a).
Petroleum is the primary energy source for Hawaii and
Puerto Rico (EIA 2015a). Both Hawaii and Puerto Rico
receive large quantities of petroleum products at different
types of ports, barge landings, and docks. At some sites,
such as offloading docks for electricity generating stations,
fuels are stored and consumed on location and require no
secondary transportation once on the island. For example,
Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority’s (PREPA’s) largest
power plant (Aguierre, located on Puerto Rico's
southwestern coastline) receives both No. 2 and No. 6 fuel
oils from barges via dedicated discharging docks and stores
fuel on site for use in its boilers and turbines (PREQB 2008).
Since the closing of the Cataño Refinery in 2009, Puerto
Rico has no refining capacity and must import finished
petroleum products.
In Hawaii, unrefined crude oil is the primary petroleum
import and is delivered to two refineries on Oahu. The
refineries use offshore moorings to receive crude oil.
Refined products that are used for transportation, heating,
and electricity generation are transported from these
refineries to downtown Honolulu via a 10-mile
underground pipeline (OMPO 2011). Petroleum products
are also loaded onto barges for transport to other fuel ports
across the state (OMPO 2011). Hawaii's refineries supply
feedstocks for the state's synthetic natural gas processing
plant that converts naphtha to methane, and the facilities
distribute this natural gas to commercial and residential
customers via a pipeline distribution system (EIA 2015a).
This system is also being supplemented by small imports of
containerized LNG (EIA 2015a).
Relatively little natural gas is used in Puerto Rico and
Hawaii. Puerto Rico imports natural gas for electricity
production via LNG tankers at EcoEléctrica's Peñuelas LNG
terminal and regasification facility located on Guayanilla

Bay on the island's southern coast. Because of the
historically high cost of petroleum relative to other fuels,
PREPA is planning to convert several of its oil-fired turbines
to use natural gas, requiring an expansion of the island's
LNG import capacity (EIA 2015a). PREPA is planning a new
LNG import terminal to serve its 1,500 MW Aguierre power
plant on the island's southeastern coast, and the power
company is considering using either pipelines or a second
LNG import terminal to access its power plants on the
northern coast (EIA 2015a). Containerized LNG is also
imported for small industrial purposes (Crowley 2014, EIA
2015a).
After fuel is shipped to the islands, it is primarily
transported via roads, as railroads are not commonly used
in Hawaii or Puerto Rico. Other less common forms of nonroad energy transport include conveyors and pipelines. For
example, on Oahu, coal offloaded for the AES-Barbers Point
power plant is carried via a 1.6-mile elevated, enclosed
conveyor belt (OMPO 2011).
Climate change is projected to have the following impacts
on fuel transport and storage in Hawaii and Puerto Rico:
 Rising sea levels, combined with increasing frequency
of the most intense hurricanes in the Atlantic (and a
possible increase in the number of Pacific hurricanes
affecting Hawaii), increase the risk of flooding-,
erosion-, wave-, and wind-related damage to coastal
fuel transport and storage infrastructure such as roads,
ports, landings and docks, and storage tanks (API 2014,
DOE 2013, Murakami et al. 2013, PRCCC 2013b,
USGCRP 2014).
 Increasing frequency of intense North Atlantic
hurricanes and a shift in the track of Pacific hurricanes
toward the Hawaiian Islands increases the risk of
disruption to shipping from storms impacting
navigation (Murakami et al. 2013, USGCRP 2014).
 Increasing occurrence of extreme precipitation, Pacific
hurricanes, and increasing rainfall from Atlantic
hurricanes may contribute to more frequent inland
flooding and landslides (especially in the spring),
potentially damaging roads, bridges, and energy
infrastructure (Murakami et al. 2013, PRCCC 2013a,
PRCCC 2013b).
 Increasing temperatures, including more intense and
longer-lasting heat waves, soften asphalt and may
contribute to additional damage to island roads
important for fuel transport (PRCCC 2013a, PRCCC
2013b).
Coastal flooding poses a major challenge to the energy
infrastructure of island communities. In Puerto Rico, major
coastal flooding is typically associated with storm surge and
high wave action brought by hurricanes, but can also be
caused by other storms. In Hawaii, tropical cyclones are also
dangerous causes of coastal flooding, and evidence
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suggests that a northward shift in Pacific cyclone tracks
could expose Hawaii to more frequent hurricane impacts
(Murakami et al. 2013). In the Atlantic, research suggests a
roughly two-fold increase in the occurrence of Category 4
and 5 hurricanes by the end of the century (Bender et al.
2010). Additionally, rising sea levels can magnify the effects
of storm surge flooding by creating a higher baseline for
flood stages (USGCRP 2014). For both Hawaii and Puerto
Rico, coastal flooding threatens to disrupt and damage
important coastal infrastructure, including roads, bridges,
ports, docks, and storage tanks (OMPO 2011, PRCCC
2013b). Flooding can shut down port operations and cause
structural damage to docks, buildings, and heavy machinery
necessary for loading and unloading fuels (OMPO 2011,
PRCCC 2013b). For example, the seaport in Arecibo, Puerto
Rico, currently experiences regular problems with flooding
because of its exposure to high-energy waves (PRCCC
2013b). Rising sea levels will likely intensify flooding,
pushing storm surge and storm waves farther inland
(USGCRP 2014). Similarly, Barbers Point Harbor in Kalaeloa,
Hawaii, is vulnerable to amplified tides and waves due to
seiches (OMPO 2011). This harbor is used for offloading
coal for AES-Barbers Point, as well as loading petroleum
products from the Barbers Point refineries (OMPO 2011).
Because of its importance to the island's energy supply,
disruptions to the harbor's ability to load and offload fuels
could disrupt energy systems and have severe implications
for the state's economy (OMPO 2011).
As with fuel transfer facilities at ports, the loading and
unloading docks used by island power plants and refineries
are vulnerable to damage and disruption from coastal
flooding. All of Puerto Rico's major power plants use onsite docks to bring fuel to their facilities. Studies have
identified six of the territory's power plants as vulnerable to
flooding, with the 602 MW oil-fired Palo Seco and the 220
MW dual-fuel Mayagüez power plants being most
vulnerable (Figure 10-1) (PRCCC 2013b, PREPA 2013).

Figure 10-1. PREPA's Palo Seco Power Plant on Puerto Rico's
northern coast
Source: EPA 2012

Coastal flooding can also disrupt and damage roads and
bridges, which are key transportation links in island energy
systems. Flooding can inundate roads, blocking access to
fuel ports and preventing fuel deliveries to power plants.
Erosion caused by heightened wave activity can damage
bridges and may require that existing bridges be raised. Of
the 240 bridges in Puerto Rico's coastal zones, 30 are
potentially vulnerable to coastal flooding (PRCCC 2013b). In
1998, flooding from Hurricane Georges did a total of $21
million in damages to roadways in Puerto Rico and led to
the destruction of three bridges (PRCCC 2013b). In Honolulu
Harbor, Hawaii, sea level rise and increased storm surge
projected for 2100 could have combined impacts that
expose harbor access roads and bridges to inundation and
erosion, potentially disrupting fuel supplies (OMPO 2011).
Coastal flooding can damage and disrupt the operation of
refineries and fuel storage tanks (PRCCC 2013b). Refinery
buildings, structures, and storage tanks can be damaged by
waves and salt water inundation; and storage tanks can be
lifted if their containment berms are breached (DOE 2010).
Analysis of flood impacts at the Chevron refinery on Barbers
Point in Oahu found that three feet of sea level rise would
expose the refinery to significant flooding vulnerabilities;
this is within the 1–4 foot range projected by the end of the
century (OMPO 2011, USGCRP 2014). While Puerto Rico has
no refining facilities, fuel tanks at several airports, including
the Luis Muñoz Marín International Airport and the Isla
Grande Airport, are at risk from sea level rise (PRCCC
2013b). Additionally, coastal flooding can damage
underground fuel storage tanks in low-lying areas such as
those used by gas stations (PRCCC 2013b).
Roads as critical energy corridors
The Farrington Highway on Hawaii's most populous
island, Oahu, is the only road connecting the 45,000
residents of the Waianae Coast to the rest of the
island's communities and infrastructure (OMPO 2011).
The 18-mile two-lane highway runs along the coast and
has historically seen closures due to both coastal and
inland flooding, downed utility poles, and other
emergencies. Furthermore, some segments of the
highway are being undercut by erosion. Projected
increases to sea level and storm surges will exacerbate
these problems, and the highway is classified as “high
vulnerability” by the Oahu Metropolitan Planning
Organization (OMPO 2011). Collapse or other damage
to the Farrington Highway could cut off entire
communities from fuels and other critical supplies
(OMPO 2011).
Hurricanes can disrupt shipping by preventing navigation
for several days at a time. The increased intensity and
frequency of the most intense hurricanes in the Atlantic,
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and the possibly of more hurricanes affecting Hawaii, may
threaten the ability of fuel barges to make critical deliveries.
While large power plants typically have stockpiles of fuel,
shipping disruptions combined with damage to port
facilities may compound the risks to fuel transport posed by
severe weather events. For example, Puerto Rico's largest
generating station, the oil-fired Aguierre Power Plant,
typically receives fuel deliveries once every three days, but
it does have on-site capacity to store approximately 36 days
2
of fuel for typical operations (PREPA 2013).

Over a long period of time, warmer temperatures may also
affect roads. Higher temperatures weaken asphalt, and
continuous use at elevated temperatures can reduce
roadway lifetimes. On the islands, where roads are crucial
fuel transport links, the reliability of road infrastructure is
essential. Use of roadways during periods of elevated
temperatures—especially during prolonged heat waves—
may lead to cracking and rutting, requiring more frequent
and costly maintenance and eventually earlier replacement
of road surfaces (PRCCC 2013b).

Wind impacts resulting from hurricanes can affect a variety
of transportation and storage infrastructure, including large
storage tanks and elevated facilities (API 2014, OMPO 2011,
PRCCC 2013b). The elevated, enclosed conveyor belt used
to transport coal inland to the AES-Barbers Point coal plant
may be susceptible to wind damage, as may container port
cranes necessary for the loading and offloading of fuel
products (OMPO 2011).

Fuel Transport and Storage
Resilience Solutions
Enhancing resilience to coastal flooding and erosion
requires either relocation or hardening of existing assets, as
well as planning to ensure that future investments are
designed in anticipation of the range of possible future
impacts (DOE 2013). Hardening of assets can involve
constructing seawalls to reduce erosion, enclosing
equipment in submersible cases, replacement with
submersible equipment, or raising infrastructure above
projected flood stages (DOE 2013). Relocation of assets
inland or to higher elevation coastlines can increase
resilience to flooding and erosion, but the practice is
contingent on local geography and may not be a feasible or
cost-effective option for large facilities with significant
dedicated infrastructure.

Inland flooding and landslides may pose a risk to Puerto
Rico's roads, bridges, and ports, as some climate models
project significant increases in the intensity of hurricanerelated extreme precipitation events in the springtime
(PRCCC 2013a). Several ports in Puerto Rico already
experience regular river flooding, including the Pan
American dock in San Juan and the Port of Ponce (PRCCC
2013b). Landslides occur when bursts of heavy rainfall
destabilize the soil on sloped terrain, and in Puerto Rico,
they are a significant source of damage to property,
including roads (Figure 10-2) (PRCCC 2013b). For example,
heavy storms in May and June of 2011 led to landslides and
extensive road and bridge damage in parts of Puerto Rico. A
state of emergency was declared, and almost $6 million was
requested to repair damage to roads and bridges (FEMA
2011).

Figure 10-2. Severe storms and flooding swept away roads and
bridges in Barranquitas, Puerto Rico
Source: FEMA 2010
2

These shipments deliver 780,000 barrels of residual fuel oil, and
consumption is around 21,700 barrels per day (PREPA 2013).

Harbor facilities such as docks, access roads, storage areas,
and tanks may be raised in anticipation of higher flood
stages, and vegetative buffer zones may be used to reduce
flooding and erosion. For example, an open vegetative area
on the southern (ocean-facing) shore of Sand Island in
Honolulu Harbor may act as a buffer zone for both erosion
and flooding of infrastructure in Hawaii's largest port
(OMPO 2011). In cases in which infrastructure is destroyed
and must be rebuilt, replacement facilities can incorporate
hardening measures into new designs. Following Hurricane
Georges in 1998, the damaged Río Tallaboa Bridge was
heightened to avoid future damage from coastal flooding
(PRCCC 2013b). Sea walls are a likely hardening option for
large facilities that may not be economically raised or
relocated. Sea walls can stabilize or stop erosion and can
provide protection from storm surge flooding (O'Connell
2009). However, sea walls may also carry negative side
effects: hardening of Hawaii's shorelines have contributed
to the loss or narrowing of 24% of Oahu's natural sandy
beaches—a crucial economic asset for the state (O'Connell
2009).
For many climate impacts, including damage to roads from
increased heat, landslides, and wind, improved planning
and designs may be the most effective means of reducing
vulnerabilities. As roads damaged by flooding are replaced,
new routes, designs, and innovative materials may be
considered.

Regional Vulnerabilities and Resilience Solutions | Islands

10-4

Thermoelectric Power Generation
Subsector Vulnerabilities
Hawaii and Puerto Rico share several commonalities
between their respective fleets of power plants. As the
islands have no domestic fossil fuel production, they must
rely on imports of fuels to operate their baseload
thermoelectric power generation. Most of the power plants
use ocean water for cooling, while the remainder typically
use recirculating cooling systems to reduce their reliance on
freshwater, as the availability is limited (UCS 2012).

Use of renewables is increasing in Hawaii. In 2012, wind,
geothermal, biomass, and some hydroelectric and solar
produced approximately 10% of Hawaii's electricity (EIA
2013a). Puerto Rico uses relatively few renewable
generators, with 224 MW of installed renewable capacity
producing approximately one percent of the island's total
power (PREPA 2013, EIA 2015a).

Figure 10-4. Locations of large electricity generation facilities in
Hawaii (2005)
Figure 10-3. Share of energy consumption by fuel (2012)

Data source: UCS 2012

Source: EIA 2014

The bulk of Hawaii’s and Puerto Rico’s electric power
generation infrastructure is concentrated in low-lying,
coastal areas (Figure 10-4 and Figure 10-5) (EIA 2015a,
PRCCC 2013b). On the island of Oahu (with Hawaii's largest
population), the Kalaeloa/Barbers Point area hosts nine
power plants, including the island's largest, alongside two
refineries. The Kalaeloa coastal plain is 9–12 feet above
mean sea level (OMPO 2011). In Puerto Rico, several
generating stations are located near the coast, including the
AES-PR and PREPA Aguierre power plants in the southeast
and the PREPA Costa Sur and Ecoeléctrica plants outside
Ponce (PREPA 2013).

Historically, U.S. islands have relied on petroleum as their
primary energy source, including as a fuel for electricity
generation (Figure 10-3) (EIA 2014). Petroleum-fired power
plants include both traditional steam boilers burning
residual fuel oil and combustion turbines/combined-cycle
plants burning distillates (EIA 2013c). Hawaii and Puerto
Rico each have one coal-fired power plant: AES-Barbers
point, on the Hawaiian island of Oahu, and AES-Puerto Rico
in Guayama (Hawaiian Electric 2013, PREPA 2013). Puerto
Rico also hosts a 540 MW natural gas-fired combined-cycle
power plant, EcoEléctrica, which is fueled by an on-site LNG
receiving terminal (PREPA 2013). PREPA purchases power
from EcoEléctrica, and in 2013, PREPA converted two units
of its nearby Costa Sur generating station to dual-fuel firing,
capable of burning oil or natural gas purchased from
EcoEléctrica's terminal (PREPA 2013). PREPA is planning to
convert additional petroleum-fired power plants to dualfuel capability, starting with the 1,500 MW Aguierre power
plant, following construction of additional LNG import
capacity (EIA 2015a, PREPA 2013). In Hawaii, Hawaiian
Electric Company and its subsidiaries (“Hawaiian Electric,”
the state's primary utility, which serves approximately 95%
of Hawaii's residents) are also considering a future energy
plan that would convert many petroleum-fired power
plants to also use natural gas (Hawaiian Electric 2013,
Hawaiian Electric 2014, Hawaiian Electric 2015a). Hawaiian
Electric's preferred energy plan would see petroleum use
fall dramatically by 2017, and the AES-Barbers Point coal
plant would switch to 50% biomass co-firing (Hawaiian
Electric 2014).

Figure 10-5. Locations of large electricity generation facilities and
major transmission lines in Puerto Rico (2012)
Data source: PREPA 2013
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Climate change is projected to have the following impacts
on electric power generation in Hawaii and Puerto Rico:
 Increasing hurricane intensity and frequency of the
most intense hurricanes in the Atlantic, as well as a
possible increase in the frequency of hurricanes
affecting Hawaii, may increase the vulnerability of
coastal power plants to damage and disruption from
sea level rise-enhanced storm surge flooding,
heightened wave action, and wind damage (DOE 2013,
Murakami et al. 2013, OMPO 2011, PRCCC 2013b,
USGCRP 2014).
 Salt water intrusion caused by sea level rise, increases
in evaporation rates, and changes in precipitation (in
Puerto Rico) may decrease the availability of fresh
water for cooling of thermoelectric power plants in
Hawaii and Puerto Rico (DOE 2013, IPCC 2014, PRCCC
2013b, USGCRP 2014).
 Higher temperatures may reduce the efficiency of
thermoelectric power plants and diminish the peak
capacity of island electricity systems (DOE 2013).
Hurricanes pose a considerable threat to island energy
infrastructure, including power plants. Associated heavy
rainfall and storm surge can cause coastal flooding that
forces shutdowns, disrupts generation, and damages and
destroys electrical equipment by inundating it with
saltwater. Wind, wave action, and erosion can also cause
structural damage (DOE 2013). Because many power plants
in Hawaii and Puerto Rico are located close to the ocean,
coastal flooding can threaten a significant share of an
island’s electric generating capacity in a single event. For
example, on Hawaii's populous island of Oahu, hurricanes
are historically the most damaging natural events (City and
County of Honolulu 2012). The large concentration of
energy infrastructure along the coast increases Oahu's
vulnerability to winds, flooding, erosion, and wave damage
from tropical cyclones (Figure 10-6). For example, nine
power plants clustered in the low-lying area around
Kalaeloa/Barbers Point represent almost 70% of the island's
generating capacity (OMPO 2011). Similarly, models
simulating 643 historical storm tracks in the vicinity of Oahu
and Kauai (including Category 2, 3, and 4 storms) have
shown that in the worst-case scenario (direct impact of a
Category 4 hurricane), much of Honolulu would be
inundated by a combination of storm surge and wave force
(Kennedy et al. 2012). A total of 61% of the electric power
generation facilities in Oahu are located within the
inundation zone of a Category 4 hurricane (FEMA 2009).
The electric power sector and the fuel transport
infrastructure are often interdependent systems (DOE
2013). In Hawaii and Puerto Rico, several important fuel
supply facilities and power plants are co-located in coastal
industrial areas (OMPO 2011, DISUR 2012). Because these
assets often have low levels of redundancy (OMPO 2011),
the direct impact of a hurricane has high potential for

affecting these assets simultaneously, further elevating the
risk that damage or disruption to one of the energy
subsectors will cascade into the other.

Figure 10-6. Hawaiian Electric Company power plant at Kahe
Point in West Oahu
Source: Zamuda 2015

Climate change is projected to contribute to the increasing
scarcity of freshwater on islands. Local freshwater scarcity
for power plants can be caused by intrusion of salt water
into fresh water reservoirs, increased evaporation of
surface water due to higher temperatures and, in Puerto
Rico, projected declines in future precipitation (PRCCC
3
2013a, USGCRP 2014). Disruptive changes in water
availability can impact power plants; if reduced surface
water availability affects power plant intakes, or if saltwater
intrusion fouls power plant wells, finding a new source of
water could prove expensive.
Almost 30% of Hawaii's electricity generating capacity relies
on freshwater for cooling (UCS 2012). These power plants
employ recirculating cooling systems, and the U.S.
Geological Survey (USGS) estimates freshwater withdrawals
for thermoelectric power production to be approximately
3% of total withdrawals (USGS 2005). The rest of the state's
power plants use either ocean water or dry cooling systems
(UCS 2012). In Puerto Rico, all six of PREPA's baseload
power plants use some freshwater for cooling; however,
the USGS estimates that freshwater withdrawals in Puerto
Rico for thermoelectric power production represent less
than 1% of total water withdrawals (USGS 2005).
Projected increases in temperature for the island regions
are relatively mild compared to other places in the United
States; however, even incremental increases in
temperature reduce the efficiency of combustion turbine
3

Precipitation models for the Caribbean are uncertain compared
to other regions, but indicate decreasing precipitation over the
course of this century (PRCCC 2013c, USGCRP 2014).
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power plants (DOE 2013, NOAA 2013, PRCCC 2013a). While
the changes in power output are small (less than a 1%
reduction for every 2°F increase in temperature), they could
have significant impacts on the electricity supply system,
particularly during heat waves, if losses in capacity are not
offset by greater supplies elsewhere or by reduced demand
(DOE 2013). Because capacity reductions due to efficiency
reductions are largest when temperatures are highest,
increasing peak temperatures reduce a power plant’s
effective peaking capacity at the same time that demand
for cooling energy peaks (see Energy Demand section).
Thermoelectric Power Generation
Resilience Solutions
Because of the dependence of both Hawaii and Puerto Rico
on coastal power plants, resilience to damage and
destruction from hurricanes may be improved through an
array of strategies that involve protecting against high
winds, storm surge, coastal erosion, and flooding. These
include engineering improvements to structures, installing
or enhancing sea walls and other barriers, and relocating or
elevating facilities such as fuel storage tanks and unloading
docks. Additionally, site selection and design of new power
plants and support facilities (including future LNG import
terminals and gasification facilities) can incorporate
projected rather than historic coastal flooding heights, wind
speeds, and wave energy projections. For example, a new
27 MW utility-scale solar photovoltaic (PV) project in Loiza,
Puerto Rico, was completed in 2013. Located in a hurricaneprone area, the elevated solar array was designed to resist
damage from both flooding and high winds (TSK Group
2013).
Electricity system resilience can also increase through
diversification of the generation fuel mix to include local
renewable resources, such as biomass, solar PV, or onshore
wind turbines that are located inland and do not rely on
fuel transportation infrastructure. Because electricity
generation in Puerto Rico and Hawaii relies primarily on
imported petroleum, electricity prices are much higher than
in the continental United States (Figure 10-7). In recent
years, high oil prices and low natural gas prices have
provided a strong economic incentive for islands to diversify
fuel sources for electric power generation. An increasingly
diverse fuel mix that includes renewables (such as locallysourced biomass) will provide islands with improved
resilience to climate change-related disruptions in
petroleum supply. Furthermore, due to the high price of
electricity on the islands, renewable technologies are much
more likely to be cost competitive with incumbent
generators. Both the Hawaiian and Puerto Rican
governments have policies intended to help transition their
respective fuel mixes to include larger shares of
renewables. Hawaii has Renewable Portfolio Standards with
a 40% target by 2030 and a 100% target by 2045, and

Puerto Rico has a 20% goal for 2035 (EIA 2015b, Hawaiian
Electric 2015b, PRGEF 2015).

Figure 10-7. Average residential electricity prices (2012)
(*Puerto Rico data is from 2011)
Data source: Adapted from EIA 2014

Puerto Rico is focusing on wind, solar, and waste-to-energy
projects to meet its renewable portfolio standard. More
than 400 MW of solar PV and 250 MW of wind are in
development (EIA 2015a). Studies so far show Puerto Rico
has limited potential for large-scale wind projects, but has
taken advantage of the tropical sun and become a leader in
distributed solar applications, including solar hot water
heaters and PV (Figure 10-8). No municipal solid waste or
other waste-to-energy facilities have yet been built, but
PREPA has signed more than a dozen power purchase
agreements with developers. Puerto Rico is exploring the
use of biofuels, primarily those derived from agricultural
wastes, and investigating ocean energy technologies.
However, PREPA faces financial barriers to making large
investments in new resilience measures, as existing debts
may constrain its financing.

Figure 10-8. A 286 kW solar PV installation at an industrial site in
Puerto Rico sells excess power to the grid
Source: USDA 2012
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Because most island power plants already use saline
sources for cooling water or employ recirculating systems,
the power generation sectors in Hawaii and Puerto Rico
may be more resilient to potential water scarcity in the
future than U.S. mainland power plants. However,
implementation of advanced hybrid/dry cooling systems
that can operate with minimum cooling water could be
considered for future thermoelectric capacity to avoid
freshwater availability concerns.





Reductions in peaking capacity caused by higher
temperatures can be addressed through the addition of
new capacity (discussed above) and through demand
reduction measures (See Electricity Demand section).
Electric Grid
Subsector Vulnerabilities
The electric transmission and distribution systems of Hawaii
and Puerto Rico are isolated from wider electricity grids,
and the use of submarine interconnections between islands
is limited. The majority of transmission and distribution
lines on the islands are aboveground with limited
undergrounding of lines.
Puerto Rico’s electric grid is operated by PREPA, a
government-owned corporation, and consists of
approximately 1,100 miles of 230 kV and 115 kV lines and
45 transmission substations that provide the grid's
backbone and sectionalize the island into three main loops.
In the San Juan area, 35 miles of 115 kV lines have been
undergrounded (PREPA 2013). PREPA operates a 38 kV
subtransmission network, primarily in and around load
centers but also to serve remote communities in the
island's interior. The 38 kV grid also includes 55 miles of
submarine transmission cables connecting the main island's
grid with the islands of Vieques and Culebra (PREPA 2013).
PREPA's distribution grid comprises 333 distribution
substations and approximately 31,500 miles of distribution
lines, including approximately 1,900 miles of underground
distribution lines, primarily in urban areas (PREPA 2013).
In Hawaii, none of Hawaiian Electric's five island grids are
interconnected; each island operates an independent grid
connecting local generation to load (Hawaiian Electric
2013). As part of its integrated resource planning process,
Hawaiian Electric has considered interconnections between
Oahu, Maui, and Hawaii as a solution to reduce long-run
costs; however, no submarine lines are currently used in
the state (Hawaiian Electric 2013).
Climate change may increase the vulnerability of the
electric grid in Hawaii and Puerto Rico in the following
ways:
 Increasing hurricane intensity and frequency of the
most intense hurricanes in the North Atlantic, and a
possible shift in Pacific hurricane tracks toward Hawaii,

will put electric transmission and distribution
infrastructure at increased risk of damage and
disruption from coastal flooding and erosion, wave, and
wind damage (DOE 2013, Murakami et al. 2013, PRCCC
2013b, USGCRP 2014).
Rising sea levels will magnify the impacts of storm
surge and wave action and increase risk of inundation
of low-lying coastal infrastructure such as switchyards
and transmission and distribution substations (OMPO
2011, PRCCC 2013b, PREPA 2013, USGCRP 2014).
Increasing temperatures reduce grid capacity and may
shorten the expected lifetime of transformers (Bérubé
et al. 2007, DOE 2013, USBR 2000).

Hawaiian Electric supplies power to about 95% of Hawaii’s
population and owns about 3,000 miles of transmission and
distribution lines, of which about 60% are aboveground
(Hawaiian Electric 2015a). Almost all of the transmission
and distribution circuit mileage in Puerto Rico's electricity
system is aboveground (PREPA 2013). Historically, tropical
storms have caused major damage and disruption to the
Hawaiian and Puerto Rican electric grids (see sidebar:
Hurricanes in Hawaii and Puerto Rico). Wind and torrential
downpours threaten overhead transmission lines by causing
direct structural damage to poles and transmission towers,
damaging or breaking conductors, and increasing the risk of
lines being downed by fallen trees and vegetation (DOE
2013). Inland flooding associated with extreme
precipitation events can erode riverbanks and uproot
power poles. Coastal flooding, amplified by sea level rise,
can inundate substations, transmission centers, and
switching yards (DOE 2013, PREPA 2013). Destructive waves
from storms, heightened by sea level rise, can also erode
protective shorelines and cause structural damage to grid
infrastructure located along the coast. Furthermore, the
risks presented by climate change to Puerto Rico's grid
could complicate ongoing efforts to address existing
challenges in the island’s electric power system, including
reliability issues, system security margins, voltage stability,
and transmission losses (DISUR 2012).
Hurricanes and the electric grid
 Hawaii: In 1992, Hurricane Iniki knocked out power to
80% of Kauai residents for four weeks. Iniki destroyed a
quarter of the island’s electric transmission poles and a
third of its distribution poles (Sommer 2002).
 Puerto Rico: Recent hurricanes have caused a
combined $336 million in damages to the Puerto Rican
electric power system, including $36 million in 1996
(Hortense), $240 million in 1998 (Georges), and $60
million in 2004 (Jeanne) (PREPA 2013). Hurricane
Georges resulted in power loss for 96% of Puerto Rico’s
customers and at least half of the island’s electrical
poles and cables were damaged (PRCCC 2013b).
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Increases in average and peak temperatures can also affect
the capacity and lifetime of transmission and distribution
components (Bérubé et al. 2007, DOE 2013). At higher
temperatures, transmission wires sag, increasing the risk of
arcing between conductors, or to other objects such as
trees. In order to reduce the risk of line outages, operators
reduce the current carrying capacity of transmission lines
on very hot days, typically when peak capacity is most
needed (DOE 2013). Traditional power transformers can
also be damaged by operating at elevated temperatures,
requiring earlier replacement and higher costs (Bérubé et
al. 2007, USBR 2000). Although projected temperature
increases in Hawaii and Puerto Rico are moderate
compared to other regions, current temperatures in these
island regions are already elevated relative to most U.S.
mainland locations, so even small increases in ambient
temperatures could have significant impacts on transformer
lifetime (Bérubé et al. 2007, Hashmi et al. 2013, NOAA
2013, PRCCC 2013a).

(Hawaiian Electric 2013). This step will have the added
benefit of avoiding the potential coastal flooding associated
with a hurricane. The City of Honolulu is proposing an array
of projects to improve resilience to impacts of future
hurricanes: hardening above-ground utility assets,
increasing electric power generation capacity, and
integrating new topographic wind speed maps into
electricity distribution infrastructure planning (City and
County of Honolulu 2012).

Electric Grid
Resilience Solutions
The resilience of island electric grids can be improved by
building redundant and sectionalized circuits for rural areas
to prevent widespread outages on backbone lines; by
hardening structures including towers, conductors, and
transformers; by undergrounding critical grid corridors; and
by exploring the use of distributed generation capacity
where feasible.
Installing transmission and distribution lines underground
can protect them from wind impacts. Although the cost of
undergrounding lines is high, selective undergrounding can
help protect critical corridors to maintain system stability in
an emergency. For example, following the devastation of
Hurricane Georges in 1998, PREPA undergrounded 28 miles
of San Juan’s 115 kV transmission lines, as well as a
significant number of distribution lines, to improve the
resilience of the city’s transmission and distribution grid to
future hurricanes, tropical storms, and other disruptions
(Figure 10-9) (PREPA 2013). These undergrounded lines are
designed to maintain service to the city's central business
district in the event that overhead lines are lost (PREPA
2013).
Hawaiian Electric is already deploying many projects that
will improve Hawaii’s grid resilience. Hawaii's utilities are
acting on a strategy to further lower electricity prices,
increase integration of the state's renewable resources,
harden infrastructure against tsunamis or hurricanes, and
increase the flexibility and redundancy of grid operations
under emergency conditions (Hawaiian Electric 2013). For
example, to protect its grid operations from the impacts of
a tsunami, Maui Electric (a subsidiary utility of Hawaiian
Electric) is planning to move its central dispatch center to
higher ground outside of the anticipated inundation zone

Figure 10-9. PREPA's underground 115 kV transmission system
for San Juan, Puerto Rico
Source: PREPA 2013

Connecting island grids to larger networks may also
improve grid resilience by providing operators with greater
flexibility if generation assets are lost or if portions of the
grid must be sectionalized. In Puerto Rico, proposals to
connect the island's grid to other Caribbean islands have
been suggested (VIWAPA 2011). Similarly, Hawaiian Electric
has considered a number of scenarios using interisland grid
interconnections to increase resilience and decrease longrun system costs (Hawaiian Electric 2013).
Electricity Demand
Subsector Vulnerabilities
Electricity demand in Hawaii is driven by economic and
population growth, both of which have outpaced the
mainland (US Census Bureau 2014a, Hawaiian Electric
2013). In Puerto Rico, the population is shrinking, and the
economy has struggled to return to pre-recession growth;
however PREPA projects that growth in electricity demand
will outpace the national average by 2017 (EIA 2015a,
PREPA 2013).
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Climate change is projected to affect electricity demand in
the following way:
 Increasing temperatures are likely to increase power
demand for air conditioning, which could have
implications for electricity reliability if such increases in
demand are not compensated by increased supplies or
reduced demand elsewhere in the system (DOE 2013).
Both Hawaii and Puerto Rico have tropical climates
moderated by influences from the ocean, with fewer
extremes in seasonal temperatures than most other regions
of the United States. For example, the warmest month in
Hawaii is August, with an average temperature of 78°F; the
coolest month is February, with an average temperature of
72°F (NOAA 2013). Average temperatures in Hawaii and
Puerto Rico are projected to increase as a result of climate
change: 2°F–5°F by the end of the century in Hawaii and
3.6°F–9°F in Puerto Rico (NOAA 2013, PRCCC 2013c). Higher
temperatures are likely to increase electricity system loads,
which may cause both Hawaii and Puerto Rico to face
electricity supply constraints.
Most homes in Hawaii and Puerto Rico use air conditioning,
so an increase in air temperature will likely drive an
increase in the energy use of existing air conditioners, an
increase in the hours of operation, or both (Champagne et
al. 2010, PNNL 2008). In Puerto Rico, for example, most air
conditioners are in operation between 7 and 12 hours a day
(Champagne et al. 2010). Without demand management,
improvements in air conditioner energy efficiency, or new
generation capacity, increasing use of air conditioning may
increase power sector vulnerability to service disruptions.
Population growth is also a significant factor in total energy
demand, amplifying the impacts on electricity demand
attributed to increasing temperatures alone. Hawaii’s
population is projected to expand 25% between 2010 and
2040 (DBEDT 2012). Conversely, Puerto Rico’s declining
population (a projected 14% reduction between 2010 and
2040) may offset increases in demand caused by higher
temperatures in the long-run (Pew 2014).
Increasing electricity demand could compound
vulnerabilities of the broader electricity supply on the
islands, as higher temperatures coincide with reduced
power plant and transmission line efficiency and capacity.
Electricity Demand
Resilience Solutions
Both Hawaii and Puerto Rico have programs and incentives
designed to improve energy efficiency and reduce
demand—measures that will improve the energy sector’s
resilience to higher temperatures.

Hawaii has established a state energy efficiency portfolio
standard that requires the state to achieve a 4,300 GWh
savings in energy demand through efficiency by 2030, a
reduction equivalent to 38% of total generation in 2008 (EIA
2013a, HPUC 2013). The state has also decoupled the
profits of investor-owned electric companies from total
electricity sales, enabling companies to encourage
efficiency (ACEEE 2014, HSEO 2015a). Hawaii has had a
recent increase in the number of energy efficiency
programs available to utility customers, such as the Hawaii
Residential Direct Load Control Program, which allows
customers to participate in demand response by installing
“EnergyScout” load control receivers that can control hot
water heaters and air conditioners during critical periods.
The program has approximately 36,000 customers
controlling 17 MW of load (ACEEE 2014, Hawaiian Electric
2013). Similarly, PREPA offers commercial and industrial
customers time-of-use rates that encourage large users to
shift demand to off-peak times (PREPA 2013).
Both Hawaii and Puerto Rico have made progress in
replacing electric water heaters with solar water heaters,
reducing a significant source of residential electricity
demand from the grid. Both governments have also
recently enacted building code standards that mandate the
use of solar hot water heaters in newly constructed singlefamily homes (HSL 2014a, PRPRA 2010). Hawaii residents
may receive up to $2,250 in tax credits for installing solar
water heaters, and approximately 85,000 solar water
heaters, or one in four households, are already in operation
(Hawaii Electric 2015b, HSL 2014b). In Puerto Rico,
incentives and programs to deploy solar water heaters,
combined with incentives for small-scale PV, have removed
40 MW of load from the electric grid (EIA 2015a).
Finally, new power generation capacity can help electric
grid operators meet increasing demand. Hawaii and Puerto
Rico are endowed with abundant solar resources, and
adding more solar PV to the generation mix can help meet
daytime increases in air conditioning demand. To
accommodate the increasing share of intermittent
renewables in the state’s electricity mix, both demand
response and energy storage are expected to play
increasingly important roles in the Hawaiian electric power
market. PREPA is using a strategy of purchasing power from
independently-owned renewable energy projects to
increase its reserve margins (Hawaiian Electric 2013, PREPA
2012). In recent years, Hawaii has also seen an increase in
the number of distributed renewable energy systems.
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Regional Climate Change Observations
and Projections in Detail (Hawaii)
Higher Temperatures
Historical observations
 Over the last century, average temperatures have
increased 0.07°F per decade, equal to an increase of
0.6°F between 1919 and 2006. The rate of warming has
accelerated in the last four decades and has increased
faster at higher elevations (NOAA 2013).
 Since 1975, temperature patterns have become
increasingly decoupled from historical drivers of
regional climate. Before 1975, temperature was tightly
coupled to the Pacific Decadal Oscillation. Global
warming may be responsible for the subsequent
decoupling (NOAA 2013).
 Between 1958 and 2009, the number of below-freezing
days at high elevations decreased (NOAA 2013).
Future projections
 Average temperatures are projected to increase:
Increases of 2.0°F–5.0°F are projected by 2070–2099
compared to 1971–1999 levels, depending on the region
and greenhouse gas emissions (NOAA 2013).
Precipitation
Historical observations
 A general downward trend in precipitation has
occurred. Although there is high variation among
leeward and windward areas, the overall decline in
rainfall is consistent with an increase in frequency of the
Trade Wind Inversion, a decline in trade wind
occurrence, and associated warming at higher elevations
(NOAA 2013).
 Hawaii has experienced increasing drought during the
winter rainy season. From 1980–2011, all of the major
Hawaiian Islands have experienced longer periods of
consecutive dry days compared to the period 1950–
1979 (NOAA 2013).
 Extreme precipitation events have declined. A
significant decrease in the frequency of high-intensity or
moderate-intensity precipitation events occurred in the
period 1980–2011 compared to 1950–1979 (NOAA
2013).
Future projections
 Projected changes in average precipitation are small
and not statistically significant. By the end of the
century (2070–2099), precipitation is projected to
change by -1% to more than 3% compared to the period
1971–1999 under an A2 emissions scenario (NOAA
2013a). Under a B1 emissions scenario, precipitation is
projected to decrease by more than 2% in the Northern
islands while increasing by about 2% in the Southern
islands (NOAA 2013).

Hurricanes and Sea Level Rise
Historical observations
 Pacific hurricanes are less frequent but more severe.
Over the past 20 years, fewer hurricanes have occurred
across the Pacific, but the number of major hurricanes
(Category 4 and 5) has increased (NOAA 2013).
 Sea level has increased by 8 inches since 1900. Global
mean sea level has accelerated in the past two decades,
rising 1.3 inches per decade. Higher rates of sea level
rise in Hawaii compared to global sea level are partly
attributed to changes in prevailing wind patterns
associated with El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) and
the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO) (USGCRP 2014).
Future projections
 The frequency of hurricanes near Hawaii is projected to
increase. By 2075–2099, a Northwestern shift in the
track of hurricanes in the Pacific Ocean may increase the
frequency of hurricanes affecting Hawaii (Murakami et
al 2013).
 Global mean sea level is projected to rise by 1 to 4 feet
st
by the end of the 21 century (USGCRP 2014).

Regional Climate Change Observations
and Projections in Detail (Puerto Rico)
Higher Temperatures
Historical observations
 Since 1900, average temperatures in Puerto Rico have
increased by more than 2°F. The rate of measured
temperature change has been between 0.022°F and
0.25°F per year (PRCCC 2013a).
 The Caribbean has seen an increase in very warm days
and nights. Since the 1950s, the region has experienced
an increase in the number of days above 90°F and nights
above 75°F (USGCRP 2014).
Future projections
 Average temperatures are projected to increase.
Projected temperatures for Puerto Rico show an
increase of at least 1.4°F by mid-century and as much as
3.6°F–9°F by the year 2100 (PRCCC 2013a).
 Temperature increases in Puerto Rico are expected to
be higher than the tropical average (PRCCC 2013a).
Precipitation
Historical observations
 Precipitation trends in the Caribbean are unclear. Some
regions have experienced more precipitation than the
historical average, and others less (USGCRP 2014).
Future projections
 Projected changes in average precipitation are
uncertain. Models are not consistent, but the majority
show future decreases in precipitation (USGCRP 2014).
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Severe Weather and Sea Level Rise
Historical observations
 In the past several decades, intense hurricanes in the
North Atlantic have increased in frequency. The
number of Category 4 and 5 hurricanes has increased
substantially since the early 1980s compared to the
historical record starting in the mid-1880s (USGCRP
2014).
 Sea level rise has contributed to coastline loss. The
coastline of Rincón, Puerto Rico, has eroded at 3.3 feet
per year because of sea level rise (USGCRP 2014).
 Sea level has increased by 8 inches since 1900. Global
mean sea level has accelerated in the past two decades,
rising 1.3 inches per decade (USGCRP 2014).

Future projections
 The frequency of the strongest (Category 4 and 5)
hurricanes is projected to increase in the North Atlantic
(USGCRP 2014).
 Hurricane-associated storm intensity and rainfall rates
are projected to increase: Rainfall rates within 100 km
of tropical storm centers are projected to increase by
20% by 2100 (USGCRP 2014)
 Global mean sea level is projected to rise by 1 to 4 feet
st
by the end of the 21 century (USGCRP 2014).
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11. Discussion and Conclusions
Climate change is already affecting the U.S. energy sector.
In recent years, record temperatures, droughts, and floods
have damaged energy infrastructure, disrupted energy
systems, threatened energy security, and harmed the
economies of affected communities and the nation. Climate
change projections indicate the potential for more frequent
and severe disruptions.
While climate change impacts will vary by region, all regions
will be affected (see Figure 11-1 and text boxes on next
page). Region-specific impacts include increasing wildfire
mainly in the West. The frequency of the most intense
hurricanes are projected to increase in the Atlantic, which
threatens the Gulf coast, Atlantic coast, and Puerto Rico.
Permafrost thaw is a critical impact in Alaska.
Some vulnerabilities span regional boundaries, particularly
where climate change projections and the existing energy
infrastructure are similar. Increasing annual temperatures
and more intense, frequent, and prolonged heat waves are

Key conclusions
 Critical energy subsectors are vulnerable to climate
change in every region of the nation.
 Efforts to improve climate resilience are underway
in every region, but the severe challenges posed by
climate change could overwhelm current resilience
efforts unless more comprehensive and accelerated
approaches are adopted.
 Resilience planning can be improved with better
informational resources such as more geographic
detail in climate change projections and metrics to
help evaluate the value of resilience options.
expected to affect electricity generation, transmission, and
demand in nearly every region. Nearly all coastal regions
are expected to experience effects of sea level rise on
energy infrastructure.

Figure 11-1. Potential climate change impacts on the U.S. energy infrastructure vary by region. Energy subsectors considered most
vulnerable to projected climate impacts shown first within each region.
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Key climate impacts regional summary
 Increasing temperatures and more frequent and severe heat waves will affect all regions and nearly every energy
subsector.
 More frequent heavy rainfall events are a significant threat to infrastructure primarily in northern regions.
 Decreasing water availability is projected to affect energy systems in most regions, particularly in western and southern
regions.
 Increasing wildfire impacts are concentrated in western regions.
 Rising sea levels and greater storm surge are increasingly important in nearly all coastal regions, particularly Gulf and
Atlantic coastlines.
 Increasing hurricane intensity and frequency of intense hurricanes are a major hazard for regions with Gulf and Atlantic
coastlines, including Puerto Rico.
 Thawing of permafrost threatens important energy systems in Alaska.
Major energy systems affected by regional climate impacts
 Oil and gas exploration and production operations are most vulnerable to climate impacts in the Southeast, Southern
Great Plains, and Alaska.
 Fuel transport in every region is vulnerable to a variety of climate impacts, such as increasing heavy precipitation, heat
waves, droughts, hurricanes, and sea level rise-enhanced storm surge.
 Thermoelectric power generation is vulnerable to increasing temperatures and reduced water availability in most
regions, particularly in the Midwest, Great Plains, and southern regions.
 Hydropower is vulnerable to reduced snowpack, earlier melting, and changes to precipitation patterns, mainly in
western regions.
 Bioenergy crops in the Midwest and Northern Great Plains may be harmed by higher temperatures and more frequent
droughts and floods.
 Electric grid operations and infrastructure are threated in every region by a variety of climate impacts, including
increasing temperatures, heavy rainfall events, wildfires, hurricanes, and storm surge.
 Electricity demand is affected by increasing temperatures and is a key vulnerability in nearly every region.
Climate change impacts depend on changes to regional
climates and the types of energy systems. At least four
critical energy subsectors in each region exhibit important
vulnerabilities to changing climate conditions. Climate
impacts to the electric grid, thermoelectric power
generation, fuel transport, and electricity demand will be
manifested in nearly every region. In Figure 11-1, the
subsectors in each region that are considered most
1
vulnerable are listed first.
As demonstrated in this report, the large majority of climate
change impacts on the energy sector will increase the risk
of damage to infrastructure and disruption of systems and
services; however, some changes may prove beneficial to
existing systems or create new energy opportunities. For
example, warmer winter temperatures may significantly
1

The order of subsector vulnerabilities is based on judgments by
the report authors as well as experts from government agencies,
national laboratories, and private sector energy companies. Key
factors in assessing relative vulnerability include the extent to
which the subsector is expected to be affected by projected
climate changes, the prevalence or size of the affected subsector
in the region, the implications of damage and disruption to the
subsector from projected climate impacts, and the effort required
for the subsector to adapt or respond with resilience solutions.

reduce energy consumption for heating, especially in
northern states, reducing the winter burden on fuel
transport systems. Reduced sea ice in the Arctic may open
new shipping lanes and offshore oil exploration
opportunities. In the Midwest and Northern Great Plains,
northern states may see expanded growing seasons that
allow the cultivation of new crops.
Across all regions, energy system planners, owners, and
operators are taking steps to prepare for climate change by
identifying vulnerabilities, investing in more resilient
infrastructure, improving operations, and planning for rapid
recovery from damages that do occur. In some instances,
future climate hazards and probabilities are already being
incorporated into risk management systems; however, the
magnitude of the challenges posed by climate change on an
aging and already stressed national energy system could
overwhelm current efforts. The appendix provides an
extensive set of resilience actions undertaken or under
consideration by planners, owners, and operators.
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Key challenges

Technological challenges include the increased upfront
costs that energy asset owners are likely to incur in
adopting new technologies that improve resilience, such as
costs related to financing, capital, operations and
maintenance, and business interruptions. For example,
some technologies that can enhance resilience to reduced
water availability, such as dry cooling or wet-dry hybrid
cooling, may impose higher capital costs upfront while the
benefits are distributed over several decades. Innovative
technologies may also bring additional uncertainties about
performance that complicates financing or insurance. In
other situations, proven, cost-effective resilience
technologies and systems may be limited in availability or
may not exist. In addition, the nation’s energy
infrastructure is an interconnected, networked system,
which may complicate implementation of some resilience
solutions that require the effective coordination of many
stakeholders.
Informational challenges prevent access to or full
understanding of climate projections, vulnerabilities, and
resilience solutions. Scientific uncertainty about climate
change impacts, including the severity and geographic
distribution of certain impacts, can significantly inhibit
resilience investments. Planners may lack access to
projections of local climate impacts that could support
decision making on local resilience solutions, such as facility
siting and hardening measures. Informational challenges
also arise in translating climate projections into specific
actions for energy asset planners, owners, and operators.
Informational shortcomings about both the costs of climate
change impacts as well as the benefits of investments in
resilience may impede the ability of energy sector owners
to make an attractive business case for resilience actions.
The lack of metrics, tools, and best practice guidelines
increases uncertainty about vulnerabilities and the
potential value of resilience solutions. Currently accepted
metrics may not always be appropriate to guide companies
in planning and defending resilience investments or
measuring progress over time. For example, several of the
electricity sector’s broadly accepted reliability metrics (e.g.,
2

Technological/Financial

st

The design and deployment of a 21 -century U.S. energy
sector that provides enhanced reliability and climate
resilience will encounter a number of key challenges. Figure
11-2 summarizes these challenges, which are grouped into
four categories: technological, informational and
2
behavioral, institutional, and policy-related.

Various frameworks have been developed to help stakeholders
understand the challenges of increased climate resilience,
including one presented in the Third National Climate Assessment
for the economy as a whole (USGCRP 2014).



Lack of cost-effective, commercially available
technologies: There is a lack of commercially available
climate-resilient technologies with acceptable capital,
operation, and maintenance costs.



Early mover risk: Unproven or untested performance of
first-of-a-kind solutions increases risks and decreases
access to, or cost of, financing.



Business interruption costs: Implementing resilience
solutions at existing operations may require temporary
downtime and loss of revenue.

Informational/Behavioral


Lack of relevant information: Available information is
insufficient to identify vulnerabilities and support informed
decision making about climate resilience solutions.



Poor understanding of costs and benefits: Limited
information is available on the costs to design, implement,
and operate new resilience technologies and practices, and
on how to evaluate the associated benefits.



Lack of trained workforce: Few personnel possess
expertise in climate impacts, vulnerabilities assessment,
and resilience planning and implementation.



Established practices: Entrenched methods and priorities,
along with limited understanding by affected parties of
climate change, may influence resilience decision making.

Institutional


Limited knowledge-sharing platforms: The diverse,
competitive, and fragmented energy sector impedes
information sharing and slows technological change and
coordination.



Competing objectives of different stakeholders: Differing
incentives for participants in the energy economy can lead
to conflicting objectives.

Policy


Lack of policies that internalize social benefits: Current
policies may not sufficiently help energy system owners
and operators internalize the social benefits associated
with improving climate resilience.



Policy uncertainty: Lack of clarity regarding future public
policy can create uncertainty and adversely affect
investments in climate resilience.



Competing policy goals: Climate resilience may conflict or
compete with other policy goals.

Figure 11-2. Key challenges to enhanced climate resilience in the
energy sector

SAIDI, SAIFI, CAIDI) often exclude major outage events,
making it harder to justify investments that would improve
resilience to these types of events. Moreover, poor
understanding of costs and benefits can undermine the
ability of energy companies to make resilience investment
decisions, which requires comparing critical infrastructure
damage or loss that could occur in the absence of such
actions. Behavioral challenges include overcoming and

Regional Vulnerabilities and Resilience Solutions | Conclusion

11-3

updating entrenched methods, proecedures, practices, and
priorities.
A knowledgable workforce with a better understanding of
climate change and the real-world interactions of complex
energy systems will facilitate successful identification of
climate change vulnerabilities. For example, improved
understanding of how both electricity demand and system
capacity respond to changes in temperature in different
regions would help utilities and markets prepare for
potential climate change impacts. Characterizing these
relationships would assist resource planning by the utilities.
Similarly, planners need economic models that consider
energy demand relative to other factors, such as population
growth and new technology adoption. Key weaknesses in
current climate models include the projection of noncyclonic storms (e.g., convective storms, winter storms, and
tornados), which are especially important for some energy
subsectors and regions, and detailed projections of
hydrology-precipitation interactions, particularly in
watersheds with significant hydropower generation.
Improved informational resources are needed to assess the
potential limitations of resilience actions over a range of
spatial and temporal scales (including high-impact/lowprobability events). Improved approaches could better
characterize both the individual and aggregate climate
change vulnerabilities of energy systems and better
understand the interdependencies among sectors (e.g.,
manufacturing, transportation, communications, water
supply and treatment, and health care) that can lead to
cascading impacts.

economy and natural resources, promoting sound
management of climate risks, and supporting local efforts
to build stronger communities and infrastructure.
Accordingly, the U.S. Department of Energy is taking the
following actions:
 Facilitating basic scientific discovery
 Enhancing research, development, demonstration, and
deployment of innovative energy technologies that
strengthen climate resilience
 Providing technical information and assistance
 Fostering the adoption of enabling policies
 Convening and partnering with states, communities,
and the private sector
These actions will help to ensure that energy system
planners, owners, and operators act on the most relevant
and geographically-specific information available and use
cost-effective and appropriate energy technologies to
address climate change risks. Local and regional energy
investments need to consider climate vulnerabilities and
resilience options to implement the technologies and
designs best suited to the unique needs of each region.
While government agencies as well as non-governmental
organizations and the academic community have roles to
play in overcoming these challenges, companies that own
and operate the energy systems are primarily responsible
for proactively assessing their assets for vulnerabilities and
implementing resilience actions. Active information
exchange will contribute to a positive feedback loop and
improve access to critical information needed for decision
making (Figure 11-3).

Institutional challenges, such as the lack of comprehensive
platforms for open information exchange, may impede
organizations from sharing information. Competing
interests among stakeholders—both internal and external—
can also hinder organized responses to climate risks. Such
fragmentation can prevent certain resilience solutions from
becoming more widespread.
Policy challenges include uncertainty about future policy
decisions or the duration of current policies that can
undermine confidence in otherwise justified business
decisions, diminishing the effectiveness of government
incentives. For example, the rate of new U.S. wind power
installations over the past two decades reflect the multiple
lapses in and reinstatement of federal incentives for
construction of new wind capacity. Competing objectives
among policymakers can also inhibit resilience investments.
For example, new transport capacity that may alleviate a
critical chokepoint in a fuel supply chain may be opposed by
stakeholders for environmental, safety, or other reasons.
The federal government can help address these challenges
and fill an important role in protecting the nation’s

Figure 11-3. Process of increasingly effective planning and
investments in climate resilience

Regional Interdependencies
Interdependencies across regions and sectors affect the
ability of decision makers to incorporate regional climate
projections into their risk management approaches.
Components of the U.S. infrastructure for energy
generation, transmission, storage, and distribution are
growing increasingly complex and interdependent.
Connections can span regions (interregional dependencies),
energy subsectors (intrasectoral dependencies), and
economic sectors (intersectoral dependencies). Energy
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Table 11-1. Examples of regional dependencies

Dependencies
Interregional

Energy Subsectors

Resilience and Vulnerability Examples

Electric Grid

Resilience: Interregional power transmission allows power to be imported when local
capacity for generation is curtailed.
Vulnerability: The Northeast blackout of 2003 started with transmission line failures due
to high heat in the Midwest, spreading the vulnerability across regions (DOE 2004).

Intrasectoral

Intersectoral

Oil and Gas
Exploration and
Production

Resilience: In 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita disrupted production and refining
activities in the Gulf of Mexico, and petroleum prices increased; however, demand
could still be met from production in other regions (EIA 2005, EIA 2015).

Electricity Demand

Resilience: Increased summer electricity demand in the Southwest is met using
hydropower production from the Northwest, where summer temperatures are
more moderate .

Electric Grid and
Fuel Transport

Vulnerability: Power outages in the Northeast following Hurricane Sandy interrupted
both the supply of petroleum products to the region (via the Colonial Pipeline) and the
distribution of fuel through pumping stations.

Fuel Transport and
Thermoelectric
Power Generation

Vulnerability: Damage to the Joint Line Railroad in Wyoming's Powder River Basin in
2005 delayed deliveries of coal, forcing power plants in the Midwest to draw down
stockpiles and reduce summer production (DOE 2007).

Electric Grid and
Electricity Demand

Vulnerability: A 2007 wildfire in California halted operation of a major transmission line
that supplies power to San Diego, requiring the area's utilities to reduce demand by
500 MW and nearly causing rolling blackouts (PPIC 2008).

Health Care

Vulnerability: Following Hurricane Katrina in 2005, extended power outages shut down
New Orleans’ Memorial Medical Center for several days (Fink 2009).

Emergency Services

Vulnerability: During the northeast blackout of 2003, Detroit’s computer-aided dispatch
system for the police and fire departments failed to operate reliably and
communications were disrupted when cellular sites lost power (Kilpatrick 2003).

Financial Systems

Vulnerability: Power outages in New York City’s Financial District caused by Hurricane
Sandy resulted in a two-day halt in trading on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)—
the longest weather-related shutdown in more than a century (Brown 2012).

sector interdependencies can exacerbate—or ameliorate—
the vulnerability of energy systems to climate impacts.
Table 11-1 lists examples of these interdependencies
affecting energy sector vulnerability or resilience.
Interregional dependencies are evident in the electric grid.
The contiguous United States is served by three
independent grids: the Eastern Interconnection (serving the
Northeast, Southeast, and Midwest, as well as parts of the
Northern and Southern Great Plains), the Western
Interconnection (serving the Northwest, Southwest, and
some of the Northern Great Plains), and the Electricity
Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT). These three grids allow
power generated in one part of a grid to serve loads
elsewhere. In so doing, they spread out variations in
demand and supply, minimizing costs and the likelihood of
shortages. For example, annual hydropower production in
the Northwest peaks in early summer, but that region's
temperate climate means that few households regularly use
air conditioning (EIA 2011, EIA 2013a); as a result, some of
California’s peak summer air conditioning demand can be
met by importing low-cost hydropower from the Northwest
over the grid (EIA 2011). This interregional connection
makes California's electricity sector less vulnerable to high
summer temperatures. Conversely, power grids also extend

energy system vulnerabilities from one region to another.
For example, synchronized transmission grids must be
carefully balanced so that disruptions at any point on these
grids do not affect the rest of the network. In August 2003,
high heat and transmission line outages in the Midwest
caused power outages for 50 million customers across the
northeastern United States and Canada (DOE 2004).
The fuel supply network offers another example of
interregional dependency. The Gulf Coast is home to more
than 50% of U.S. refining capacity, supplying oil products
across the eastern half of the country. The high density of
oil infrastructure that supplies a large area means that a
single event, such as a strong hurricane making landfall in
the Gulf region, can disrupt fuel supply across several
regions. One strategy to mitigate risks related to this
interregional dependency may be to develop strategic
regional stockpiles of oil and refined petroleum products to
help respond to shortfalls. For example, the federal
government has established regional product reserves (e.g.,
Northeast Home Heating Oil Reserve, Northeast Gasoline
Supply Reserve), and New York State, NYPA, and others are
planning to set up a strategic fuel reserve for gasoline and
diesel fuel to provide short-term supply in the event of a
shortage (NYPA 2014, DOE 2015, NY Storm Recovery 2015).
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Intrasectoral dependencies reflect the interplay between
energy subsectors, such as power plants that rely on fuel
delivered by gas pipeline or fuel stations that rely on the
electric grid. The impacts of Hurricane Sandy on the
Northeast's energy system illustrate such vulnerabilities
(see text box on next page). Although the region's main
sources of gasoline were temporarily disrupted following
the storm (including petroleum terminals and the Colonial
Pipeline), the primary cause of gasoline shortage in the area
was the lingering power outages that prevented use of
(electrically powered) gasoline pumps at fueling stations.
Mitigation of energy disruptions has become increasingly
important as interdependencies grow and put other critical
sectors at risk. Intersectoral dependencies affect nearly
every sector of the economy (e.g., transportation,
communications, food and agriculture, manufacturing,
health care, and financial systems). For example, the
transportation sector requires energy to supply motive
power, while the energy sector relies on transportation to
deliver the necessary coal, oil, and natural gas to operate.
Likewise, the communications sector requires electricity to
operate, while the energy sector increasingly requires
communications systems to monitor and manage the
electric grid. As a result, disruptions in energy supply can
lead to cascading disruptions in multiple sectors. The
crosscutting nature of these issues may illuminate
opportunities for improvement and collaboration across
government agencies, state and local planning authorities,
universities, the private sector, and other organizatons.
Hurricane Sandy: Example of impacts from
intrasectoral dependencies
Hurricane Sandy brought devastating storm surge
flooding and high winds to the Northeast. The storm
damaged more than 7,000 transformers and 15,000
poles across the region, and more than 8 million
customers lost power in 21 states (DOE 2012, DOE
2013). The power outages caused extended fuel
shortages, leading to fuel rationing in New Jersey, New
York City, and Long Island.
The storm damage included significant impacts to
petroleum infrastructure, and the area experienced
major gasoline shortages. Flooding caused fuel
terminals in New York City to lose power and delayed
shipments for a week or more. The storm also shut
down the Colonial Pipeline (a major source of gasoline
for the region) for four days (ICF 2014, NYC 2013). Six
refineries were either temporarily shut down or forced
to reduce their output (DOE 2012). Even after many gas
stations had been resupplied with gasoline, they could
not provide fuel to customers because they did not
have electricity to power the pumps (Nahmias 2013).

Planning in uncertainty
Any projection of the future carries inherent uncertainties.
While many broad climate trends are projected with high
certainty at a national scale (e.g., increasing temperatures),
projections at the regional level are subject to a degree of
uncertainty that can make it difficult for energy
stakeholders to devise effective climate resilience
strategies. On the other hand, planning and managing
energy investments based on climate norms of the last
century presents risks that could result in significant costs
to local communities and the U.S. economy. The need to
prepare now for a wide range of future climate impacts is
heavily underscored by three factors: the typical service life
of energy assets (several decades in most cases), the cost of
the associated investments (e.g., more than a billion for
some new power plants), and the pace and magnitude of
the projected changes (EIA 2013b).
Planners often need to make decisions with limited
knowledge of future conditions, and energy sector
managers and investors are experienced at operating in the
presence of unknowns. Given the long service lifetimes for
most energy infrastructure, decision makers must consider
long-term climate trends, such as those projected for 2050
and beyond. Recognizing this timeframe, near-term
resilience actions should seek to extend system flexibility.
For example, planners today might assess vulnerabilities
and consider resilience as part of routine infrastructure
improvement efforts (e.g., selecting less vulnerable
locations when replacing critical energy infrastructure).
Planners in all regions would benefit from identifying nearterm opportunities to enhance energy sector resilience to
climate change and extreme weather.
Resilience actions identified in this report are largely based
on today’s technologies, which will evolve and expand over
the next several decades. For example, advances in
distributed generation and energy storage technologies
may produce revolutionary shifts in the way electricity is
generated, delivered, and used. As new technologies are
increasingly adopted, validated, and standardized, barriers
to their use can fall. In addition, energy demand patterns
may change radically as a result of population shifts and
new devices and technologies, such as electric vehicles. The
Southwest, for instance, in addition to becoming hotter and
significantly drier, is expected to increase its population
68% by 2050 (USGCRP 2014), greatly increasing demand
and load. These changes may affect both energy sector
vulnerability and the appropriateness of specific resilience
actions.
A robust strategy for building energy sector resilience will
need to be responsive to these changes. It will require
regular dialogue and information sharing among industry,
government, technical institutions, and non-government
organizations active in basic and applied research, energy
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system planning, siting, and resilience policy development.
It will need to embrace multiple elements, to include:
 Lower-carbon power generation
 Innovative technologies for improving the efficiency
and reliability of operations
 Strategic rebuilding after disasters (e.g., siting key
energy infrastructure in less vulnerable locations)
 Designing energy assets that can withstand more
extreme events
st

Building a 21 -century energy system that is resilient to the
impacts of climate change and extreme weather is not a
quick or easy process; however, current and projected
climate change impacts dictate a strong need for common
sense to guide near-term actions and investments. Smart
decisions today will help to provide a robust and resilient
energy infrastructure that serves all citizens and economic
goals at the local, regional, and national levels.
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Appendix: Illustrative List of Energy Sector Climate Change Resilience Solutions

Type of
Measure

Climate change impacts
Increasing temperatures and
heat waves

Increasing precipitation or
heavy downpours

Decreasing water
availability

Increasing wildfire

Increasing sea level rise and
storm surge

Increasing frequency of
intense hurricanes
 Install emergency backup
generators for critical
operations
 Incorporate more robust
design specifications for
equipment in hurricane
zones
 Locate rigs on more stable
areas of sea floor
 Brace vulnerable
equipment to protect from
wind damage
 Update design criteria for
new equipment in
hurricane zones to
account for extreme wind
loading
 Update engineering and
operations guidance and
storm plans to account for
higher frequency of
intense hurricanes

1. OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION
Hardening

 Engineer structures in
permafrost areas with
design criteria suited for
warming
 Insulate or ventilate
underlying permafrost,
such as construction of a
gravel pad of appropriate
depth or the use of
thermal piles

 Enhance levees and
floodwalls
 Elevate critical equipment
 Install emergency backup
generators for critical
operations

 Use alternative water
 Install emergency backup
supplies, such as degraded
power, such as diesel
water, wastewater,
generators, for critical
brackish water, or
operations
produced water

 Install sea walls, riprap,
and natural barriers such
as vegetation
 Elevate critical equipment

Planning
and
operations

 Update design and
operations guides for
equipment operating in
Arctic Alaska

 Update design, siting, and
operations plans to
account for heavy runoff
and possible increasing
floods

 Update plans for securing
water to consider
decreasing water
availability

 Update siting and
operations plans to
account for SLR

 Update wildfire response
plans to account
increasing frequency and
severity
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Type of
Measure

Climate change impacts
Increasing temperatures and
heat waves

Increasing precipitation or
heavy downpours

Decreasing water
availability

Increasing wildfire

Increasing sea level rise and
storm surge

Increasing frequency of
intense hurricanes

2. FUEL TRANSPORT
Hardening

 Upgrade thermosyphons
to avoid damage from
permafrost thaw

 Enhance berms, levees,
 Dredge critical sections of
and floodwalls
waterways prone to low
water levels
 Install riprap along bridge
piers
 Elevate or relocate
infrastructure, including
railroads, pump stations,
and bridges
 Install emergency backup
generators for critical
operations such as
pumping stations and
refueling centers
 Upgrade drainage systems
and ensure culverts can
handle increased runoff
 Bury pipelines deeper
underground using
horizontal directional
drilling
 Install barriers or
vegetation above pipelines
to reduce the risk of
erosion
 Use pipeline materials that
are less likely to leak or
rupture from impacts (e.g.,
coated steel rather than
cast iron or bare steel)
 Anchor tanks or add
product to increase tank
weight and prevent
floating

 Protect selected aboveground pipeline segments
with insulation and fireresistant jacketing

 Install sea walls, riprap,
 Install emergency backup
and natural barriers such
generators for critical
as vegetation
operations such as
refueling centers
 Elevate or relocate
infrastructure (e.g.,
 Install wind girders on fuel
railroads, pump stations,
storage tanks
and bridges)
 Install watertight doors for
low-lying equipment
 Use pipeline materials that
are less likely to leak or
rupture from impacts (e.g.,
coated steel rather than
cast iron or bare steel)
 Relocate particularly
vulnerable assets
 Anchor tanks or add
product to increase tank
weight and prevent
floating
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Type of
Measure
Planning
and
operations

Climate change impacts
Increasing temperatures and
heat waves
 Incorporate future
temperature projections
into design when replacing
road materials and rail
equipment
 Upgrade road and rail
integrity and inspection
programs
 Update monitoring
regimes for roads,
pipelines, and other
infrastructure located on
permafrost
 Reduce speed of freight
trains on vulnerable rail
segments during high
temperatures

Increasing precipitation or
heavy downpours
 Update design, siting, and
operations plans to
account for heavy runoff
and possible increasing
floods
 Upgrade road and rail
integrity and inspection
programs
 Identify alternative
transport routes for use
during flood events
 Increase fuel stockpiles at
or near customer sites
 Increase use of local
energy resources to
reduce dependence on
fuel transport

Decreasing water
availability
 Update design, siting, and
operations plans to
account for possible lowwater conditions
 Identify alternative
transport routes for lowwater periods

Increasing wildfire
 Update design, siting, and
operations plans to
account for increasing
wildfire
 Utilize improved
vegetation management
practices that keep rightsof-way clear

Increasing sea level rise and
Increasing frequency of
storm surge
intense hurricanes
 Update design, siting, and  Apply extreme wind
operations plans to
loading design criteria for
account for SLR
critical equipment
 Update storm plans,
including alternative
transport routes, to
account for higher
frequency of intense
hurricanes
 Increase fuel stockpiles at
or near customer sites

3. THERMOELECTRIC POWER GENERATION
Hardening

 Increase or install
additional generation
capacity

 Enhance levees and
 Install water-saving
floodwalls
cooling technology (e.g.,
closed-loop cooling, hybrid
 Install waterproofing
measures such as concrete wet-dry cooling, dry
moat walls, floodgates and cooling)
watertight doors, sluice
 Install equipment capable
gates, reinforced walls,
of using alternate water
pressure resistant/
sources (e.g. brackish
submarine-type doors in
groundwater, municipal
deep basements,
wastewater) for cooling
expansive polymer foam in
conduits, submersible
pumps
 Elevate critical equipment

 Install sea walls, riprap,
 Reinforce elevated
and natural barriers such
structures (e.g., cooling
as vegetation
towers, water towers,
smokestacks, etc.) for
 Install waterproofing
greater wind loading and
measures, such as
potential wind-driven
concrete moat walls,
debris
floodgates and watertight
doors, sluice gates,
reinforced walls, pressure
resistant/ submarine type
doors in deep basements,
expansive polymer foam in
conduits, submersible
pumps
 Elevate critical equipment
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Type of
Measure
Planning
and
operations

Climate change impacts
Increasing temperatures and Increasing precipitation or
heat waves
heavy downpours
 Update integrated
 Update design, siting, and
resource plans to account
operations plans to
for reduced available
account for possibility of
generation capacity from
increasing floods
higher temperatures

Decreasing water
availability
 Secure back-up water
supply in case of low flow
conditions
 Install monitoring systems
on source water supplies
 Develop operating
procedures for low water
conditions

Increasing wildfire

Increasing sea level rise and
Increasing frequency of
storm surge
intense hurricanes
 Update design, siting, and  Develop alternative fuel
operations plans to
delivery options
account for SLR
 Maintain larger fuel
inventory onsite
 Apply extreme wind
loading design criteria for
critical equipment
 Develop or update storm
plans to account for higher
frequency of intense
hurricanes

4. HYDROELECTRIC POWER GENERATION
 Reinforce structures and
upgrade equipment to
accommodate high flow
periods

Hardening

Planning
and
operations

 Update integrated
resource plans to account
for reduced available
generation capacity
 Incorporate thermal
predictive models into
reservoir level forecasts

 Increase storage capacity
of reservoirs
 Increase turbine efficiency
and minimize water leaks
at existing dams
 Update design and
 Develop integrated water
operation plans to account management plan that
for altered precipitation
accounts for changing
patterns (e.g., heavy
water availability
streamflow events,
 Manage reservoir capacity
reduced snowpack;
(e.g., maintain higher
summer drought)
winter carryover storage
levels, reduce conveyance
flows in canals and flumes,
and reduce discretionary
reservoir water releases)
 Install monitoring systems
on rivers with telemetry to
increase data availability,
trending, and station
response times
 Develop operating
procedures for low water
conditions
 Improve forecasts of
snowmelt timing based on
snowpack and
temperature trends
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Type of
Measure

Climate change impacts
Increasing temperatures and
heat waves

Increasing precipitation or
heavy downpours

Decreasing water
availability

Increasing wildfire

Increasing sea level rise and
storm surge

Increasing frequency of
intense hurricanes

5. BIOENERGY AND RENEWABLE POWER GENERATION
Hardening

 Increase or install
additional generating
capacity

 Enhance levees and
floodwalls
 Elevate critical equipment

Planning
and
operations

 Update design plans for
increasing temperatures

 Develop alternative fuel
delivery options
 Maintain larger fuel
inventory onsite

 Use alternative water
supplies at biorefineries
(e.g., degraded water or
wastewater)
 Employ sustainable
agriculture methods
including crop
diversification, crop
rotation
 Update plans for securing
water considering
decreasing water
availability

 Install sea walls, riprap,
and natural barriers such
as vegetation
 Elevate critical equipment
or enclose equipment in
submersible casings

 Account for increased
 Update design, siting, and
wildfire risk when siting
operations plans to
facilities
account for SLR
 Incorporate increased
wildfire risk into forest
management practices,
such as frequency of
prescribed burns and
reduction of hazardous
fuels to prevent
uncontrolled fire depleting
woody biomass resources

 Develop alternative fuel
delivery options
 Maintain larger fuel
inventory onsite
 Apply extreme wind
loading design criteria
 Develop or update storm
plans to account for higher
frequency of intense
hurricanes

 Increase redundancy in
transmission system
 Limit customers affected
by outages by installing
additional substations and
breakaway equipment,
and by sectionalizing
fuses; develop island-able
“microgrids”
 Replace wood poles and
support structures with
fire-resistant materials
(e.g., steel or concrete)
 Install smartgrid devices to
speed identification of
faults and service
restoration

 Increase redundancy in
transmission system
 Limit customers affected
by outages by install
technology such as
microgrids, additional
substations, sectionalizing
fuses, and breakaway
equipment
 Replace wood poles and
support structures with
stronger materials (e.g.,
steel or concrete)
 Underground critical
transmission and
distribution lines
 Replace ceramic insulators

6. ELECTRIC GRID
Hardening

 Limit customers affected
by outages by installing
additional substations and
breakaway equipment,
and by sectionalizing
fuses; develop island-able
“microgrids”
 Upgrade transformers
(e.g., forced-air or forcedoil cooling)
 Install smartgrid devices
that to speed
identification of faults and
service restoration
 Increase or install
additional transmission
capacity

 Increase redundancy in
transmission system
 Enhance levees and
floodwalls
 Limit customers affected
by outages by installing
technology such as
microgrids, additional
substations, sectionalizing
fuses, and breakaway
equipment
 Underground critical
transmission and
distribution lines
 Install waterproofing
measures, such as
floodgates and watertight

 Install sea walls, riprap,
and natural barriers such
as vegetation
 Limit customers affected
by outages by installing
additional substations and
breakaway equipment,
and by sectionalizing
fuses; develop island-able
“microgrids”
 Replace wood poles and
support structures with
stronger materials (e.g.,
steel or concrete)
 Elevate or relocate critical
equipment
 Install smartgrid devices to
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Type of
Measure

Planning
and
operations

Climate change impacts
Increasing temperatures and
heat waves
 Install breakable links and
towers designed to
tolerate lateral movement
of foundation in event of
uneven permafrost thaw
and frost heave

Increasing precipitation or
heavy downpours
doors, sluice gates,
reinforced walls, pressure
resistant/ submarine type
doors in deep basements,
expansive polymer foam in
conduits
 Elevate or relocate critical
equipment
 Develop best operating
 Site equipment in areas
practices for equipment at
less prone to flooding
high temperatures
 Install water level
 Include extreme
monitoring systems and
temperature scenarios in
communications
future grid planning
equipment inside
vulnerable substations
 Deploy future equipment
and lines with higher
design temperatures

Decreasing water
availability

Increasing wildfire

 Site equipment in areas
less prone to wildfire
 Enhanced vegetation
management (e.g., tree
trimming, forest thinning,
and prescribed burning)
 Develop fire response
plans and tools;
coordinate with local
partners
 Develop firefighting
compounds safe to use
near active power lines

Increasing sea level rise and
Increasing frequency of
storm surge
intense hurricanes
speed identification of
with polymer
faults and service
 Install smartgrid devices to
restoration
speed identification of
faults and service
restoration
 Utilize mobile
transformers and
substations
 Site equipment in areas
 Apply extreme wind
less prone to coastal
loading design criteria to
flooding
critical infrastructure
 Install water level
 Site equipment further
monitoring systems and
from coast
communications
 Enhance vegetation
equipment inside
management programs
vulnerable substations
 Update storm plans to
 Update siting and
account for higher
operations plans to
frequency of intense
account for SLR
hurricanes

7. ELECTRICITY DEMAND
Hardening

Planning
and
operations

 Implement weatherization
programs
 Install energy efficient
equipment
 Increase generation and
transmission capacity
 Invest in grid-scale energy
storage systems
 Update resource plans to
accommodate projected
increases in CDDs and
decreases in HDDs
 Implement programs that
incentivize and encourage
energy efficiency
 Implement load
management and demand
side response programs

 Implement water and
energy efficient
technologies and practices
to reduce energy demand
for water production,
pumping, and filtration

 Emphasize water
efficiency in buildings,
industrial processes,
municipal utilities, and in
other areas to reduce
energy demand for water
production, pumping, and
filtration
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